Prima Secundae
186. Summa I-II Q.77 aa.7–8 and Q.78 a.1: Whether Passion Excuses Sin, Mortal Sin from Passion, and Sinning from Malice
Class of 2014-10-30
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/186-summa-i-ii-q-77-aa-7-8-and-q-78-a-1-whether-passion-excuses/

[0:00] To the seventh one precedes us. It seems that passion wholly excuses from sin, because whatever causes the involuntary excuses what totally from sin, huh? But the concupiscence of the flesh, which is a certain passion, causes the involuntary. As is said, according to that of Galatians five, that the flesh what desires against the spirit, that not whatever one wills does he do that right? Therefore, the passion wholly excuses from the sin.

[0:39] I blacked out. That's funny Explains everything You made me so angry. I blacked out. Didn't know what I was doing. Just probably kind of my fist or my or my hammer or whatever it was. I had

[1:04] my yeah. I remember one time a monk. He was in serving jail time though because he beat a guy up with a hammer. I said we'll pray about that.

[1:19] More of a passion causes a certain ignorance in the what singular particular. But ignorance of the particular wholly excuses from sin, huh? This has been had. Therefore, passion wholly excuses from sin. This is great stuff. Moreover, infirmity of the soul is more grave than infirmity of the what body. But the infirmity of the body wholly excuses from sin, as is clear in the mad, huh?

[1:54] I think that word comes originally from the Greek, that frenetici is originally Greek word. Therefore, much more passion, which is an infirmity of the what soul.

[2:10] But against this is what the apostle says in Romans seven. He calls the passions of sin. Not except because they what cause sins, right? Which would not be if from sin it wholly what excused one, right? Therefore, the passions do not wholly excuse from passion.

[2:36] Hence, it should be said that according to this only some act which is in its genus bad, right? Totally what excuses from sin that renders it totally what yeah.

[2:56] Whence, if a such a passion, which what, involuntarily, the act falling, would wholly excuse from sin, right? Otherwise, huh? Not totally, huh? But about this, two things should be, it seems, should be considered, huh?

[3:19] First, that something is able to be what? It is second say, as when the will directly is carried towards it, right? Or according to its cause, when the will is carried to the cause and not to the what effect? As is clear in the one who what? Voluntarily becomes drunk. From this, as it were, voluntary is imputed to him what he commits through ebriety right? Who is it that got drunk there that that is excused there in the gospel in the Old Testament?

[3:59] Is it Noah? Noah, yeah. Yeah. And they covered him up, you know, because he was. Yeah, yeah, but he didn't know the power of the wine, right? That's he's not taking his what? New wine. I think it was yeah. Yeah, he didn't know the power of it, yeah.

[4:16] Okay. So even though what the man being drunk there didn't seem to be acting voluntarily, right? He chose voluntarily to be drunk. Yeah, so he's yeah, yeah. Secondly, it should be considered that something is said to be voluntary directly directly or indirectly, huh? Directly when that in which what the will is is carried, right? Indirectly when the will is able to what? Prevent something or not preventing.

[5:12] But does not something, but does not do so. And according to this, it ought to be what distinguished, huh? Because passion sometimes is so great that it wholly takes away the use of what.

[5:35] Just as clear in those who, on account of love or anger, insanity. So what about Rome and Juliet? What about Coriolanus there? And then, if such a passion was from its beginning what voluntary, then the act is imputed to what sin, because it is voluntary because it is voluntary in its cause,

[6:17] just as about drunkenness this has been said, right? If, however, the cause was not what voluntary, but natural, as when someone from what sickness or some cause of this sort falls into such a passion that totally takes away what use of reason, the act is altogether rendered what involuntary, and consequently totally excuses from sin, just when the cause is what natural rather than than voluntary, right?

[6:59] But sometimes the passion is not so great that it totally intercepts intercepts the use of reason, right? And then reason is able to what exclude the passion by diverting to other what thoughts, or to impede it lest it what get its effect, right? Because the members are not applied to work except to the consent of reason, when such a passion does not wholly excuse from what yeah, because you still have use of reason, right?

[7:36] Although diminished. Now, what about this text from saint paul, right? to the first, therefore, it, should be said that that which is said there in the text, that not whatever you will, that do you do, right? It should not be referred to those things which come about through an exterior act, but to the inward motion of what concupiscence. For a man wills never to what desire the bad,

[8:16] just as also is expounded that which is said in Romans seven fifteen, that the evil that I hate, that I do, referring to the emotion, okay?

[8:38] Or it can refer to a will preceding the passion, as is clear in the continent who against their what their will might say act and encounter their what their concupiscence, yeah.

[9:15] There's two ways of expanding that text, then, right? To the second, should be said that particular ignorance, which totally excuses, is the ignorance of a circumstance which is someone what that someone is not able to know, right? Despite what, yeah, suitable diligence.

[9:43] But passion causes ignorance of the law in particular when it impedes the application of the common knowledge to the particular act, which passion reason is able to what repel. as Has been said. that was talked about earlier, right? We got the two. What? Adultery is bad. Adultery is pleasant, and you

[10:13] assume one to the other. Okay. It's not excusing you. To third, should be said that the infirmity of the body is involuntary. It would be similar if it were what voluntary, as has been said about what ebrietate, which is a bodily infirmity.

[10:52] Okay, go to the eighth article here. What? Sure. Question seventy-seven. To the eighth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the sin which is from passion cannot be what mortal.

[11:14] We'll talk to David about that, I guess. For venial sin is divided against mortal, but a sin which is from infirmity is venial, because it has in itself the cause of its what? Yeah. Is that what the word venial sin means? Then a forgivable sin. Yeah, well, that's encouraging.

[11:45] Since, therefore, the sin which is from passion is from infirmity, it seems that it is not able to be what mortal. Moreover, a cause cannot be more potent than its effect.

[12:16] But the passion is not able to be a what mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in sensuality. Is was that above? Therefore, the sin which is from passion cannot be mortal. Moreover, passion what takes away from I guess reason, but it's of what reason to be turned towards God or to be turned away from Him. In what consists the ratio mortal sin? Therefore, the sin which is from passion is not able to be what mortal.

[12:59] How I was just going to trickle down, you know, I was talking about trickle down the economics, big argument. Maybe trickle down moral theology, right? Is such a thing, you know? How let's get down to the common man or common woman, you know.

[13:19] Therefore, the sin which is from passion is not able to be mortal. But against this is no less an authority than the apostle himself.

[13:32] Is anybody else called an apostle by antonomasia besides Saint Paul? He made Saint John earlier. Called Saint John an apostle. Really, where? In the previous, whichever one it was, the name was free. It's the first objection in Article Five. Oh, I'm sorry. He's naming the quote afterwards. I'm sorry. Yeah, no, I don't think. I think only Paul and Peter. You know. That's what caught my eye, but they.

[14:01] Yeah. That's kind of striking, though, you know. Among the, I mean, don't the apostles come after Mary? You know, is having high position, right? And these guys are called, you know.

[14:20] I was married, I think, in the feast of Peter and Paul. Yeah, so good, good credentials there. Okay. Okay. But again, this is what the apostle says in Romans seven five, that the passions of what operate in our members with the fruit of what fruit of death. But this is proper to mortal sin, that it what. What kind of funny to say that to to death? Therefore, the sin which is from passion is able to be what mortal.

[15:11] Yes, Paul's the apostle of the what Gentiles, and Peter's kind of the apostles of the Jews, isn't he? The circumcised. He claims he was the actually apostle. He claims he was the one chosen to bring the gospel first to the Gentiles. Cornelius.

[15:31] Now, I answer. It should be said that mortal sin, as has been said above, consists in turning away from the last end, which is God, huh?

[15:48] Which aversion pertains to reason deliberating, huh? Of whom also it is to order in what. Yeah. Ordinare in finem right? That's the effective. Definition of reason.

[16:12] In this way only can it happen that the inclination of the soul in something that is contrary to the last end is not immortal sin, because reason deliberating cannot what occur in this case, huh? Which happens in what? Sudden motions. Sudden motions, huh?

[16:46] But when from passion someone proceeds to the act of sin, or to a deliberate consents, this does not come about suddenly, huh? What did David see? Bathsheba taking a bath, wasn't that what happened? And then he said, "But he sent somebody down to bring her up to the the castle." That took a little time. Yeah, yeah. So he had time to deliberate, huh?

[17:19] When someone proceeds from passion to the act of sin, or to what? To deliberate consent. This does not come about what suddenly, right? And he planned to get rid of the husband, right?

[17:43] Whence reason deliberating, huh? Is able here to what? Meet it or something. Yeah. To occur. Run into it. Yeah. Is able to exclude, or at least to what? Impede passion. Whence, if it does not run in there, it is a mortal sin, huh?

[18:10] Just as we see that many homicides, and some in the paper every day, I think, and adulteries, huh, are committed through what? Yeah. That's why I I was admired the working the grace of the soul of man was he kind of came to the realization he had a problem with alcohol and then he realized he said I have to make a choice if I'm in this part of town and I have to go that part the bar is in between them I can't go there because I'll I'll go right in if I go by it I see it I'll be in it so I have to go over here or here over here to get that was reason deliberating had it to the first therefore

[19:12] it should be said that venial is said in three ways that's news to me huh in one way from its cause huh because it has some cause for forgiveness right which diminishes sin and thus the sin from infirmity and from what ignorance huh those two kinds is said to be what venial because there's some reason to get forgiveness huh so what did Saint Paul say you know he persecuted the church out of what ignorance yeah

[19:50] that doesn't mean it wasn't something sinful about his persecuting the church right but it had some reason for Being pardoned, right? Another way from the event, as every sin through penance becomes what venial Well. That's good to know. That is and achieves what.

[20:19] Yeah. In a third way, it is said to be venial from its genus or kind as an idle word. Now I can see somebody trying to explain that in a in a sermon, right? What an idle word is! What is an idle word? Because I've been trying to be polite Great, dear. Is that an idle word? No, I think that's deliberate. And this venial only, right? The third, one I guess, is opposed to the what?

[21:17] Yeah. But the objection, however, proceeds of the what? First. To second, it should be said that passion is a cause of sin on the part of what? Conversion.

[21:40] But that it be mortal is on the part of the aversion, which per accidens follows from the conversion. Whence the argument does not what? Follow.

[21:55] What does the argument say? Cause is stronger than effect. Yeah. Yeah. We don't weigh weigh the seriousness of the sin by what? The seriousness of the cause. Because it follows per accidens, huh?

[22:23] But the per se one has to be stronger. The stove heats the water; it must be hotter. Per se, right? But if I burn my house and it gets cold, is the fire colder than the cold air?

[22:52] Per accidens, huh? Yeah. What's the first distinction of being that Aristotle gives in the fifth book of Wisdom? First distinction of being. Yeah. Even before he distinguishes between being according to the figures of predication, right? Substance, quantity, quality, and so on, and being according to act and ability. What's the first distinction he gives of being? I'm going to guess. If I guess, I would say per se per accidens.

[23:46] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, what kind of being is a philosophical grandfather? Yeah, yeah. Because to be a grandfather and to be a philosopher happens to the same man. Therefore, you now have a philosophical grandfather. And I'm a white logician. What kind of logician is that?

[24:30] I suppose there's some black logician around somewhere. The kinds of logicians, right? Warren Murray tells me that if my parents had been Irish, I would have made a bad philosopher. Or if both my parents had been Swedish, I would have made a bad philosopher, right?

[25:21] So the dangers from my being Irish, from my Irish mother, are offset by my father's Swedishness, and the defects they have from being Swedish are offset by my Irish mother. Yeah, maybe something to that.

[25:42] I think a Swedish Irish philosopher is still a prudent combination. So that's a rather fundamental distinction, right? Okay. To the third, should be said that reason is not always in its act wholly impeded by passion. Whence there remains what free judgment, huh? That is able to turn away from or to be converted to what to God.

[26:22] If, however, it totally took away the use of reason, already there would not be what sin, neither mortal nor what venial, right? So can anger be so great that a man loses his use of reason?

[27:03] It says, "This always." Something like the ancient Vikings get into a berserker sort of rage, which is very helpful in battle, although it left them open, wasn't too good for defense, but it was the best offense. So, sort of losing the reason in a certain way. You mentioned Squeez before.

[27:36] You mentioned anger before, but love also, right? No, I guess I think true medieval man. I think that love drives some people mad. Would Coriolanus be a tragic character if if his anger had really taken away his reason entirely? No, I think he's still for a while that he tries to listen to reason, right? And then get him going again, you know. The Spurs. Yeah. Macarthur,

[28:22] when he gets to the point, you know, about the time you know when Truman removed him, right? Huh. Of course, it wasn't too long in front of that when Truman wrote that terrible letter, you know, to the guy who had said some bad words about his his daughter's musical performance, you know. Maybe he lost his temper, you know. He used a lot of you know bad words, you know.

[28:44] You know how he's gonna. Put it in writing. It's not contemporary. Okay, we've got time to go on for one more. Yeah, get into malice now. Then, we ought to consider about the cause of sin, which is on the part of the will, which is called what malice, Raymond. Like I mentioned before about how Thomas's prayers—you ever see his prayers there for confession? But he's saying, you know, that from he sinned against God the Father from what infirmity, right?

[29:30] Because we appropriate to God the Father what power power, right? And then from ignorance he sinned against the Son, who to whom we appropriate wisdom. And then by malice against the Holy Spirit, right? And therefore he's offended the whole Trinity, right? It's kind of beautiful way of tying that up, you know.

[29:56] Sometimes I pray for somebody, you know, and I invoke the Father, you know, for to give them power and strength, right? And the Son to give them wisdom, you know, and the Holy Spirit to give them love, right? And it's kind of what's appropriate to those three, you know. It's beautiful, Thomas' prayer on confession.

[30:18] So now we're down to malice here. So when Hitler did the what do you call it? The came into the Jews there. Was that passion or malice?

[30:39] When Hitler, when Hitler, yeah, Holocaust, what they call it. Yeah, that was planned. That's what I look at to draw other comparisons with Catholics who are pro-abortion in the say legislature or whatever.

[30:56] Say, well, they can't say that they are ignorant. They all claim they know what the Church teaches. They disagree with it, but they don't have ignorance. And it's not like they're not free. They don't have the ability or power to do something else to what's left. Yeah. Actually, way up here, I heard on the radio a very nice ad from from the the National Pro-Life Organization. You know, very, very, very well said.

[31:25] You know, I haven't heard it be read on the radio before. You know, it's very good. Maybe so, maybe so, but I didn't know. Must cost a lot of money to to put on the radio like that, but very good.

[31:47] Talking about stopping the the baby and so on, you know. Yeah. To the first one proceeds. Oh, let me look at the proemium here. Then we ought to consider about the cause of sin, which is on the part of the will, which is called what malice.

[32:15] So, infirmity is on the side of the passions, right? And ignorance on the side of reason, And again, on the side of will, right? This is the worst one, right? This is the worst, it seems to me. But about these four things are asked.

[32:36] First, whether someone from certain malice or what industry can sin? huh? Well, you know the way Hitler, you know organized the thing, right? I mean, that's really organized for production. But same way as with the abortion, you know, industry, right? It's regarded called industry right now.

[33:05] Second, whether whoever sins from habit sins from certain malice. I must put habit here now, rather than passion, right? Doesn't say whoever sins from passion sins. You would say that.

[33:25] Third, whether whoever sins from certain malice sins from habit. This is reverse, right? Whoever sins from habit does he sin from certain malice? And whoever sins from certain malice does he sin from habit? Watch out for his habits, right now.

[33:51] Fourth, whether the one who sins from certain malice sins more gravely than the one who sins from passion. I would anticipate he would say yes. I think that is. huh

[34:12] Buckley talking about the tenacious ill will talking about the tenacious ill will. Some of his opponents. Tenacious. Tenacious ill will. Sounds like like malice, you know.

[34:32] To the first one proceeds thus: It seems that no one sins from industry, right? Or from certain malice. For ignorance is opposed to what industry or certain malice. But everyone who is bad is ignorant, according to the philosopher. And it says so in the Bible too. Proverbs chapter fourteen verse twenty two. They err who do evil; they're mistaken, they're ignorant. Therefore, no one sins from what? Certain malice, huh?

[35:23] But that everyone sins from ignorance or being ignorant. What I do understand is that the same statement, right? Let's see what Thomas says. I'm just guessing, you know. I don't have the slightest idea. But this how Thomas gets out of here.

[35:47] More of Dionysius, huh? In the fourth chapter of the Divine Name, says that no one intending to evil, yeah. But this, it seems to, it is sin from malice to intend evil in sinning, right?

[36:14] Now, what is outside of intention is, as a word, praeter intentionem, and does not denominate the act. Therefore, no one sins from malice, huh?

[36:29] Dionysius, I mean, he's you know quite a big authority, huh? So, probably the great that brought Dionysius back from, I thought he was ambassador or something to, Byzantine, yeah, to the capital, and then I think he, he was Dionysius was known there more than in the West, you know. He was known at all in the West, I don't know. However,

[36:55] malice itself is a what sin? If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it would follow that what sin is a cause of sin in infinitum, which is unsuitable, inconvenient.

[37:14] No one, therefore, sins from what malice, huh? But against this is what is said in Job thirty four twenty seven. Quasi de industria, right? They receded from God, right? And did not wish to understand His ways.

[37:40] But to recede from God is to sin. Therefore, some sin ex industria, or from certain what malice, huh? People around like that today. I remember seeing—I won't repeat the expression—but some Christian was giving some witness when there was one of the gay pride parades, and somebody videotaped it. And the way they insulted this guy, they said, "We don't want any of your Jesus stuff." They know what that means, and what they mean, and they don't want to know what it means.

[38:32] That's what it seems like anyways. I answer: It should be said that man, just as every other thing, right, naturally has a desire of the what good,

[38:55] whence that his. Desire declines to the evil right, happens from some corruption right, or disorder in some of the beginnings of man right. For thus, in the actions of natural things, peccatum, right is found.

[39:22] I wonder how they translate that in the text because peccatum, you know, sin has got a more narrow meaning than peccatum in what Latin right. So you know if a baby is born with you know defects, that's called a peccatum naturae, right. It's not a sin, you know. But how do they translate that? Sin. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what came out of the translator program. Well, that's why I say sometimes you know translating is a thankless task, you know, because there's no way sometimes to translate these things.

[39:57] They could have said defect Yeah So I always say you know translating Shakespeare into French is a thankless task, you know. How do you translate "full fathom five thy father lies"? Keep the alliteration there, you know. No, it doesn't know how to translate that.

[40:34] Now the beginnings of human acts are the understanding of the understanding and what desire right, both the rational desire which is called the will, and the sensitive desire, right?

[40:53] Now sin in human acts happens sometimes as from the what defect of the understanding when someone sins through what ignorance, and from the defect of the sense desiring power as when someone sins from what passion right.

[41:16] So also from a defect of the will, which is the what disorder of it. But a will is disordered when it loves more the lesser good.

[41:36] Consequently, it is that someone chooses right to suffer loss in the good less loved that he might enjoy the good more loved. That's what David was doing there when he.

[42:01] Just as when a man wishes to what go cutting off of a member knowingly that he might conserve his life, which he loves more. Hmm. So animals do that Animals do that I've seen I've heard it said that a bear caught in a trap his legs, he'll chew his leg off and get away. Yeah, yeah.

[42:30] And in this way, when some what disordered will loves more some temporal good, as for example wealth or pleasure, right? Then the order of what reason or of the divine law or the love of God, right, or something of the sort, it follows that he wishes what to undergo a what

[43:04] a loss of spiritual goods that he might enjoy some what temporal good, huh? What did Faust say, right? He sold a soul, right, for to get some things, huh?

[43:25] Temporal things. Now the evil is nothing other than the what privation or lack of some good, and thus someone knowingly wishes some spiritual evil, which is evil what simpliciter, through which a spiritual good is what lost or deprived, that he might enjoy a what Temporal good. Whence he is said from certain malice or from industry to sin, as it were knowingly choosing what Evil.

[44:27] Instead of instead of industry, they say on purpose. Yeah, maybe that could be. Yeah, that's steady with it. Great industry, industry. Yeah, yeah. You wonder why

[44:53] the Democratic Party now, you know, so pro-abortion, you know. To get the votes of women you know—that they do this or what? Yeah, what it's got to be a stepping stone to some more power? so they think Yeah There's nothing lovable about it by itself. Even they agree, right? Did Obama say that the first, the first election, one of the debates leading up to his first election, when they asked him about it, he said, he said nobody likes abortion.

[45:26] You and me does it. Nobody likes it. So there is some other motive. What is it? Seems to be more malice now than ignorance, you know. Yeah there's so much science in embryology and all that stuff Yeah yeah

[46:04] To the first, therefore, it should be said that ignorance sometimes excludes knowledge by which someone simply knows, right? Some pitcher there knows this to be bad that is done, and then one is said to sin from ignorance, right? Sometimes, however, it excludes the knowledge by which a man knows this now to be evil, right? As when he sins from passion, right?

[46:37] Sometimes, however, it excludes the knowledge by which someone knows this evil to not be what sustained on account of the obtaining of that good, right? He knows nevertheless this simply to be what evil, and thus he is said to what? And thus is said to be ignorant the one who sins from what? Certain powers. Yeah. So in

[47:32] this case, he knows something to be bad, right? But he doesn't know that it should be what not sustained on account of getting something good. Can you do that again, please?

[47:53] He knows something to be bad, right? But he doesn't know that it should not be sustained. This evil, in order to get this other good.

[48:12] I mean, if he didn't know the baby was a human being, that would be one thing, right? But if he knows it to be human being, he knows this is bad, you know. But you have to do that in order to, yeah, yeah. I remember when when uh Ginsburg, I think, was being, you know, testifying before she was a- she was being appointed to the Supreme Court, you know, or they, interviewed, and she she was saying, well, you have to have this, you know, in order for women to be equal with men, right?

[48:42] Yeah, wow. Because it's actually discrimination, of women, you know, to force her to keep this thing in her for nine months, you know. She doesn't want it in her. So therefore, in order for women to be equal, men have to kill people. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a strange kind of logic. Yeah. But there's a real willful ignorance talking to doctors or lawyers who should know better, especially doctors.

[49:15] Yeah. Um, they they don't want to see it That's it. They look away. That's the crass ignorance, that's it. Or as Saint Fons calls it, it's a willful inadvertence. Mhm.

[49:35] We gotta stop now. or what is that? Hmm? Gotta stop now. No, we can finish the objections. Okay, finish the objections here. We want to get our money.

[49:53] To second, it should be said that evil is not able in itself to be intended by someone, right? Huh? It, however, can be intended to avoiding some what other evil, or to achieving some other what good, huh? And in such a case, someone chooses to what pursue the good per se intended. Without this, that he what. Except for some loss or some other good Yeah.

[50:25] Just as someone who's lascivious, right, wishes to enjoy some pleasure without the offense of God, huh? But two things being proposed, he more chooses by sinning to incur the offense of God than to be deprived of the pleasure.

[50:45] So women must be equal with men, right? Therefore, they must be free to engage in sex without having trouble with baby, which men can do because men can do this. Yeah, and they take off and have no responsibility for the results of this act. So they're so their model and exemplar, their ideal is irresponsible men. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You must be as free as men are. Free from free from justice, free from responsibility.

[51:19] Yeah. Get the wrong model. To third, it should be said, huh? That the malice from which someone is said to what sin can be understood to be an habitual what malice, right?

[51:47] According as a what bad habit is named by the philosopher, who is that philosopher? He's quoting all the time. The capital P. Is named malice, right? Huh? Just as a good habit is named what virtue. And according to this, someone is said to sin from malice, who sins from the inclination, of a habit. It. Can also be understood as actual malice, right? Huh? Whether the choice of the what evil is called what?

[52:31] Malice. Yeah. And thus it is someone said to sin from malice, in so far as he sins from the choice of something bad, huh?

[52:42] Or also, malice is said to be what some preceding guilt, from which there arises a subsequent guilt. As when someone attacks what fraternal, grace He attacks from envy, right? Huh? And then the same is not a cause of itself, but the interior act is a cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another, not however infinitum, because it is necessary to arrive at some what first sin, which is not caused from some prior sin, huh?

[53:23] It goes back to your life history, right? Back to your first sin, huh? We got to stop there, then.