Prima Secundae
180. Summa I-II q.74 a.6-10: Morose Pleasure, Consent in Higher and Lower Reason, and Mortal vs. Venial Sin
Class of 2014-10-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/180-summa-i-ii-q-74-a-6-10-morose-pleasure-consent-in-higher/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, to enlighten our minds, in order to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question seventy-four, Article Six.

[0:31] To six, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the sin of morosae delectationis huh, it's kind of a what? Morose pleasure is not in reason, right, huh? For delectatio, pleasure, delight, implies the emotion of the appetitive what? Power, yeah. But the appetitive power is distinguished from reason, which is a grasping power, right? Therefore, morose pleasure is not in what? Reason, huh? I was reading in Thomas there, another text there, where he's saying that

[1:23] the appetitive act, and especially desire, seems to be like motion, right? Why knowing is more like rest. And I'm just thinking of the idea of grasp, right? That idea of you know you're holding something at rest, so to speak, and by desire you're kind of going out to the thing in search of it, is where. And so the emotions are well named in that sense from motion.

[1:46] Not only because there's a bodily motion, but because desire itself is that sort of thing. Moreover, one is able to know from the objects to which what power the act belongs, huh? So if the object is color, then it belongs to the eye, and so on, right? To this that the power or ability is ordered to what the object. But sometimes the what morose pleasure is about sensible goods, huh?

[2:22] And not about the goods of reason. Therefore, the good of morose pleasure is not in what? Reason, Reason huh? Moreover, morosum, huh, is something said to be morosum on account of the what? Length of the time, right? But the length of time is not a reason why some act pertains to some power. Therefore, morose pleasure does not pertain, but yeah.

[2:59] But against this is what Augustine says in the twelfth book, the Trinity, that the consent to a what illicit I guess, if one is contented only with the what pleasure of the thought.

[3:17] This I think is like having right a woman right, but alone it's a what food that is prohibited right. Oh yeah, I'm sorry. a bacon Yeah. It's kind of a strange text there from Augustine, right?

[3:41] You're thinking of Eve Yeah. But to the woman is understood lower reason, right? As he expounds there. Therefore, the sin of morose pleasure is in reason. This is obscure enough, isn't it?

[4:04] Answer should be said. This has been said. Sin happens to be in reason sometimes, right? In so far as it is what directing human acts, right?

[4:21] Now it is manifest that reason not only directs exterior acts but also the inward passions, huh? And therefore, when reason fails fails in the direction of the inward passions, there is said to be sin in what reason.

[4:49] Just as when one fails in the direction of what exterior acts, huh? Can I take a little pause there, right? Now he goes into two ways this takes place, right? The it reason huh fails in the direction of the inward or interior passions in two ways, right? In one way, when it commands illicit what passions. Just as when a man from deliberation provokes in himself I guess emotion of what anger or what yeah.

[5:32] Notice he takes those two things, anger and concupiscence, because they are what. Yeah, for the vehemence, huh? Okay. Shakespeare mentioned that metaphor there, and yeah, you like it, right? Yeah, in the very what. Wrath, love. Yeah. But you know when Thomas takes up temperance, the virtue of temperance, right? And then he takes up other virtues that are similar to temperance, and he does so with the other ones, right?

[6:05] He takes up the mildness, which moderates what anger, with what temperance, right? Because you have these two strong emotions, right? Okay. And Samuel Johnson, huh? You can see that anger comes out sometimes, huh? So much that you know Irving, not Irving, but Boswell compares it to you know, you know, like going to erupt the mountain or something, you know. He's got to kind of avoid these things, right?

[6:35] Huh? And I was just quoting earlier the freak. Even he's he's very kind of mad at the Americans, right? Huh? For their insubordination, huh? And he says, talking about you know your neighbor and being good to your neighbor, I'm going to be good to every man, he says, except an American, he says. He goes on, he gets really angry, you know, for some reason, huh? And

[7:04] funny, huh? That's that's an emotion that needs. Shakespeare has the famous what Coriolanus there, right? Yeah, his anger, right? Once he gets his anger going, and he can't control himself, huh? But I think I think men who are gaining power, you know, tend to have some kind of an anger, you know, to kind of frighten their subordinates unless there's nothing else.

[7:31] So that's when it when it what actually commands illicit passions, right? That's one way. Another way when it does not repress, right? A illicit or unlawful motion of passion, right? As when someone after he has deliberated that the motion of the passion arising is what disordered, right? Nevertheless, he what dwells, right?

[7:59] About it, and does not what expel it, right? Huh? And according to this, sin of what indwelling, dwelling on pleasure is in what reason, huh?

[8:16] Now, to the first objection, he says that pleasure is in the desiring power, as in a what proximate principle or beginning, right? But it is in reason, as in the first what motive, right? According as has been said above, that actions which do not go out into exterior matter are as in a subject in their what very beginnings, huh?

[8:53] Wouldn't this be true of all sins? Yeah, I don't know why he's taking it up with pleasure in particular, right? But maybe that's a question for the, you

[9:06] know. What he's saying seems to be true. When we use our reason to direct all our moral actions. Yeah. Yeah. So in the reply to second objection, he kind of gets into that. To the second, it should be said that reason has its own what? Illicit action, right? About its what? Its own object, right? Huh?

[9:32] But it has direction about what? All the objects of the lower powers, right? Which powers can be directed and are able to be directed by reason, right? And according to this, also pleasure about sensible objects pertains to what? Reason. To the third objection from the idea that,

[10:09] yeah, pleasure is not said to be what remaining or dwelling, not from the what remaining of time, but from this that reason deliberates about it, right?

[10:34] By dwelling on it a long time, but does not nevertheless does not repel it, right? Holding on to and evolving freely, what at once as they attack the soul ought to be what rejected, huh? As Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity, huh?

[11:01] Jump into the the bush, right? Benedict, is it Saint Francis, too. Okay, to the seventh one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the sin of consent and act is not in higher what Reason. reason, right?

[11:40] For to consent is an act of the desiring power, as has been said above. But reason is a vis apprehensiva. Doesn't want to say knowing. He says apprehending, grasping.

[12:00] Therefore, the sin of consent and act is not in higher reason. Moreover, higher reason aims at what the eternal reasons at looking upon them and what consulting them, right? Thomas said, sometimes we'll stop in those two words of Augustine, huh? In inspiciendis, right, which means looking upon them in themselves, right? And then consulting for the sake of the lower thing, you're consulting what is in accord with the the higher.

[12:37] Yeah. But sometimes it consents in act, not consulting the eternal reasons, right? For not always does a man think about divine things when he consents in some act. Therefore, the sin of consent and act is not always in higher reason. Moreover, just as through the eternal reasons a man is able to regulate or rule exterior acts, so also interior what pleasures or other passions.

[13:23] But to consent in pleasure without this, that what one states it should be what fulfilled by doing is of inferior reason, as Augustine says. Therefore, also consent in the act of sin ought sometimes, right, to be attributed to lower reason. All the trouble that Augustine got us into by starting this distinction between higher and lower reason.

[14:01] Moreover, just as higher reason excels lower, so reason excels the imaginative power. But sometimes a man proceeds to act through the grasping of the imaginative power without any deliberation of what reason, huh? Just as in someone from an unpremeditated, without meditating, moves his hand or is what foot. Therefore, also sometimes reason, lower reason, consents in the act of sin without what higher reason, right?

[14:43] Didn't know it was a sin though, to move your foot. Yeah, I was thinking about those times. Of course, you ever wake up shortly after you go to sleep, you you wake up with a sudden movement like that. Your arm moves or something. Why? I don't know. Thomas talks about the beard too. You know, you can't hear. You know. Yeah. You guys should know about that, right?

[15:04] But I wonder. Wonder if Thomas had a beard. It's a customary phrase. No, usually don't pretend as having a beard. I mean, you know, the paintings don't have the beard. Yeah.

[15:17] Because Siriki and Mel teach you always talk about that painting of just the Dominican there, where everybody you know with the crosses on the cross and like that. Everybody's you know, you know, kind of penitent, so looking down. Thomas is looking at the cross. Kind of understandable. What is this? You know. It never was. There was a stained glass window in a parish where they had Christ and the finding in the temple.

[15:44] You got the Christ drawing, all these Jewish-looking guys, and down in the front, it was interesting. It was done at the end of the 19th century or beginning of 20th century, and one of the figures they had down in the front was all dressed in red. He's got this very aquiline nose, and it's Newman. Yeah. And in the back is this big jolly-looking friar with like Thomas Aquinas listening to the grater.

[16:07] Hey! And Newman's on the big man. It was a stained glass window. Oh. It was a Jesuit parish, and some Germans did this stained glass, but it was curious that they put Aquinas in the back. Yeah. With this astonishment on his face, the wisdom. This is the scene of the finding in the temple. Yeah, so they got mostly you know Jewish-looking rabbis, but then Aquinas in the back, Newman's down in the front.

[16:33] It's kind of curious. Okay, now Augustine's got this likeness here, where he compares the woman and what Adam, right, to lower reason, right, and higher reason, in their being tempted, right. For if Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity that if in the consent of using badly things which are what sense through the sense of the body, right, huh? There is to be what discerned any sin.

[17:16] If what. There be what, right? Also, completed by the body. It should be understood that the what woman is given listen food to the man, right? The woman superior reason is what signified, right? Therefore, to higher reason pertains consent in the act of sin. I remember the parish there. We had the auxiliary bishop was our pastor there, you know, for a number of years, right? And very holy man, you know.

[17:52] Of course, the ladies in the parish know. We always try to go communion from him, you know, rather than just a regular priest, right? You know, so so you'd have all these little girls and all these people would go over to him, you know, and then and the poor priest not getting.

[18:08] I don't think that you you get any more for it. But when he was saying, you know, what he was saying was that that if Adam had not gone wrong with her, right, we would not have been, you know. We're fallen nature. Yeah, yeah. I don't know what would have happened here, but yeah, yeah. But I mean, we would not have, you know, descended to all of us, you know, this original sin, right?

[18:31] So he's if he's being compared to higher reason, right, and she to lower reason, right, well then, you know, his consent was what really done us in.

[18:49] Therefore, to higher reason pertains to consent in the act of sin. I answer: It should be said that consent implies a certain judgment about that in which one consents, right, or to which one consents. For just as looking reason, as I say, judges and gives a judgment about understandable things, so practical reason, right, judges and gives a position about things to be done, right.

[19:32] But it should be considered that in every judgment, the last what sentence pertains to the supreme judging power, right? Just as we see in speculative matters that the last what judgment about some proposition is given by resolution to first beginnings, right? I was thinking, you know, a good question. I was going to try to catch Warren or something on this, you know. I said, does reason go from beginnings to conclusions, or does it go from conclusions to beginnings?

[20:09] What would you say? Yes. It seems it can do both right Yeah. It can go both ways. But you might be inclined to say, you know, well, the conclusion is deduced from the from the beginnings, right? And therefore, reason goes from the beginnings to the conclusion. To go from conclusion to the beginning, I mean, would be going backwards, right? But in the reasoning, going to a conclusion, you have to appeal to some higher.

[20:39] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. What Thomas expresses in this one text is he says, reason goes from the beginnings to the conclusion in the via inveniendi, right? In the way of finding and looking, and then it goes from the what thing is found back to the beginnings, right? Huh? In via iudicandi, in the way of judging, right? Huh? So you go back there, right? Huh? And I notice myself sometimes in in you know, I'm getting working Euclid, but you know, you followed the argument, you know, to the conclusion, right?

[21:12] And then you kind of see, now, can I resolve that conclusion back into the things that are more known, right? Whereby you you judge it finally, right? But it's kind of interesting to see that the mind doesn't. there's. Kind of a circle there in the mind, huh?

[21:36] So long as there remains some beginning that is higher, right, huh? Still, through it, one can examine that about which one is what asking, right, huh? Because not yet is what? Because still yet is suspended the what judgment, as it were, not having been given the what final sentence of judgment, right? Okay. Sentencia, as we get the sense of the Lombard right It's like the opinions, you might say, right?

[22:13] Yeah, yeah, that's one of. Okay. Now it's manifest that human acts are able to be ruled from the rule of human reason, right? Which is taken from what created things, which naturally man what knows, and then further from the rule of the divine law, as has been said above, right, huh? Whence, since the rule of the divine law is superior, it follows that the last or the ultimate judgment, right, ultimate rather position, through which the judgment is finally or at last terminated, pertains to superior reason, which pays attention to the eternal reasons, huh, which looks towards them, which aids at them.

[23:18] When, however, about many things it occurs to judge, right? The final judgment is about that which last what occurs, huh? Now, in the human acts, the last thing that occurs is the what act, huh? But a preambulum, huh? Walking before, right? Is what the pleasure which leads one into the act, into the act, and therefore to higher reason properly pertains consent in the act,

[24:01] but to lower reason, which has a inferior or lower judgment, pertains the what preambulum judgment, right? Which is about pleasure, right, huh? Doesn't Thomas, you know, use the word preambulum, He talks about philosophy being kind of for theology preambula, right?

[24:26] Although also higher reason it can judge about pleasure, because whatever is subject to the judgment inferior, is also subject to the judgment of the superior. but then, not the reverse, huh?

[24:43] He doesn't really I thought he maybe would explain the distinction between lower and higher reason. That that comes up in the prima pars, right? When he takes up reason, right? Then he asks whether higher reason and lower reason are two different powers in us, right? They're not two different powers; it's the same reason, but it's one is looking at the eternal, and the other is looking at something, more temporal, right?

[25:03] So they're not really separate, but powers. He does the same thing. He asks whether looking reason and practical reason are two different reasons, right? They're really the same reason, right? But one is, you know, directing us in our actions; the other is just considering the truth in itself or by itself. I often think of that distinction between the lower and the higher because of what Saint Paul speaks of the spirit and the soul.

[25:26] Because the soul anima is looking like the word animal is kind of looking towards the body, whereas the spirit looking towards God. Yeah, yeah. Saint's spirit has a sense of the the part of the soul that is immaterial, right? Now, involves the reason and the will, right? That's that's spiritual. Why the soul is defined as the act of a natural body composed of tools, right?

[25:57] So sometimes called a soul in terms of its being the act of the body, right? But insofar as it is not, has being that's not just in the body, right? A being that Thomas says not immersed in the body, right?

[26:13] Then we call it a spirit, right? Now wasn't it magnificat right? My soul magnifies the Lord. Spirit rejoices in God, my Savior. Right, it's kind of interesting that she uses those two words, right? I know when she says my soul magnifies the Lord, she's thinking of being the mother of God, you know. But then it's in her body, right? That she she gives birth to him, right?

[26:40] But her her spirit, meaning her will and her reason, right? Rejoices in the Lord himself, right? Which is kind of magnifying, multiplying God's presence in things, right?

[26:59] Interesting. Now to the first objection, it should be said that to consent is an act of the desiring power, not absolutely, but consequently to the act of reason deliberating and judging.

[27:24] In this, for in this consent is terminated, that the will tends to that which has been judged by what reason. Whence consent can be attributed to both will and to reason. The

[27:54] second should be said that from this, that higher reason does not direct human acts according to the divine law, impeding the act of sin. Right? It is said to what consent? Right? Whether it thinks about the what Eternal law of God. or not.

[28:15] For when it thinks about the law of God, in act it has what contempt? Right? When it does not think about it, it neglects it. Right? By way of a certain omission, right? Or that could be a sin too.

[28:33] Whence, in all ways, consent in the act of sin proceeds from higher reason. Whence, because as Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity,

[28:53] that is not able to what? Effectively, perpetrating. It can't be discerned by the mind that sin has been efficaciously perpetrated, unless that intention of the mind, among whom or by whom, is what the highest power of moving members to to do something or prohibiting or prohibiting them from working. Right? When it gives way to a what? Yeah, for sure.

[29:43] When Joshua comes back, is slapped and all. Yeah, put all all of us to shame, right? Augustine writes in Thomas. I mean I read things like that's not right sometimes At least they say you know Aristotle's Greek and those pig Greek, you know. They say you know I play this book for you know, flour for it all. Yeah, yeah. But Thomas, I think, adopts that, right? But if you see his dedicatory epistles to the Pope, you know, then there, then they have a different type for Latin or formal, but that's not appropriate for teachers to do that.

[30:20] So I say looking reason rather than speculative reason or theoretical reason. People are so accustomed to those Latin or Greek words, you know, that they don't. What's that?

[30:48] To the third, it should be said that higher reason, through its consideration of the eternal law, just as it is able to direct or to what prohibit, you know, or restrain, yeah, an exterior act, so so it can do this with the interior what pleasure, right?

[31:13] But nevertheless, before it arrives at the judgment of higher reason, right? At once, as sensuality proposes pleasure, right? Lower reason, huh? Deliberating through temporal reasons, right? Sometimes accepts this what pleasure, right? And then consent in pleasure pertains to what lower reasons, huh? If however, considering eternal reasons, man perseveres in the same consent, right? Then such a consent pertains to what higher reason, right?

[31:59] It doesn't seem to be saying that it only takes place by consent to higher reason, right? That's really consent, and it should, you know, consult those things, but sometimes it does not.

[32:20] To the fourth, it should be said that the grasping of the imaginative power is sudden and without what deliberation, and therefore it can cause some act before higher or lower reason has the time of what. But the judgment of lower reason is with some deliberation, huh? Which needs time, in which also, in which also, higher reason is able to what deliberate. Whence it does not

[32:58] prevent from the act of sin to its deliberation, it is imputed to it, huh? Okay. Okay. Get to Article Eight. To the eighth one, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that consent in pleasure is not a what mortal sin, right? Huh? For to consent in pleasure pertains to what lower reasons, yeah, which is not to aim or pay attention to the eternal reasons or the divine law, and consequently neither to be what away from them.

[34:00] But every mortal sin is by turning away from the divine law, as is clear to the definition of Augustine on given of mortal sin. Therefore, consent in pleasure is not a what mortal sin, huh?

[34:20] Moreover, to consent in something is not bad except because that is bad in what one consents, right? That's clear enough, huh? Sit. Oh, there's your favorite phrase. Yeah. And kind of what each thing that more, that more, or at least not less, huh? Usually doesn't have that.

[34:55] Therefore, that and what in which one consents, right, is able to be what a lesser evil than the consent itself. But pleasure without the deed is not a mortal sin, but venial only. Therefore, neither consent in pleasure is what a mortal what sin, huh?

[35:26] Moreover, pleasures differ in goodness and badness according to the difference of what operations, as the philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics, right? Aristotle takes up pleasure before he takes up what happiness as final consideration.

[35:46] But other is the interior thinking, right? The operation, and another the exterior act, as example of fornication. Therefore, also the pleasure falling upon the act of interior thinking

[36:07] so much differs from the pleasure of fornication in goodness or badness as interior thinking differs from exterior act, and consequently also the same way it differs to consent in both. But the interior thinking is not a mortal sin. Therefore, neither is a consent in that what thinking. Therefore, consequently, neither consent in the what pleasure, right? Christ answers that one very directly. That one was a very direct answer on authority.

[36:44] Oh my, he's got six objections. Yeah. Moreover, the exterior act of fornication or adultery is not a mortal sin by reason of the pleasure, which is also found in the matrimonial act, but by reason of the disorder of the act itself.

[37:06] But the one who consents in the pleasure, not an account of this, consents in the disorder of the act. Therefore, it does not seem to be mortally sin. That's brilliant.

[37:19] It would take somebody like St. Thomas to think a reason for that. Moreover, the sin of homicide is more grave than that of simple fornication. But to consent in the pleasure which follows thinking about homicide is not a mortal sin. Oh, I put that in order. Think of these ISIS people. Are they beheading people all day? Yeah.

[37:52] Therefore, much less is it to consent in the pleasure which follows the thought about fornication a mortal sin. Really good question. Isn't that correct? Yeah. They

[38:10] do the seminaries and they they give lessons on hearing confession. You know. Yeah. One of the philosophers there in my brother Richard's department there said, "Going to a priest under thirty is just not worth it." You know, you gotta get an old guy. You know, he's been around for a while.

[38:40] Yeah. Moreover, the Lord's prayer is said daily, right, for the omission of what sins, as Augustine says. Huh. The text in the gospel text this morning was the one on prayer there in the in Luke, right? Huh. Which is not as complete the prayer as the one in the Sermon on the Mount, right? Huh. Got thinking about it because it it it had,

[39:12] "Hallowed be thy name," I think, and thy kingdom come, but not thy will be done, right? They went to you know to the get us our daily bread, right? I was like, let that that one out.

[39:26] Anyway. Um. But consent in pleasure, Augustine teaches, to be abolished by the Lord's Prayer, right? To say it for these sins. For he says in the twelfth book of the Trinity that this is what, much less a sin, right? Then if it were what? To be fulfilled I guess so Yeah, it set it down, right? Stated to be fulfilled. And therefore, about such thoughts, venia, forgiveness, should be asked, huh?

[40:08] And petimus quae dicendum, dimitte nobis debita nostra, right? Therefore, consent in pleasure is a venial sin, huh? We're going to quote Augustine again, right? Augustine against Augustine.

[40:38] But against this is what Augustine says, after a little while, that the whole man is what, unless these things which, without the will of doing, right? Nevertheless, with the will of what?

[40:57] Yeah. Only thought about them is thinking to be sins. To be sins is thought alone, right? To be what, remitted, forgiven through the grace of the mediator. But no one is damned except for mortal sin. Therefore, consent in pleasure is a mortal sin, right?

[41:31] I think most people who are saved go to to purgatory, yeah. I think so. See, as I flew over there a few years ago, you know where the sun got afterwards, you know, and asked us to pray for his father, right? You know, because you don't know what, you know, his thing is, and you know, people say, oh, I'm so glad he's, you know, out of the suffering, you know, maybe suffering more.

[42:04] and something more than he did Yeah. You know, the the old priest in the parish church said to my mother, you know, after my father died, never stop praying for him because we don't know when when they get out, you know. There's too much of this, you know. Yeah. Yeah, I remember my father died because well, his sacraments were versus. I hope so.

[42:34] That's what I heard. This really irresponsible remark. There's a girl out in California. I talked about this brain brain death happened about a year ago. She had some surgery, and the cop, she's only 13 years old, and they declared her brain dead, and all they issued a death certificate the whole night there, but she's still on the ventilator for almost a year now, and mother refuses to pull the plug and so on and so forth, and they've got videos now.

[43:02] She's moving. Mother tells them, moves her hand, she moves her hand, moves her foot, and everything. Anyways, but some priest got on Fox News, and he's sort of a talking head, Catholic opinions on things, and they asked him about it, and he just, he said, well, the doctors said she's dead, therefore she's in heaven now. And I said, well, that's first of all, that's a presumption about the state of soul, but her body is alive.

[43:25] I mean, it's there, and the fact is, the surgery she had, she's healed from. Corpses don't heal. And and and and and it goes on, but it's just so it's just so irresponsible.

[43:38] Because the doctor said it, therefore it's it's uh infallible or something. When yeah, the more I learn about this brain dead thing, the more if I'm brain dead, don't pull the plug. We have some interesting articles in the brain. Well, they used to declare brain dead to sleep for almost two years. That seems to be it. Because they pretty much that's pretty much it for fresh organs.

[44:02] Yeah, it seems to be what Father Tad, what's his name, said. Was it brain dead? According to what this comment said, is really brain injured. It's like their handicap. They're not really dead because the body is doing things that if they if they were the brain was really dead, according to what John Paul said, they wouldn't be. They'd be decomposing within days. But I mean, but it's just that preacher Mark.

[44:31] Because the doctors that she did, therefore she's in heaven. That doesn't even make sense. It makes sense. Okay. Answer should be said that about this some have opined diversely.

[44:59] For some, right, say right that consent in pleasure is not a mortal sin, but venial only. Others say that it is a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more like the truth, right?

[45:31] It should, however, be considered that since every pleasure follows some operation, as is said in the tenth book of the Ethics, and again since every pleasure has some object, right?

[45:46] The any pleasure can be compared to two things, right? To it, to the operation which it what follows, and to the object in which someone what delights.

[46:05] Now it happens that some operation is the object of pleasure, just as some other thing is, because the operation can be taken as a good and as a what end in which someone being pleased rests.

[46:31] And sometimes the operation itself, which pleasure follows, right, is an object of what pleasure. In so far as the what desiring power to which it belongs to what take delight comes back upon right its own what operation as kind of good, as when someone thinks and delights about that which he thinks. In so far as his thinking is what pleasing, right? Sometimes pleasure fall in one operation, as for example, some what thought has for an object another what operation, as were a thing thought about, right?

[47:30] And then the such a pleasure proceeds from the inclination of the desiring power, not in the thinking itself, but in the operation thought about, huh? Thus, therefore, someone thinks thinking about fornication can be pleased about two things, huh? In one way about the thinking itself; in another way about the fornication being thought of.

[48:10] Now the pleasure about the thinking itself follows the inclination of the affections, right? In the thinking itself. Now the thinking itself by itself is not mortal sin, right?

[48:35] Nay, sometimes it is venial only, as when someone uselessly thinks. Wicked in that kind of said all the time I guess. Sometimes without sin entirely, as when someone usefully thinks about something, right? As when he wants to preach about it or dispute about it, right?

[49:03] And thus, consequently, the affection and the pleasure which is thus about the thinking of fornication is not of the genus of mortal sin. But sometimes it is a venial sin; sometimes none. Whence neither is the consent in such a pleasure a mortal sin. And in this way, the first opinion has some truth, right?

[49:33] But that someone thinking about fornication would be delighting about the act thought about, right? This happens from this that his affection is inclined to the act.

[49:50] Whence that someone consents in such a pleasure, this is nothing other than that he consents in that to which his what affection is inclined

[50:03] in fornication. For no one delights except in that which is conformed to his what appetite. Whence that someone, from deliberation, chooses that his affections be conformed to those things which, in themselves, are mortal sins, is a peccatum mortale. When such a consent in the pleasure of mortal sin is a what mortal sin, as the second opinion lays down.

[51:03] Do you have this text here from some of the propositions condemned by Innocent XI? This is one of the things. Licitum est filio filio, right? Gaudere de parricidio parentis hac in ebrietate perpetrato, propter ingentes divitias inde hereditate consecutas. That's else condemned. Whether is it licit for a son, right, to rejoice about the what? parricide of his parents perpetrated by himself in ebrietate in being drunk on account of the divitias inde hereditate consecutas.

[51:59] That shouldn't be condemned. It seems to me. This one here is condemned here. If with debita moderatio, you do one can without mortal sin. About the life of another to be sad, right?

[52:34] And about his death, natural death, to rejoice, right? That to ask and desire by an efficacious affection, not from displeasure of the present, but on account of some temporal emolumentum Now, see, would this be a sin if you thought, you know, that if my father died, ah, I would have all this money, something, right? Is that you know, would be kind of nice. I got bills to pay.

[53:16] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Would that be? Yeah, yeah. See, what would that be? How would you handle that in a confession? Say, well, those things are good, but maybe dwelling on them too much would be getting closer to. the. serious Mm mm mm

[53:35] E Even the natural death of your parent, you could see some good coming to you, right? And so, are you rejoicing in the good that has come to you from the death of your father, or are you rejoicing in the death of your father because it is, you know, I mean, you know, there's a kind of, you know, yeah, that's kind of like the guy saying,

[54:11] "Is it okay to pray when I'm smoking or smoke when I'm praying?" Yeah. Which you know, which is it? What's your primary attention? Well,

[54:44] he says he's going to get demmed anyway. To the first, therefore, should be said that consent in pleasure can be not only of what lower reason, but also of what higher reason. And nevertheless, lower reason is able to be turned away from the eternal reasons, right? Huh?

[55:07] Because although it does not intend or aim at them, that it should be ruling according to them, right? Because that's proper to superior or higher reason, right? It intends nevertheless, right, that it be ruled according to them, right? And in this way, turning itself away from them, it can sin what mortally.

[55:32] For the acts of the lower powers and even of the exterior members, right, can be mortal sins, according as they lack the order of higher reason, huh? Ruling them according to the eternal reasons

[55:55] To the second, it, should be said that consent in sin that is venial from its genus, right, is a what venial sin, huh? And according to this, it can be concluded that consent in the pleasure which is of the vain thought of fornication is a venial sin. It's a little kind of strange what he's saying. But the pleasure which is in the very act itself of fornication, right.

[56:27] So that is about the vain thought of fornication, not the thing itself, right? But pleasure, which is in the very act itself of fornication, is of its what genus, a mortal sin, right? But before consent, it is a venial sin only, right? This would be only prejudicial on account of the imperfection of the act, right? Which imperfection is taken away through the deliberate what consent coming upon it.

[57:01] Whence from this it is led into its own nature that be a what mortal sin now. Now the third objection: that argument proceeds from the pleasure which has thinking for its object.

[57:30] To the fourth, it should be said that the pleasure which has the exterior act for its object cannot be without the what agreement, you might say, of the exterior act according to itself or by itself, even if it not be established to be fulfilled on account of the prohibition of something higher. Whence the act becomes disordered, and the what consequently that the pleasure itself will be what Disordered, right?

[58:05] Now the question about pleasure: you know is pleasure is such bad, right? Well, if it's bad, let's say to torture people, let's say, then would pleasure in torturing people be something bad? It seems to follow, right?

[58:27] And pleasure in a sense joins to the thing even more than desire for it does, because pleasure is in the presence of the thing, right?

[58:45] But taking pleasure in torture is even worse than wanting to torture, because you're more joined to the bad act. To the fifth, it should be said that also consent in the pleasure which proceeds from what being pleased with the thought is a mortal sin, right? But not the consent and the pleasure which proceeds from being pleased at the thought about

[59:42] it. I don't know how relevant that is in hearing this. Don't think about it. To the sex, it should be said that the Lord's prayer not only is against, should be said only against venial sins, but also against mortal sins. huh?

[1:00:18] a little break here in a moment. Goes forward thus, it seems that in higher reason there cannot be a venial sin, according as is directs the lower what powers. That is, according as it consents in the act of what sin.

[1:00:39] For Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity that higher reason adheres to what the eternal reasons, but to sin mortally is by what Turning away from eternal. eternal reasons. Therefore, it seems that in superior reason there cannot be a what sin except one that is what mortal. Moreover, higher reason has itself in the spiritual life, as it were, a what beginning, just as the heart in the bodily life.

[1:01:17] But the infirmities of the heart are mortal. Therefore, the sins of higher reason are what mortal. Moreover, venial sin becomes mortal if it comes about from by contempt. But this does not seem to be without contempt that someone from deliberation sins even what venially, since therefore the consent of higher reason always with is with the deliberation of the divine law. It seems there cannot be it cannot be without mortal sin on account of this contempt of the what divine law.

[1:02:03] So saying an outer word involves contempt of the divine. Maybe in a state of original justice. Against this, consent in the act of sin pertains to higher reason, but consent to an act of venial sin is a what venial sin. Therefore, in higher reason there can be venial sin. It should be said, I answer that as Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity, higher reason adheres to the eternal reasons, to looking at them right, and consulting them right.

[1:02:43] We mentioned the difference between those two right. One is looking at them for their own sake, so to speak, and the other is consulting them to direct and rule the lower right. Okay, and then Thomas explains it here. What do you know? Just saw another text we've been saying. One conspiciendis according as one looks at their what their truth right, consulting according as through the eternal reasons one judges about others and orders about others right.

[1:03:18] To which it pertains that deliberating through the eternal reasons, one consents in some act, or one dissents from it. But it happens that the disorder of the act in which one consents is not contrary to the eternal reasons, because it is not with turning away from the last end, as is what contrary the act of mortal sin. But it is what apart from them as the act of a venial sin, right?

[1:03:55] Whence, when higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, not turning away from the eternal reasons, whence is not sin mortally, but what venially? And through this is clear, the answer to the first, right?

[1:04:15] To the second should be said that twofold is the infirmity of the heart. One which is in the very substance of the heart and changes the natural complexion of it, and such infirmity is mortal. Another is the infirmity of the heart in account of some disorder, either of its what motion or of those something of those things which stand around the heart, and such infirmity is not always mortal.

[1:04:46] And likewise, in superior reason, there always is a mortal sin, which taken away, right, the very order of superior reason to its own object, which is eternal reasons. But when there is a disorder about this, it is not a mortal sin, but what venial. The third should be said that a deliberate consent in sin does not always pertain to contempt of the divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the what divine law.

[1:05:30] I can say an outer word then. Sent to say an outer word. Yeah. But it's not a moral sin Saint Alphonsus is kind of tough about people who habitually confess the same venial sins. They they don't have to confess them, but when they habitually confess them and they never improve, he says, don't give them absolution first because they don't need it. Yeah. For venial sins you can get it, but why confess repeatedly if you're not doing anything about it?

[1:06:00] Why bother to confess if you don't have to confess? But you're not doing anything about it. Yeah. You need to make that change your attitude, basically. Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of it's a subtle point, but it's a point To

[1:06:15] the tenth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in higher reason. There cannot be a venial sin according to itself. That is, according as it looks upon the what, looks into the eternal reasons. For an act of a power cannot be found to be deficient, except through this that it has itself in a disordered way about its own object. But the object of the superior or higher reason are the eternal what reasons, from which to be disordered is not without what mortal sin.

[1:06:58] Therefore, in higher reason there cannot be a venial sin according to itself, by itself. Moreover, since reason is a deliberative power, the act of reason is always with deliberation. But in every disordered motion in those things which are of God, if it be with deliberation, it's a mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason by itself, there never is what venial sin.

[1:07:35] Moreover, it happens sometimes that sin from what suddenly is a venial what sin. But a sin from deliberation is a mortal sin. Through this that reason deliberating runs back to some greater good, right? Against which the man acting gravely sins. Just as about a delectable act, a disordered delectable act, reason deliberates that it is against the law of God, he more gravely sins by consenting than if he only considered that it is against what more virtue.

[1:08:17] But superior reason cannot run back to something higher than its own object. Therefore, if being moved suddenly, it is not a mortal sin. Neither will the what deliberation coming upon it make it to be a mortal sin, which is clearly to be false. Therefore, in higher reason by itself, there can be there cannot be a what a venial sin. But against this, the motion of sudden infidelity is a venial sin.

[1:08:56] But it pertains to superior reason by itself. Therefore, in superior reason, there can be a venial sin according to itself, right? What's this sudden infidelity

[1:09:11] Yeah, kind of sudden thing, right? I answer: It should be said that higher reason is in a different way carried to its object, and otherwise in the what object of the lower powers, which are directed by it.

[1:09:39] In the objects of the lower powers, it is not carried, except in so far as it consults about them. It consults the eternal reasons about them, right? Whence is not carried in them, except by the motion of what? By way of deliberation. Now, a deliberate consent in those things which, are in their genus, are mortal, is a what? Mortal sin. And therefore, higher reason always mortally sins, if the acts of the lower powers in which it consents are mortal sins.

[1:10:13] But about its own object, it has two acts, to wit, simple understanding or looking into, and what deliberation, according as even about its own object it consults the what? Yeah. According to simplicem intuitum, I like these words. Intuition, so looking into, according to some understanding understanding, it can have some what about divine things, as when it undergoes a subitum, a sudden motion of infidelity. The devil likes to do that, you know.

[1:10:56] Someone was talking about that, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Who's you know those those guys who had some doubt about the the real presence and so on, right? They probably rise it sometimes.

[1:11:18] And although infidelity, according to its what genus, is a mortal sin, right? Nevertheless, the sudden motion of infidelity is a what? Because the mortal sin is not except what Against the law of God. of God,

[1:11:41] but it can be that something of those things that pertain to faith, by a sudden reason, occur under some other what reason before one takes counsel about this, right? Or is able to consult the eternal reason as the law of God, right?

[1:12:04] As when someone considers suddenly that the resurrection of the dead is impossible according to what nature, and at the same time apprehending he what

[1:12:18] checks this. Before he has time to deliberating, that this is treated for us, or handed over to us, as to be believed according to the divine law. If, however, after deliberation, the motion of infidelity remains. It is a peccato mortale, right? It's kind of an obstinate, right? Disbelief, huh? And therefore, about its own object, although it is a mortal sin ex genera, nevertheless, higher reason can sin venially in sudden motions, right?

[1:12:53] Or it can also sin mortally to a what? Yeah. Okay. In those things, however, which pertain to the lower powers, it always sins mortally in those things which are mortal sins from their genus, not however in those things which, according to their genus, are. genus To the first therefore, it should be said that a sin that is against the eternal reasons, although it is a mortal sin ex genere, from its genus, it can be nevertheless a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the what?

[1:13:37] Sudden act, huh? The saints undergo that too, didn't they? Yeah. Trying to think of. To the second, should be said that in operativi operativis, to which pertains deliberation, pertains the

[1:14:10] simple what? Looking into of those things from which deliberation proceeds, as also in speculative things. To reason it pertains both to what? Syllogize and to form propositions, and therefore also reason can have a what? Yeah.

[1:14:40] What's he saying there? It's kind of the thing. One doesn't always deliberate, right? So there's a simple movement there. To the third, it should be said that one and the same thing can be had according to what? One can have diverse considerations, of which one is higher than the other. Just as God is able to be considered, either insofar as he's knowable by human reason, or in so far as He is believed by divine revelation divine revelation, which is a higher consideration.

[1:15:22] And therefore, though the object of higher reason is something according to nature, or the thing most high, Nevertheless, it can be reduced in somewhat. And for this reason, what is in a sudden motion will not be a mortal sin, but being reduced by deliberation to a higher consideration becomes a mortal sin. Yeah. So you might be considering according to a lesser consideration, right? You kind of puzzled by it.