Prima Secundae
176. Summa I-II q.73 aa.6–7: How the Demons Know, the Cause of Sin and Circumstances That Make Sin Worse
Class of 2014-09-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/176-summa-i-ii-q-73-aa-6-7-how-the-demons-know-the-cause-of-sin/

[0:00] Two twelve here. The name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. I was reading Thomas this morning there on the punishment of the demons, right, huh?

[0:35] And of course, some of the objections are saying, you know, they're complete ignorant now. Thomas says that's not true. But it's interesting kind of distinctions that he brings out there, huh? To discuss the knowledge of the demons, right? And the first distinction, of course, between the natural knowledge and then the supernatural knowledge, right? And the natural knowledge is not really, but interfering with it's still there, right, huh?

[1:03] He says the angels altogether simple, so you can't punish them by taking part of them away, like says a man can cut off an arm or a limb like the Lebanons do and so on. But then he distinguishes, you know, the spiritual knowledge, huh? And it's kind of interesting distinction he gives between a knowledge that is purely speculative, right? And the angels, the fallen angels, had some of that knowledge, huh?

[1:30] They had some revelation made to them, and sometimes things were revealed to them by the higher angels. Then they saw, you know, what Christ's miracles, and they saw the spread of the church, so they could gather certain things, you know, and but then he said the other kind of spiritual one is is not pure speculativa not pure speculativa, but affectiva, right, huh? And this is the one that they had none of, because that's the one that gives you the love of God, right?

[1:59] But then Thomas makes an interesting thing there that, and this is what's found in the the gift of the Holy Spirit that is called what wisdom, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? Because the the word in Latin for wisdom is what sapientia, which comes from sapor, which Thomas says sapientia means sapida, savory, scientia, savory knowledge, so it arouses a love of God in you, right? And this is the way that the gift of the Holy Spirit called wisdom is attached to what charity, right?

[2:38] You know, if you see that in the secunda secunda, right? And I think Thomas there in the do you know Thomas's prayer? Any of you the rhythmus they call it in Latin? It's got they call it the rhythmus because it's in meter. I think it's in trocaic, I don't know what. But And it's rhyme, right? The first it's in seven what quatrains, I guess. And the first and the second will rhyme, and the third and the fourth will rhyme, right?

[3:05] But in the fifth quatrain, right, where he says, "Memorial mortis domine, panis vivus vitam praestans homini vitae." And then he speaks of, you know, give me life from you, right? And then "Dulce sapere," right? That might sweetly savory, right? What sapientia there means what this cognition affectiva, he calls it in the text there in the Summa Theologiae. This affective knowledge that is tied up especially with the knowledge that is the gift of the Holy Spirit called wisdom, right?

[3:39] So it's a little different than the wisdom of even theology and the wisdom of of obviously Aristotle, right? But it's kind of interesting, huh? Interesting text there.

[3:52] But it's kind of hard for us to understand the obstinates of the what fallen angels, right? One of the objections, you know, saying, well, the malice of the what demons is something finite, but the mercy of God is infinite. Therefore, there must be what must be a possibility for them to be converted, right? That sounds kind of like a reasonable argument, doesn't it, to you, right? The mercy of God is much greater than the malice of of the devils, right?

[4:26] And fittingly greater. And Thomas replies, "Well, God has mercy only on those who are penitent. and it's impossible for the what fallen demons, right, to be penitent. And that's because when they go for something in a choice, the whole the angel goes for it, right? It's not this kind of a lukewarm choice that we make, you know, where we can, you know, have an opportunity later on going back against it, right?

[4:57] Or even repenting of our of our choice, huh? And it's hard to understand, you know. But I guess when we die, you know, then we are like the what angels, right? And you know, like it says in Scripture, where the tree falls, there shall lie. And so Thomas likes to quote that thing from Saint John Damascene, you know, that this choice was for the angel of death is for us, right?

[5:18] You know, the whole soul goes that way, right? You know, Thomas often quotes Aristotle: "Such as a man is in his habits, right, so does the end and purpose of life seem to him, right? And if you can't change your habits, then you can't what? Yeah, yeah. So could Hitler change the last moment? Well, it'd be extremely difficult for him, right? Because his habits are so much.

[5:49] Going back to Mozart, there, Don Giovanni, right? He can't repent at the end when he's in the hand of the commander, right? No, no, he goes down to the hell, right? So, so why is it the why is it we cannot change? Why is it we cannot change our habits when we die? Because you are not in time anymore. We don't have oh, God, in time. I was going to say we don't have bodies.

[6:14] Yeah, we're so used to time and and this wishy washy life we have, where we're halfing, you know, what we should be and half what we shouldn't be. You know, we think it's always possible to be in the state of of being able to change. It's not possible. So there will be like the angels too when we die in this way, huh? That our will will now be determined, huh?

[6:39] You know, it's kind of interesting, you know, the way the tradition of the church and the traditional prayers of the church show the wisdom of the church, right? And I think the the second part of the Hail Mary is is what not from scripture, like the first part is from scripture, right? From the angel and from you know Elizabeth, yeah. The second part, you know, was a Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners now and at the hour of our death.

[7:06] Why do you say in particular and at the hour of our death? You know, it's because that determines everything, the way your your will what falls there, right? Huh? It's like a snapshot. Yeah, but it's kind of frightening, you know. See, but I'm always a little bit nervous when I read about the angels and how evil they are, right? But how you know quick they can fall, right?

[7:35] No. The second instant of their existence, huh? Yeah. We're not we're not finished off the second instance of our life. Okay. Okay, so we're up to Article Six here in Question Seventy Three. Whether the gravity of the sins should be observed according to the cause of the sin, right, huh? To the sixth, therefore, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the gravity of sins is not to be observed according to the cause of sin.

[8:24] For the greater is the cause of sin, the more vehemently, right, the more strongly is one moved to sinning, and the more difficult is it, huh, to what resist it, right? But sin is diminished from this that what it's more difficult to resist it. For this pertains to the weakness, huh, infirmity, huh, of the one sinning. That is not easily what resists sin, but a sin that is from what weakness, levius, more likely, is judged right.

[9:09] Therefore, sin does not have gravity on the side of its what cause. Moreover, concupiscence is a general cause of sin, whence the gloss says upon that of Romans seven seven. Unless I what was ignorant, huh? Did not know concupiscence. Good is a law which, when it what prohibited concupiscence, prohibited every evil. But when a man is conquered by greater concupiscence, there is a less sin, right? Falstaff says, right, huh?

[9:53] You know, they have more flesh than other men's. more to overcome. Therefore, the gravity of a sin is diminished from the magnitude of the cause. Moreover, the third objection: just as the rectitude or rightness of reason is a cause of a virtuous act, so the defect of reason seems to be a cause of sin. But the defect of reason, the more it is greater, the less is the what sin, huh?

[10:35] So Thomas says, for us, educate people to sin is more what serious than for the peasant, huh, to sin who doesn't have the same knowledge, huh? So much so that those who lack the use of reason, like the little boy or the baby, are altogether excused from sin, huh? And the one who sins from ignorance more likely sins, huh? And therefore, the gravity of sin is not expanded, huh?

[11:07] Blown up from the magnitude of the cause. But against this is that the cause being multiplied, the effect is multiplied, huh? Therefore, if the cause of sin is greater, the sin is greater. And last objection was like sounds like what our Lord said about if you knew the master's will, you didn't do it, you're going to get a severe beating. But if you didn't know the master's will, you get a light beating.

[11:34] Yeah, yeah. That's the objection Okay. Whereas Thomas says that appropriation to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, when he's got his prayers for confession, right? So he sinned against the Father by what weakness, huh? And he's sinned against the Son by ignorance, right? And then he's sinned against the Holy Spirit by malice, huh? That's the worst thing, huh?

[12:06] I answer: it should be said that in the genus of sin, in the kind of thing sin is, right? Use English, huh? Just as in any other genus, huh? There can be taken a twofold what cause, huh?

[12:27] One is the proper and per se cause of sin, which is the will itself of sinning, and this is compared to the act of the sin as a tree to its fruit, huh? As is said in the gloss upon that of Matthew seven, that the good tree, right, huh, is not able to what Produce bad fruit, fruit, yeah. Interesting. The Latin word for happiness is what felicitas, huh?

[13:03] Which comes from fruit, huh? Okay. Though here you speak of bad fruit, right? But it's kind of the natural result, huh? What you do? Any cause of this sort, the greater it is, the more grave is the what sin, huh? For the more the will was inclined to sinning, right, huh? The more you had a will for sinning, right? The more gravely does a man what sin, huh?

[13:40] But other causes of sin are taken as it were something extrinsic and what remote, huh? From which to it the will is inclined to sin, and in these causes one ought to what distinguish, huh?

[14:02] For some things of this sort lead one lead the will to sinning according to the very nature of the will itself, just as the end, which is the proper object of the what will. So Aristotle always talks about the end and the good being what the same thing, right, huh?

[14:29] And from such a cause sin is what magnified, huh? Increased. For that man sins more gravely whose will, from the intention of a worse end, is inclined to what sin, huh?

[14:53] Other causes there are which incline the will to sinning apart from the nature and order of the will itself, which is to naturally be moved freely from itself according to the judgment of reason. Whence the causes which diminish the judgment of reason, as ignorance, or which diminish the free motion of the will, as infirmity or violence, huh? Or what threats against or fears, yeah? Or something of this sort diminish the what sin, huh?

[15:38] Just as they diminish the what Voluntary. voluntary, right? So much so that if the act is entirely involuntary, it does not have the character of a what sin, huh? Okay. Again, Thomas. does Not simply affirm or deny, but he gives these what Distinctions. distinctions, huh? And he has what two distinctions of two, right?

[16:11] And in what one of the two it is, but in the second it's one of the two too. So it's two out of three, right? Okay.

[16:24] So the first one, it should be said that that objection proceeds from a extrinsic moving cause, right? Huh? Which diminishes the voluntary, right? And the growth or the magnitude or the yeah growth of such a cause diminishes the what sin, huh? Okay.

[16:54] The second, it should be said that if under concupiscence is included also the motion itself of the will. Because notice these words, you know, concupiscence can maybe name first the emotion, but sometimes they name what the act of the will that is like a passion, not in being bodily or involving a bodily change, but in its formal aspect, right? If under concupiscence is included. included also the motion itself of the will, thus where there is more concupiscence, there is more what sin.

[17:32] But if concupiscence is called a certain passion, huh? What we call emotion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, huh? Thus, a greater concupiscence preceding the judgment of reason, and the motion of the what will diminishes the sin, right?

[17:57] Because from a greater concupiscence, the one is stimulated to sins, huh? It he falls from a graver what temptation, right? Whence it is imputed to him less, huh? And not more, right? I

[18:15] always say to the students, you know, so many people apologize for getting upset, you know. What do they say? When I said to you, I wasn't myself. That's true, right? Huh? You know. I wasn't myself. Don't you see that sometimes you did maybe yourself sometimes, right? Huh? That there wasn't me. See, and it's not that's not just a you know an excuse. I mean, it wasn't so much you.

[18:46] Yeah. There was something of you in there, but but it was yeah that was my anger that was in me. See, but you realize in that anger, the emotion is not what makes you to be a man, right? Might Make a dog to be a dog, but

[19:07] but if the concupiscence thus taken follows the judgment of reason, right, and the motion of the will, right, then where there is a greater concupiscence, there is a greater what Sin. sin, huh?

[19:25] For sometimes there arises a great motion of concupiscence from this that the will, without restraint, without any, unbridled. Yeah, unbridled. Yeah, tends in its what object, huh? Okay. And somebody will premeditate something, whatever it is. Mm-hmm.

[19:47] Okay. Think about politics, and you get you know certain judgments. Suddenly you're angry about what's going on. I try to adopt the way of speaking. You know, I say. Terrorists and abortionists

[20:07] lack respect for human life. That should be said, you know. And if you think of saying that, you know, people might might say dawn upon them, you know. Yeah, especially when you consider we're getting all upset about a few people being beheaded. Yeah, yeah. Abortionists do it every day for money. Yeah, we should couple those things, you know, because they're similar, right? Huh. You know, he's. It was an abortionist who was almost assassinated by a pro-life insane lad, and he wrote an article that the New York Times published.

[20:44] And he started it off with, "I was just finishing up my sixth abortion of the morning when a bullet shattered the glass and just missed me, something like that." And he goes on about just how he suffered. Yeah. What a victim he was, and the juxtaposition of his callous comment, "I just finished my sixth abortion," yeah, and his own self-misery—it was. I wonder if it had an effect he didn't intend when people started waking up a little bit to see that that both of these things were evil—they attempted murder, but the actual murders too.

[21:18] We see when they when they show a film, you know, the head being chopped off or whatever it is—it's it's all on the open, you know, huh? You know, when they make a you know film like who's the guy who's converted in it The Sound of Silence. Yeah, who's the guy? Oh, we're Nathan. Yeah, Nathan. Yeah, you know, and I think what what Reagan did do was to use that film, right?

[21:38] You know, the one that it had done in real abortion, right? You realize that you're you're tearing somebody apart, or but if you're doing, you know, it's. But it's things a little more hidden to the senses.

[21:53] I found that a little astonishing that he first first dawned on him when he looked at that film. Unless there's something I'm missing, but I mean, in order to do an abortion, the abortionist has to tear up tear the parts out. Yeah, yeah. So he must I mean it's not like he saw that for the first time. Maybe he saw pain. Yeah. Pain in the victim. Yeah.

[22:13] You never know when something will strike people. You know, There's always a famous one in Witness there, by Whitaker Chambers, you know, where he's still communist and he's in the kitchen there, and his little daughter's there, and he happened to look at her ear, you know, how interesting her ear, her ear was, and then he suddenly dawned on him that could have happened by chance, this little ear.

[22:30] You know, I mean, there's more than one thing for you could have said that this could not be by chance, right? I mean, the eye is more, more, more, you know, amazing thing than even the ear, right? Then looking at little your little daughter, and you know, all of a sudden it dawns upon you, you know.

[22:53] But these things that ISIS is doing—that kind of to to frighten us or to or to shock us or something—you know, I mean, it's obvious, you know, that everybody is getting, you know. Even Obama has to, you know, try to come out and oppose them now, you know.

[23:11] Okay. Third objection there. Okay, that that argument proceeds from a cause which causes the what involuntary, and therefore it diminishes the what sin, huh? Now, Article Seven: Whether circumstance aggravates sin, right? Huh? Makes it more grievous. To the sixth, one proceeds thus: It seems that circumstances do not what? Yeah. Increase the gravity of the sin. For sin has its gravity from its what? Species, huh? Essential nature. But a circumstance does not give a species to sin.

[24:20] Does make it different kind of sin, right? For it is a certain what? Accident, huh? So the white man a different kind of man than the black man? No.

[24:39] Therefore, the gravity of the sin is not to be considered from its circumstance. Moreover, either circumstance is bad or it is not. If the circumstance is bad, then it what? By itself or through itself causes a certain what? Species of badness.

[25:05] If, however, it is not bad, it has nothing whereby it would increase the what? Evil. Therefore, circumstance in no way increases sin. It's like saying it causes either what? Another sin, in which case it's not increasing the sin of the first one, right? Or else it doesn't have anything whereby it's going to increase the evil that's not bad itself. So if I kill a white man or a black man, does it make a difference really?

[25:37] Whether he's white or black, I don't think. Okay. Moreover, the malice of the sin is on the part of what? Aversion, I suppose, from God. But the circumstances follow sin on the part of what? Conversion. Therefore, they do not augment the malice of the what? Sin, huh?

[26:09] But against this is that ignorance of a circumstance diminishes a sin. For the one who sins from ignorance of the circumstance merits what? Forgiveness, as is said in the third book of the Ethics. My Shakespeare's history plays there, huh? You know where the father is on one thing and the son is on the other. The father kills the son. Then he discovers he's killed his own son, and then another.

[26:39] battle scene, the son kills the father, and then discovers afterwards the man is killed, is his own father, right? What? Like antithesis. Yeah, yeah. But this would not be unless circumstances make this sin more grievous, and therefore circumstances, what? Make sin more grievous. Yeah. Well, I answer that is Thomas answers. You say get that straight.

[27:14] I answer it should be said, that each thing from the same thing is naturally apt to be increased from which it is caused, right? Just as the philosopher says about the habit of what, virtue in the second book of the ethics. For it is manifest that sin is caused from the defect of some what, circumstance, huh? For from this it recedes, huh, or departs from the order of reason.

[27:46] Because someone that someone in acting does not observe the what? Yeah, suitable circumstances. Whence it is manifest that sin is apt to be what? Yeah, weighed down. By circumstances, huh?

[28:08] Okay, but this happens in three ways. Now close the book and tell me the three ways. My brother Mark and I used to joke about trying to straighten out some of these professors on campus, you know, and lock them in a cell, right? And give them only a little bit of the sum and a time, or a little bit of an article, you know, and

[28:29] try to you know, you know, discover those three ways, right? Huh? On your own, you say, my goodness. Now, you remember what Brother Mark would say about Euclid's Theorem, which are very clear in one way, you know, but see, you know, how long would it have taken me on my own to to arrive at that theorem? Just to make the circle out of a triangle, I think I would spend most of my life.

[29:01] But this happens in three ways. In one way, in so far as a circumstance, right, carries over, huh? To use the English for transfers, right? In another genus of sin, right. Just as the sin of fornication consists in this that a man approaches one that is not his own, huh?

[29:29] But if one adds to this the circumstances that the one to whom one accedes is the wife of another, right? It is carried over into another genus of sin,

[29:43] to wit, to injustice, right? Insofar as a man usurps the thing that belongs to what another, right? And according to this, adultery is a graver sin than what fornication. Incidentally, we say that adultery is is a is a form of fornication or not?

[30:20] Well, I'm inclined to say the other way around because of the commandment, but that's only my supposition, because it says to act in adultery, and we say that fornication is wrong because has to do with that. I'm not sure, you know, with the word fornication, you know, is kept by one, you know, then the new one get a new name, or whether you know fornication right away means the lesser thing, right?

[30:45] We seem to use it in that sense, you know. That's not really important, huh? It's a question of the word, but so that's interesting, right? Some cases, circumstance, right? So I suppose killing my mother or my father rather than a stranger might make it a different sin, right? And suicide is different sin than

[31:16] yeah, yeah. So sometimes a circumstance carries it over, right? You've got to be careful. You see, a circumstance is a what accident, right? What? Those things that stand out. Yeah, yeah. Sometimes, however, a circumstance does not weigh down a sin, as it were, drawing it into another genus of sin, right? Huh? It's interesting, you know. I was talking about kind of like the word predicament, right, taken from the word for the categories of Aristotle, right, and that you can't go from one genus to another, right?

[31:59] Huh? And that's we get the expression the predicament, right? I'm in a situation I can't get out of, but it's taken from from logic, right? Huh? But you've got to realize that there's definite a thing here if you can draw something into another genus, right? But you're in the same broad genus, right? Sometimes a circumstance does not aggravate a sin, as it were, drawing it to another genus of sin, right?

[32:31] But only because it multiplies the what definition of the sin. Just as if the prodigal man, right, gives when he ought not to, right, and to whom he ought not to give, right,

[32:50] he more multiply in many ways, you might say, sins by the same genus of sin, right? If he only gives to one to whom what? Well he doesn't know he ought not Yeah.

[33:04] Okay. And from this, the sin becomes more grave, right? Just as also sickness is more grave when more parts of the body are infected, huh? Metastasizes the cancer, they say, right?

[33:28] When' also Tullius says in the Paradoxes, right, that in what, Violating the life of the father, right, many things are sinned. Right, because one violates the one who what? who I guess nourished I guess Yeah, who instructed him, right? Who in house and home and in the country called him forth, right? Into that, huh? Okay. So I don't think he's talking here about killing the father supposedly killing a stranger, right?

[34:07] He's talking about the many reasons why you're indebted to the father, right? And the many kinds of gratitude and so on, right? That you have killing your father, right? Huh? Because he's done all these things for you, right? Okay. If your father, you know, generated you but then abandoned you, you know, went off and left you with your mother, well, then you don't owe him as much as a man who, you know, nourished you, educated you, and all that sort of stuff, right?

[34:35] Huh? Okay. Okay. Doesn't draw it to another genus of of sin, right? Okay. Oedipus right? Because he didn't he he's excused somewhat because he's ignorant, right? That the man who stopped him was his father. So that distinction between the first and the second is not too hard to see, right? Now, what the heck is the third way, though? Because third is the thing we say all, right?

[35:14] Okay. In a third way, a circumstance makes a sin more grievous. From this, that it increases what? A deformity coming from some other circumstance, right?

[35:33] Just as to take what belongs to another, right, constitutes the sin of theft, right? Huh? If, however, one adds the circumstances that one takes much from another, right, it's a more what? Yeah. Although to take much or less of itself does not say something about the ratio of good or bad, right? Okay. You see the difference between the third one and the second one? Yeah. Okay. See.

[36:07] Yeah. You see, if I kill the man who generated me and fed me, right, you see that's worse than just to kill a man who generated but then abandoned me, right? Or a man who fed me but did not generate me, right? So that comes under the what? Second one, right? Huh? It's bad to kill the man who fed you. It's bad to kill the man who generated you.

[36:39] it's even worse, to kill a man, who, both generated you, fed you, right? Isn't that the second one that he's talking about there, right? Okay. Long time. Yeah, yeah.

[36:51] But to take much, to take little, doesn't seem to be by itself, right? Something bad, right? But to take what is not yours, right? To take much, right? Is worse than to take little, yeah. Okay. Now, why can't you think that? You know. I remember I was talking about something about the angels and about the angels, and said, "Why can't you figure out why this is so?"

[37:22] Thomas figured it out. Why can't you? I was in my thirties, and my I was telling my mom how marvelous St. Thomas was. He wrote this book, short little work, De Malo. He was like twenty-nine years old when he wrote it. It's really, really profound. My mom, I was in my thirties, so my mom said, "So what have you been doing?"

[37:58] To the first, therefore, Thomas says, "Huh? That's one that said that it's just an accident, right?" You be careful that word, accident, huh? You know, I was. Talk

[38:15] about the angel. Does the angel still have his natural knowledge, right? And one of the objections was saying, "Well, the natural object of the angels is separated substances, right?"

[38:30] And you know, some of the philosophers say man's beatitude consists in knowing separated substances. Some of the Arab philosophers and so on, right? And so there'd be some beatitude there for the angel, right? And Thomas then replied

[38:48] to the objection there. He says, "Well, maybe we could say a bit about man. There'd be some happiness for man to know the separated substances, right? But even for a man, that's not his ultimate happiness, right? His ultimate happiness is to know the first substance, right?" So gee, that's usually Thomas would say that, right? But he calls God the first what? Yeah. And then, of course, you know, it's an article in that God is not in the genus of substance, right?

[39:18] But here you can call God the first substance, but it's a analogous use of the word, right? You got to be kind of careful about that. Okay.

[39:35] He says, you know, for the angels to know separated substances, like for us to know sensible things, that's not our happiness at all, right?

[39:44] And the angels, not knowing the first substance, are not happy. You've got to have something above yourself to be to be happy, right? Okay.

[40:03] So he says some circumstance gives the species to the moral act, right? And that was what he's talking about there in the first method in the body of the article, where it draws it to a different genus, right, a different species, huh? But nevertheless, a circumstance which does not give the species to the act can make it more what? grievous huh? For just as the goodness of a thing is not only what weighed from its species, but also from some accident, right?

[40:35] So the goodness of a man consists not only in its being a man, but in being, say, a courageous man, right, or a prudent man, and so on. So also the malice of an act not only is weighed from the species of the act, but also from the circumstances, like in the second and third here, we saw.

[40:58] To the second, it should be said that in both ways a circumstance is able to what aggravate a sin, huh? If it is bad, not on account of this only, right, is necessary that it always constitute a species of sin. For it can add a ratio of wickedness in the same what species as has been said, and that's in the what second way, right?

[41:36] If, however, it is not bad, it can aggravate the sin in order to malice of another what circumstances, right? Notice how thoroughly the body of the article helps you to answer the objections, right? Really marvelous thing. This poor guy we're going to put in the kind of prison cell, right? He'd get the objections without the body of the article or the answers, right? He'd have to, you know, try to answer the objections for a while, right?

[42:05] And then finally, one day, it would be dropped through the the body of the article, right? And then if he asked again after studying the body of the article, now it's going to answer the objections, and perhaps he could, perhaps he couldn't, something could, something couldn't, and then finally after a few more days of this torture, we drop in the third part of the thing, you know, huh?

[42:27] There's an danger in having the whole text, you know, here, you know, you like in the Marietti text, maybe your text too, you know, they they print the answer in in in bold, say, all three. You don't have any understanding, right? Huh?

[42:45] Just memorizing, but not. Understanding, huh? Now, what about this aversion and so on? To the third, it should be said, huh, that reason ought to order an act not only as regards its object, right, but also as regards what all circumstances, huh? So it's hard to be good, right? No, you can

[43:13] avoid one of these circumstances you should have ordered it to, and therefore aversion from the rule of reason, huh? Not from God, he's talking about from the rule of reason, is to reserve according to corruption of any what circumstance, right?

[43:35] If, for example, someone acts when he ought not to, and where he ought not to, right, huh? Okay. So I laughed when I was in church. I shouldn't have done that, baby. Or I laughed more than I should have, right? All these things. I got to observe all these things. It's not the time to be fooling around at church. Okay.

[44:02] It's a famous story told about Thomas and one of his one of his colleagues or brothers. There was saying he saw an elephant out in the road. Thomas goes over and they're laughing at him, you know. and Tom says, I'd rather believe that there's an elephant out there." than that one of my. Brothers would lie.

[44:31] So you might you know sin by alcohol by drinking too much, right? Or drinking when you shouldn't, right? You know, I'm going to operate on somebody today, and I shouldn't be you know drinking beforehand, right? Right. I worked with a guy there who had been on the bombing planes and the Normandy landing, right? Huh. Wow. He was only 17 at the time, right? And he said you wouldn't eat anything before you went on the thing because you just throw it up and you're so tense, right?

[45:01] And the first day they went in, of course, they missed their target. He said you flew too high. The Germans were shooting at us. So second day they went and hit their target, you know. He says when they got off the airplane coming back, you know, they had these little cups of of whiskey, right? Taking calm you down, but you don't take a whiskey before you fly over there.

[45:22] You'd be not gun happy, but gun unhappy. You know. But it is you know so all these circumstances, right? Huh. So this drink at the wrong time could be what unreasonable, right? Huh. Another time the same amount might be reasonable, right? Huh. I used to take an example, you know, it's on Thanksgiving and your grandmother has you know prepared this and that and so on. So eat more than you'd eat on a normal day, right?

[45:54] And that's not really wrong, right? And grandma would be you know hurt if you're not enjoying fully everything she prepared to you know these things. But eat that much every day or on a day when you know grandma's not there, of course. Yeah, yeah. These meals in Germany, you know, they serve us in it's too too heavy, you know, huh? You can't feed them all, and they just have to be you know.

[46:24] And I don't know about those Germans, but the the guy says we love to eat, you know. They're not alone. Yeah. See, see, my kind of thing is that the Italians and the French eat better than us, right? And but we're better than the Germans, I think. So exceptionally to this, but

[46:56] with regard to cuisine too, and why you see the influence, perhaps, in certain regions, France and Italy, compared to more northerly climes where the quality of cuisine diminishes rapidly, and the same thing with wine. Oh, I'll have some sort of pole about that.

[47:23] And this aversion suffices for, the definition of evil, right? This aversion from the rule of reason follows what? From turning away from God. To which a man ought to be joined through right reason.

[47:45] Don't hear that in sermons too much, do you? You don't hear that in sermons too often, do you? Now, I just want to skip the title of the article because I don't think it's in Thomas, is it? Originally, no, I think it's just the. I notice that when I read the Summa Contra Gentiles, which, as you know, is my so-called favorite work, but they have a title, you know, for each chapter, you know, and kind of fits it, but something's not exactly right, you know, and I suspect it's not by Thomas, right?

[48:27] So I, you know, not scholar, you know, but it makes right Thomas. I think that's put in by the editor, right? So on.