Prima Secundae
184. Aquinas on Passion and Sin (Summa I-II, Q. 77, Arts. 1–2): Can Passion Move the Will and Overcome Knowledge?
Class of 2014-10-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/184-aquinas-on-passion-and-sin-summa-i-ii-q-77-arts-1-2-can-passion/

[0:00] Okay. Then we have to consider about the cause of sin on the side of the sense-desiring power, right? Whether the passio or the emotion of the soul is a cause of what sin, huh? Did you ever, see how Thomas in his prayers there for confession, right? He deals with these three particular causes, but he's like, you know, by the sins of weakness, right? He's offended God the Father, right, huh?

[0:31] By the sins of ignorance, right? You know, the I mean, the Son, and by malice, of course. Just the three things he offended the whole Trinity, right? I mean, it's pretty serious. And about this, he asks eight things: whether the passion or the sense-desiring power is able to move or incline the what will, right? Can hunger move my will? I wonder. Can't move mine.

[1:08] Secondly, whether it can overcome reason against its very what knowledge, huh? Whether third one, whether the sin that comes from what passion is a sin from infirmity, huh? So because you attribute to the Father, what you appropriate strength, right, to the Father? So sin of infirmity, right, is like sinning against the Father. Fourth, whether this passion, which is the love of oneself, is a cause of all what sin?

[1:48] Don't they try to teach you to love yourself? They would do in high school, an hour, grade school, or something. Yeah. Fifth, about those three causes which are laid down in 1 John 2: The concupiscence of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of what life. So that's the source of all evil, right? Those three, huh?

[2:31] What's the one Psalm there where you have the some things applied to man and applied to the Son of Man, right? And you have three animals that's put under him. And one is the the beasts, and one is the the fish, and one is the birds. The birds are superbia vitae and the the fish are the the concupiscentia oculorum, because that's where you trade by the sea.

[3:00] And then and the beasts are concupiscence of the flesh. So overcoming all those, John the Cross has a lot of things on these three, you know, John the Cross.

[3:18] Six, whether the passion which is a cause of sin diminishes it. Seven, whether it wholly excuses it. The order is reversed here, right? Ignorance.

[3:38] Eight, whether the passion which is from passion, the sin which is from passion, can be what mortal. To the first, then one proceeds thus: It seems that the will is not moved by the passion of the sense-desiring power,

[3:57] for no passive power is moved except by its own what object. But the will is both a passive power and active together, in so far as it is moving and moved. Move mover, as Aristotle says.

[4:18] As in the third book about the soul, the philosopher says universally about the sense-desiring power. There you have that antonomasia again, right? Now this expression that you have sometimes, the king of kings, right? That's kind of equivalent almost to antonomasia right? What we call Shakespeare the poet of poets, or something like that, or Mozart the musician, musicians like saying he stands out in that particular kind. Like you do when you name them antonomasia.

[5:00] Since, therefore, the object of the will is not a passion, the sense-desiring power, but more the good of reason, it seems that the passion of the sense power does not move the will, right? So the object of the will is the good as known by reason, right? So that's what moves it. That's the moved mover, right? The moved mover is the will.

[5:26] Moreover, the higher mover is not moved by the lower, as the soul is not moved by the what body. But the will, which is the desire of reason, is compared to the sense desire as a higher mover to the lower. As the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, that the appetite of reason, desiring power of reason, moves the desiring sense power, just as in the heavenly bodies, sphere moves sphere, but the higher sphere moves the lower, and not the lower the higher.

[6:04] Therefore, the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sense appetite. Further, nothing immaterial is able to be moved by something material. But the will is a certain immaterial power, for it does not use a what bodily organ, since it is in what reason, the rational part of the soul, as Aristotle says in the third book about the soul. But the sense-desiring power is a material power, as founded in a what bodily organ.

[6:43] Therefore, the passion of the sense appetite is not able to move the intellectual appetite. I'm convinced, for the time being, aren't you? But against this is what is said in Daniel 13. Concupiscence subverts your heart.

[7:09] Yeah, Yeah. Daniel was the boy that wasn't here. at that time? He said, well, let's interrogate these guys separately, right? They contradict each other, right? "

[7:32] So, when Bathsheba, there, right? That seems like there's an example there of sense desiring moving the will, right? I answer: It should be said that the passion of the sense-desiring power is not able to directly draw or move the will, but is able to do so indirectly. What does that mean? In this, in two ways.

[8:09] In one way, according to a certain what abstraction. For since all the powers of the soul are rooted in one essence of the soul, it is necessary that when one power is what intensified, you might say, right, in its own act, another is what. less. Yeah. Or even wholly impeded, right? Huh? So they said Mozart's ears are so sensitive, right, that the whole man is in the ear when he is listening to these things, right?

[8:45] So you're so what taken up with that, you don't notice other things, huh? My brother Mark was visiting a friend there in in Michigan, you know, and some of these guys were artists and so on, right? And they're all taking it up with their eyes, you know. My brother describes, you know, they come into a room like this, you know, and they they see green, you know.

[9:09] Oh, I've never seen a green, you know, or a red shade just like that, you know. They're completely taking it up with their eyes, you know.

[9:24] I suppose some of the poets are completely in their what, imagination, right? There was a book sale one time, and I picked up a a book, you know, from the road clubs there in England, right? It's describing, you know, England taking all around England and what you could see and so on. So it's kind of interesting. Didn't cost much, and. There's a mountain there in in Wales, they say if you sleep at the foot of this mountain, you'll wake up either mad or a poet.

[9:57] Well, there isn't too much difference between a madman and a poet, right? But the kind of in their imagination, right? Huh? You know. the poet Have you read that Yeah I think so. I don't know. Yeah, No no no Yeah, the poet is so totally distracted. Yeah, yeah. Our teacher Kasurik defined the poet as a man with his brains kicked out.

[10:27] Actually, the history department was kind of intellectual. He said that's the first definition of a poet I agree with. So they go, oh good. It's

[10:42] intensity, right? Is that one thing? No. That's because they're all rooted in the one essence of the soul, right? Huh? So the one is intensified in its act; the other is what more remiss, weaker, or even totally impeded, huh? Also, because every power dispersed towards many becomes what less, huh? Whence, contrarily, when it is intensified about one, it is less able to what be dispersed towards others, right?

[11:22] Then also because in the works of the soul, there's required a certain what Intention. intention, which when is vehemently applied to one, one is not able to what. Attend and notice other things with the same vehement.

[11:48] studying, you know. And the Konig would you know he would stop breathing as he went through a sentence, you know. You know, it's just so intense, you know.

[12:01] But the other powers are kind of weakened, right? You know. I was taught about an old Dominican friar who was so intense in the old days in Europe, and I guess maybe during the Second World War, and all they could get to eat was a piece of salted fish. And the brother would come in bringing his supper or whatever it was, a piece of fish. Yeah. This friar was so busy, so intense reading St.

[12:24] Thomas, and when he finished, he he didn't even notice he took the fish and he put it close to the book and he left. It was like a bookmark. He didn't even notice.

[12:36] Yeah. Well, these just tell these stories. I don't know if they're true. You know, you know that when Thomas would be operated upon for something, you know, just thinking about something, you know, not that may be worth. Hey, I'm not so sure about that, you know, but. Nice. And according to this way, to a certain what distraction, when the motion of the sense power is a desiring power is fortified according to any what passion, is necessary that they be remitted or totally impeded.

[13:26] The proper motion of the rational desiring power, which is the what will, petitus rationalis, that's the the will. Okay, so he's pointing out a couple things here, right? One that these powers are all rooted in the one soul, right? And that intention isn't quite required, right? So when something becomes very strong in one of them, right, then the other ones, yeah. Okay.

[14:01] So when you get angry, right, kind of occupies you, doesn't it? Another way on the side of the very object of the will. This is the other way. What is this? Which is the good apprehended by reason? How does it interfere with that? Well, the judgment and the grasping, those are two different things, right? Of reason is impeded on account of the vehement and disordered grasping of the imagination and the judgment of the what estimative power.

[14:51] These are two of the internal senses. So the reason, the use of reason, depends upon what the internal senses do, and they're affected by the what sense appetite, and therefore affecting the will on the side of its what object, right?

[15:09] As in clearing those who are out of their mind, amentibus. Is manifest that the apprehension imagination, what follows the passion of the sense appetite, huh? So the poets are always talking about this, right?

[15:33] And the judgment, the estimative power, just as the disposition of the tongue, that the judgment of the what taste follows the what disposition of the what tongue.

[15:49] Once we see that men who are existing in some Passion, right? Do not easily turn the imagination away from those things by which they are what, by which they are affected, yeah. Whence, consequently, the judgment of reason, plerumque, often, right? Many times follows the passion of the sense appetite, and consequently the motion of the will, which is apt to follow the what, judgment of what, reason, huh?

[16:21] Aristotle speaks in the rhetoric, you know, how if you are mad at somebody, you know, you kind of want to say the whole class of them are bad, right?

[16:35] And it's kind of true, you know. Assassination by association. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, so he thinks his wife is unfaithful there in in Cymbeline I was doing this, right? It's just denunciation, wonderful denunciation of all womankind, you know, as if all vices are originated with them, you know. And he said they're not even faithful to their vices, you know, because they're always changing one for another one.

[17:03] So it's really a beautiful denunciation, you know. But your reason's kind of overtaken, right, huh? By this, huh? But he gets some, you know, some of some class or some race, you know. My brother was was going to Notre Dame. His landlady was scared stiff of black people, right? Because her husband got beat up by some black guy or something, you know. Once and he thought they're all, you know, you know, didn't like the neighborhood at all.

[17:43] Made her very nervous. So what are the two ways then that that the the will can be influenced by the sense appetite? In what way not? Can't be influenced directly, right? But because what, all the powers are rooted in the one soul, and you have to have what intention, right, huh? If one power is very what, very strong, right, and your intention is very much directed towards that, huh?

[18:15] And the others are less Yeah Yeah, yeah. My cousin Dow, you know, he said, you know, he used to listen to baroque music, you know, but it was kind of a complement to his reading and studying, right? And then he didn't appreciate Mozart, he said, but then he realized he had to give his full attention to Mozart to really appreciate him, right? And and he began to realize how good Mozart was, right?

[18:42] I think it's interesting, though, right, huh? Because you are studying, and this is background. Some people use classical music as kind of background to calm their emotions down a bit, you know. Did not really listen to it, what? Fully, you know. Of course, Mozart stayed the nobility, you know, playing the cards and half listening to the music, right?

[19:04] But you can see that what he's talking about there, right? And so that's one way it affects it, right, indirectly, right? And the other is that it affects the internal what senses, right, which are necessary for reason, and therefore they affect the will even on the side of its object, which is. good as well. yeah, yeah.

[19:31] We know how our judgment is affected that way a lot, doesn't it? Yeah. So he says to the first objection. Then, right? To the first, therefore, it, should be said that through the passion of the sense appetite, there comes about some change about the judgment of the object of the will. Right? Like we said, because reason is affected as judgment by the internal senses. Right? And the internal senses are affected by the passion.

[20:17] Although the what passion of the sense appetite is not directly the object of the what the will. Right? Like the good is known by reason. Okay. So Bathsheba was quite a good, right? His judgment was telling him this is no sin for her, you know, to come up to the palace, right? Yeah.

[20:44] The painters I see in the pictures don't do justice to her. Okay. The second should be said that the higher is not moved by the lower directly, but indirectly, in some way, it can be moved. Right? And that is by this kind of abstraction. He said, right? And similarly, one can say to the third objection, right? About the material, the material being moved by the material, right?

[21:15] Not directly, but by this distraction, abstraction. Okay. Now we can look at another article here. I guess we got time for. To the second one goes forward thus. It seems that reason is not able to be overcome by a passion against its own what knowledge? That's kind of the way Socrates spoke, right?

[21:45] Huh? That might have been true about him, but for most of us are afraid not. For the stronger is not conquered by the what weaker. But knowledge, an account of its certitude, right, is the strongest of those things which are in us.

[22:08] Therefore, cannot be overcome by a passion which is weak and quickly what passing. Moreover, the will is not except of something good or an apparent good, huh? But since passion draws the will in that which is truly good, but when it does that, huh, it does not incline reason against what its knowledge, right? But when it draws it in that which is an apparent good and not existing a real good, it draws it in that direction that seems to reason, huh?

[22:51] But this is in the knowledge of reason that it seems so to it. Therefore, passion never inclines reason against its what knowledge? If it be said that draws reason knowing something in universal, that it judges the contrary in the particular, huh?

[23:19] Against this, huh? The universal and particular proposition, if they are opposed, are opposed according to contradiction, right? As every man and not every man, right? But two opinions which are contradictories are contraries, as is said in the second book of the Peri Hermeneias. That's the second book in logic. It's come down from the father of logic, right? It's a book about statements.

[23:47] If there is someone knowing something universal, judges the opposite in the singular, it would follow that he has at the same time contrary opinions, which is what impossible. It's like being sick and healthy at the same time, right?

[24:12] Moreover, whoever knows universal knows also the particular that he knows to be contained under the universal. Just as whoever knows the mule to be sterile. Knows this animal to be sterile, so long as he knows it to be a what mule, as is clear through that which is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, another book of logic of demonstration, right? But the one who knows that something universal, as for example, no fornication should be done, right?

[24:49] He knows this particular under the universal to be contained, that this act is what fornication. Therefore, he sees also. Therefore, it seems that he also what knows in particular that this is wrong. So, what about David there, right? He must have known that adultery is wrong, right? This is adultery. Therefore, moreover, those things which are in voice in in the vocal speech are signs of the understanding of the soul, according to the philosopher.

[25:32] But a man existing in what passion frequently confesses that that what he that he chooses is bad, even in the what particular, right? Therefore, also in the particular, he has what knowledge. Thus, therefore, it seems that the passions are not able to draw reason against its universal what knowledge, because it cannot be that he has what knowledge and estimates the opposite in particular.

[26:09] But against all this is what the apostle says, and that's Lex fomitis David, Saint Paul, Romans seven verse twenty three. I see another law in my what members, huh? Repugnant to the law of my mind, and what holding me captive, right, into the law of sin, huh? Lex fomitis is called. We'll get to the chapter chapters here on law eventually. Okay, kind of interesting use of the word law there, right?

[26:53] But the law, however, which is in the members, he's talking about there, is concubiscence, right? About which one is spoken above. Since, therefore, concubiscence is a certain passion, it seems that passion does draw a reason, even against that which it what knows. huh? Miserable creature we are. That's what um a friend of mine said to me. I'm conflicted. And I said, Join the club. That's one of the best Saint Paul.

[27:23] Saint Paul was conflicted. Answer. It should be said that the opinion of Socrates was, as the philosopher says in the seventh ethics, the Commentator on the Ethics says, that science can never be overcome by passion. That's what Socrates said.

[27:50] Whence he laid down that all the virtues are what sciences, and all sins are what ignorances. In which matter he, in some way, what Rightly judged, yeah. Tasted, yeah.

[28:12] Because since the will is of the good or the apparent good, right? Never would the will be moved to something bad, unless that which was what not good, in some way appeared to reason good. And an account of this, the will never what tends to evil except with some what ignorance or error of reason. Whence it is said in Proverbs fourteen, Errant qui operantur malum, they err, they are mistaken, who what do something bad, right?

[28:59] But since by experience, it's where we start in ethics, right? It is clear that many act against those things of which they have knowledge, right? And this also experience is confirmed by divine what authority. According to that of Luke twelve, the servant who knows the will of his lord and doesn't do it will be what beaten with many. Hand beaten. Yeah. And in Jacob, James, chapter four, verse seventeen, to the one knowing to what to how to do the good, and not doing, it is a sin to him, right?

[29:45] But what Socrates does not simpliciter verum dixit, in some way he does, right? But it's necessary to what distinguish. Ah, that should be memorized as a passage right there. Yeah. It's necessary to distinguish, as the philosophers. Tweets in the seventh book of the ethics. So Aristotle is going to be the philosopher, not Socrates. You know, Socrates is very often the model for the philosopher in some way, right?

[30:17] People are attached to Socrates. Since for for rightly acting, man is directed by a twofold what knowledge, that is of the universal and the particular, right? By universal knowledge and by particular knowledge, I guess it's an adjective. Okay, but the defect of what? Yeah, suffices for this that there be impeded the rightness of the what, work and of the will, as has been said above. Right? Or it can happen that someone who has a knowledge in the universal, has that no fornication should be what, committed, done.

[31:06] And nevertheless does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, should not be what, done. And this suffices that the will does not follow the universal what, knowledge of, reason. Also, it should be considered that nothing prevents something that is known in habit that is not considered in what act. You see that in the students all the time. You probably give me a solution sometime. I think is correct.

[31:41] You know, then, oh yeah, but I know habitually this form is what you know. You can't draw any conclusions from the first figure from universal affirmative and a universal what negative, which is the minor premise, right? Reverse, you can. I, you know, wasn't applying it to this argument, right? So you deceived me, right? Huh?

[32:06] So they say, you know. Probably most people you say to them, you know, they say I know from my mean examiner, you know, I put on an exam, you know, and says this good, you know, every mother is a woman, no man is a mother, no man is a woman. They'll say that's good, right? You guys some of you thought too, I think, didn't you? Huh? So you can catch somebody, right, who might even have studied logic, right, because he doesn't recall what he knows habitually, right, in this one here.

[32:44] So it should be considered that nothing prevents also someone what to know something in habit that in act he doesn't consider, right? Huh? So that's why we prayed there, huh?

[32:58] Yeah, yeah. That prayer we say to the angel, right? Strengthen the light of mind, ordain their images, arouse us to consider more correctly, right? Huh?

[33:13] It could happen that someone also has right knowledge in the singular and not only universal, right? But nevertheless, in act he does not what consider.

[33:27] And therefore, it is not difficult that apart from that in which he does not consider an act, the man acts, huh? That he acts apart from that what he does not consider an act, huh?

[33:48] Now that a man does not consider in particular that which he habitually knows, sometimes what happens from the sole defect of intention, as when a man knowing geometry does not intend to the consideration of what conclusions of geometry, which at once impromptu he has to what consider, huh?

[34:16] Sometimes a man does not consider that which he has in habit on account of some impediment, yeah. In account of some exterior occupation, or in account of somewhat bodily weakness, and in this way, the one who is constituted in some passion does not consider in particular that which he knows in what Universal, insofar as a passion impedes such a what consideration.

[34:51] That impedes in three ways. First, by a certain distraction, as has been expounded above, right. Secondly, through contrariety, because often the passion inclines to the contrary of that which universal science what has,

[35:15] and third, through a certain what bodily change, from which reason is in a way what bound, so that not freely what go into act, as sleep or what, yeah, by a certain what body transmission made binds the use of reason.

[35:46] The one's often deceived in dreams, huh? And this happens in passions. It's clear from this that sometimes, when the passions are much what intensified, huh, man loses totally the use of what reason. Huh? Coriolanus there when he's under the influence of anger, right? Yeah.

[36:12] For many, in account of the abundance of love and anger, right, are what converted to insanity, huh? And in this way, passion draws reason to judging particular against the knowledge one has in universal. So Socrates is kind of ignoring experience, right?

[36:43] To the first, therefore, it should be said that universal knowledge, which is most certain, right, does not have what principality, huh, chiefness in operation, but more what, yeah,

[37:03] in that operations are about the what singular, right? Hence, you don't commit adultery with married women in general, both Bathsheba in particular, right? You know, and so that the senses and the sense appetite have great force because. Action is in the what singular.

[37:35] See, that wouldn't be the same problem in geometry, right? your conclusion would be something universal too, you know. Whence nones miram, Huh? It's not wonderful. No wonder. If in things to be done, right? Passion acts against what?

[37:58] Personal knowledge. Yeah. Being absent the consideration in the particular, right? The second should be said that this seems what to reason in particular something good that is not good, right? To be some good that is not a good. It happens from some what passion, right? Now. Make an exception with with Bathsheba, right? Huh? You know. He's worthy an exception, right?

[38:28] And nevertheless, this particular judgment is against universal knowledge of what reason, huh? Now, people, you know, they buy a sack of candy and eat the whole thing, you know, because it's really good, you know.

[38:47] So down in in Williamsburg there, you know, they they're all talking about the family. Even my son was talking about the the what do they call them? Cherry sours they're called, right? And so cherry sours they're called, and they kind of melt in your mouth. Oh, they really are good. Paul says this is the best I've ever had, you know, because I I bought a package of it, and each grandchild, you know, I could stuff myself completely because I mean you you would just tend to go into the whole thing.

[39:18] It was just you know, it's really good, really good, you know. And you got to finish off, you know. Don't share. That's for me. Yeah, I bought two packages. The second batch, what? Grandchild, each for. Grand one, grand one, grand one, grand grand. There's only by the time you give either nine to a boy, there's much left. But they were very good. They were very good. I mean, that was the best I've tasted.

[39:51] So you have to, you know, think you could do. You can have a good contest for that to be first. A man is known by his

[40:02] examples. Yeah. Told you we went to the Oktoberfest, right? Huh? You know, they had you know in our package, you know, you had a dinner, right? And they bring out like a whole chicken, you know, for you know, really nice and stuff. And then you have two things for these big mugs, you know, the leader, of course. Once you had a liter of beer, I don't want any more than that, you know.

[40:32] And so, all of us at the table, you know, we all had a liter of beer, and you know, going to get the ticket, got no liter of beer, no. So we had these young guys behind us, you know. So we all passed more into these guys. The thirsty. Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

[40:52] I had a little more than a liter because one guy had had gotten two liters, and he couldn't finish the second one, so he gave me some of that. The other guy some.

[41:17] Now, what about the? Okay, right to the third objection. All right. To the third, it should be said that it cannot what happen. That someone has together, right, ama simul, together in act knowledge or opinion which is true about the universal affirmative, and opinion false about the particular what, negative, or the reverse, right? That's the famous square of opposition, right?

[41:52] But bene potest it can well happen that someone have what a true knowledge most habitually, huh, of the universal affirmative, and a false opinion and act about the particular what, negative, huh? For act is not directly contrary to habit, but to acting. So I see a distinction between knowing something habitually and knowing it, yeah, yeah.

[42:25] Now, to the fourth, it should be said that the one who has knowledge universal, an account of passion is impeded, lest he place under that universal, right, huh, and arrive at the what conclusion? But he assumes under another universal, which the inclination of passion what suggests, and he concludes under that. Now he gives the example there, right, from what Aristotle teaches an example. Whence the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics that the syllogism of the incontinent man, right?

[43:04] The incontinent man is a man who knows in universal what is good, right? But he has four propositions in his mind, huh? Two universal, of which one is a reason that no fornication should be what committed. Another is the of the passion or suggested by the passion, right? That pleasure should be what should be followed, right, huh? Passion therefore what binds reason, lest it assume, right, and conclude under the first, right?

[43:43] Whence it remaining, he assumes and concludes under the second, right? Pleasure should be what pursued. This is pleasant, therefore, simple enough, right? Syllogisms can be dangerous, right, huh? Okay.

[44:03] Now to the fifth one. What about the man who knows these things you know, What was the correct numeral I was saying years ago? I think I said, everything I like is either what sinful or fattening?

[44:25] To the fifth, it should be said that just as the drunk sometimes what puts forth words signifying profound what positions, right or opinions, which nevertheless he cannot what judge by his mind, drunkenness, per ebrietatem this, so also the man existing in passion, right, although by mouth he he puts forth this should not be done, nevertheless inwardly in his soul, right, he senses that it should be done, as is said in the seventh book of the ethics, right.

[45:00] So that's a very profound book of Aristotle's. Every book of Aristotle is profound, right. So, okay, so I have to stop there.