Prima Secundae
169. ST I-II Q.71 aa.2-4: Vice Against Nature and Reason, Habit vs. Act, and Whether Sin Can Coexist with Virtue
Class of 2014-04-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/169-st-i-ii-q-71-aa-2-4-vice-against-nature-and-reason-habit/

[0:00] Now, even more directly, is the second article about vice being against nature, right? The second one goes forward thus: it seems that vice is not against nature, right?

[0:15] For a vice is contrary to virtue, as had been said in the first article. But the virtues are not in us by nature, right? But are caused in us either by being poured in by God, huh? Or by being accustomed to them, right? So Aristotle, in the second book there of the, I mean, of the ethics, there he takes up virtue in general, there, right? And he points out that you don't have these virtues in a perfect state by nature, right?

[0:46] But you acquire them by repeated what acts, yeah? You think of what your parents did for you, right? With repeated acts. They say, they say, uh, familiarity breeds contempt, right? So the little kid is not as afraid of his what mother as of his father, you know. If the mother's at home, you know, and the father's, away. So if we get a little out of hand, my brother, would say, no, wait, till father comes home, you know, huh?

[1:28] My father would say, you sit in that chair, you know, move, you know." And I would sit there, I would move. My mother is, you know, amazed at this. you know, this tranquility. My father is introduced, you know? But probably don't what to expect, right? And it's kind of like a stranger, you know. Sometimes too can scare a kid more because you don't what to expect, huh?

[1:50] I was driving my aunt Helen crazy, you know. She had a little shop there and ice cream, you know, stands these little kind of things. I was spinning around, like that. I was driving her crazy. And this small town in Minnesota, Watertown, and in comes the cop to get his coke, you know. And he sits down, you know. My aunt said all day with me, and she says, "what do you do with the little boy who's been spinning these things all day."

[2:13] She says, "oh, he said, we can put him in jail for a day. ' Boy, did I... Boy, did I sober up." There was, a, there was a. I don't remember anything about it except that it came on in the must be in the seventies. There was some TV show on, and it was called "Wait Till Your Father Gets Home." Yeah, yeah, yeah. Like, woo. Must take my belt off, you know.

[2:39] I just whack it at the edge of the table, you know. That's why I did it. Whack the kids, but whack the kids. It's time to time to behave.

[3:01] Moreover, those things which are against nature, one cannot be made what accustomed to them, right? Just as you keep on throwing the stone up, right? You don't make it to stay up, you know, or go in the opposite direction. It's going to go down, huh? As Aristotle says in the same ethics. But some people are what accustomed to vices. What's against nature? How can that be, right?

[3:25] So you think that keep making the stones would go up, you know, stay up? No. And therefore, vices are not against nature. That's beautiful.

[3:36] See, Thomas thinks these alchemists. You heard the story of Thomas at the King of France's table, right? Yeah. And it's the middle, of, you know, dignified meal, right, and so on. All of a sudden, Thomas finishes the Manichaeans. And they're just looking at him. Of course, the King of France was was a saint. So quickly, someone write down what Thomas has thought of, you know.

[4:12] Moreover, nothing that is against nature is found in those having that nature, ut in pluribus, right? So you know, most men are not born missing an arm or a leg or something, you know. But sometimes yes, I'm born missing an arm or something, right? But it's always, you know. But vices are found in men, ut in pluribus, for the most part,

[4:38] I'll teach you Kasurik stories quote another text to Thomas, where he says, "Evil in human race for the most part." And Greek philosophers said the same thing, right? Most men are bad. Scripture says not many men are wise. No, the number of fools is infinite. Yeah, yeah, that's what it says. Once it is said in Matthew seven, "Lata wide," I guess, right? Wide is the road which leads to perdition, and multi many, right?

[5:08] They go through it. And therefore, vice is not against nature. Moreover, sin is compared to vice as an act to a what Habit, As has been said. what But peccatum, sin, is defined, as Augustine says, as something said or done or desired against the law of God, as is clear through Augustine in the twenty-second book against Faust. Now he was really after Faust, right? When he saw through him, huh?

[5:50] But the law of God is above nature, right? Whence more should it be said that vice is against the law than against what nature, right?

[6:04] There's some connection between nature and law, right? But against this is what the great Augustine says, huh? In the third book on what Free judgment, huh? Free judgment. Every vice, in that it is a vice, is against nature. What a clear mind that this had He's an amazing guy.

[6:35] Yeah, good guy, Augustine. John XX John Paul II, he's got a nice encyclical on Augustine, right? I suppose there's been other encyclicals on Augustine, but you really get the impression of how important he is and central in our thinking. if you look at the the catechism of the Catholic Church, right, the new one, great one, Augustine is quoted even more than Thomas, right? But he's really, you know, almost every, over and over again, huh?

[7:17] The answer should be said. as has been said that vice is contrary to what Virtue, huh? But the virtue of each thing consists in this that it be well disposed according to the suitability of its what nature, right? Whence is necessary that in each thing vice is called that which from which something is disposed against that which is what suitable to what nature, yeah.

[7:51] Whence about each thing, right? Each thing is what held in contempt, I suppose. Yeah. From vice, the name of what contempt, right? In Latin, there, vituperatio, vituperatio, has been drawn, it's believed, as Augustine says in the third book on free judgment. What does Cajetan say about Thomas there, in the beginning of his commentary on the Summa, you know. Thomas so reverenced the church fathers, you know, he seems to have inherited the mind of them all.

[8:38] It's a little bit like you know Aristotle seems to have inherited the mind of all the Greek philosophers before him, right? He's so read them carefully and reverenced them.

[8:54] It's amazing, you know. One of these articles I was reading, in the De Potentia there is the one where the connection between faith and miracles, and how there's, you know, Christ will see that in the in the Gospels, right? huh? Didn't work miracles because they had no faith, right? And but especially when you're when you're able to perform a miracle in a certain power, right? Huh? Well, when Thomas explains it, it goes back to what Anaxagoras, who played with Aristotle, admired so much, right?

[9:29] And what did Anaxagoras said? Huh? Well, this greater mind had to be what unmixed with other things in order to what command them, right? Huh? See, so if you're mixed up with things, you can't what control them, right? Huh? If the parent becomes one of the kids, you know, the wife, the mother becomes one of the daughters, right? Or the the father becomes one of the boys, Uh you can't what command them anymore, right? It's Going back to the great Anaxagoras you know, it's quite a quite a quite a mind.

[10:16] But it should be considered that the nature of each thing, most of all, is the form according to which the thing gets its what specific nature. For a man is constituted in his species through his rational, huh, soul, right? And therefore, that which is against the order of reason is properly against the nature of man, in so far as it is is a man. What, however, is in accordance with reason is in accordance with the nature of man, in so far as he is what a man.

[10:56] For the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, and the bad of man to be what outside of reason, as Dionysius says, right? Fourth chapter of the Divine Names.

[11:11] Whence human virtue, which makes man good, and his what makes his work his deed good, right? Huh? And that's from Aristotle, from the second book of Ethics, you know. In so far as it is according to the nature of man, in so far as it is what suitable to what reason. Vice, however, in so far as it against the nature of man, in so far as it against the order of what reason, right?

[11:40] So if you wanted to say in one word what is a bad human act, huh? Unreasonable Unreasonable act, right? Huh? And a good human act would be reasonable act, right? That has to be built in first, but I mean that's kind of the starting point, right? Huh? Because the nature of man can be an animal that has what reason, right? So Shakespeare says, "What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed?

[12:12] He feasts no more, right? Huh? " These are beginning from what a proportion, right? Which is a what likeness of ratioism. We use this first in math, and we say that what four is to six is what two is to three, right? Huh? And then we carry it off, right? We say to non-mathematical things, we say as seeing is to the eye, what is to the ear?

[12:43] Yeah. And then you can start to see this, right? Huh? And Aristotle says the mind is exercised in seeing these. Yeah, yeah. So the chief good of man, this is where Shakespeare's argument: the chief good of man is to man, as the chief good of the beast is to the what beast. But again, to avoid sounding too pedantic and sound like a teacher rather than the Greek poet he is, right?

[13:09] Huh? He takes instead of the chief good of the beast. What is the chief good of the beast? Sleep and feed, Sleep and feed, right? And I remember, you know, our cat there. She seemed to purr when she got her food, and when she what settled down together, she snoozed, right? Then she purr, yeah. This is the chief good, right? So if the chief good of the man is no more than what the chief good of the beast, then he's no more than a what?

[13:39] A beast, right? I used to try to explain the the way he's arguing. He's saying, "What is a three if it be half a four?" Two, yeah, yeah, okay.

[13:53] So you're going against the chief good of man, which is going to involve the use of what? Reason, right? Okay, let me see. Now, you said virtues are in accordance with nature. Does that mean that we're born with the virtues? Unfortunately not. Was I born temperate with candy or something? Wouldn't it be nice?

[14:30] Wouldn't it be lovely? My little grandchildren know what he thinks. Yeah, sugar is really the best thing in the world. That's what monks think after Easter. first, therefore, it should be said that virtues, although they are not caused by nature according to their perfect being, right? Huh? Now, sometimes a person has an inclination to what By nature to one virtue or even to one vice, right? no?

[15:09] But not in their perfect state. Nevertheless, they incline to that which is in accordance with nature. That is according to the order of what? Reason, right?

[15:24] I used to talk to students. They'd say, "Now, if you want to get into a fight with somebody, right? Now, is the more apt to get into a fight if you call him wicked, or if you call him stupid?" Probably

[15:41] stupid. Yeah, and some guys, you know, go around, you know, seduce girls or what do they do? They kind of enjoy being called wicked, right? Huh? You know, but they don't like to be called stupid. But what's that assignment, right? Huh? Stupid is opposed to what? Reason, right? Huh? More directly, than wicked. Wicked is in the. consequence, but directly, you know, say you're stupid is saying that you're not quite fully human, you know.

[16:12] You have a defect as a rational animal, right? So, in the sense, that, we kind of know that we should be what reasonable, right?

[16:27] I used to say to to students, you know, you get into the dialogues later and say, which is more me, my emotions or my reason, right? And a lot of students would say emotions, especially girls, which has some truth in that as well. But kind of they kind of identify their emotions when they ask the question, right? Then with reason, and then I say to them, you know, other things being equal, right, which would you judge more severely, right?

[17:11] A pre-planned murder, right, or a murder of passion? Pre-planned. Yeah. Is it somehow you're more what? Yourself, reason. Yeah, yeah. I said, you know, if you're mad at somebody, right, you say I don't want to see you anymore.

[17:41] That's not as permanent as if you sit down, write a letter, talking them off, right? And that's really kind of final. You said it's a letter, right? I don't want to see you. I want you to know. Why the letter more than what I say? I'm just further away. I don't see you. Think it out more. Yeah, yeah. So reason is more involved, right? Okay. So that's kind of a sign, right?

[18:05] That we kind of recognize that reason is, and or say, you know, do you live by your reason or by your emotions? Maybe they honestly say by their emotions, right? But then you ask the question: Should you live by your reason or by your emotions, right? Well, how can they defend they should live by their emotions unless they give what Reason. a reason why they should live by emotions rather than by reason?

[18:36] And but then they're already admitting that reason should decide what you should live by reason or by emotions. Emotions can't decide that. So if reason has the authority to decide what you should live by emotions or reason, they're already put reason in first place, right? You should live in accordance with reason. So you're not being honest in sense with yourself if you don't realize that, right? You know.

[19:02] But nevertheless, when you're born, you have these emotions, and they're kind of what? Outside of. Where? Yeah, yeah. I mean, they're attracted to, to the sensible things, right? Independently, kind of reason, right? And they can be what?

[19:24] Crazy case in the people today, it was. Yeah. The guy wanted some more booze, and he said, "Why'd you drive down rather than walk down? " He's right next to the liquor store. I want more wines. He sounded absolutely crazy. You know, I just kind of heard the conversation. my wife was being over the newspaper. Okay. So to the first, it should be said that virtues, although they are not caused by nature, according to their perfect being, right?

[20:08] Nevertheless, they incline to that which is in accordance with nature, right? Once the virtue is but established, right? That is according to the order of reason. For Tully says in his rhetoric, that virtue is a habit, right? In the mode of nature, right?

[20:26] In agreement with what? Reason, right? So it becomes almost second nature to you, right? So man has acquired the virtue of what temperance is kind of second nature to him. He doesn't drink, you know, excessive amounts. You know, certain amount. Thomas says he should drink usque ad hilaritatem right? But not to the point of you're not knowing what you're doing, you know. And

[20:55] the weak idea, you know, was that a man went off and did something like a rape or a murder or whatever it is, drunk, right? He should be punished twice, right? Once for the crime of rape or murder, and the other for getting himself drunk, right? He's guilty of two different sins, huh?

[21:16] And in this way, virtue is said to be according to nature, right? Not that you're born to virtue, right? And therefore, by contrariety, is understood and advised against what nature, right?

[21:39] To the second, it should be said, right? The example there of the stone, there. Please, quoting from Aristotle. To the second, should be said that the philosophy there speaks about those things which are against nature, according to what? To be against nature is opposed to that which is to be by nature, right? Okay.

[22:01] So it's by nature that we have two hands, right, or two arms, right? So somebody's born without an arm or something, right? That's what against nature, right? Because it's against what is by nature to have two arms, right?

[22:16] You know, we need a third arm. You know, people sometimes, when they're carrying the grocery and they want to unlock the door, you know, so you need a third arm. But you can really get along without a third arm. But you know, just one arm kind of, you know. It's kind of tough. Yeah, yeah. The same way, you don't need three eyes, but to that one eye, two eyes, and three eyes, you're in the children's story, right?

[22:37] But you really kind of need two eyes, you know, for depth and distance, yeah. Okay. Now, however, according as against nature is opposed to that which is to be in accordance with nature. In that way, in which virtues are said to be according to nature, in so far as they incline to that which is what suitable to nature. And Shakespeare presents that in the plays. You know, he often takes, you know, brothers, or even, you know, I think King Lear he takes father and son, or father and daughters, right?

[23:20] And of course, then it's very easy to see, you know, something against nature. when The father is being betrayed by his son, right? His enemies, and so on. Or when one brother, in *in as you like it*, you have two pairs of brothers, right? And in one case, the younger brothers usurp the throne of the older brother, right? And the older brother is banished out there in the forest, dividing.

[23:43] In another case, the older brother is not giving any inheritance to the younger brother, and so the younger brother ends up eventually in the forest too, right? But eventually, brothers are reconciled, but in the what? Forest. Yeah. That's kind of metaphorical for what? Nature, right? So we're first introduced to the duke who's banished.

[24:10] He says, "In this, our old public haunt, you know, finds what tongues and trees, you know, books in the running brooks, sermons in stone, and good and everything. " Let's say to the nature's what kind of standing for nature's what's good, and it's got to be in harmony with nature, right?

[24:37] What is the Goneril? The one who's traiting against her father, right? Her husband healthier, sir. What about third objection, right? And this is the one that says most men are bad, right? And Heraclitus says most men prefer a life suitable to beasts, right? Aristotle talks about that.

[25:20] To third, it should be said that in man there is a twofold what nature: his rational and his sensitive nature. And because through the operations of our sense, men arrive at the act of what reason. Therefore, more follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature than the order of what reason.

[25:45] For there are more, right, who achieve or follow. Yeah, to the beginning of the thing, then those who arrive at its what perfection. Yeah.

[26:00] And from this vices and sins in men arise that defile the inclination of the sense nature against the order of what reason? So concupiscence, right? Desire for the the woman, desire for the booze, right? Or anger, right? That explains to some extent, right? They say that

[26:35] most of the angels are not bad; most are good, right? If you fell, right? But man has this double nature, right? Easy, easy prey.

[26:55] That's why you need the fine arts, huh? Thomas says in the proemium to the Poetics there he talks about the poetics. He says, "Poeta est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per decentem representationem belongs to the poet to lead us into something virtuous through a suitable what representation. Remember, a friend of mine, you know, was in some kind of conflict with his brother, and as you likely showing, right?

[27:24] So I said, let's go see this and change it all round, you know, because the suitable representation, right, of you know brothers in conflict, you know, which you can see as something bad, right, in the play, and then they're eventually reconciled.

[27:47] Someone's asking me this question: "you know kind of hard answer What's your favorite play of Shakespeare?" You know, I said, "Well, King Lear, probably, but it's really the one where nature is emphasized, huh?" Just.

[28:02] You have one father with three daughters, and one is good, and what a daughter should be, and the other two are. pretty bad. Yeah, then you have another man who's who's got two sons, and one is good, and one is bad. So I mean, you can't avoid seeing these things. It's a suitable representation of some kinds of things, but you have to kind of be led by these, what, fine arts, right?

[28:30] Because they have something appealing to the senses too. To the fourth, it should be said. The fourth objection was about law rather than nature, right?

[28:55] To the fourth, it should be said that whatever is against the Ratio, the definition of the artificial thing, is also against the nature of art, by which the artificial thing is produced. But the eternal law is compared to the order of what? Human reason. As art to the what? Artificial work. Yeah. Whence it is of the same reason that vice and sin is against the order of human reason, and it be against the law of what?

[29:30] Eternal law. Actually, human law is kind of a partaking of the divine law, right, applied to us. Whence Augustine? Who is this Augustine? I always quote.

[29:42] One man. Somebody. I thought when I first started reading it about Thomas, you know, that I saw somewhere that Thomas said, you know, the way to become wise, he said, is to be a man of one book.

[29:56] I can't, I can't find that quote. here right across it, you know, but. So it kind of struck me, you know, one book at a time, right? Thomas always read more than one book, right? But he really, you know, mastered these books, huh? The way to become wise is to be a man of of one book, right? Book of Nature, yeah, yeah, like Bonaventure there, you know, Thomas says what if he did?

[30:25] He cropped the goose, crocked the cross, you know, So that's where he is, that was his book, a man of one book. Once Augustine says in the third book on free judgment that from what all have from God, all natures have from God that they are natures, right? And insofar as they are vicious, insofar as they what proceed from the art by which they were made, right?

[31:08] Yeah. Discedent, huh? from that art by which they were made, right? This marriage stuff, you know. It is so, so mad, you know. So, mad. It's obviously against nature, right?

[31:32] Same sex marriage. Please take a little break now. Sure. What's up. I was asking if you're a guest master. Oh. The third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that vice, that is a bad habit, is worse than sin, that is a bad act. For just as the good which is more long-lasting is better, right? So the evil that is longer-lasting is worse. But a vicious habit is longer-lasting than a vicious act, which at once passes away.

[32:28] Therefore, a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. Moreover, many evils should be more what fled than one evil. But a bad habit is virtually, right, in power, we, might say, a cause of many evil acts. Right. Therefore, a vicious habit is worse than a what vicious what act.

[33:02] Moreover, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit perfects an act both in goodness and in evil. Right, it completes it, you might say. Therefore, the habit is more potent than the act both in goodness and in evil.

[33:23] I go to bed tonight and think out the answer to these three objections, huh? But against this, that someone is justly punished for a vicious act, not ever for a vicious what habit, unless it goes forward to an act. Therefore, a vicious act is worse than a vicious what habit.

[33:49] Even without vicious habits, you're punished for a bad act, right? The answer should be said that a habit is in a middle between potency or ability and act. Right. Now it is manifest that an act in both goodness and in badness is preeminent to what potency or ability, as is said in the ninth book of metaphysics. That's the book on act and ability, right? And Aristotle shows that.

[34:28] For it is better what the chicken and the egg. Yeah. For it is better to act well than to be able to act well, right? Huh? And likewise, it is more worthy of blame to act badly than to be able to act badly, right? Whence also it follows that a habit in goodness and in badness is in the middle grade between the potency and the what? Yeah.

[34:58] Yeah. So, which is worse for me, to kill you or to be able to kill you? Kill me. Yes. Yeah. And now the habit is what? In between, right? In between the ability and the act. That a good habit or a bad one is before, right, in goodness and badness to the what?

[35:23] Potency, right? I mean, preeminence. So also it is what? Given under the act, right? Subject to it. Which is also apparent from this that a habit is not said to be good or bad, except from this that it inclines one to a what? Good act or a bad one, right? And in account of the goodness or badness of the act, the habit is called good or what?

[35:57] Bad. And therefore, is more potent the act in goodness and badness than the habit, because of the Propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis est. tale What's my expansion, unfold that great principle right Well we say when the same thing belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other belongs more to the cause. Yeah. Okay.

[36:37] So if bad is said of the bad act and of the bad habit, right? But of the bad habit because it inclines to the bad act, then belongs more to the bad act.

[36:51] That's what Thomas decides. The peaceable man he was. Mm-hmm. Now my teacher, Kasurik, said that Thomas, you know, prayed all night till he had to start teaching. He didn't want to be distracted. I don't know. He wanted to learn more? maybe I don't know. I don't know what the basis was for that, to break up the idea, but he told me one time.

[37:29] So there's two ways then he shows us, right? Huh? Of course, in some respects too, you know, the ability can be for both the good and the bad, right? Huh? So the doctor maybe is able to heal you, right? But no one is more able to kill you than the doctor, right? Huh? So it's the same ability there, right? Huh? It's not until you get to the act that you have fully good or fully bad, huh?

[38:12] Now, how does he answer the first objection there? To the first, therefore, should be said that nothing prevents something being simply what more potent than another; that nevertheless, in some way, secundum quid, right, it falls short of it, huh?

[38:37] This the old distinction that we made, this kind of distinction between simply and what not simply but in some way, right, huh? And this is also the one of the kinds of what mistakes. Yeah, the second kind of fallacy outside of language, right, huh? And in the great dialogue there, the what? Meno right, huh? Meno in a sense, makes this mistake, right? How can you investigate what you don't know?

[39:04] Why are we paying these guys to find the cause of cancer, right? If They don't know it. How can they go looking for it? They don't know what they're looking for. Right? Yeah. They're after making money. Yeah. But they know in some imperfect way what they don't know, right?

[39:26] They know effects. Yeah. So it's not the distinction between simply in some respect. Okay. Simpliciter, that is more potent, is judged more potent, that what excels regards what is considered per se both, right?

[39:46] But secundum quid, that is preeminent, that has itself what to both, right? Now it's been shown, right? This is in the body article that from the very what ratio, the thought of act and habit, the act is more potent in goodness and badness than the habit, right? Just two ways to show that. But the habit is what longer lasting than the act. Happens from this and that both are found in such a nature that is not able always to act, and whose action is in a what transient motion.

[40:33] When simply act is more potent both in goodness and in what malice, right, than the habit, but the habit is more potent in some way, right? Secundum quid, yeah.

[40:50] Which is worse, to be drunkard by habit or to get drunk? Yeah, simply speaking, it is right. But in some way, it's worse to be what to be chronic alcoholic, yeah. To be drunk right, it's going to be longer lasting, right? And give rise to many acts of being drunk, I guess.

[41:20] That's a hard thing: that distinction between simply and not simply, right? Going back to the example of philosophy, there, which is more familiar. If you look at philosophy, what part of philosophy is wisdom simply? What part of philosophy is wisdom in some ways couldn't have quit as a life

[41:51] and great? Is it first philosophy? Yeah, first philosophy is wisdom simply. By. Natural philosophy is not wisdom simply, but wisdom about natural things, right? The wisdom of nature, as Shakespeare calls it, right? So it's not wisdom simply, but qualified the wisdom of nature, right? And geometry, right? It's wisdom about continuous quantity, right? Arithmetic is wisdom about numbers, right? Okay.

[42:24] But if you compare first philosophy with God's wisdom, right? Then God's wisdom is what wisdom simply, and first philosophy is wisdom second and third, right? Our wisdom. Yeah.

[42:46] So I mean, you have to be able to see that distinction, right? Huh? That's kind of interesting. You might say one way you call first philosophy wisdom simply. Some case.

[43:05] But if you understand the origin of philosophy, some people think the word philosophy means a love of wisdom. I don't think it does, huh? It's not in that sense that Aristotle uses the word philosophy. He uses the word philosophy for some kind of knowledge, right? The reason out of knowledge, huh? And but it's a kind of knowledge that a philosopher or a lover of wisdom would pursue, right?

[43:28] So the knowledge that has most of the character of wisdom would have most of all right to the name philosophy, if that's the name of the knowledge that a lover of wisdom pursues, huh? So Aristotle would sometimes call first philosophy philosophy, period, right? Yeah. Philosophy. Period. Oh, we have another one. Yeah, yeah. But he won't call it natural philosophy after, huh? Philosophy period. Simply, sorry. Philosophy, in some senses, you know, a less ambiguous word than wisdom in one sense, right?

[44:03] Huh? Because Aristotle is very clear that either God alone should be said to be wise, only God is wise in the full sense, right? And man's only wise in some imperfect, very limited, qualified sense, right? Huh? Why philosophy seems to, you know, if you look at the origin of the word, right? It's for man who already admits that he's not wise in the full sense, right? But that he has a certain what love of this name, right?

[44:35] So I always say, you know, if Aristotle had access to the word of God, we have to agree that this is more wisdom theology than first philosophy, right? But it'd be because he he knows that God is. Most wise, right? God alone is fully wise. Yeah, he's always Thomas is always quoting Aristotle's critique of Empedocles, right? Because Empedocles' theory about knowledge makes it conclude that we know something God doesn't know.

[45:13] That's not so necessary. So there's something wrong with this theory that that Empedocles has, right? Empedocles says, you know, by earth we know earth, and by water we know water, and by air we know air, and by fire we know fire, and by love we know love, and by hate we know hate, because we have these six things inside of us, we know them, right? But then he speaks of God, huh?

[45:42] As having no hate in him, just very very profound, right? Huh? And he says, well, then God doesn't know hate, right? So therefore, we know something hate that God doesn't know. That's that's yeah, he says it both in the Ethics and he says in metaphysics, right? You know, and it's very very clear, you know, the criticism. So you have to admire Empedocles, how he saw something there, right?

[46:06] If there's hate in God, then hate is what separates things, you know? God would not be immortal, right? He would not be indestructible. Now,

[46:25] in both of these divisions of being, you know, the two main divisions of being into substance and accident, right? In being into act and ability. In both of these, one is said to be being what simply, and the other to be being what. So you couldn't do quit, right? So when I walked into this room, did I come to be? In some way. In some way. Yeah, you have to qualify, right?

[46:52] I came to be in this room. I didn't come to be when I walked in this room today. I came to be in the year 1935. Just spent many in my mother's womb, you know. Popped out on January 18th, 1936, right? Made your debut. Yeah. Somewhere in 1935, I came to be simply.

[47:18] You come to my house for class. You don't come come to be to you. The same with act and ability, right? You know, if you're able to know something, just that you know it. A lot of people do. Now, if you're able to know something, you know it and ability. you've got to qualify it, right? Huh? You know, it's only if you know it actually that you would be said to know it simply without qualifying it, without diminishing something, right?

[47:50] It's interesting how human names, huh? You know, the the some of the names, you know, mean a little somebody, right? You know, Rosemary, my last name means little rose, right? You know, and stuff.

[48:08] But you've kind of added something, you know, kind of a diminutive, right? Okay. So that's actually important. That distinction is right to understand ability and act, right, or to understand substance and accident, huh? Okay. When I do geometry, did I come to be?

[48:30] I came to be a geometry. Twenty nineteen five that I came to be. Without qualification. When I leave here, I used to be. I mean, if I said that was on the leave here, you'll cease to be. Yeah, it was simply I would I would hesitate twice to to leave this room, you know. I should cease to be. Cease to be in this room, I can I can put up with that.

[48:56] Dinner before. So that's a that's a very important distinction, right? The ability to see a distinction is the definition of reason, sir. Mm-hmm. And the ability to see before and after is included the ability to see a distinction, just like and the ability for large discords is included the ability for small discourse. So Thomas, he's got to find, you know, he's got a good reason

[49:41] there. To the second should be said that a habit is not simpliciter plures actus. It's not simply many acts, but in some way that is in virtue or in potency, huh? Whence from this one is not able to conclude that a habit is simply more potent in goodness or badness than the what? Yeah. Act, huh?

[50:11] Now, to the third should be said, right? See, the cause is more potent than the effect, right? Ah. But now, how do you solve that there, Joshua? Does this man objector know that there are many kinds of causes?

[50:33] To the third should be said that a habit is a cause of the act in the genus of what? Efficient cause. Efficient cause, the third kind of cause, huh? The mover or the maker. But act is a cause of the habit in the genus of what? Final cause. According to which is considered the definition of good and what bad. So when Aristotle takes up that fourth kind of cause, he says that end and good are what basically the same thing, right?

[51:06] And therefore, in goodness and badness, act is preeminent to what habit. Well, my dear, what have you done without Aristotle? You've known the, you know, how far do you go without Aristotle?

[51:27] There's great respect for Aristotle. Okay, good time for one more, I guess, huh? Where sin can be together with virtue. The fourth one goes forward thus: it seems that a vicious act or a sin Cannot be together with what virtue,

[52:02] for contraries cannot be together in the same thing. But sin is in some way contrary to virtue, as has been said. Therefore, sin cannot be together with virtue.

[52:16] But maybe there's something about the different ways of being opposed, right? Moreover, sin is worse than what vice. That is a bad act than a bad habit, as has been said in the previous article. But vice cannot be together in the same with what virtue. Therefore, neither sin, because that's even worse. How clever these guys!

[52:46] You must enjoy thinking these things off, huh? Yes, I always think of late, think how can I stump them tomorrow? Moreover, just as sin happens in what voluntary things, so also in natural things, right? The word "peccatum there, you know, translated in English, there by sin, right? But it's got a broader sense in Latin, "hamartia" in Greek, basically. These are for nature, right? So if a baby is born missing a leg, that's a "hamartia i.

[53:20] e. peccatum naturae," right? A sin of nature, right? Okay. So he says, just as peccatum happens in voluntary things, so in what natural things, right? Of course, the word "sin" is just restricted.

[53:39] As is said in the second book of the physics. But never in natural things does there happen any sin except through some corruption of the natural power, just as monsters. A monster originally was what something. Yeah, you know, missing an arm. It's a monster, right? It doesn't mean monster in the modern sense of the word there, with the Hollywood movies, right? Okay. The monsters happen some beginning being corrupted in the what sea, as is said in the second book of the what physics, right?

[54:13] Therefore, also in voluntary things there does not happen sin except in some what Virtue the soul is so corrupted. And thus, peccatum and virtus cannot be in the same.

[54:31] But against this is what the philosopher says in second book of the ethics that through contraries virtue is what generated and corrupted. But one virtuous act does not cause virtue, as has been said before. Therefore, nor does one act of sin take away what virtue. Able, therefore, to be in the same way. So the man who has virtue, if he performs a bad act, then he probably repents of it, right?

[55:05] Okay. We continue to the soul. He's kind of not repenting. Okay. Answer should be said, huh? That peccatum, sin, is compared to virtue as a bad act to a good what? Habit.

[55:24] Now, in a different way, is habit in the soul and a form in a what? Natural thing. For a natural form of necessity produces an operation suitable to it.

[55:43] Example: the fire burning, right? It's going to burn the paper there, right? Actually. Whence there cannot be together with a natural form the act of a contrary form, just as there cannot be with heat the act of what? Cooling. Nor together with lightness the motion of what? Excuse me. It should be motion of descent, right? Except perhaps in the violence of an exterior what? Mover. But a habit in the soul is not produced of necessity.

[56:20] Does not produce by necessity its own operation, because a man uses the habit when he what? Wishes, huh? And that's a quote from De Virtutibus Okay. So the will is able to, as is free, right? It can choose to do something or not do it, right? Or to do it in this way or to do it in what? That way, huh?

[56:49] So if I go out to the what? Restaurant, I could order what? Salmon, right? Or not order. If you want to. I could order, right? It's possible.

[57:03] I could order steak. I could order chicken, you know. So, whence the habit, at the same time existing in the man, right? He is able to not use the habit or to act what? Contrary, right? And thus is able that one having the virtue proceeds to the act of what? Sin, huh? So notice how how weak man is, huh? That he requires what? God's help, right? Even when he has virtue, huh?

[57:37] Then he can still what? Sin, huh? The virtue doesn't make you immune from sin, right? Now the act of the of sin, if it be compared to the virtue, in so far as it is a certain what habit. Is not able to what corrupt it if it be one what only, and that shows something about its not being what fully opposed to it, right? In the full sense, right?

[58:11] You can't have the vice at the same time you have the virtue, can you? You can't be a temperate man and intemperate man at the same time. You can't be a brave man and a coward at the same time, right? But the act is not opposed in that way, is it?

[58:29] For just as the habit is not generated through one act, so neither is it corrupted by one act. So, and one way of understanding the term moral virtue is to say it's from moss, right, which means custom, right?

[58:49] But if the what act of sin is what compared to the cause of virtues, right? Then it is possible that through one act of sin, some virtues are what. Yeah. For any mortal sin is contrary to what Charity. charity.

[59:19] In this sense, you can say that in one respect, then charity is less stable than what temperance, because it can be lost by one act, right? Temperance and courage are not lost by one act, right?

[59:34] For any mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of what all the infused virtues, in so far as they are virtues, right?

[59:49] And therefore, through one act of mortal sin, right, charity being excluded, right, there are excluded consequently all the virtues that are what infused, Infused, huh? as far as this that they are what Virtues, huh? virtues, huh?

[1:00:09] I say this on account of what faith and hope, whose habits remain unformed, right, after mortal sin, and thus are not what virtues, huh?

[1:00:25] But venial sin that is not contrary to charity nor excludes it, right? But consequence also does not exclude the other what virtues, huh? But the acquired virtues are not taken away through one act of what. Yeah. So in some sense they're more stable. Therefore, you need those, right? Some people say, what do we need these these virtues Aristotle talks about We got all these infused virtues, charity and so on, right?

[1:00:55] But that introduces a kind of a what instability in our life, huh? Because charity and other virtues can be virtues anyway, lost right? By one act. Isn't that the acquired virtues? Thus, therefore, mortal sin cannot be together with the infused virtues, but it can be together with the what? Yeah. Yeah. So he's distinguishing. That's very important. But a venial sin can be together, what? Both with the infused virtues and with the acquired.

[1:01:31] So he sees all the distinctions there, right? The necessary, right? Mortal sin cannot be with infused virtues, but can be with the. With the venial sin can be with both, right?

[1:01:54] Drip drip drip drip right. Gotta watch that though huh Yeah. Now, to the first, you know, it goes back to the distinction, right? There's not contrary in the full sense there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that sin is not contrary to virtue secundum se, but according to its what act. And therefore, sin is not able to be together the act of virtue. Can't have same act be courageous and cowardly, right?

[1:02:32] But the early days of the American army, there, you know, Washington almost lost his cool. You know, how am I supposed to win with this kind of an army? You know, because they were running away when the British were coming, right? And they say, well, you know, these guys had no experience of being in battle or facing up to the, West Point you know,

[1:03:00] in the football games and they'll cheer on the team saying, "Fix bayonets, you know." Fix bayonets. Fix bayonets. Yeah, that is, you know, when they fix bayonets, it's ridiculous. That's what there was. That's what they did in Normandy. Yeah. Right after they landed, and they were there was a bunch of German gunners. Yeah. And they had the Americans tied down. There was like a there was a pathway along the beach or something, and they were stuck down below it, and being stuck down, you're a target.

[1:03:40] Yeah. So they couldn't figure out what to do, and their commanding officer brilliant maneuver. He just said, "fix bayonets, Boom!" And they just charged right at the... and the Germans just froze. These guys got to be crazy, and they took them out. Took out the Germans. And all when the commanding officer said, Fixed Bayonets, they all went, "what? I've never seen that one before." Yeah, Not one year.

[1:04:04] They had. Machine guns up there. Because especially in the 18th century, this was you know the guns are not too accurate. Yeah. And so, fix bayonets was sometimes the way to do. Yeah, the only way to do it. Yeah. That's a good story. Yeah. Okay. To the second one now. Although

[1:04:32] the vicious act is worse, right? Nevertheless, it should be said to the second that vice is directly contrary to virtue, right? Just as sin to a what? Virtuous act. Yeah. And therefore, vice excludes what virtue, just as sin excludes what act of virtue. Virtue, yeah.

[1:04:57] See what he's saying there, right? Vice is to virtue as the vicious act is to the virtue, and they exclude each other. But vice is not, the vicious act is not to the virtue same way.

[1:05:20] Now the third objection was taken from sin and nature. To the third, it should be said that the natural virtues act of what necessity, and therefore the virtue existing whole, right, perfect, never is sin found in the act. But the virtues of the soul do not produce acts of what necessity, right? Hence, is not a what similar reason.

[1:05:52] It's not sufficient to have the virtue, but you've got to use the virtue too. That's what God said to Saint Catherine. of Siena He said what good is it for me to show you the steps across the bridge unless you take your feet and walk? Yeah, do it.

[1:06:14] Okay, so we have to stop now. Okay.