Prima Secundae
188. Malice Without Habit, Malice Worse Than Passion, and Whether God Causes Sin (ST I-II q.78 a.3-4; q.79 a.1)
Class of 2014-11-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/188-malice-without-habit-malice-worse-than-passion-and-whether/

[0:00] But now the next article is going to say what is everyone who sins from certain malice is sinning from habit, right? Okay. Are these convertible? See, are animal and dog convertible? Is every dog an animal, but is every animal a dog? See, okay. But it's interesting, huh? I mean, this habit is really kind of the main thing there, malice, huh? So Don Giovanni's got a habit of you know what, huh?

[0:36] And so he he sins from habit all the time, right? At the great dinner before the ghost appearance, right? He's singing, you know, woman is the glory of man. and so on.

[1:15] See, Don Giovanni begins the opera with him trying to seduce a woman, right? But then the father has come on and is drawing the sword, and you know he kills the the father, you know. He

[1:30] can't change, right? You know. You know when when you say in the Hail Mary, you know, we say, Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners, now and then at the hour of death, right? What's important about the hour of death, right? It says where where your the tree falls there it's alive, right? Then where your habits are you're going to fall that way probably, right?

[1:52] And it'd be only the great mercy of God that you wouldn't fall in the direction that your habit is, right? And Don Giovanni just he he falls where his habits are, as most people would do it, you know. That's where going to lie for all eternity. It's frightening. It's frightening.

[2:17] But now is the sin of certain malice tied to sinning from habit? Can happen, you know. It's more understandable, Sonny, that you know one would sin from habit, right?

[2:40] To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that whoever sins from certain malice sins from what habit? It seemed that way, huh? For the philosopher says in the fifth book of ethics, that's the book devoted to consideration of justice, huh?

[3:03] That is not just of anyone to do unjust things in the way that the unjust man does them, right? Which is to wit, from what choice, huh? But only in those having the habit. But to sin from certain malice is to sin from the choice of evil, right? Therefore, to sin from certain malice is not except the one having a habit, huh? Aristotle is very good about the influence of habit upon what choice, right, huh?

[3:38] It's a habit of choice, right? It's a habit of since a habit of choosing, right, huh? If I have the habit of of gluttony, huh? I habitually choose to eat more than I should.

[3:57] So your habit, your choices are very much influenced by these things, right? I was thinking about when I go to a restaurant, they give you a menu, right? You know, right away. When I was in Quebec, I used to go to a little restaurant, a Montcalm restaurant, and it's named after the guy, you know, the famous defender of Quebec in the old days. But mostly one of the houses they lived in you know originally, but it's a little restaurant.

[4:24] I used to always get the petite steak, you know, huh? Petite steak, French fries, Every day. I go there every time I go there I order that. So the waitress got to know me, you know. When she saw me walk in the door, she'd turn around and yell at the kitchen, petite steak, that's it. But when I was in high school, I worked at McDonald's. and a UPS truck came in every afternoon at two o'clock, He always wanted two hamburgers mustard only.

[4:57] So as soon as I, could see the front of the store I could see the truck put down two hamburgers mustard only right away He comes in the drive-through, boom, he's gone two hamburgers mustard only every day. Five days a week. I don't know if he's still alive.

[5:19] To the first, therefore, it should be said. Let's look at the reply to the objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that to act as the unjust one acts, right, huh? Is not only to do something unjust, right?

[5:50] From certain what malice, but also what With pleasure. yeah, and without any great what refusal of reason, right, or opposition of reason, right. Which is not except of one who has the what habit, huh? Okay.

[6:10] So every morning I choose to drink tea instead of coffee, you know. I'm already making a choice, you know. but you know, I always choose. I won't judge. Who am I to judge? Or you go to one of these banquets you know and sometimes you have a choice, you know. you want steak or you want salmon? No choice. no choice

[6:41] No brain. Whatever Origen says in the first book about the beginnings, huh? That it is not what suddenly, right? That someone is empty or fails, but little by little, right, huh? Is necessary for him what through parts, right, to decline, right, huh? But the maximus defluxus, right, flowing down would seem to be when someone sins from certain what malice. Therefore, not at once from in the beginning, but through much what custom, from which a habit is able to be generated, does someone arrive at this thing that he sins from certain malice, huh?

[7:33] You got to become. Accustomed to it Yeah. Yeah. Well, what's what's the um. Yeah, yeah. The woman, the the the people are raised from the dead by Christ, right, huh? Do they see a spiritual sense in this, right?

[7:58] Um, Lazarus is buried, right, huh? Four days. The uh the the son of the the widow there. Taken out, and then there's a girl who's. Just died. Yeah. And these are different stages of people in the death of sin, right? I mean, spiritually signifying this, huh? Um, but the one who's already buried, been in the grave for four days, that's a person who has died and is habitual in all his sin, right, huh?

[8:27] And then you know you have the different grades, right? That's what they're talking about here right now, but but origin is talking about, huh?

[8:39] To the second, it should be said, huh? That not statim at once, right? Does someone fall that he sins from certain malice, but it presupposes something, right? Which nevertheless is not always a habit, right? I wonder what that is, huh? Maybe wonder is aroused by this. No one.

[9:04] You know, philosophy begins in wonder, right? You know, but the objections, you know, if you do them properly, they kind of arouse a certain what? Reasonable wonder, right? Or more educated wonder, right? So there's really a problem here, right? Otherwise, your mind thinks it's too easy, maybe the thing, right?

[9:31] You know, in these texts I can never read here, You know, the answer is printed in bold. You know, so you get right to the answer you know? But there's no wonder they're aroused, right? Huh? You know, I say, well, what is he talking about there? You know.

[9:53] Okay. Moreover, sometimes someone, right? Whenever someone, when someone sins from certain malice, it is necessary that his will of itself be inclined to the evil that he what chooses. But from the nature of the power, man is not inclined to evil, right? But more to the good, right? Huh?

[10:20] But it's necessary that if you choose evil, that this be from something coming upon the power, right? Huh? Which is either a passion or a habit. But when some sins from passion, he does not sin from certain malice, but from infirmity, as has been said. Therefore, whenever someone sins from certain malice, it is necessary that he sin from habit, huh? So he's saying that God gave you your nature and the inclination that follows upon that nature is something good, just as the nature that God gave you is, right?

[10:53] So how can you, using that power that has a natural inclination to what is good, how can you choose something that you know to be bad, right? To make sense, there has to be something added to that natural power, and that can be either an emotion, a passing thing, or it can be a habit, right? And if it's from a passion, well then we say that's not sin from from malice, right?

[11:19] So it must be from habit, right? I'm convinced, right? I rest my case, you know. You know, you're guilty. Sin from, you know, malice is sin from habit, right? Aren't you convinced of that?

[11:36] Maybe Thomas is not convinced, but I'm convinced. Who wouldn't be convinced, any reasonable man, huh? I guess. Now it's interesting how Thomas has replied to the said contra. I notice sometimes, you know, huh? You're stuck. You say, hey, how come he's got four answers and only three objections, right? But there's objection on the other side, right? Said contra. But against this, just as a good habit is to the choice of good, so is a bad habit to the choice of bad.

[12:15] That's the great influence of habit upon choice, that Aristotle points out. But sometimes someone not having the habit of virtue chooses that which is good according to virtue. Therefore, sometimes someone not having the habit, vicious habit, is able to choose evil, right? The two things are similar, right? Which is from certain malice to what sin now? And Thomas says to the fourth, it should be said that is not similar reason about the choice of good and about the choice of bad, right?

[12:55] Because evil never what is without the good of what nature. But good can be without the what, evil, guilt, perfectly. Okay, let's see what Thomas says. I'm surprised he's going to do. It creates suspense. Huh?

[13:23] Do? You ever read what Plato or Socrates says about wonder? There, one of the dialogues. It's not a bad genealogy, he said. The one who said that Iris is the offspring of Thalma. And he goes on, doesn't explain, right? I said, well, now, this is a marvelous thing Thaumas of course is is what wonder personified, right? And Iris is, you know, from Shakespeare's play, is what, two things, the rainbow personified, right?

[14:08] And and what else, messenger of the gods, right? So when Iris is introduced in in one of Shakespeare's plays, the Tempest, right? And Prospero conjures up this vision, right? And when Iris appears, someone says, "Hail, many-colored messenger." So she's both the rainbow personified, person, and what,

[14:39] messenger of the gods, right? So Socrates is saying that Iris is the offspring of wonder, huh? Thaumas bad genealogy. says he goes on, doesn't explain what he's saying. What does that mean?

[14:56] Iris is the offspring of wonder Yeah that's a good genealogy. It goes back to what, one of the great poets. Homer, but the other one. Yeah. What?

[15:20] Ask about Iris first of all. Why should Iris both be the rainbow and the messenger of God? The rainbow goes from heaven. to earth? Yeah, it joins heaven, the place of the gods, right, with earth, the place of man, right? And what does the messenger do? It goes between God and us, right? So to say that Iris is the offspring of wonder is to say that wonder does what?

[15:45] What? Leads us to God. Leads us to the cause. Yeah, it unites us in some way with God, right? Well, how does wonder do that? Well, wonder makes us look for the cause. And if we know the cause, it makes us look for the cause of the cause, right? And the wonder is never fully satisfied till we get to the first cause, and that's God, right? So wonder joins us with God, right?

[16:08] The beautiful way of saying it, though, right? And you know how wonder, how the rainbow in the Old Testament, right? After the flood and so on, it's a sign now of what reconciliation between man and God. And why is the rainbow appropriately as a sign of that, right? Apart from being pretty beautiful, but I mean, why is it appropriate, right? Because it seems to unite heaven and what?

[16:30] That's beautiful, beautifully said, you know. Beautiful. We're wondering now as to how how one can sin from malice and not from what? Habit, huh? It seems like that would be at least the usual thing, right?

[16:58] Let's see what the master says because he's got a he's put us in the he's confused the issue now. As the fellow teacher would say, it's the business of the teacher to confuse the issue, make you think, right? I answer it should be said that the will has itself in a different way to good and to bad, huh?

[17:22] For from the nature of what its potency, huh, the will, it's inclined to the good a reason, right? Justice to its own what object, right? Whence every sin is said to be against nature. What does Shakespeare say? Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. Well, birth is where we get the word nature, right? So he's moved the word birth there to to what we call nature day.

[17:56] But nature comes from that nativity, prenatal, postnatal, right? Comes from birth. Whence every sin is said to be against. nature. Yeah, and that's a what we call in logic a universal affirmative statement. Every sin is said to be against nature, right? So excellent Shakespeare, huh?

[18:19] For not so what? Good, but strange in that fair use, revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. Whence, therefore, that something that the will, what in choosing inclines to something what bad, is necessary to what that happened elsewhere, right? That's what one objection was saying, right? That's got to be a passion or habit, you know, that that convinced the dummy bricklayer, right? Okay.

[18:54] And sometimes it happens from the defect of reason, as when someone sins from what ignorance. Sometimes from the impulse of the sense, desiring power, as when someone sins from what passion. But neither of these is to sin from what certain malice.

[19:19] But then only from certain malice does someone sin, when the will itself, from itself, right, is moved to evil, right, which can happen in two ways.

[19:35] In one way, and this is the way that's more obvious, through this that a man has some corrupt disposition, right? A habit is a disposition, right?

[19:48] Through this that a man has some corrupt disposition, inclining him to evil, right? Thus, that according to that disposition. It becomes to the man suitable, right, and similar something evil, right.

[20:10] And in this, by reason of the what agreement, the will tends as if it were in something what, good, right, huh? Okay. What's the first definition of good? The good is what all want, right, huh? So you want this because you have it, and therefore it seems to be something wantable. What's wantable? Something good, right? So it seems to be something good, right?

[20:41] Such a what corrupt disposition is either a what habit acquired from what custom, which has been turned into what nature, right, huh? Or it is some what sick habit on the part of the body, as when someone having certain natural inclinations to some sin, like Coriolanus, anger, right, huh? On account of the corruption of the of nature, what in him, right, huh? Okay.

[21:22] In another way, it happens that the will, per se, tends in something evil through the removal of something what, preventing it or prohibiting it,

[21:36] as when someone is what prevented to sin, not because the sin is displeasing to him as such, right? Not because fornication is such as displeasing to him, right? But either on account of the hope of eternal life or on account of the fear of hell, right, huh? So in the act of contrition that they taught me, you first referred to these two things, right, and then later on most of all because of envy, my God, right?

[22:07] But mostly for moved by the other, right, huh? You know, I called the counting house there. I go on Sunday there, and we count the money, you know, the church, right, coming in, you know, do all this kind of fancy stuff and so on. But I think I'd said in there, you know, I'd seen this thing from Padre Pio, you know, where where someone said, "I don't believe in hell," and Padre Pio said, "You will when you get there."

[22:32] And so last Sunday there, I was there, and I think I said, you know, Kasurik says, and the other guy, me, forgot that I'd said it, but he he pointed out he said he heard that Padre Pio had said this, you know, he said we said shiver down.

[22:47] Yeah, so it must have said a shiver down. This guy, you know, sure, sure. Padre Pio said it in you know with the as good in mind, huh?

[23:00] But removing hope by what? Despair. Or fear through what? Presumption. Okay. Unless those two things, right? Hope through desperation and fear through presumption, huh?

[23:22] Now we talked about how Thomas there in the commentary in the Psalms, right? Since in the Psalms you mention both hope and fear, hope in God and fear of God, right? Together, right? And Thomas says you need both, right? Because the hope without the fear would become presumption, right? And the fear without the hope would become what? Despair, right? And I sometimes

[23:54] that's interesting, you know, the tragedy and comedy, right? Now tragedy arouses what? Fear, you know, and pity too, but but fear, right? And comedy raises what? Mirth and and hope, right? But they kind of balance each other, right? Huh? You know, if you had if you you know the Greeks would have I think two or three tragedies and they'd play comedy, right? Because if you listen nothing but tragedy, you'd probably get kind of what?

[24:29] Melancholy and kind of despair about the human situation. But if all you do is listen to comedy, you get superficial and and and you know think everything is tutsi tutsi tutsi, right? And nothing has to be taken too seriously, you know, no matter what it is, right? We have to balance those things, right? Huh? But as a philosopher, I said same thing, you know, huh? You know the beautiful dialogue there the the last day of Socrates' life, right?

[24:54] Huh? And you need the hope of what? Finding the truth, the hope that you can come to actually know the truth, right? And a lot of philosophers or thinkers have despaired of really knowing the truth, right? Um, you know, like what did Whittaker Chambers you know, said when he came back, you know, to his you know fellow students there at Columbia, you know, huh? He had to soon you know despise them because they regarded ideas as ping pong balls, huh?

[25:26] That's a beautiful metaphor, right? Ping pong ball you knock back and forth, you know, but you don't take the ping pong ball very seriously.

[25:34] Yeah, and that's what they do with ideas, right? They knock them back and forth, you know, talk about them, but you know they don't take seriously. They're not trying to find the truth anymore, huh? I mean, a lot of them have despaired to find the truth, right? A lot of people are like that in the academic world, huh? But then if you didn't have the fear, right, of being mistaken, right, fear of being error, you know.

[25:56] Like Warren Murray said about Monsignor Dehon, his principal passion is fear. But I remember when I went first went to Laval, I told you that I think before, but Kasurik, you know, was telling me, you know, one time he was in Monsignor Dionne's class, and he had some question about something he had said, and so he went to see him in his office afterwards, right? And he talked much differently in the office.

[26:22] And Kasurik said, "Why are you talking so much differently in the in the classroom?" Oh, he says, "It's the business of the professor to encourage the students," you know. But then you see, sometimes you got to have this other thing, right? Fear, right? You know, incalculable amount of fear, right? And so you have to get a balance between hope and fear, right?

[26:57] Yeah, I guess that's going that long thing, but you can see it here, right? The necessity, right? You can lose your soul by desperation. You can lose your soul by what presumption, right? You got to avoid both.

[27:23] Okay. So if one despairs, or one becomes presumptuous, then one could sin from certain malice, as it were, without what? Right. Yeah. Yeah. And talking about scripture isn't about you know them kind of despairing of their salvation, and they just turn themselves over to the vices of you know the sinners were kind of what by choice, right? You know. That's kind of modern world. Yeah. There's a lot of despair despite all the nonsense that goes on.

[27:57] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, seeing a quote there from some, was it Commonweal or some place? You know. When what the Pope says doesn't fit, you know, then the only proper response is dissent, you know. Yeah.

[28:30] Thus, therefore, it is clear that the sin, which is from certain malice, right, always presupposes in man some disorder, right, which nevertheless is not always what habit.

[28:47] Hence, it is not necessary that whoever sins from certain malice sins from habit. Okay, what's interesting when he says that right now, that it could be through either desperation or what, Presumption, right huh?

[29:13] Yeah, we make mistakes. I always think correctly, you know. I don't worry about the specific reputation. I don't. I don't. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Kinds of errors, huh? What What's it got to do with me?

[29:30] You know, there are kinds of errors you can distinguish. Let's just get onto the important things. I want to really do deep stuff. I don't want to talk about beginners. Yeah,

[29:45] yeah. You can despair too, right? I'm lost. They tell you that that little thing about the the nun who was taking care of John Paul II. There, he didn't look too healthy, you know. One day, and she said, "I'm worried about your holiness." He said, "I'm worried about my holiness too."

[30:12] That's marvelous. That's a marvelous, marvelous little little anecdote, you know. But you know, let's we take a little break here now. Whether the one who sins from certain malice sins more gravely than the one from passion.

[30:34] To the fourth, one goes forward thus: It seems that the one who sins from certain malice does not sin more gravely than the one who sins from what passion.

[30:48] For ignorance excuses sin either wholly or in part, but more is ignorance in the one who sins from certain malice than in the one who sins from what passion. Because the one who sins from certain malice suffers ignorance of the principle, right? Which is maxima, as the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics, right? Um.

[31:19] For he has a bad estimate of the end, which is the beginning in things to be done. Therefore, he is more excused from sin the one who sins from certain malice than the one who sins from what passion. Let's look at the reply to that objection.

[31:43] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the ignorance of what choice, from which the objection proceeds, neither excuses nor diminishes the sin. This has been said above. Whence neither more does more ignorance, such more greater ignorance, yeah, make it to be a what less sin? We have to wait for the Bible article tomorrow. Later, upon what that means.

[32:17] Second objection: The more someone has something, what greater impelling to sin, the more what less he sins. Just as is clear about the one who, by a greater impetus of passion, is what sin. But the man who sins from certain malice is impelled by his habit, whose force or impulse is stronger than passion. Therefore, the one who sins from habit sins less than the one who sins from passion, right?

[32:52] He's kind of yeah. That's I'm with you to that, aren't you? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. Now, most beautiful answer to that. To the second, it should be said that the impulse which is from passion is, as it were, from the outside with respect to the will,

[33:16] but the what through habit. The will is inclined, as it were, from within. What's not a similar reason, right? Well, you know, is there something like that when they talk about the good act, right? Is a man who does something good out of charity, is that more meritorious than somebody does something good without charity? Yeah, because his will does it more. What inclination, right? More inclined to do good.

[33:48] But somebody could argue and say, you know, well, you know, then he's got more impetus to do good than the other man, right? That man's got hardly any inclination to do good, so he does good is more meritorious, right, huh? But he does so with less what inclination of his will.

[34:07] It's being about the seraphim, you know. Of course, you know, Dionysius, you know, says that the seraphim get their name from fire, right, huh? Well, why they get the name from fire, right? Well, he says three qualities of fire, right? One is that fire always burns upward, right, now continuously, right? And that's the way their heart is going to God with love, right now. It's always ascending to God, but continuously, right, huh?

[34:31] Okay. And then the fire, what? Yeah, it what burns things, absorbs them, right? And that's the way they're they're influencing the other what? Yeah, yeah. And there's a third likeness there. Was it the?

[34:58] Yeah, yeah. There was light. Yeah, who knew that? Very good. Yeah, yeah. The enlightened, you know, the fire has has a light and enlightens the higher hierarchy and enlightens the lower ones. It's a beautiful, beautiful explanation of it. I think that that we have a ringer because he's a Franciscan

[35:19] You know the seraphic and seraphic order. Very right. Very right. Seraphic. Yeah. Okay. Very good. The second reply, the habit, say intemperance would be in the consummable appetite, right, and not the will. That's where the habit would be, right? That would be outside. Yeah. Yeah. That implies he's still doing it from choice. Yeah, but it's it's still making the the habit influences more the choice, which is intrinsic to the will, right?

[35:57] Let's see. That's good. Okay. Moreover, to sin from certain malice is to sin from the choice of evil. But the man who sins from passion also chooses what evil, right? Therefore, does he is not less sin than the one who sins in certain malice, right?

[36:26] Now, to the third, it should be said that other is it to sin choosing, another to sin from choice. That's interesting. The same kind distinction he had the other article, right? For the one who sins from passion sins, to be sure, choosing, right, but not from choice. That's interesting, right?

[36:55] Because choice is not in him the first beginning of the sin, but he's induced from passion to choosing that which, existing outside of passion, he would not what choose, right? But the one who sins from certain malice, secundum se, as such chooses evil, in the way that has been what said, huh? In the first article, and therefore choice in him is the beginning of sin. In account of this, he is said to sin from choice.

[37:32] huh That's what I remember. I have might say the the objection is an objection I heard from a priest who said that oh if you got a young couple living together that married you have to absolve them if they come because he says they're addicted.

[37:52] What? So that's kind of the the confusion maybe he's here something. like that I mean. But against this, the objections is that the sin which is committed from industry, right, huh? From this merits a more grave what punishment, huh? According to that of Job chapter thirty four, right?

[38:26] He what? The word strikes. Yeah, he strikes the impious, right? In the place of those what seeing who, as it were, of the industry recede from it, right? But sin is not punishment is not increased except on account of the gravity of the guilt, right? Therefore, the sin is aggravated from the fact that it is from industry or a certain malice, huh? And what does the master say?

[39:00] Do you have a master like Thomas around? Huh? Being our company here, huh? Even by company by the written word, he can't be here by the spoken word. I suppose he could, but

[39:12] um. And it should be said that the sin that is from certain malice is more grave than the sin which is from passion, for a threefold reason. Right. Now, first, because since sin is chiefly consists in the will, right? Chiefly in the will. The more a the motion of sin is more what proper to the will itself, the more grave is the sin, other things being what equal.

[39:49] Right. Now, now the more one sins in certain malice, the more the what motion of the sin is proper to the will, as the were being moved from itself rather than passion or something else into the what sin. Then, when from what the passion one sins, as it were, from an extrinsic impulse, right, being moved to sin, right. Hence the sin from this that it is. From malice is made what more grave, and the more so, the more vehement is the what malice.

[40:34] From this that is from passion is diminished, right? And the more so, the more the passion was what, yeah. So David have a real vehement passion there.

[40:50] Yeah. I wonder about David, and even wonder about Peter. You know, with his, you know, denying Christ. You know, how much that was brought up to him. You know, many times. He

[41:09] was pope, you know. I mean. Yeah, but you. Okay. Secondly, because the passion which inclines the will to sinning, tends quickly right, passes over right, and then the man quickly returns to his good proposal, being penitent about his what sin.

[41:40] But the habit by which a man sins from malice is a what permanent quality, and therefore the one who sins from malice more what longer sins right.

[41:59] Whence the philosopher in the seventh book of the ethics compares the intemperate man who sins from malice to the infirm man who continually what labors in labors in sickness. The incontinent man, however, who sins from passion, to the one who is what. Labors now and again. I should say Yeah.

[42:26] I mean, he's temporarily bad today or something, you know. But i guess it's every day he's miserable, right? Sick, you know. So he's comparing the sickness of the body, two kinds of sickness of the body, right? Yeah.

[42:41] Yeah. Yeah. That's the way he's ordering these reasons, because the first reason is more principal, right? Okay. Third, because the one who sins from certain malice is badly disposed as regards the end itself, which is the beginning in things to be done, right? And therefore his defect is more what dangerous than the one who sins from passion, whose proposal tends towards a good end, although this proposal is interrupted.

[43:27] For the time being, on account of what passion, huh? Always the defect of the beginning is most worse. I'm going to see if Dionne would would would knock that into our heads all the time. That idea that the beginning. Aristotle talks about the importance of the beginning. Huh? Defect in the beginning affects everything else. A little mistake in the beginning, he says, is a great one in the end.

[43:59] Okay, so do a little bit of here. You know, I'm way wide there at the target there. When I a little move over here, a little one in the beginning.

[44:15] So semper defectus principii est pessimus Once it's manifest that he, uh, is more grave a sin which is from malice than one that is from passion. Huh? I'm convinced, by the Master here, he convinced me. When I was first teaching in California, I had a student. You know, he he'd come into class and he almost every class he'd pose an objection. You know, huh? Because I had heard all these ones before.

[44:43] You know, so I'd decline. I then I'd answer his objection. You know, and then I could see he'd be like this. You know, he raised an objection this, and then gradually this, and I answered it. I could see him. This is the body would relax like that. And he said to me one day after the after the course was over, you know, he said, "Yeah, I always thought.

[45:02] One day I thought I really had you. You know, I I could get him. Just got to get him today. You know, I've heard these before. I mean,

[45:12] yeah. Oh, he's a good student. He's a good student, and he knew when objections had been answered. You know, some kids might not know when the the answer has been given.

[45:22] Some of these objections, I mean, they're so classical. I mean, you hear them over and over again. I mean, it's just you know. So go into the next one here. We got time here. Okay. Now we've got to go to the exterior causes of sin, right? What the hell is that? And first on the part of God, kind of a heretic is this. Secondly, on the part of the devil.

[45:56] Thirdly, on the side of what man. About the first four things are asked. First, whether God is a cause of what sin. Sin. I was reading in another text of Thomas today. There, you know, he's talking about the. There's nothing wrong with Christ teaching there with parables, which the audience sometimes misunderstood. Is he a cause of their error?

[46:36] See, there's nothing wrong with that. It came from the defect of their mind, right? That they misinterpreted the thing, right? Well, anyway. About the first four things are asked. First, whether God is a cause of sin. These are fighting words now.

[47:02] Secondly, whether the act of sin is from God. Third, whether God is the cause of what blindness and hardness of the heart. There's plenty of times in the Gospels there where Christ is said to be angry, right, with the hardness of their heart.

[47:27] Fourth, whether these are ordered to the salvation of those who are what blinded or made. It's hard to see that that would be so.

[47:41] To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus: It seems that God is the cause of sin. For the apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter one, about some, that God turned them over to a what? Reprobate sense. Reprobate sense. That they might do those things which are not suitable to do.

[48:08] And the gloss says there that God works in the what hearts of men, incline their wills in whatever He wants to, whether in the good or in the bad.

[48:25] But to do those things which are not suitable, and to incline towards the will, incline the will towards the evil, is a sin. Therefore, God is a cause of sin for men.

[48:46] My goodness, let's see what they replied. Ejections. I'm worried about this. To the first, therefore, it should be said that as regards the words of the apostle, from the text itself, the solution is clear. For God, what handed over some to what reprobate sense already right? They had a reprobate sense to doing those things which do not what. Suitable.

[49:21] Is said to turn them over to their reprobate sense insofar as he does not prevent them from following what Their reprobate sense. Reprobate sense. Just as we are said to what expound those whom we do not expose those yeah whom we do not what defend yeah.

[49:46] What Augustine says in the book on grace and free judgment, free will, once the gloss is taken right, huh? That God inclines the wills of men in good and bad. That should be understood that in the good he directly inclines the will right. In evil, in so far as he does not what prevent it, this has been said. And nevertheless, this also happens from the merit of the preceding what sin.

[50:22] Difficult text on nevertheless huh. Yeah, it's a related thing. Augustine says somewhere about God respects the laws that he's made and he allows his creatures to make their own moves. Yeah.

[50:36] Moreover, in the book of wisdom, chapter fourteen, it is said the creatures of God are made in hate and in temptation to the soul of men.

[50:53] But temptation is accustomed to what They call provocation. provocation to sin. Since therefore the creatures are not made except by God, as has been had in the first there. It seems that God is a cause of sin, provoking men to sinning. Right. He made woman. He made Bathsheba. Moreover, what is a cause of the cause is a cause of the effect. But God is the cause of liberum arbitrium, free judgment, free will, which is a cause of sin.

[51:38] Therefore, God is a cause of sin. God made my will. My will is a cause of sin. Therefore, God is a cause of. Oh, we should look at to reply to objections here. I get to go back to the second one first of all. To the second, should be said that when it is said that the creatures of God are made in hate and in temptation to the soul of men, this preposition "what in" is not laid down causality, but what consecutively, right?

[52:22] For God did not make creatures for the evil of men, but this followed an account of the foolishness of men, right? Once he subjoins and in a what trap, I guess for the feet of the what foolish, huh? That's why he made Bathsheba.

[52:48] Because through his own foolishness, they used creatures for something other than they were made, huh? So that comes up a number of texts that use the word "in" there, right, huh?

[53:10] But it's not laid down causally there, but consecutively, right? What the cause of a cause? To the third, it should be said that the effect of the middle cause, proceeding from it, according as it is subject to the order of the first cause, is reduced also in the first cause, right? But if it proceeds from the middle cause, according as it goes out of the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to the first cause.

[53:47] Just as if the minister or servant does something against the command of the Lord, this is not reduced to the Lord, is in a what cause? And likewise, the sin that liberum arbitrium commits against the precept of God is not reduced in God, is in a what cause?

[54:20] So if I send you to beat the kid, and I said, but you know, do so gently, and you don't do gently, am I responsible for? Am I the cause of what you did?

[54:37] Moreover, everything bad is opposed to the good, but it is not repugnant to divine goodness that He be the cause of the evil of what punishment? Huh? And about this evil, it is said in Isaiah chapter forty-five that God is creating evil, right? My goodness. And in Amos 3, if there is evil in the city that God did not make, huh? Therefore, also to the divine goodness is not repugnant that God be the cause of guilt, right?

[55:15] To the fourth, it should be said that punishment is opposed to the good of the one who is punished, huh, who is deprived of some what good. But guilt is opposed to the good of order which is in God, huh? Whence it is directly opposed to the divine goodness. An account of this is not similar. The reason about guilt punishment, huh? Punishment as opposed to my good, right?

[55:45] Not that God's good, the good is God, but guilt as opposed to sin as opposed to God, the good which is God, right? But against this is what is said in Wisdom chapter eleven about God. You hate none of those things which you have made, right? Huh? But God, what hates sin, right? Huh? According to that of Wisdom chapter fourteen, the impious is what? Odious to God impiety, right?

[56:21] Huh? Therefore, God is not the cause of sin, right? So He loves what He Himself has what? made, right? Huh? He doesn't love what the sinner or the sin, right? And therefore he didn't make him to be a sinner.

[56:44] I answer: It should be said that man is in two ways, huh? A cause of sin, either of himself or of another, huh? That's good to know. In one way, directly, by inclining what his own will or that of another to sinning, right?

[57:12] In another way, indirectly, when to it he does not restrain or draw back people from what sinning, right? Whence Ezekiel chapter three verse eighteen to the speculator it is said, if you do not say to the impious by death you will die, his blood I will what require from your hand, right?

[57:44] So we don't tell him that this is wrong, right? But God is not able to be directly the cause of sin, either of himself or of another, right? Because every sin is by the recess from the order which is to him as into an end, right? For God inclines all things and turns them back, you might say, to Himself as to the last end, as Dionysius says in the first chapter about the divine names.

[58:23] Whence it is impossible that to Himself or to others He be a cause of what departing, you might say, which is towards Himself. Whence He is not able to be directly a cause of sin, huh?

[58:43] Likewise, neither indirectly. It can happen, huh, that God does not to some, offer assistance, aid to avoiding sin, which if He gave, they would what, not sin, huh? But the whole of this He does according to the order of His own wisdom and justice, since He Himself is wisdom and justice, right? Whence it is not imputed to Him that someone another sins, as to the cause of sin, right?

[59:22] Just as the governor is not said to be the cause of the submersion of the ship, from this that He does not what, ship, except when He what subtracts the governing, when He is able and not to what, govern, and thus it is clear that God in no way is a cause of sin. Stop here, I guess.