Prima Secundae
172. Summa I-II Q.72 aa.3-6: Sin by cause; against God, self and neighbour; mortal and venial; omission and commission
Class of 2014-05-28
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/172-summa-i-ii-q-72-aa-3-6-sin-by-cause-against-god-self-and/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, enlighten the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:30] So up to Article Three, I guess, in Question Seventy Two, the sins are distinguished in species according to their causes. To the third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the sins are distinguished in species according to their causes. For from the same a thing has its species of which it has its being. But the sins have their being from their causes.

[1:06] Therefore, from the same they also obtain their species. Therefore, they differ, therefore, in species according to the diversity of causes. Moreover, among other causes that would less seem to pertain to the species, the material cause. But the object in sin is as the material cause. Since, therefore, according to objects, sins are distinguished in species, it seems that sins much more would be distinguished according to the other causes in their species.

[1:50] More of Augustine says under that of Psalm Seventy Nine, the fire is what incensed, I guess, and stifled, I guess. That every sin is either from fear badly humiliating somebody, or from love badly inflaming somebody. Huh.

[2:17] It said also in the First Epistle of John, Chapter Two, that everything that is in the world is either concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of what life? Huh.

[2:34] The beast, the birds, and the fish, right? In Psalm 8, the spiritual senses, those three there. The beast is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the the birds the concupiscence of the eyes. I mean the

[2:54] pride of life, right? And the concupiscence of the eyes is the fish. Huh. That's where you become what. But so England became rich, right? Oh, yeah. No, I mean the the fish that go off the world, right?

[3:20] So everything that's in the world is either the result of the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life.

[3:30] That's where the three vows are tied up with. Two or three, those three, right? Something is said to be in the world and counted sin, according as lovers of the world are signified by the name of what? The world. So when the girl says she's going to get married, she's going to the world. They say in Shakespeare, right? I'm going to the world.

[3:59] Gregory says, as Augustine says upon John, Gregory also, the thirty-first of Moralia, distinguishes all the sins according to the seven capital vices. But all these divisions regard the causes of what sin? All the divisions are touched upon in the subjection. Therefore, it seems that sin is different species according to the diversity of causes.

[4:28] But against this, it is that according to this, all sins would be of the same what species, since they are caused by one cause. For it said in Ecclesiasticus that the beginning of every sin is what pride.

[4:45] That's the first thing said about either MacThomas there and Capinia in the first epistle to Timothy, that the root of all evils is cupidity. Right. Is manifest, however, that there are diverse species of sins. Therefore, sins are not distinguished in species according to the diversity of causes. My next thought is to tell you that it's going to begin by recalling the distinction of the four kinds of causes.

[5:14] Hence, it should be said that since there are four what genera of causes, matter, form, over, and end. in diverse ways they are attributed to what diverse things. For the formal cause and the material cause regard properly the substance of the thing, like my body and soul make up my substance. And therefore, substances, according to their form and matter, are distinguished both in their species and in their what genus, right?

[5:59] But the agent and the and the other two kinds of causes regard directly motion and operation, motion being an imperfect act and operation a perfect act. And therefore, motion and operations are distinguished in species according to causes of this sort, according as but but diversity nevertheless.

[6:33] For natural active beginnings, natural active causes are determined always to the same acts. Shakespeare says, "Nature not being able to be more than one thing."

[6:53] And therefore, diverse species in natural acts are to be noted not only according to their objects, which are the ends or the limits, but also according to their active principles. Just as to heat and to cool are distinguished in species according to hot and cold,

[7:20] but the active principles in voluntary acts, of which sort are the acts of sins, do not have themselves a necessity to just one. And therefore, from one active or moving principle, there can be what diverse species of sins proceed. Just as from fear, badly, lowering somebody can proceed that a man steals, and that he what kills, yeah, and that he deserts the flock committed to himself. And these same things right could proceed from love.

[8:03] Hence, it is manifest that sins do not differ in species according to diverse active causes or motives. Son, they proceed from the acts of the will, which is the truth that he said, but only according to the diversity of the what Final. Final cause. final cause. For the end is the object of the what will primary object. Has been shown that human acts have species above from their end.

[8:35] So he distinguishes right. Never affirm the Dominican said right. Seldom deny. Always distinguish. Just annoying that thing, but anyway, There's no truth to it.

[8:54] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the active principles in the acts of the will, since they are not determined to one. Do not suffice for producing human acts unless the will be determined to one through the intention of the end, as is clear through the philosopher in the ninth book of metaphysics. And therefore, from the end is perfected both the being and species of the sin.

[9:27] Not to the second section. It should be said that the objects, according as they are compared to exterior acts, have the notion of matter about which. But according as they are compared to the interior act of the will, they have the notion of ends, right? From which they have that they give species to the act. Although also, according as they are the matter about which, they have the notion of what. Ends or limits, from which motions are specified, as is said in the fifth book of the physics.

[10:07] That's the book devoted to dividing motion into its species, right? So Aristotle talks about how they distinguish the species, and in the tenth book of the ethics.

[10:20] But nevertheless, also the limits of motion give species two motions, in so far as they have the ratio or notion of an end. And then about those three divisions, or so in book in book objection three. I had a colleague and every time he talks Shakespeare plays, he said, "Now in this book, you know, He wanted to emphasize the fact that there's much more in this than you know at first sight.

[10:48] You know, so he called it a book, you know." I'm sitting behind getting a lecture, you know, a little paragraph, you know, Thomas, there, you know, the whole lecture's on a little little tiny paragraph.

[11:05] He says those divisions of sin are not given to distinguishing the species of sin, right? But to manifesting the diverse causes of them, right? You want to root out those causes of sin, right? You guys taking these three vows, right? You're rooting out three of those causes there, right? Which people like me in the still world are, you know, suffering from, right? Misbehaving, more or less, all the time, huh?

[11:39] Now, Article Four, where sin is suitably distinguished by sin in God, in oneself, and in one's neighbor, right? More suspicious of these titles. I don't think you go back to Thomas. That little utrum, you know. I don't know if they do go back to Thomas. I'm a bit suspicious. I can assume Contra Gentiles you know, they have a kind of a little title. You know, each chapter, you know what it's about.

[12:07] The same way I was reading in this Compendial Theology, right? They have a little one in the text, you know. But it just goes back to Thomas. In fact, one of them seems to be contradicting some of the things. I don't think it goes back to Thomas. Can't watch those things, you know. But that's the word of wisdom, you know. Over to the wise is sufficient, huh?

[12:29] To the fourth one goes for it. Thus, it seems that unsuitably sin is distinguished by sin which is in God, in one's what neighbor and in oneself, right? So this is the way of distinguishing sins. I can sin against myself, or against my neighbor, or against God.

[12:50] Well, that which is common to every sin ought not to be laid down as a worthy part in a division of sin. That sounds like a good solid logical principle, wouldn't you say,

[13:04] Joshua? Yeah, that sounds like a pretty good one. But it's common to every sin. that's been against God, right? For it's laid down in the very definition of sin, that's against the law of God.

[13:22] Therefore, the sin in God ought not to be laid down as worthy part in the division of sins. Okay, Abelard, I can see your point. However,

[13:36] every division ought to be through opposites, huh? Like tragedy and comedy, right? Distinguished by opposites, huh? Virtue and vice. But these three three sins are not opposed, huh? For whoever sins in his neighbor sins also in himself and in what God. This above all, to thine own self be true, right? And if thou canst not then be false to any man.

[14:09] Okay. Therefore, sin is not suitably divided according to these three. I give up, Thomas. I give up. How are we going to get out of this? Moreover, those things which are extrinsic do not confer species, but God and neighbor are outside of us.

[14:32] Therefore, through them, one does not distinguish sins; are not distinguished according to species. And so to be, therefore, according to these, three sin is what divided.

[14:46] But against this is what Isidore says, right? In the book on the highest good, distinguishing the sin says that a man is said to sin in himself, in God, and in his way.

[15:05] It's kind of funny though, the word in there, isn't it? It's sometimes used when they use it with the accusative, yeah. Sin upon oneself, upon God, or into oneself. Yeah.

[15:21] Well, I answer, Thomas says that as has been said above, sin is a disordered what act? But threefold, however, is out the order in man to be. There's threefold order that ought to be in man. I didn't know that. Did you know that? I don't think I hadn't adverted to it anyway. It's three though, right? Okay. It's great. Well,

[15:57] two or three, right? He's reading a book on Venetian art, right? And he says there are basically three periods of Venetian art, and each of them there's two painters that dominate. In the first period, it's in time it's the Bellinis.

[16:17] In the second one, it's what Titian, yeah, and Giorgione, and then in the last part is Tintoretto and Veronese, right? I have a painting of Veronese in my dining room, you know. Well, you know. So I said this makes it very clear to me now. Three, three, and each divided into two, right? And then you get a few lesser guys in there, but I said I'm very happy with that.

[16:47] Oh, Venetian. Venetian. Venetian. Gee, I didn't know they do that. No, no. I guess his Tintoretto—he was named because he worked in his father's shop, and he did—he was a little guy, and he did the tinting of the materials, right? Yeah. And I assume his real name was Robusti or something like that. Horrible name. And Tintoretto always sounds like a name of a painter, doesn't it? Yeah, yeah.

[17:10] Tintoretto. It just sounds so. So. Yeah. So here he's got what threefold order, right? Yeah. That's beautiful, though, right? Isn't it? He says sin is a disordered act, and disorder, of course, has got to be understood by the order you're violating, right? Okay.

[17:33] One, he says, is by comparison to the rule of what? Reason. In so far as all acts and all of our actions and passions ought to be measured according to the rule of what? Reason. Right.

[17:52] I drunk enough wine now. What would reason say, right? Yeah. Reason, as by by Thomas, I mean Thomas. Another is by order in comparison to the rule of the divine law, by which man ought to be what directed in all his what acts. And those times he's admitting here in omnibus, right? He says, right. We talked about, huh? Omnes actiones, passions, right? They got to take an account, but that's the objections where things say.

[18:32] And if man was naturally a solitary animal, this twofold order would what suffice. But because man is naturally a political and a social animal, as is proven by Aristotle, right, in the first book of the what politics, right.

[18:53] Therefore, it is necessary that there be a third order, by which man is ordered to other men, with whom he ought to what live together, right.

[19:08] Now, of these orders, the first contains the second and exceeds it, right? Huh. For whatever are contained under the order of reason are contained under the order of God Himself, right. For whatever are contained under the order of God Himself, but some things are contained under the order of God which exceed human reason, just as those things which pertain to faith and which are owed to God what alone, right.

[19:44] Whence the man who sins in them is said to sin in God, right? Just as the heretic, right, and the sacrilegious man, and the blasphemer, right.

[20:00] Similarly, also the second order includes the third and exceeds it, right. Is there a confusion in the text there or not? Because you mentioned first the order of reason, but but you know, I guess we can't attend comments on this. It's a little footnote in my edition. I don't know if it was in yours. But first, second, and third here refer. Not to the numbering made in the letter, but to the enumeration according to the nature of order, right?

[20:34] Order of nature, so that the obeying the divine what law would be most universal, right? And then obeying what reason, so on. Okay. When he said you know at the beginning of this paragraph of the order, the first contains the second. He's talking not about the first one mentioned, but the first in the order of nature, right? Well, there are Kajetans doing a good job to, you know, not get confused, right?

[21:04] Yeah, that's what I was wondering about. Yeah, it's a little bit you know strange. And so we have the second order. That's the order now of reason, right? And exceeds it, right? Yeah. Because in all those things in which we are ordered to our neighbor, it is necessary for us to be directed according to the rule of what reason. But in some things we are directed according to reason as regards ourselves only, not In regard to our what neighbor, Neighbor right?

[21:35] And when a man sins in these things, he is said to sin in himself, as is clear of the man who is gluttonous, right? Luxurious—that means you know, sexual excess, right? And even the prodigious man, right?

[21:52] But when a man sins in those things by which he is ordered to his neighbor, he is said to sin in his neighbor, right? It is clear about theft and what homicide, right?

[22:08] Now, it's diverse things by which man is ordered to God and to his neighbor and to himself, huh? Whence this distinction of sins is according to what objects by which species of sin are what diversified, as we said in the earlier article. Whence this distinction of sins properly is according to diverse species of what sins, huh?

[22:37] Not according to what causes, right? According to species, he gives a sign for the virtues to which the sins are opposed are distinguished according to this difference in species.

[22:53] By theological virtues, man is ordered to God by temperance and fortitude to himself, and justice to his what neighbor, Neighbor, huh? So the distinction then which he solves the first objection, he says that to sin in God, according as the order which is to God includes every what human order, is common to every sin, right? But as regards that which in which the order of God exceeds the other two orders, thus the sin in God is a special genus of what sin, huh?

[23:38] And he makes this principle underlying this distinction there in his second reply to the second objection. To the second should be said that when what some of these one includes another are distinguished from each other, distinction is understood to be not according to that one contained in the other, but according to that one that what exceeds the other. Just as is clear in the division of numbers and figures, and figures.

[24:09] For triangle, when triangle, for triangle is not divided against square or quadrat the quadrilato, according as is contained, right? So Euclid is always dividing quadrilatos into two what triangles, right? So well square includes, what? Triangle. Yeah, therefore, okay. You don't divide it against the triangle that makes up it, right? But one that's separate by itself and not part of the quadrilateral. And you divide four against three, right?

[24:44] To make the example here, you're not dividing four against the three that's in it, but the three that is just what three, right? Unqualifiedly taken as Thomas says sometimes touches upon the distinction elsewhere, right? Other examples. Well, you divide man against animal, right? And not so far, animal includes man, right? But something that is just an animal, right? Animal unqualifiedly taken, right? It's? Just an animal, right?

[25:20] So when I said to my mother, "You know that man is an animal," she said, "I don't like that. That's right. Well, he's not just an animal, Mama. He's an animal that has reason. Okio, that's better," she said. Okay, that's right. She wanted me to distinguish between animal and man. She was teaching. Yeah, but man is an animal, right? Yeah, so.

[25:45] So you distinguish man against the animal that is just an animal and not a man, right? And so you distinguish the sin against God, right? Not from what's common to all sin and against the law of God, but one that's directed against God in particular, like I don't believe Him, right? He's disbelief there that God, you know, did he read me what he said, right? You don't really lose your, die.

[26:10] You'll be like the gods, right? Eat that fruit. Well, it's more, more like my. Poor Eve and and Adam. They're gonna have a hard time. The jokes, you know, about them. Living that down, yeah. Yeah, you're responsible for all economic mess in the human race. They're gonna have a hard time living down there. That's why they say. That's why there has to be a particular judgment, or there's a general judgment, and a particular judgment.

[26:44] Yeah. There's a general judgment, we're going to see the consequences of all my sins. Yeah. When I'm before God, it's not enough just my sins, but all the consequences of the world. Karl Marx.

[26:59] Yeah. To the third, it should be said that God and neighbor, although they are outside with respect to the one sinning, right? Nevertheless, they're not extraneous with respect to the act of the sin, but they are compared to it as. It's proper what objects, yeah. So if I kill you, murder you, you're the object of my. Article five. To the fifth one goes forward thus. it seems that the division of sins, which is according to what guilt?

[27:53] Did you translate that as? the debt of punishment Punishment. Okay. Diversifies species. When it's divided according to venial and what mortal, right? For those things that differ in infinitum, right, cannot be of one species, nor even of one what genus, right? But venial and mortal sin differ in infinitum, right?

[28:36] For the to the venial there is owed temporal punishment. To mortal eternal punishment, right? Now the measure of punishment corresponds to the quantity of what guilt, huh? According to that of Deuteronomy chapter twenty-five, for the measure of the what crime will be the mode of what stripes? Stripes, yeah. But Thomas has always been modus is tied up with what you know? Measure determines, yeah. Shakespeare has a play called what?

[29:19] Measure for measure, right? I don't even know the play. And a man does what? The same thing for which he's condemned another man to death, right? So measure for measure would require that he

[29:33] eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth. Yeah. That's what we say in the Our Father. Forgive us as we forgive. Yeah. As you command. Of course, the man who's guilty, that is Angelo. Did Jacque one? Everybody thought he was he was. Measure for measure. Have to make that one. Create a play, yeah.

[30:04] You are familiar with that play, son. You are educated men, huh? No. Some of. Moreover, some sins are mortal from their what genus, as what homicide and adultery, huh? Some from their genus are what venial sins, as an idle word, yeah, and superfluous laughter, yeah. These are superfluous.

[30:45] Therefore, mortal and venial sin differ in what? Species. However, just as a virtuous act is to reward, so is sin to what? Punishment. But reward is the end of a what? Virtuous act. Therefore, punishment is the end of sin. But sins are distinguished in species according to the ends. This has been said. Therefore, also they are distinguished in species according to the. Yeah. I'm thinking of a Parisian Pratchettian distinction coming in somewhere.

[31:26] I bet you. But against this, those things which constitute a species are what? Yeah, just as specific what? Differences, huh? But punishment follows upon what? Guilt effect. Guilt effect. As its effect. Therefore, sins do not differ in species according to. guilt of punishment Yeah.

[32:04] Answer it should be said that of those things which differ in species, a twofold difference is found. One which constitutes the diversity of species, and such a difference is never found except in diverse species, as rational and irrational.

[32:30] And sold and unsold, right? Another difference is following upon the diversity of species, and such a difference, although in some it follows the diversity of species, in others it can be found in the same what? Species. Just as white and black follow the diversity of what? Crows. Crow or raven. and I don't know what Swan yeah. Swan. Swan.

[33:09] Nevertheless, there's found this difference in the same species of what? Of man, right? Black and white man, right? Pretty pretty difficult there. It's getting very complicated, you know. You got to avoid the word, you know, Negro, right? Huh? And now some people don't want to use the word black man, right? And so they want to say people of color. And now some people say this is an insulting thing, people of color.

[33:37] They can't agree as to which names are insulting, which names. Getting very hard to to talk anymore, you know. Better not to just say nothing. Yes, yeah. It's Chesterton, long before he imagined anything like the internet and iPhone, he said something like, he said, "It's never been easier in the history of the world for man to say anything he wants, anytime, anywhere, any time of day, and exactly the moment in history when he has nothing to say."

[34:07] So all this, all this nonsense, all this talk, all this talking people, and they got nothing to say. It's just all gibberish. As Cuddey would say, there is no doubt that we can talk. It is verboten. You can't tell the thing that you know these. Well, that's why that's why Christ appeared to a woman first.

[34:40] Trying to get the word out. I say, therefore, it should be said, therefore, that the difference of vino and mortal sin, right, or any other difference, is taken according to what. being owed some punishment, is it? Is not able to be a difference constituting a diversity of what species, huh?

[35:06] For never that which is praecedens constitutes what species, but that which is outside the intention of the agent is praeter intentionem, as is clear in the second book of the physics, huh? So you got to know the physics for second time reference to that theology, right? I am not to go back and study the physics again sometime. Yeah, yeah, this is a good idea, Joshua.

[35:40] You are talking about the the infinity there, which is in the second half of the third book of the physics, right? And there, Thomasina was talking about the common thought of the Greeks that the beginning of things is infinite, and it's something divine and so on. When Thomas takes up the infinity of God, he goes all the way back to that text in the physics, right? That kind of shows that the human mind is, without understanding in what way God is infinite, right?

[36:12] Is seen the beginning of things as being what infinite, huh? They all thought the that the infinite is the beginning of things, huh? And that it was something divine, right? So in a confused way, right, depending towards God, right? When Thomas takes up the substance of God in both Sumas, right, and in the Compendium too, you know he divides it into these five, usually, right? And God is simple and and perfect and unchanging will be one of them, right?

[36:45] And one and and infinite, right? So it's one of the attributes of God, right? God is endless. Perfection of God is endless. It goes back all the way back to the early Greeks. They're thinking this way. It's a marvelous thing. But it's not infinite in the way they thought. But there is some element to the truth in what they're thinking.

[37:20] It's good to see the human mind moving in the right direction, even if it doesn't quite arrive. For never that which is per accidens constitutes a species, but that which is outside the intention of the agent. Is per accidens, right? But It is manifest that punishment is outside the intention of the one. So I didn't think I get caught.

[37:55] So I didn't commit the crime. I didn't intend it. That's for sure. Yeah. Yeah. Yes, this famous bank robber. During before many times, the judge in a finding. Why did you rob banks anyway? He says, "That's where the money is."

[38:13] He didn't say that's why I get punished for. Yeah, he didn't say that. But it is ordered to sin by something outside, to wit, from the justice of the one, what? Judging, right? Who, according to the diverse conditions of the sin, inflicts diverse what? Punishments.

[38:46] Whence the difference, which is from the what? The what? From the guilt of punishment. Well, that was a very famous translation. Every one was it. It's reality. Yeah, the two. Oh, the punishment isn't that the sense. How do they translate that in the English text?

[39:07] What? No, the difference which is it's after. Between venial and mortal sin, it's consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness, which constitutes the notion of sin. Now, this is the one after. No. Inordinateness is twofold. No. We just have the text we read about

[39:32] the justice of the one judging, right? Who, according to diverse conditions of sin, inflicts diverse punishments. Whence the difference, which is from the what? Obligation of punishment, in a sense. They call it debt of punishment. Yeah, debt of punishment. Yeah, that's a good way of translating it. Whence the difference, which is from the debt of punishment, is able to follow a diverse species of what sins, right?

[40:08] But it does not, however, constitute the what. Yeah. So if for your inordinate laugh, I'm not going to cut your head off, right? But for your adultery or for your murder, we're going to do that.

[40:29] Now the difference of venial sin and mortal follows the diversity of the disorder, which completes the notion definition of sin. Now twofold is disorder: one by taking away subtraction of what is the beginning of the order, right, the principle of the order; another in which the beginning or the principle of the order being saved, there comes about a disorder about those things which are after the beginning.

[41:08] Whence, just as in the body of an animal, sometimes the disorder of the complexion proceeds all the way to a destruction of the vital principle, and this is what? Death. Sometime saving the principle of life, there comes about a certain disorder in the humours, right, and then there is what? Sickness.

[41:36] Now the beginning, the principle of the whole order in morals, is the last in, which as Aristotle says has itself in things to be done, as the indemonstrable beginning or principle has itself in looking matters, right, in speculative matters, as is said in the seventh book of the what? Ethics. Whence, when the soul is disordered by sin, all the way to an aversion from the last end,

[42:08] to it God, to which we are united by charity, then there is a what? Mortal sin, right. But when there comes about disorder, what? Of the version of God, then it is a what? Yeah. Forgivable. Just as in bodily things, the disorder of death, which is by the removal of the beginning of life, is irreparable, right? According to nature, that is to say. The disorder, however, of sickness is able to be what?

[42:45] Repaired, yeah. On account of the fact that the principle of life is still saved, right? And likewise analogy in those things which pertain to the soul. For speculative matters, who errs about the beginnings, is what? Not persuasible. Not be persuaded. I've met those. Yeah.

[43:12] But whoever errs with the principles of being saved, he can be called back to the beginnings themselves, right? There you go. In similarity in operative things, who sins by turning away from the last end, as far as is from the nature of sin, has an irreparable what? Lapse. And therefore he is said to sin mortally, and he should be punished what? Eternally. But whoever sins, apart from this aversion from God Himself, right, is disordered by reason of the sin.

[43:50] But he's what? Reparable. Yeah, disordered in a way can be repaired because the principle is what preserved, saved, yeah. And therefore he said to sin venially. Because he does not so sin that he merits an endless punishment, huh? Just a really long one.

[44:20] Now, that was the answer to that first objection, which I thought was pretty powerful, right? To the first, therefore, it, should be said that mortal sin and venial, differ in infinitum, on the part of what aversion, not, however, on the part of conversion. To which they regard the what object, right? Whence it has what? Whence the sin has its species, right? Okay, so we kind of sin by turning what away from God, but towards some what some creaturely thing, huh?

[44:57] Okay, and what we turn towards is the object, right? And the object determines the species, right? Right, the infinity comes from the fact that you're turning away from something that's infinitely good, right? That's not the object, right? Whence

[45:17] nothing prevents, in the same species, there to be found some what mortal sin and a venial one. Just as the first motion, the genus of adultery, is a what venial sin. Or a idle word, which plerumque most of the time is what venial, can become what mortal. Yeah,

[45:41] I would shut those idle words, huh? To second should be said, from this that there is found some sin mortal from its genus, and some sin venial from its genus. It follows that such a difference follows the diversity of sins according to species. It does not, however, what cause them, right? And such a difference can be found also in those things which are of the what same species.

[46:29] They don't always differ in genus, huh? On the third objection, reward is the of the intention of one meriting for acting virtuously, but punishment is not of intention of one sinning. But more is against his will, right? Once there's not a similar reason now, so the distinction between the per se and the per accidens is important. Now,

[47:05] to the sixth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the sin of commission and omission differ in species. We give them separately, don't they, in the mass? Now, I don't know if you give them together in our mass. We don't just say that No I thought there was. No. Unless, oh no, it's in in uh, Ranshe. Yeah.

[47:37] I'll have to see what he says. So, delictum is divided against sin. huh? Delictum, I guess, is something. It's A crime. It's one way of saying. that.

[47:58] When you were what? Dead in your sin, or should you were dead in your literally crimes and sins. Offense. Fail offense. Yeah. I mean, he's understanding it here as a sin of omission, isn't it? Okay. When you were dead, delictis and peccatis vestris, huh? Delictis, that is by what?

[48:38] Setting away what you were commanded? Commanded and sins by doing the things are prohibited, right? From which it is clear that through delictum is understood the sin of what? Omission. Omission. Per peccatum, the sin of commission. They differ therefore in species, since they are divided ex opposito right? They are opposites, as the word diverse what species. Commission and non-commission.

[49:12] Were it to a sin, it belongs per se that it be against the law of God, for that is laid down as definition. But in the law of God, other are the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, huh? Which I did not honor my father or mother, right? And other are the so we excuse for your your absence from that class. We know that you commit the sin of omission, honoring your father and mother when they visited you.

[49:50] If you missed that earlier, I was saying he had not been in class, and I was excoriating him, but now it seems that he would have been omitting to honor his father and mother, so we have to excuse his absence in class last. But keep a tight watch upon him.

[50:15] Which is another way of saying he doesn't trust you. Okay, but in the law of God, others are the affirmative precepts, huh? Against which is the sin of omission. And other are the negative precepts against which is the sin of what? Commission, right?

[50:39] So I shouldn't commit robbery or adultery and so on, and I shouldn't omit to honor my father and mother, right? You know, I have to ask Father Elias, when we pray the Our Father in Aramaic. You know, we say, "Forgive us our trespasses." We use two words in Aramaic, this and this, but we just translate it as one because that's what we're used to. I should look up maybe it's this, maybe it's

[51:12] this. Therefore, the sin of omission and the sin of commission differ in what species? Different. Different commands, right? Moreover, omission and commission differ as affirmation, negation. The affirmation, negation cannot be of one species, because negation does not have a species. For of none being there are neither what species nor differences, as the philosopher says. Therefore, omission and commission cannot be of one species, huh?

[51:52] The medieval guys were really way ahead of us, weren't they? Yeah, Light years. Yeah. But against this, in the same species of sin is found omission and commission. For the avaricious man, both what steals things of others, which is the sin of commission, and he does not give his own to whom he ought to give, right? Which is the sin of omission. Therefore, omission and commission do not differ in species, right?

[52:29] Not supporting the church Supporting the church. Well, let's see what Thomas says here now. By. Answer: It should be said that in sins is found a twofold difference. One material and the other what? Formal, right? The material difference is to be noted according to the natural species of the acts of sin. The formal, however, according to the order. To one

[53:08] proper end, right, which is the proper object, right. Once there are found some acts materially differing in species, which nevertheless formally are in the same species of sin, because they are ordered to the same. Just as the same species of homicide pertains, choking, strangling, stoning, and perforating with all the things, although the acts are in species different according to the species of what nature.

[53:52] Thus, therefore, if we speak of the species of the sin of omission and commission materially, they differ in what species, speaking nevertheless in a large way, right, loose way of species, according as negation or privation are able to have the species, right, in a secondary sense. If, however, we speak of the species of sin and omission and commission formally, thus they do not differ in what species, because they are ordered to the same thing and they proceed from the same what motive, huh?

[54:32] For the avaricious man, in order to congregate money, both what steals and does not give those things which he ought to what? to give. And similarly, the gluttonous man, to satisfying his gluttony, both eats too much, right, and omits the suitable what. Fast that they should. They should, yeah. And the same can be seen in other things, right? For always in things, negation is founded upon some affirmation, which is in a way its what cause.

[55:10] Even logic can't draw a conclusion from two negatives, right? Get an affirmative to draw a conclusion, so. I missed. I missed. I missed. Do you see that? For in things of

[55:25] negation, is always found from affirmations. Yeah, yeah. Can you touch down? Why is it? Can you just some examples right here? Yeah. But you can stop and think about that a little bit, huh? Give me examples of that.

[56:04] Maybe when Saint Peter denied knowing our Lord, it's because he loved his own life. He feared to lose his life or something. That's kind of a positive or affirmative thing. To deny something else If I say two is not an odd number, right? Why is that? Even. Yeah, that's affirmative, right? Right.

[56:30] As an even number, it can't be an odd number. Would you say that? You're the mathematician here. Should I show you how the twinning of famous colleges, Saint Thomas, out there? What would you say? Even number can't be an odd number. You say why can't two be odd? Because it has divisible parts Yeah, because it's even then, right? So isn't that negative based upon the even? the affirmative. Mm hmm. Why can't Why can't I be a woman?

[57:10] Again, know these things in this crazy world out there. I know. You can always deny reality. Yeah, but it's because I'm a man, right? That can't be a woman, right? Okay. That's the insanity of it. Why can't I be a dog or a cat or a horse?

[57:30] Because I'm a rational animal, right? An irrational animal cannot be a dog, a cat, or a horse, because they're they're rational, right? So the the negative is based upon something affirmative, isn't it? So these things are for sins now. What? Upon those sins. Okay. We

[58:04] gave the example there, didn't you? The customer's man, right? He omits fast because he wants to eat too much. Okay. The average man doesn't pay his bill because that's that's noteworthy. I mean, they said the the man himself, Ted Kennedy, that people in restaurants never got paid when they ever got the money. Come in and a feast, leave. It's always one example, but because he makes money too much, rich men don't get rich by giving the money away.

[58:51] Secretary of the Treasury, there for a while, he didn't pay his taxes.