Prima Secundae
198. Replies on the seven capital vices, then the effects of sin (Question 85, article 1): does sin weaken the good of nature?
Class of 2015-01-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/198-replies-on-the-seven-capital-vices-then-the-effects-of-sin/

[0:00] Okay, now he's got to reply to all those horrible objections, right? Okay, makes life difficult, doesn't he, Thomas? I think he must enjoy doing that, huh? Chuckling to himself, right?

[0:14] Keep people down there, okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said. This is the one that now that said they should be one-to-one correspondence, right, in the number of vices, right? Of course, evils in many ways. That's the first thing that I think of. But Thomas is a little more precise here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that there is not the same reason of origin in virtues and in vices, for the virtues are caused by the order of desire to reason, or also to the what unchangeable good, which is God, the bonum incommutabile.

[0:55] Got to talking about time with my students there. We're gonna talk about eternity next next time, you know, the incommutabile good, God. But vices arise from the desire of some commutable good. Okay, but there are more of them around, right? Okay.

[1:20] So guys have a hard time competing there with all these goods we have. Now I was thinking, you know, of how the dignity or worth of man comes from reason, right? And in the Nicomachean Ethics, when Aristotle gets through considering the third book, there the senses, and then he takes up reason, right? And then he has a little place where he talks about the soul on the basis of what he's taught or learned about the senses and reason, right?

[1:59] And he says that the soul was in some way all things, right? Because the senses are open to all things sensible, and the reason to all things understandable, right?

[2:12] And then put that together with what Thomas does, and he quotes God saying to Moses, "I will show you every good." And Thomas says that is myself. So in a sense, God is every good, right? But the soul is in some way all things too, but in a very imperfect way, right? Now when you say large discourse, you know, if discourse about the universal, the universal covers what?

[2:38] If it's being in one, like in metaphysics, it covers everything, right? But even number, you know, covers infinity of things, right? So the soul, knowing these universals in some way, at least a confused way, is all things, right? So in a very distant way, he's what like God, you know? So Aristotle, I mean Shakespeare calls reason godlike, right? Just that that likeness there.

[3:11] But the commutable goods are multiplied, right? Hence, it is not necessary that the principal vices are opposed to the principal what virtues. Okay. Now, what's the second objection about? Why do you take things that pertain to joy and sadness, but not to the other ones? Of course, he takes the two principal ones in the concupiscible appetite, and the two principal ones in the irascible. But you got to remember that the irascible ones arise in some way from the concupiscible.

[3:47] one. To the second, it should be said that fear and hope are the passions of the irascible. Now, all the passions of the irascible arise from the passions of the what concupiscible, which are which all of these are ordered ultimately, right, in some way to pleasure and sadness, huh?

[4:17] Because we act as something that pleases us, or want to avoid something that makes us sad, right? And therefore, pleasure and sadness are chiefly enumerated among, right, or enumerated in the capital vices, as it were, not only the principal, but principalissime, right, the most principal, right, passions, right, has been had above when we discussed the passions, right. I think I told you my little thing there when I first started getting interested in fiction there in a logical way there from reading Aristotle's book on the poetic art, right.

[4:55] Well, he lost the part on comedy, right, and in the part on tragedy, though he speaks of pity and fear, right. So I said, well, comedy is the opposite of tragedy, therefore it should move the opposite passions of what pity and what fear, which would be what

[5:19] some kind of joy and and confidence or boldness, right, just the opposite of what fear, fear, yeah. And then as I started to study emotions more in Thomas, you know, in the De Veritate and so on, and then you look what the principal passions are, right, and it's not confidence, is not one of them, but it's hope, right. And then I said, then I began to realize that comedy is more concerned with mirth, which is a form of joy, and hope, right, huh?

[5:53] And when I was studying it, I was studying the Roman comic dramatists a bit, right, and the guy was, you know, quoting Saint Paul there, you know, about faith, hope, and charity, for the greatest of these charities. But the comic poet, the greatest of all, is hope, he says, right, and you know, and I was saying, yeah, because that's you know, kind of you know, he was talking about you know these comic dramatists and the Romans and the aspect of hope, you know, which.

[6:20] But that's because the principal passion, though, right? You can see that, right? So I was mistaken, right? Huh? Though it wasn't a bad idea. You don't see that, you know? Contrary things have contrary effects, right? So like, like the great what? Empedocles says, you know, that what brings the atoms together, what separates them are love and hate, right? Love brings them together, hate separates them, right? So this argument is saying, but even though hope and fear are principal passions, are not the principalissime, right?

[6:57] The most principal, right? Which are in the concupiscible. So when they talk about the the passions, they say the concupiscible ones are first, and then the irascible what arise from that, and then you go back again to the concupiscible at the end, right? So if I beat up the guy, you know, anger, you know, and I have some joy, you know, you know,

[7:25] or if I hope to get the girl, I get the girl and the joy, you know, see, you know, so the hope goes back to joy, right? You know, the concupiscible, right? But it begins with you know love and hate, and then you you want something that you love, and you try to avoid something you hate, right? And there's this difficulty arising. Then you need the irascibles, right?

[7:44] You know, to help you overcome the difficulties of getting the good or the difficulties of avoiding the bad, right? So if you're stepping on my toe, and I say you're on my toe, and you say so what? Well, that requires maybe a little bit of anger on my part to get you off my toe, you know? Or you're out there, you know, using my kids' or target practice, right?

[8:05] Well, that's going to get some anger on my part. Or like the folks said there, right? Insult my mother. You talking about my mother? Yeah. Yeah. So that's the reply to the second objection, then, right?

[8:29] Now the one about anger, though, is a little more of a problem, isn't it, right? Because that's not even a principal. That's not even one of the the four, right? Okay. Let alone being principalissime, right? Yeah. To third, it should be said that anger, although it is not a principal passion, because nevertheless it has a special reason of a appetitive motion, in so far as someone what the good of another under the notion of something what honourable, right?

[9:05] Huh? Of something just that is conductive or punishing or forecoming or something. Therefore, it's distinguished from the other capital vices, right? Huh? Okay. But you know, you can go on. You can say. What Shakespeare says there, you know, they're in the very wrath of love, right? It's kind of a pun on there, right? But, but why do you compare love with wrath, right? Huh?

[9:37] Because they're strong, what? Emotions, right? Huh? And not so easily we can kind of see when somebody's angry, right? Huh? They come in, you know, and you see they're angry about something, you know, they're you charge them too much, you've done something that made them angry, right? Huh? And and angry is a very manifest passion, right? Huh? But it's it's it's strong, right? Huh? And so in Aristotle, I'm not Aristotle, but Thomas takes up the virtues in more detail in the secunda secunda, right?

[10:07] And he divides them according to the three theological virtues and the four cardinal virtues. But then he takes up the other virtues and attaches them to one of the cardinal virtues. Well, to what cardinal virtue does he attach? Mildness, right? Which is the virtue concerned with anger, right? What virtue is he attached to? Temperance. Yeah, yeah. Because desire for food or drink or or sex, something like that, needs to be what?

[10:37] Refrained, right? Huh? Why, in the case of courage, you know, you know, you have to be kind of pushed into it, right? You know, you have to go forward, even though the fact, you know. And a lot of people, you know, they get up to speak in front of an audience, and they kind of freeze, you know, and they have to be what? They have to practice this, in a sense, huh?

[11:00] See, but the case of anger, it's something that needs to be what? More restrained, right? So it's it's like you know these strong emotions, right? And so, given the strength of it, maybe he doesn't want that here, but he doesn't secundum secundum, right? And and Shakespeare does that metaphor, right? Huh? In the very wrath of love, how can he compare? You know.

[11:24] And in the very wrath of love, he says clubs could not part them. I mean, you know, you you part dogs with the club, right? And maybe you had angry people, in a sense, but certainly dogs. That was the common way to do it, you know, in London, there, you know. And so

[11:45] parents have to kind of separate the young lovers. Do sometimes, right? Huh? So it makes a pun, huh? So then, the very wrath of love, clubs cannot part them, right? Huh? You know. So the idea is to get them married off quickly because that's what they do, yeah. And and then of course Orlando says, "See happiness through another's eyes." You know, it's a terrible thing, you know.

[12:11] To see. Love through another's happiness through another's eyes, right? You know, to see something else, you know. And then of course, you know, if you know the play, there, as you like it, you know like it, you know. But I mean that comparison, right? I think it's something about why anger is a principal passion, right? Because. It's because of the strength of it, for one thing, right?

[12:32] Huh. But something could be developed a little bit more here than the master does it right here. That's what he says. There's a special reason of the appetitive motion in so far as one what fights against the good of another, right? Under the notion of something what? Yeah, yeah. Notice how different that is from from what envy, right? Because envy is kind of a thing that people don't want to admit that they're envious of somebody, right?

[13:05] Because that makes it worse, right? Huh? You know. You know. Um. I got to think of funny examples of that, you know. I have to almost do funny to

[13:34] the car. The girls running up and down the street there, and the bike there at home, and I'm out there mowing the lawn, you know. And she's having a good time riding by, you know. Don't you wish, Raul? Trying to rouse envy. The last person I want to be with, you know. Yeah, kind of funny, though. Funny. Yeah. But envy is kind of an insinuating thing, you know.

[13:54] People, you know, are envious, right? One girl is getting all the attention. The other girls get kind of what? Envious, you know, and they start saying bad things about them. Yeah, they said talking.

[14:13] First thing they do. Yeah, yeah, yeah. She commented. But you see that in the academic world too, you know. So you know, people want to say bad things about somebody, you know, get too much attention or something.

[14:47] The Pope commented, "That's one of the illnesses of mankind." Yeah, yeah. Clergy too. Yeah. Mathematician. Yeah, the tyranny of gossip. It's amazing. I'm, I'm, you know, reading Euclid a little bit, you know, and marvelous some of his theorems, right? I got thinking again about about the the the Mino of Plato right And Amino, in their particular thing, Socrates says, you know, that I heard said, you know, that that we were that soul existed before us in the body, you know, and we picked up all this knowledge.

[15:07] If we could only recall it, we'd be all set, right? And Mino said, "That sounds interesting, but you got any evidence what you're saying? " And that's when he has a conversation with the slave boy, right? And of course, Mino will testify that the slave boy has never studied geometry, right? So Socrates says, "I suppose you have a square, and you want to get one twice as big as that.

[15:29] What would be the side of this square twice as big? " And slave boy says, "Twice as long. " And of course, that's would give you a square of what? Four times as big, right? So Socrates, by asking the slave boy, you know, simple questions, right? I mean, he might say, you know, "What if the square was two by two, right? " If you double the side, be four by four.

[15:52] And four by four would be sixteen, and two by two, it would only be four. what? Sixteen would be. even the slave boy could see it, you know. So, um, then Socrates, um, says, "Well, suppose you took this square and you put another square next to it, you know, another one right down below the other one, one like that. You had four squares making up a bigger square.

[16:14] How many times as big would that square be? Would be four times, right? But now suppose you write the diagonals, right? And so you end up with four halves of those four squares, right, to make up a square. And that's actually the diagonal of the original square. Okay? That's a marvelous thing, right? Huh? I see. What I would I wonder about in in geometry is sometimes the simplicity of these things, right?

[16:39] So you got a square here. Give me the side of a square twice as big. Just take the diagonal. I mean, wow, something, right? Huh? Say. And so it's wonderful because it's simplicity, right? You know. But then I kept thinking about it again, and what a wonderful thing that is. And the thing I thought of years ago was, of course, the fact that you have the Pythagorean theorem here in a particular way.

[17:06] Because here you have a right-angled isosceles, and you say that in an isosceles right-angled triangle, the square opposite the right angle will be equal to the squares exactly on the two sides containing the right angle. I wonder if there would be two other triangles, right? And then later on, of course, if you said Euclid, like in the forty-seventh theorem of Book One, you'd find it's true about all triangles, right?

[17:32] And this is the way some of these things were discovered, right? They'd be seen in a particular way, right, particular kind, and then later on they see the universal one, right? Huh? I was looking at it again, and I said, "Gee, what a dummy I am." There's something else marvelous about this, right? Because if I said, you know, we got a square here, right? And we want to make a square four times as big, right?

[17:58] What's got to be the side of that square four times as big? You say, well, two times, right? Okay. Okay. Then you say, what would be a square just twice as big, right? What could you multiply the original one by? Say, you couldn't multiply it by two. Can't by one. You have to multiply it by something in between the two, right? Say, well, well, let's see now.

[18:26] Let's say it was a foot by foot, right? Let's divide it into twelve inches now, right? Huh? Okay. Now how many inches did it have to be if you're going to make just twice as big? Well, you couldn't say in inches. You know, twelve times twelve is what? One hundred forty-four. Half of forty-four is seventy-two. But seventy-two is not a square number, right? Okay. Well, I got to get something smaller than an inch, you know, to measure it with, right?

[18:51] But no matter how small you went, you would never, ever, right, find something that would measure it. So you couldn't give something like you could for the square four times as big, right? Where you can say multiply by this, right? There's nothing you could multiply it by that would give you one twice as big. Oh my God! Well, how could I ever find the side of a square that's twice as big?

[19:18] We can only do it geometrically. You can't do it like you would with the one four times as big, right? And and so and of course it's the diagonal, right? Very simple way. Something that would amaze you, you know, you can't do it arithmetically, you might say, right? See, I like to say where it begins. You double the thing, right, to get one that would be four times as big, right?

[19:42] How do you multiply to get one just twice as big? What exactly are you multiplying by? I don't believe that. How could that, you know? And that's the thing that Aristotle takes as as an example of wonder, right? See, because one would think you must be able to take some unit small enough that you could say what you could multiply it by, like how many inches or some part of an inch or something, you know?

[20:03] And you can't, right? And they say what a marvelous example, Socrates. I mean, Plato, my master there, took, you know, that's just amazing, right?

[20:14] Now I was we were talking about the natural law, because my brother Richard was writing something in the natural law, and We we're giving the awards there, you know, the pro-life committee there in the parish there. They they sponsor a a essay thing for the seventh and eighth graders, you know, and then we give actually financial little rewards, right, to the the four top papers, right, descending order.

[20:42] So, but we gotta read all these papers and grade them, you know. So I was stuck there with three ladies there, my wife and for the ladies from the pro-life committee, you know, trying to decide which are the four best in the seventh grade and the eighth grade, and then so on those four, which is one, two, three, four, and so finally do it. So anyway, the ladies there who was who was there, she says, "What's the natural law?"

[21:06] She says, she asked me, right, you know, because you know I haven't been a professor, you know. So I talked a little bit about the natural law, right, and we see, but how do you lead somebody to admit that there is a natural law, something naturally known, right? Well, if you go back to this beautiful example in Meno, Socrates, of course, is maintaining that we naturally know the whole geometry, but we've forgotten it because we've been struck into this crazy body, you know, that distracts us and so on, right?

[21:41] And so that learning is not is really recalling what we already know, right? And he gives the appearance that the slave boy is recalling geometry because it's out of the answers the slave boy that comes the answer to how to double a square that's going to be the diagonal, right? So Socrates says, I didn't teach him that or give him that; I came out of what he knew, you know.

[22:08] So he was recalling it, yeah, yeah, yeah, said said Meno right? So Socrates is giving an example, right? And but did the slave boy really recall how to double a square? In fact, when he first asked him how to double it, he said you double the side, right? He was even worse than not knowing it; he was mistaken about it, right? And

[22:36] but Socrates has hit upon a very important truth, right? That what you're doing in geometry is you're learning a new theorem. You have to recall, right? You have to recall something you already know, right now, okay? So that you are able to know the new theorem of which you already know. But to be able to know is not the same thing as to actually know it. So you have to put these things together and see what follows from them, right?

[23:09] Before you actually come to know, right? So he's not really recalling how to what double a square, right? But he's coming to know it by recalling things he already what knows.

[23:24] Well, where did this all begin then? The definitions the axioms and the logic books He had to recall something that he didn't come to know by recalling something else. So much as something he naturally knew, like the whole is more than the part, and so on, right? If you kind of begin to realize that there's something naturally known, right now. But in Socrates' kind of exaggerated view of this, you're natural the whole geometry, right?

[23:58] Well, you actually know just the very the very beginnings are naturally known, right? And quantities equal to the same equal to each other, we naturally know that, right? If I'm the same height as you, and he's the same height as you, then then we're the same height, right? This table is the same length as that one, and that one is the same length that one, then this one's the same length, you know, one down there.

[24:21] So that's very important, right? Because people usually want to admit something that's naturally known. I was looking at Aristotle's, you know, count there of the positive law and the natural law in the in the rhetoric, right? Because he begins with the positive law, right? And then you go on to the natural law, right? Which is which is a natural order, right? And sometimes you know people know Thomas, you know, they'll take the Summa, where he talks about the natural law and the positive law, but it talks about the divine law.

[25:00] But Thomas is proceeding in theological order there, right? So the natural law might be defined as a partaking of the divine law, right? But that's kind of the way you proceed in theology, where you start with God and see other things in light of God, right? But Aristotle proceeds in the opposite order, right? My old teacher Kasurik used to have a meeting with the lawyers on St.

[25:24] Paul, right? And they they had a dinner and then they they discussed the treatise on law. You know, the difficulty they had in understanding any notion of law except the positive law, right? The law that is on the books, right? You know what this sort of law that is on the books, right? And and so you got to begin there with these guys, right? Huh? See. And but when Aristotle kind of hints that there's another law, he he quotes what Sophocles, right?

[25:53] Now in the plays, right? What? Escalus, not Sophocles. no, no, no, no, no, no. This this is the one the one what's your name? Antigone. Antigone, yeah, yeah. Where he's passed the law that somebody should not be buried, right? That's against the natural law, right? Yeah. And she goes out there and starts burying, right? She appeals to to the natural law, right? Huh? So it's kind of beautiful thing, you know, but.

[26:28] But Socrates is already deducing today. that. There's something natural there, something naturally no. Marvelous these guys, huh? Marvelous. Marvelous. Started to look at the, the fourth book there, you know, where you're inscribing circles inside of squares and triangles and vice versa, you know, and so on. But, you know, if you had an equilateral triangle, you'd kind of guess that the three points, right? You could draw a circle through them, right?

[27:07] But if you get an odd-looking triangle, you know, you know the odd sides and so on, could you always draw a circle that would go through those three points? Well, he shows that in that book there, right? You know, kind of marvelous. It's kind of a marvelous little thing, you know.

[27:27] But I should, I should envy him, right? Huh? He's so far ahead of me, right? The marvelous things he sees, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah People are studying him Yeah. Yeah. Who's paying attention to me? Yeah, You should write a book about Berkwish, Ellen. I guess at one time, when C. Dionne was a censor of the billboard, you know, for the diocese up there, you know. He was detecting things left and right.

[28:06] Another here needs to be printed. That's true, you know. Most of the stuff is, you know, just cluttering the, the, yeah, yeah. It's just too many, too many books being published, right? You know, that shouldn't be published, catching people and wasting their time, you know, and so on. I need glory, right? Get my book published Okay To the fourth it should be said right Huh That pride is said to be the beginning of every sin according to the notion of a what End And according to the same ratio one takes the what Principality my book published.

[28:35] Okay. To the fourth, it should be said, right? Huh? That pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, according to the notion of a what? End.

[28:59] And according to the same ratio, one takes the what? Principality, of the capital vices. And therefore, pride, is where universal vice, huh, is not numbered among them, but is more laid down as the what? Queen of all vices, as Gregory says, huh? What a splendid, huh? Queen there, right? Huh? You know. But look at her, all the people doing her service and carrying out her wonderful wishes, huh?

[29:38] But avarice is said to be the root, according to another ratio, right? Yeah, kind of like the what, supplying it, huh? Feeding it, yeah.

[29:51] Now the fifth one is a different kind of objection, right? Saying, well, don't sometimes there are other ways that sins arise, right? To the fifth, it should be said that these vices are said to be capital because from them, ut frequentius right, More more often, right, others arise, right, huh? Whence nothing prevents some sins sometimes to rise from other what causes, right, huh? Okay. And of course the objection was talking about ignorance in particular, right?

[30:27] It is able, however, to be said that all sins that come from ignorance can be reduced to what? Acedia right? Huh? Because in the old Bulgarian they they translated laziness, but that's a little too broad, right? Because laziness could be what? Yeah, and then not doing your work and you know doing your exercise, what it was, you know.

[30:49] To which pertains a negligence, by which someone what? Recuses themselves, as they say nowadays, to acquire spiritual goods on account of the what? Yeah, yeah. I mean, am I supposed to read the Bible? What are you

[31:09] doing? I go to church every Sunday. Without exception. What I don't feel like. I remember my old teacher there, Kasurik, there, you know, saying, you know, he's talking to somebody. The guy says, you know, I don't think God's going to send me to hell, you know, for for not going to church, you know. And Kasurik says, well, I think you better think about that again. Yeah, but.

[31:41] For the ignorance, right, which is able to be a cause of sin, right, can't be invincible ignorance, right, but the one that comes from what? Negligence, right? Huh.

[31:55] So some people don't want to learn logic, right? That's that stuff, you know. Plug through that ABC. That someone commits some sin from a good intention would seem also to pertain, right, to ignorance, right? Huh. In so far as one is ignorant that one ought not to do evil things, that good might come, right? Huh.

[32:30] You see, notice how you don't put down something like like like murder here as a capital sin, right? Because murder is what? Too obviously bad, right? Huh. It's got to rise from something else, right?

[32:50] I suppose you know lust has something to do with with the fact of abortion or something of the sort, right? Huh. Why did they kill Christ? Why did the? what? Yeah, yeah. Pilate and Lord Yeah. Yeah. See, you know how envy gives rise to really some tremendous what? Sins, yeah, yeah.

[33:24] No, take a little break here. Then we're not to consider about the effects of sin. If you're a misanthrope, you'll be especially enjoy this part coming up.

[33:42] And first about the corruption of the good of nature, right? Secondly, about the stain of the what? Soul, I guess, maccata the stain. Third, about the what? Obligation for punishment, right? Guilty of that. This first part is what do you want us to find out about this. About the first six things are asked. First, whether the good of nature is diminished by sin.

[34:16] If you late comers here, I told you that if you're a misanthrope, you'll enjoy this part a lot. Like uh So, we're talking about the effects of sin, and first about the corruption of the good of nature. Secondly, the stain of the soul. Third, the obligation for punishment, I guess. But what? The debt. Yeah. About the first six things are asked. First, whether the good of nature is diminished by sin.

[34:50] Secondly, whether it can be taken away entirely. Third, about the four wounds, which Bede lays down, by which human nature is wounded on account of sin.

[35:09] Fourth, whether the privation of modes, species, and order is an effect of sin. Fifth, whether death and other bodily defects are effects of sin. And sixth, whether they are in some way natural to man.

[35:31] To the first, one goes forward thus: It seems that sin does not diminish the good of nature. First, because the sin of man is not more grave than the sin of the demon. Quite good at that, wouldn't you? But the natural goods in the demons remain integral or whole after sin, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of about the divine names. Therefore, sin also does not diminish the good of human nature.

[36:07] We're all good. Wrong. I'm okay. You're okay. Moreover, the afterwards being changed, right, does not what change the before, but For substance remains the same, even with the accidents being changed. But nature exists before voluntary action. Therefore, a disorder being made about the action of the will, through sin, was not going to, what change the thing that's before, on account of this nature. Thus, that the good of nature diminished.

[36:58] Moreover, sin is a certain act, but diminution is a passion or an undergoing. But no agent from this that he acts undergoes. It can be happen, however, that what he acts in one and is what undergoes from another. Therefore, the one who sins does not diminish the what good of his own act.

[37:32] Moreover, no accident acts upon its own subject, because what undergoes is a being in what ability. But what what is subject to an accident is already an act of being according to that what accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a what subject. Therefore, sin does not diminish the good of nature, because to diminish is a certain what acting upon.

[38:10] But against this is what that is just as what is said in Luke chapter ten, the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, that is into the what defect of sin, was deprived of his what gratuitous goods, and wounded in his natural things. So not just expoliator gratuitis, but wounded in his what natural things, as Bede said. huh? He's quite a guy, this bead, isn't he? You read his history there.

[38:42] The... I looked at it, but never really read it. I might have read it. We have it. Yeah, yeah, Yeah. He's a lot. Thomas quotes him a lot in the in the uh, Catena, Oria, yeah. Therefore, sin diminishes the good of nature. huh? Okay, Thomas, I'm all confused now by this. huh? That's your duty, going to sort of confuse the issue first. I answer it should be said that the good of human nature can be said what Three ways.

[39:16] Three ways, huh? How does he see these distinctions that I don't see? He's got better eyes. Surely he does have better eyes, yeah. First, those very beginnings of nature from which nature is constituted, huh? And the properties caused from these, as the powers of the soul, right, that follow from this. And others of this sort. Secondly, because man, by nature, has an inclination to what Virtue. virtue, as was had above, and this inclination to virtue is a certain good of nature.

[40:00] And in a third way, that can be said to be a good of nature, the gift of original justice, which was given to the first man to be given to.

[40:13] What happened to the original justice, Adam? Tossed out. It wasn't lost; it was thrown away. The first, therefore, good of nature is neither taken away nor diminished by what sin. Now, what is that? That's the principles of nature of which nature is constituted, and the properties caused from them as the powers of the soul.

[40:45] So I'm missing some of the powers of my soul. Some people are. The first, therefore, good of nature is neither taken away nor diminished by what sin. The third good of nature is wholly what taken away through the sin of the first parent. That's the gift of original justice, huh? Just kind of gratuitous on God's part, right?

[41:17] There's some probable reason to be given why he would give this to us in the beginning. But the middle good of nature, to wit, the natural inclination to virtue, we're all good, is diminished, diminished by what sin, huh? Because to human acts, there comes to be a certain inclination to similar acts. It's necessary that from this that someone is inclined to one of two contraries, right? There be diminished inclination of him to what the other contrary, huh?

[42:05] When, since sin is contrary to virtue, from this very thing that man sins, there is diminished that good of nature which we said was the inclination to what virtue, huh?

[42:30] So Thomas distinguishes what a threefold good of nature, right? And one he says is not affected by this, right? One is entirely taken away, right? And the one in the middle, right, inclination to virtue, that is in some way natural, is partly taken away; it's diminished, right?

[42:57] Could my inclination to geometry be diminished from this? I wonder. Yeah. I think so Sometimes I'd have, when I was teaching, you know, about logic, you know, I would give a few things from geometry there, you know, because one's also natural, you know. And the students are complaining about that. I don't want to learn geometry.

[43:23] Very clear, you know. I paid good money to learn logic, and he's. teaching us geometry Why can't I just get some geometry Yeah Now, to the first, it should be said that Dionysius speaks about the first good of nature, right? Which is to be, to live, and to understand, as is clear to the one looking into his what words? That's what Dionysius said. He's talking about the angels, right?

[44:10] To the second, it should be said that nature, although it is before voluntary action, right? Nevertheless, it has an inclination to a certain what voluntary action. Whence nature itself, right? As such, is not varied according to the variation of voluntary action. But the inclination is varied from that part by which is ordered to its what end or limit.

[44:49] To the third, it should be said that voluntary action goes forward from diverse powers, one of which is active and another what passive. And from this it happens that through voluntary actions is caused something, or is taken away from man thus acting. As has been said above when we treated of the generation of what habits. Well, you all remember that, of course. Yeah. Okay.

[45:25] It's like you could even pull a theorem out, you know, from two books away, you know, and all of a sudden apply it to some odd theorem that he's trying to prove, you know, and you say, Yeah, yeah, it's like a reference back to the theorem, you know, the number there to look it up again, huh?

[45:45] Okay. To the fourth, it should be said that an accident does not act like an efficient cause, huh? In the its subject, right, huh? It acts over, or said to act, formally in it, in that way of speaking by which it is said that whiteness makes white.

[46:10] And thus nothing prevents that sin diminishes the good of nature. In that way, nevertheless, in which it is a what? It's a diminution of the good of nature, in so far as it pertains to the disorder of the what act. But as regards the disorder of the agent himself, it is necessary to say that such disorder is caused from this that in the acts of the soul there is something active and something what passive, just as the sensible moves the sense power, and sense desire inclines the reason and the will, as has been said above.

[47:00] And from this is caused disorder, not that the accident acts in its own what subject, but according as the object acts on the power, and one part acts on another, and what? Disorder. Yeah.

[47:26] Just a little bit involved there, right? Huh? Yeah. Because you're watching what TV there, and your senses are being acted upon, and then they're disordering the other faculties of your of you by what you're seeing, right?

[47:50] So that was the State of the Union last night What? Yeah, yeah, oh yeah. But you know, you know, all all the things, the movies and so on. You know, they're kind of pornographic. You know, I mean, and they're taken for granted. You know, huh? Remember a conversation a number of years ago, and someone said, "Went to the movies. Oh, things are showing, you know." And they said to the other person who has been going to movies regularly, "Oh, I didn't notice.

[48:21] Oh, that's only gone for a long time. You know, some person has been to the movies for a long time and kind of shocked by the looseness of them now compared to what they were before, right? Things would never show, right? Huh? Yeah. Even the old days, the men wouldn't go to the to the to the bedroom there. You know, they go to different beds. You know, the old movies.

[48:39] You know, now now they they do much more than go to the same bed. I mean, they go all the way. And so so these acting upon your senses, and then then they act upon other powers, right? Your emotions, and and this affects even your your will, right? So one power is is what acting upon and disordering another power, right? So there's all kinds of what. And then you get a practical judgment about what's being.

[49:06] seen That's right. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I I know the amount of people like living you know before marriage, right, and so on. These things taken taken for granted now, huh? But

[49:20] unless you you're acquainted and and absorbed in the teaching of the church, right? Huh? There's so much going on, you know, between your fallen nature and the corruption of the movies and everything. That

[49:36] they can hardly most people don't go astray, you know. It seems to me. Yeah. Yeah. That was the amazing thing. A girl on her wedding day, you know, comes down the aisle in a white dress, but she's been living with her boyfriend. Yeah. Yeah. What does that white dress signify? Does it mean anything to you? It's just that really nice white dress. What does it mean? Yeah.

[50:06] I know the priest who married my brother Richard and his wife. You know, and he's always discouraging marrying people because he thinks they're going to last these marriages. You know, he thinks you know half the people. You know, I thought brother Richard and I would stay together, you know, but it was kind of a, I mean, he thought most of these are not going to last the way the way he saw them.

[50:24] It's what somebody took. Did we hear it somewhere? I forget. Somebody said they took a survey among the clergy in some big diocese of what they disliked most, and they also said weddings. Because the wedding, the preparation, whatever they said, it's like so depressing to see these people, and they know that they're not formed, they're not interested. they just want the ceremony Just one ceremony, and yeah, that's it.

[50:47] Yeah. So it's kind of really depressing for the priest to go through the motions. Of course, they could always refuse and say, "Go away, JP. "

[50:58] Deserved. Yeah. Was it a wedding where supposed to be a Catholic family, but there was no priest involved? the justice of the peace. dressed up. I'm not kidding. As Merlin, the magician. The marriage lasted, I think, three and a half months. It was a travesty. It was embarrassing. Not even Catholic.

[51:26] At least it wasn't a real marriage. Yeah. Okay. Damn into the winter or not? It's just. This is kind of a long way. Yeah.

[51:50] Okay.