Prima Secundae
179. Summa I-II q.74, Part 2: Sin in the Passions and in Reason (Arts. 2–5); Mozart, Memory, and Mortal vs. Venial Sin
Class of 2014-10-02
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/179-summa-i-ii-q-74-part-2-sin-in-the-passions-and-in-reason/

[0:00] So, how does he reply to the first objection? To the first, therefore, it should be said that one does not sin except by the will as by a first what mover. So Thomas again is looking before and after, right?

[0:29] The other powers one sins by as by what ones that are moved by it, huh? Okay. Alii sultum potentis pecator, as as moved by it, meaning by the what the will, right?

[0:49] Now. To the second, it should be said, huh? That good and bad pertain to the will as the per se objects of it. This is good and bad in what general, right? Huh? Okay.

[1:12] But the other powers have some determined particular good and evil, by reason of which there can be in them virtue and vice and sin, according as they what of the will and of what reason, right? So Nicomachean Ethics in Aristotle, at the end of the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, he's talking about the need to consider virtue and so on, and then he gives the distinction of virtue, right?

[1:46] And the virtues have to involve reason; otherwise, it wouldn't be human, right? But it's not only the virtues of reason itself, but the virtues of that which partakes of reason, right? Okay. So,

[2:02] according as they partake of will and reason. Now, what about this last objection, saying that the sin doesn't see so much in the hand, right? Okay. He says the members of the body, right, like the hand, are not the beginnings of acts, but only the what? Tools or organa, tools. Whence they are compared to the what? Moving soul as a slave, huh? Which is what? Acted upon, huh?

[2:40] Or activated and doesn't act, right, huh? But the desiring powers, the interior desiring powers, are compared to reason as it were what? As were free, yeah, yeah. Because they are what? Some sense acted upon and act, right? As is clear through that which is said in the first book of Politics. What does Aristotle say there, right? You know, he's talking about the the rule of reason over the emotions, huh?

[3:17] Should reason rule the emotions like a master rules the slave, or like a father rules his what son? What is the Stoics answer to that? At least a caricature of a Stoic, huh? As a slave, right, huh? You know, and some psychologists say that's where you get into psychological problems, right? When when your reason, huh, rules your emotions like a what slave, right, huh? Okay, that kind of crushes the emotions, huh?

[4:00] Aristotle concludes that the reason should move, should rule the emotions like a father rules his son. Now, the son has to obey the father, right, huh? But the son has some what choice as to what he does in life, right? And the father listens some extent what the son wants to do, right, huh? Okay. I always remember my father. I think he's a very wise man in many ways, you know.

[4:31] But he was telling us the story of one of his, you know, business friends, right? He had all these hopes for his son who was going to do, right? And so he sent him out to Amherst, which is kind of a prestigious school out here, right, huh? That's going to be the first step on his glory path, right? And first year, of course, he flunked out. Right?

[4:52] He was not, you know, suitable to Amherst. In fact, he wasn't suitable to college at all. So finally, comes home and so to speak disgrace. I mean, he flunked out. And the father says, "What do you really want?" And he says, "He wanted a filling station, right? He wanted." So his father was you know good you know had a good you know, Money, he buys the filling station, sets them up in the car things you know, and the guy's happy, right?

[5:19] I think my father told me that because he could see that right now. He could see that his sons, you know, didn't want to maybe go into what into business, you know, and be professors or you know be philosophers or something like that, you know. And he said, "You could have a better life," he says, than I had. He says, "My father had a chance to go to college, right?

[5:37] You know, and so on." I mean, the father, since listens to what the sons want, but within reason, right? Huh? Something not even the the son wants, but he says so. Then what? I think that's kind of the success, you know. I mean, if you say, "Why do we need the fine arts, right?" And especially music, right? Aristotle in the eighth book of the Politics, he's talking about education there, right?

[6:00] It's a beautiful consideration of what the music and the what kind of music you should listen to, what kind of music, you know, is only for entertainment. Some music should be listened to at all, and so on, you know. But music is what if you have the music of the Baroque or the music of Mozart, right? It's very appealing to the ear, right, and to the emotions, but it moves the emotions in a what reasonable way, and therefore is disposing you what for moral virtue, right?

[6:34] Huh? It doesn't make you morally virtuous just to listen to Mozart Baroque, but it's disposing you in a sense for that, huh? And you're not what ruling the the when you use Mozart to rule your emotions, you're not what you're not treating the emotions as a slave, right? You're giving them something that they naturally rejoice, huh? I know when I first started to sing to Mozart, you'd say, now, you find that helps you control your emotions better.

[7:05] I think it came better with music that I did, you know, huh? But that's very important, right? Huh? And it's part of the way that the will should be what. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[7:21] And if you have an opera like the Marriage of Figaro there, Mozart, you can see what he's doing. He's doing exactly that, right? And see, you know, your you know Figaro and Susanna are going to get married, right? Huh? And of course, you know, you have the the droit du seigneur you know, so they're trying to outwit him, you know, and and you get you know emotionally attached to Figaro and Susanna, right?

[7:47] Against the the the Duke and of course. And the end, of course, is he is a he asks Susanna, you know, to meet him in the wooded area, and of course, his wife shows up. I mean, she's disguised as Susanna. So at the end, he's down on his knees, you know, asking forgiveness from his wife, you know, huh? And so, but it's a beautiful aria, you know, where she's, you know, you know, realizes she's getting older, and you know, he's he's running after a younger woman, and so on, you know, and it's a beautiful aria, you know, Dove sono, you know, you know, where these things.

[8:24] And but you see what Mozart's doing, right? You know, he's leading her along right? To what is something uh suitably suitably right? And Thomas says about good fiction, right? It should what? Um lead one into something virtuous through a suitable representation, right? That's what Shakespeare does, and what Mozart does, and what the great artists do, you know. But then there are other kinds of fiction and other kinds of music that just lead people astray, you know.

[8:56] I remember my cousin, you know, he got out of college, so he went into the navy for four years, and he was down there in the naval base, and it was in Newport or something, and uh, they rock and roll, running, thing, and people running wild. They were throwing these foldable chairs, you know. Talk about it! I mean, they're making me hurt you, you know, when these, you know, the description of the of the riot at the rock and roll concert.

[9:27] it's, This music is not disposing people. That's a reason, though. Yeah, yeah, just you know, and so, and music is especially important because it has such an emotional effect upon us, right? Mozart's instrumental music, you know, it's it's the symphonies that are really the most of all the moral education, you know. And of course the great operas are too, you know, but in instrumental music, it's the symphonies, right?

[9:58] It has a good effect upon the emotions. But this is true in general about the Baroque and Mozart, you know. The essay the Austria has, you know, it's that's

[10:11] very good essay. Why should you listen to that music, you know? Even people like Tchaikovsky, when they went back, you know, to listen to Mozart, and one of his friends said, "Well, why do you do that?" He said, "to escape from the from the romantic period, you know, you know, all this disorder, right?" So he's

[10:34] saying the the hand can't be a subject of sin Well, in a certainly much lesser way, yeah. It'd be a very, very diminished sense, right, compared to the emotions, right? Because the emotions can partake of reason, right? Yeah, and so it's something, you know, that this emotion of hate I might have, I'm going to hit you or something, you know, or this envy I have, or I'm feeling, you know, that is more able to be, you know, a subject of sin than my hand itself, right?

[11:03] Because the hand is just kind of like a slave; it just obeys, kind of automatically, right? Our Lord speaks to Saint Gertrude about the Father when He strikes a child. He says the hand has no choice. He speaks He speaks that way to Saint Gertrude. So he talks about the ones that God makes use of to punish us for our sin, they're not responsible. Yeah. So it's kind of Nellie's use of the illustration.

[11:31] Yeah. This will come out when he gets talking about sexuality, you know, in the next couple articles, you know. Um. So just look at the third objection again. There, to the third, it should be said that the members of the body are not beginnings of acts, but only what tools. Huh? Whence they are compared to the moving soul, right? As a slave, you might say, right? Huh?

[12:03] Which is what acted upon and does not act, right? But the desiring powers, the interior desiring powers, are compared to reason, as it were, being what free. And of course, the will primarily being free, right? But in a certain way, the emotions are in a certain state of their own, right? Huh? Which, in a certain way, right, act as well as are acted upon, right? As is clear through that which is said in the first book of Politics.

[12:34] And moreover, the acts of what exterior members are actions, what passing over into the exterior what matter, right? Huh? So they're not, as it were, in. I'm kicking you. It's more in you than in me. If you find out. Is it? So my so my hand my foot cannot be so much the subject, right? Huh? Of that activity, huh? Because more in you, huh? Okay.

[13:08] Um. Or the water, the fire heating the water, right? It's more in the water, right? It's being heated. Okay. And he gives example just as of the what striking, yeah, in the sin of homicide, right? In account of this, there is not a what similar what reason as is with the interior parts.

[13:37] Okay. To the third, one goes forward thus. Oh, take time for a break. Okay. Ready to go? To the third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in sensuality, that's kind of name for what the sense appetite, right? So falls irascible and concupiscent, right? It seems that in sensuality there cannot be what sin, right? Huh? For sin is something what private or proper to man, right? Because from his acts he is praised or blamed.

[14:19] But sensuality is common to us and the brutes. Therefore, in sensuality there cannot be sin, right? So it's like there's not sin in the beasts, right?

[14:35] Moreover, no one sins in that which he is not able to what avoid, as Augustine says in the book on free judgment, free will. But man cannot avoid but that the act of sensuality will be what disordered, right? For sensuality is of perpetual corruption, right? As long as we live in this mortal life, whence it is signified through the what serpent, huh? As Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity.

[15:13] Therefore, the disorder of the motion sensuality is not a sin. Now you have no control of that. Moreover, that which a man himself does not what, yeah, is not imputed to him for sin. But that only do we seem to what do that we do with the deliberation of reason, as the philosopher says in the ninth book of the what ethics, huh? So I should talk to students and say, you know, which is other things being equal, which is more serious, a murder of passion or a premeditated murder?

[15:56] premeditated murder? Yeah, you had time to think about it. It's like you, as I say, if you want to break off a relationship, if you do it in words, it's not as permanent as if you sit down writing the letter, right? Because you had a chance to think about what you're saying. You know, you write your insult, you insult somebody, you know, under passion, right? Huh? You're getting angry or frustrated with somebody.

[16:18] You can maybe apologize for it more easily, but if you write the insults, you know, let it go, it's pretty hard to take them back, you know.

[16:28] That's what somebody did. Writes a Christmas letter. He was complaining about the world and politics, man. And after he ranted on for a page, says, "Oh, but like my fingers got carried away on the keyboard." I don't think so.

[16:42] I don't think so. Therefore, the motion of sensuality that is without deliberation of reason, right, is not imputed to man as what to sin, huh? But against this is what is said by Saint Paul, I guess, huh, in Romans chapter what seven, huh? Not the good that I will, this do I do, but the evil that I hate, that I do, huh? Which Augustine expounds, huh, about the evil of concupiscence.

[17:20] Which it stands to, reason is a certain motion of what sensuality of the emotions. Therefore, in sensuality there is some sin, huh? Well, what does the master say? I answer, it should be said, this has been said above. Sin can be found in any what power whose act it can be what is able to be voluntary and disordered in what consists the ratio of sin, right? Most of the word inordinatus, right?

[17:58] Goes back to before and after, doesn't it? Shows you how that you know opposed to reason, right? It's disordered, right? Because reason is defined by order, right? Looking before and after, as Shakespeare says, huh?

[18:18] Now it is manifest that the act of sensuality can be voluntary, in so far as sensuality, that is the sensitive appetite, is apt to be moved by the what will. Hence it remains that in sensuality there can be what sin, huh?

[18:44] Now what's the difference between us and the beasts, right? Is the dog sin there and biting you, or barking at you? Thomas, that's what he's supposed to do. To the first, therefore, it should be said that some powers of the sensitive part, right, although they are common to us and to the brutes, nevertheless in us they have a certain what excellence from this that they are joined to what reason.

[19:21] Just as we, apart from the other animals, have in sensitive part cogitativa, right? That's the one that what like particular reason Aristotle calls it that brings together individual images and so on, and reminiscence, right, huh? Okay, Aristotle's a book on memory and reminiscence, right? Another expression, brute memory. See, that's not so human, is it? Memory rate, like what the beast says, you know. But what is reminiscence, right?

[19:51] See, was it kind of a like a discourse of reason, but in the memory, right? Huh? You know, as someone says to you, know, what were you doing last

[20:03] Sunday at at four o'clock? You know, say, well, I don't remember what I was doing Sunday at four o'clock. And then you say, well, now it's saying, see, oh yeah, Joe so and so came over on Sunday afternoon, yeah, around three o'clock, yeah. And then we talked for a while, yeah. We went out for a walk. Oh yeah, I was taking a walk at four o'clock, you know.

[20:23] Well, it's kind of a discourse, you know, from one thing to another, right? Huh? You know, I was I was laying in bed doing this, you know, I sleep about four or five hours, and then I wake up, and then I start thinking, or the thing. And this time I was thinking about Shakespeare's plays, right? And I was saying, now, I knew I had three good-natured comedies.

[20:44] What were they? Well, right away they came back, two of them, but not the third one. Comedy of Errors, right? And The Merry Wives of Windsor, right? And I say, why did those two come back to me and not the third one, right? I said, well, well, in Comedy of Errors, you got the word comedy in it, so obviously I would remember that in terms of that.

[21:06] And The Merry Wives of Windsor, well, that's the effect of comedy to make us merry, right? So I say that's why those two came back to me. What was the third one? I couldn't think of it. I'm getting the you know time of life where our names and things to remember it. And so I got up this morning and looked up. Oh, The Taming of the Shrew.

[21:23] Why the heck can I think of that? See, but but it didn't have the word comedy or merry in it, right? Huh? I said, now, how can I remember that better? Well, you see, in the in The Merry Wives of Windsor, they're being playing jokes and Falstaff, right? And he's making these proposals to the the wives of Windsor, and they pretend to accept, and they play some trick on him, right?

[21:44] And they find it is a great disgrace of him there in the forest. But why the taming of the shoe is the reverse. That's the the female getting out of order, right? Making shrew, and she has to be tamed, right? And so she's made fun of in a sense, right? And so in Falstaff, you have the man being, you know, made fun of, and Taming the Shrew, the woman, right?

[22:05] So oh yeah, yeah, that's that that's completeness there, right? I'll remember it, you know. See, but reminiscence, right? You know, you can remember things like that, huh? You know, remember one time I came into the office there with DeConnick, you know, and I was talking about some question about the text there, you know, and

[22:26] oh, when I said, you know, turn around, he's about to look at. He says, oh, don't even look at the book. He says, he saw his book, right? Because his memory is going by the, you know, you see. And I didn't even look at your book. You know, he first he looked at it, and turned around like that, just to show him the text I was, you know, reading the question about, you know.

[22:45] But you read that book sometime, and memory and reminiscence is called, you know. But reminiscence is like, you know, I don't even use the word syllogism, right? It's not a syllogism in the in the strict sense there, but there's a kind of a discourse of reason, you know, where one thing leads to what another, right? And now you think about somebody, and also you recall some time and some event in their life, and some some little thing, and it can, you know, go from one thing to another.

[23:14] So the Tessa Thomas is touching upon here, right? Reminiscence, right? There's a famous little work of Aristotle that comes after the De Anima. Book and the book comes sensation, the book comes memory and reminiscence. Okay,

[23:31] and in this way also the sense appetite in us has a certain excellence apart from that of other animals, huh? To wit, that it is apt to what naturally apt to obey what reason. Right, huh? And to that extent, it is able to be a what beginning of the voluntary act, and consequently a subject of what sin. What's that part of the soul that what can partake of reason, right?

[24:00] Without being essentially reasonable, right? And so the music of Mozart and then Baroque disposes the emotions, right, to partake of what reason, huh? And good fiction does that too.

[24:23] Now, what about this corruption, though, huh? It comes down from original sin, now. To the second, it should be said that that perpetual corruption of sensuality is to be understood as regards what the fomes yeah, The tinder, yeah, which is never wholly what taken away in this life, huh? For the original sin goes away as far as guilt, right? Baptism, I guess, and but effect, huh? Remains an act, huh?

[25:02] But such corruption of the fomes is not impeded, but that man what by reasonable will is able to repress individual disordered emotion sensuality, huh? If it is present, right?

[25:25] By diverting thought to the other things, right? So I always tell that story. I was driving up to Quebec, right? I said, well, I got to take a different road, so went through Maine there and took the route to President Kennedy, right? Well, the route to President Kennedy is no honor to President Kennedy because there's potholes all. So I was always slowing down, right? This Frenchman behind me, you know, he's getting impatient with me, right?

[25:51] So he finally, you know, had to pass me, you know, and he roared by me, you know, and his tires picked up a stone, right? I could hear it hit the side of the car. Well, I knew there was a you know new car, what it was. I knew there was a mark in the car, right? So when I got someplace there, I stopped finally, and so look at that thing.

[26:12] A little upset about it. I said, oh, I'm a philosopher. I don't get upset at such things. If I get back in the car, draw. Why repress that? That feeling, right? Why get upset about a mark in your car in this car? Father Hardin says one of the most important uses of your will is to direct your mind. but to think about it.

[26:40] But when a man right diverts his thought, right, huh? It can also what be that about that some what disordered motion arises right? Huh? Just as when one transfers his thought from what the delectables of the flesh, wishing to avoid the motion of what sins, huh? To the speculation of what knowledge, right? Huh? There breaks forth some motion of an empty glory, inane glory, right? That's one of the what capital sins, right?

[27:16] Inane glory, huh? Unpremeditated, right? Huh? Okay. And therefore a man is not able to avoid all motions of the sort, right? Huh? An account of the foresaid what corruption, right? Huh? But this only suffices to the what ratio of a voluntary sin that one is able to avoid what singular ones, right? Okay. So you can't avoid sin, as Saint John says, didn't he say that, didn't he?

[27:50] This this one has a footnote for the Council of Trent, which Council of Trent was teaches that we're not able to avoid all venial sins, and then they quote the Council, except by a special privilege of God, just like the Blessed Virgin Mary, as the Church holds. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[28:14] Now to the third, it should be said that that which man does without the deliberation of reason, he does not what perfectly, right? Do, huh? Because nothing does, ah,

[28:32] because nothing is done there by that which is principal in man, okay? Whence it is not perfectly a what Human act. human act, huh? And consequently, it cannot be what perfectly an act of virtue or of what sin, but something imperfect in the genus, huh? Of these, huh?

[28:58] Whence such a motion sensuality, going before, right? Coming before reason, is a peccatum veniale, right? Venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of what sin, huh?

[29:18] Okay. So there's some truth in those objections, right? But not the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Now, more difficult question here. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in sensuality, there is able to be what Mortal sin. mortal sin, huh? For the acts are what known from their object, right? It's famous thing in the the De Anima right? Aristotle says that the powers of the soul are known by their acts, and the acts are known by their what object, right?

[30:00] So by the music of Mozart, I know what hearing is. I don't know what hearing is. I don't know what the ear is, huh?

[30:12] But about the objects of sensuality, it happens that one can sin mortally, just as about the pleasurable, delectables of flesh, right? And therefore, the act of sensuality is able to be a what mortal sin, and thus in sensuality there is found mortal sin. That makes sense, huh?

[30:42] Moreover, mortal sin is contrary to virtue, but virtue can be in sensuality, for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, right? Parts are not rational essentially, right? As the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, huh? So in the third book of the Ethics, Aristotle takes up in particular the virtues of fortitude and what temperance, right? Takes up fortitude first, right? That's yeah, and then in book five he takes up what justice, right?

[31:22] And then in book four is is the lesser moral virtues, but very important ones, nevertheless, liberality and generosity and magnificence and magnanimity, right? philotimia, mildness, and then the social virtues of friendliness, sense of humor. What do you want to call it? eutrapelia. Shakespeare speaks very well of that, you know. Even the etymology of it, huh? Easily turning, right? eutrapelia, the guy who can turn anything he says into kind of yeah, yeah, yeah.

[31:56] That's what he describes Byron there in one of the plays, huh? Okay. Therefore, in sensuality there can be mortal sin, huh? Because opposed to virtue, since contraries are apt to be about the same. Moreover, venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. But disposition habits are in the same, since therefore venial sin is in sensuality, also mortal sin can be in the same.

[32:51] I ain't gonna solve that. huh? Put that in my pipe and smoke it. But against this is what Augustine says in the book of Retractions. All that, so Augustine doing his his correction of himself, right? And has had in the gloss Romans seven fourteen that the disordered motion of concupiscence, which is the sin of sensuality, is able to be even in those who are in what grace, in whom, however, mortal sin is not found.

[33:30] They took away grace. Therefore, the disordered motion of sensuality is not a mortal sin. Am I gonna get off this lightly or not? I don't know.

[33:44] I answer. It should be said that just as a disorder corrupting the principle of bodily life causes what bodily death, right? When I was a boy, I thought everybody who died died of a heart attack, right? Because everybody that I seem to know that died died of a heart attack. Didn't long, didn't live long enough to get cancer, whatever it is they get now.

[34:11] So a disorder corrupting the what spiritual life, right? Which is the last end causes what spiritual death, mortal sin. This has been said above, huh? Interesting, huh? Because in the body you think of what the heart, right, is kind of the principal organ there, causes death.

[34:40] But to order something to the end is not of sensuality, but only of what reason on the orderer. For a disorder from the end is not except of the one to whom it belongs to order things to the end. Whence mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, but only in what?

[35:15] I don't know if he means to exclude will. I don't think he means that, does he? Sometimes will said to be in reason, right?

[35:29] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the act of sensuality can what run together to mortal sin. But the act of what mortal sin does not have that it be a what. From this, that it is a sensuality. Just take the first part of the sentence. It wouldn't make any sense.

[35:57] But from this, that it is a what reason to which it belongs to order things to an end. And therefore, mortal sin is not attributed to sensuality, but to reason. That's a very subtle thing he's saying there, right? It's reason that orders things to an end.

[36:21] To the second, it should be said that also the act of virtue is not perfected through this that is a sensuality only, but more through this that is a reason and the will, to whom it belongs to what choose. For the act of moral virtue is not without choice. So Aristotle defines moral virtue in general in the second what book, right? How does he define it? It's a habit, right?

[36:52] With choice, existing in the middle towards us, is determined by right reason, right? So the choice is in the what very definition of moral virtue, and choice is an act of the what the will and reason rather than of the what sensuality, right? So that's principle. Whence

[37:26] always with the act of moral virtue, which perfects the desiring power, right, is also the act of what foresight? Yeah, very good. Which perfects the rational power, huh? And it's also the same thing then about moral mortal sin, right? This has been said, huh?

[37:51] Now, what about this argument from disposition, right? Well, Thomas sees a distinction there. To the third, it should be said that disposition has itself in three ways to that to which it disposes. Sometimes it is same and in the same, right? As the science that is begun, right, huh, is said to be a disposition for perfect what science, huh?

[38:28] Sometimes it is in the same, but is not the same, as heat is a disposition to the form of what, Fire fire. Sometimes it is neither the same nor in the same, right? As in those things which have an order to each other, so that from one of them one arises at the other, just as the goodness of the imagination is a disposition for science, which is an intellect.

[38:56] That's true, especially in geometry, right? And in this way, venial sin, which is in sensuality, can be a disposition for what, mortal sin that is in reason. I suspect that he'd solve it that way, right? What disposes, right?

[39:21] If your emotions are all disordered, it's going to dispose you to make a bad judgment by your reason, right? But the reason is a different faculty, right, than the faculty for the emotions. Okay. So we get time for another article here. Okay. To the fifth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that sin cannot be in reason.

[39:53] For the sin of any power is some defect of it, but the defect of reason is not a sin, but more excuses one from sin.

[40:07] For one is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore, in reason there cannot be sin. Moreover, the first subject of sin is the will.

[40:24] But reason comes before the will, since it directs it. Therefore, sin cannot be what in reason. It's interesting. Moreover, there can be no sin except about those things which are in our power, so to speak, in us. But the perfection and defect of reason is not of those things which are in us, for some are naturally deficient in reason.

[41:02] Or what? Yeah, some are solertia I don't know what that word means Does it mean quick Yeah they're the quick. huh Yeah. Therefore, in reason there is what no sin.

[41:20] But against this is what Augustine says in the twelfth book on the Trinity that sin is both in the lower reason and in higher reason, right?

[41:38] I answer: It should be said that the sin of any power consists in the act of that power, as is clear from the thing said.

[41:50] But reason has a double act, a twofold act. One by itself, you might say, huh? In comparison to its own object, huh? Which is to know something what true. Another is the act of reason, in so far as it directs the other what powers, huh?

[42:17] In both ways, it happens for there to be a sin in reason, huh? And first, in so far as it wanders, it errs in the knowledge of truth, huh?

[42:38] Which is then imputed to it for a sin, when it has ignorance or error about that which is it is able and not to what, know.

[42:55] Was a Jesuit priest at one time. Yeah, didn't like that at all. You you broke his contract. Secondly, when it commands disordered acts of the lower what powers, huh? I'm going to seduce this young lady or something, right? Or also after what deliberation it does not what coerce, right? The lower powers, huh? Okay.

[43:35] So it's in both ways, right? Huh? When I don't know or am mistaken about things, I'm able to know and should know, right? Then that's something what sin for one reason, right? And when I disorderedly what?

[43:54] Yeah, yeah. That's sin reason, huh? So to the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? That that argument proceeds about the defect of reason, which pertains to its own act with respect to its own object, right? And this, when the defect of knowledge is of what someone is not able to what to know, huh? Then such a defect of reason is not a sin, but excuses from sin, right, huh?

[44:39] As is clear in those things which are committed by the furious. If, however, is a defect of reason about that which man is able and ought to know, it does not what altogether excuse man from what sin, huh? But that defect is imputed to him for what sin, huh? The defect, however, which is only in directing other powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, huh?

[45:17] Because it can what? Interrupting, if you might say. or interject or something Yeah. To its own act, huh? Now, what about the order here of reason and will?

[45:34] To the second, it should be said, huh? This has been said above. When When treated of the acts of the will and reason, that the will, in some way, moves and precedes reason, and reason, in some way, what will right? Whence the movement of the will is able to be called what reasonable, and the act of reason is able to be called what voluntary right? And according to this, in reason there is found sin.

[46:10] Either in so far as what its defect is voluntary, or in so far as the act of reason is a beginning of the act of the will. And to the third is clear the response from things said.

[46:28] Was that enough to chew on? Indigestion, right? Alboles always talk about intellectual indigestion, right?