Prima Secundae
199. Antonomasia in Scripture: 'The Evil One' and 'The Good'; Summa I-II q.85 aa.2-3: Can Sin Destroy Nature's Good, and the Four Wounds of Nature
Class of 2015-01-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/199-antonomasia-in-scripture-the-evil-one-and-the-good-summa/

[0:01] Give you a little preacher from Matthew here. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deus gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:35] Amen. Finish reading there. The we're reading the twelfth book of wisdom. There you know it's kind of interesting. You know where Aristotle takes up God's knowing right, and that God's substance and His understanding are the same thing, and that His understanding is a life, and God's not only a life, but he's life itself, right? That's pretty good, I think, you know, for this old pagan guy, right?

[1:02] Um, then, you know, that's where Thomas' commentary ends with the twelfth book, right? So I was kinda looking at the thirteenth and the fourteenth books, you know, and this interesting in there, you know. But one thing's very interesting where he's talking about how you should treat your predecessors, right? You know, we should try to improve some things they said, right? Other things we should try to say as well as they said it.

[1:24] What a marvelous thing, right? Huh? You know, if you can say things as well as Thomas says it, right? You know, that is sufficient, right? You know, the guy said anything's beyond him, you know, or or say as well as you know Augustine near, you know, Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in thee. We never see any better than that.

[1:50] It's just like you know they say about Mozart's Don Giovanni, you know, well it's not going to be any opera better than that. The only way you could equal those was to write Don Giovanni over again, you know.

[2:02] But it's in a sense, right? You know, just saying it as as well as they said it, right? And that's that's interesting. Anyway, I was reading, you know, Matthew, the Gospel of Matthew, a bit, and you know, I'd start off with that idea, you know, that the last petition of the Our Father is what in the Greek.

[2:25] Yeah, yeah, yeah, and in the Greek it's the O, you know, the article. Uh, it's actually a genitive, but but it's ho ponēros right? The the bad one, right, or the evil one, you can see the one.

[2:42] And so I was looking at the the Catechism of the Catholic Church, like I mentioned, I think, last time, and they point out that that's really the meaning of that last one, right? So in a way, we haven't translated it quite correctly, right, huh? And this may be because in in in Latin, you know, you have malum maybe or something like that, but you don't have an article, and you kind of mistranslate a bit, right?

[3:06] I suppose they won't change it, you know, because everybody remembers this as a child. Be kind of, you know, get. They shouldn't change these things then necessarily, but.

[3:19] But it struck me that it's a example of something that I said is very strong in Scripture, and that is this figure of speech called antonomasia.

[3:34] And I was looking at the word antonomasia. There, but in the Greek, you know, it means to give a thing another name. You know, so it doesn't really tell you exactly what antonomasia is, because there's more than one way of doing that, right? Yeah, apparently it's related to the what we have in Latin pronoun, you know. and a pronoun. You know, instead of saying you know, you know, Father Michael, behave yourself, right?

[3:57] Say you behave yourself, right? And I call you you instead of calling you Michael, right? And that's kind of what giving your calling your by another name, so to speak, right? So it doesn't really help you to see exactly what antonomasia is, right? But what is antonomasia, right? Well, it's where you have a general name, right, that is said of many things, right, and sometimes used for one of them in particular, because it what stands out, right?

[4:30] And I guess the reverse can also be said too, right? If someone is especially noteworthy, right, for something like Romeo is a lover, right? Then they call somebody who's a lover instead of a lover, which would be the proper thing to say he is. We call him a Romeo, right? Or if someone is, you know, slow to act, we call him a Hamlet. Even even Paul the sixth would say it's the Hamlet himself, right?

[5:00] Okay. Now I emphasize the fact that the Bible seems to be very fond antonomasia, and the word what Bible is by antonomasia. It just means the book, right? And the word gospel, which means apparently good news or something like that, huh? That's by antonomasia, right? It's not the only good news. Um, but it is when it stands out, right? Um. Well, then I was seeing it with this

[5:37] tenth, I mean seventh thing, where it says in the in the genitive tou ponērou, right? But you say the bad one, right? The evil one, right? Huh? Well, there are many bad, evil people around, but among all of them, he is what by antonomasia the evil one. So he's being named there from being the what?

[6:05] Yeah, yeah. And as I went on, you know, reading on in these chapters of Matthew, I was looking at the chapters 13 through 16, you know, and then the ones after that. And you find, you know, often someone else who's being bad being called Ponēros right? So it's the common word, right? And then you realize very much that this is by antonomasia that he's called, ho ponēros, right?

[6:34] Then in chapter what 19 here, it's the one where I'll read you the English first, and then I'll give you the Greek. And behold, one approaching to him said, "Teacher, what good thing may I do that I may have life eternal?" And he said to him, "Why question me, thou concerning the good, right?"

[7:03] Okay, someone tries to say, why callest thou me good? And then he says, "What?" Now I was kind of struck by this because I was looking at Thomas's commentary in this passage, what Christ answers, and there's different text, you know, that Thomas has. But in the Greek text they have here, and my more authoritative Greek text at home, you know, the Greek and Latin. It doesn't have Thomas's text, but in one of the footnotes they give that little part that he has, right?

[7:36] Okay. And I notice here in this text here, which is kind of a a little Latin English text alongside the Greek text, right? But they kind of miss the one that the more authoritative text seems to have, right? Um.

[7:54] And he said unto him, "Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is God, right? Okay. God alone is good. He seems to be saying, right? What kind of loses the piquancy that I like with antonomasia, which you have in the Greek text, right? Now I'll read you what the Greek says here, huh?

[8:20] Ti me erōtas, huh? Peri tou agathou, why do you ask me about the good, right? And then, heis estin ho agathos. One is the good.

[8:39] There's nothing about saying it's God, but you're speaking about God there by what? antonomasia, right? That's very striking, right? So in in the our Father there, you have ho what Ponēros the bad one. Ponēros can mean bad or sometimes they use the word evil, even stronger word, right? But the bad one or the evil one, right? And here you have God being called by antonomasia ho agathos, huh?

[9:13] It's kind of a striking example of that, right? Now we've spoken before how Christ, with the name anointed Christ, Christus, that's by antonomasia, right? Because he's not the only one anointed—kings and priests and prophets, huh? But then why is he called Christ, right? Why is that a name of him, right?

[9:42] Well, you wouldn't see it maybe quite clear in English as you would if you knew the, you know, the Latin or the other Greek, you know, which means anointed, right? But it's essentially saying the anointed one, right? Huh? So it's by antonomasia that he's being named, right? I don't know if the word Jesus is by antonum messia. But you know Savior or Lord saves or something Yeah, But I mean, some might say, you know, what somebody else saves his country, you know, in the battle or something, right?

[10:10] But he is the savior, right? Huh? The explanation is given there, you know, that he will save his people from their sins, right? Isn't that the angel says? That's who's going to be called Jesus, right?

[10:24] What does Mary save us from our sins? Yeah, yeah, but she's not called Jesus, is she? See, so maybe there's a little bit of antonomasia there. I'm just very struck by that now. Struck by the use of that name. Now, in the beginning of the Gospel of John, which is kind of the greatest of the Gospels, perhaps, he says, "In the beginning was the Word," right? It's kind of interesting the way they translate that, right?

[10:57] Because what have they done there? Taken that word. The term, the word for thought, and made it word. Yeah. Now, see, if you go to Greek, huh? The first meaning of the word "logos," which is the Greek word, right, is what? Word, right? And then a second meaning would be thought, right? And a third meaning might be what reason itself, right? Okay, those maybe the three main reasons, right?

[11:33] And sometimes when the English word that begins in the same way as the Greek word, huh? But sometimes in English it's never been what? It's never been carried over, right? So in English, the word "word" means word. It doesn't mean thought, does it?

[11:57] Except for my English professor there in college, who says in his little book which he had us use, "Words written or spoken are thoughts." I don't think he was really doing it in such a literal way, right? Because they express thoughts, right? But in Greek, it's actually carried over to mean thought, right? Okay. So it's kind of curious that they translate it right. Now contrast that with the way we have the word "nature" say "phusis" in Greek, or the word "natura" in Latin, right?

[12:36] Huh? When they translate into English, what they translate that as? Greek. Yeah. Physics. Yeah. Which is really kind of bad, but if they translate it into English, they'll say what nature, right? Say. But is that meaning of nature in English the first meaning of the word nature, "natura" in Latin, or "phusis" in Greek, huh? The first meaning of "phusis" in Greek, or Natura, in Latin, is birth, right?

[13:09] Okay. So if they're going to translate natura, like they translate logos in Gospel Saint John, they'd say what? Birth. You see. And but you could say, why do they translate by nature? Well, we've taken over the word in its later sense, right? And rather than moving our own word over, right? I mentioned how Shakespeare, in Fire Lawrence, there, right, in Romeo and Juliet, he moves the word nature.

[13:42] It seems to me, I mean, the word birth, rather, to what? The sense of what a thing is, right? For not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give, right? Not so good, but strained from that fair use, revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse, right? Well, it means what? Revolting from your true nature in the sense of what a thing is, right?

[14:15] Okay. But nevertheless, we commonly translate it as by what? Nature. We call it the philosophy of nature, right? Now, we define nature in one of its later senses there in the second book of the physics, right? Beginning and cause of motion and rest, and that which it is first as such, not by happening. But it's interesting in the Gospel Saint John, right? What sense of logos in Greek is really meant there?

[14:47] Makes sense. Is it word or thought or reason? Which is it? I think it would be? Thought. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, we translated word, you know, as if we're supposed to know enough to move it to the sense of thought, right? But if you want to explain what it's really saying in English, since the word word has not been moved, right? You might say, in the beginning was the thought, and the thought was toward God, and the thought was God, right?

[15:20] Quite a thought. But then you see very clearly that when you say ho logos, huh? Just like ho agathos, right? You're speaking by what? Antonomasia, right? So I went back and I said, I checked the catechism, you know, what they're saying there, the seventh petition, is referring to. They said not the abstract, you know, evil, but but a person, right, and referring to the devil, right? And

[15:53] but they don't mention that that this is a way of speaking which is called what? Antonomasia right. No, nobody does. Nobody does, you know. But it seems to me that it's important to see how how often it's used in what scripture, right? So I was kind of struck when I was going on from the from looking that text in in the Sermon on the Mount there, where he gives the Our Father, right?

[16:20] And then seeing how he used the word poneros here, you know, for in general for anybody bad, right? Huh? So I said that's not the that's a common name, right? So who are you referring to there? Oh, poneros, huh? The bad one, right? Huh? By antonomasia, the evil one, right? Huh?

[16:43] That's kind of striking, huh? Now I was also thinking when I was reading through here, when this young man, right? Huh? What happens to him? Why does he refuse the invitation?

[17:01] Yeah, yeah. That's one of the capital vices. Vices, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And of course earlier he's talking about the about the marriage and so on, right? And Christ is saying we can't even get out of marriage, right? My wife and I have a joke on that marriage is a dead end, right? Oh, what's going on with our marriage, you know? No exit. Yeah, yeah, no way out, you know.

[17:33] And but then they say, well, then it's not so good for a man to get married, right? You know, because he can't get out of this. He says, well, Christ says then he can take it, let him take it, right? Huh? You know, but again, that's a difficulty, you know, I suppose, of celibacy and so on, right? And that that touches upon another what capital vice, right?

[17:54] Huh? You know, I was looking at the text in the De Malo there, you know, where he talks about the seven capital vices, right? Huh? And he has that same distinction, you know, we have the four and the three, right? But he gives only one of the two ways that he gives here in the Summa, so so even despite being very thorough, consideration of evil, right? In that sense you've got a richness in this little text here, yeah, he does one for the three goods of man, you know, the soul, but the body and the exterior good.

[18:37] Okay. Okay, so let's go now to the eighty-fifth question, the second article where we had left off, and now we're going to see whether the whole good of human nature can be taken away by sin.

[19:14] The second one goes for it. Thus, it seems that the whole good of human nature can be taken away through sin. For the good of human nature is finite. I agree, since human nature is finite. But something finite is totally consumed if one keeps on taking away something from it.

[19:47] Since, therefore, the good of nature is continually able to be diminished through sin, it seems that eventually could be wholly consumed. huh? So that's you could reason that the good of human nature is not a continuous quantity. Well, you know, it's kind of funny because there's another context, you know, where this thing comes up, you know, and somebody says, "Well, you can keep on diminishing something forever because the continuous is divisible forever, right?

[20:12] Take a half of the line, and a half of the half, and half, and so on." And Thomas says, "Well, if you could do that, always take the same ratio, right? Rather than the same amount, because if you take the same amount, even no matter how small, but eventually exhaust it. He says, "But the more you take away, the weaker becomes the what subject is something being taken away from, the more unapt it is to resist, right?

[20:40] So you actually get weaker, and therefore should take away even more, and not, you know, considerably what lesser and lesser, right? You see, that's interesting, right? Because if you take away, you know, half the line, then you take away, you know, the line. The line is getting weaker and weaker, right? So you could take away, you know, not always a lesser amount, but maybe even a greater amount, right?

[21:05] That makes sense, right? I mean, you know, when somebody is led astray, maybe he's led astray with oh, taking candy from the grocery store or something without the grocery store, you know. And then he goes on to taking bigger amounts, and finally ends up, you know, murdering to get things and so on, right? So he's larger amounts of being taken away from him, right? Not lesser amounts, right?

[21:28] You know, so he takes, he doesn't, if you take away half your goodness, he's going to take just half of the remaining, no, maybe even more, right? To end up a pretty bad person.

[21:44] It's something like like Stalin or you know Chairman Mao or even Hitler, you know, and they're responsible for killing even millions of their fellow citizens among other people, right? See, these guys are, you know, a little bit like the devil, right? Not not quite as bad as the devil, right? Yeah, yeah. They don't deserve the name They're kind of icons or images of the evil one, right?

[22:06] the evil one, right? Huh? Yeah. And my old teacher, Casuexi, said, "You know, if you want to really be bad, you're not going to succeed in in getting the top title there. You can't possibly be as bad as as Satan is, or the devil, right? Huh?

[22:26] Yeah. Okay. Moreover, of those things which are of one nature, similar is the ratio about the whole and the parts. It is clear in air and in water and flesh, and in all bodies of similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part can be taken away through sin, the whole, it seems, can be taken away by what sin, right? Huh?

[23:06] Moreover, the good of nature which is diminished through sin is a what? How do they tell us Forwards a disposition For virtue, yeah. But in some, on account of sin, the foresaid disposition is totally taken away, as is clear in the what damned, huh? Who are not able to be repaired to virtue, just as neither the blind man to sight. Therefore, sin is able to wholly take away the good of nature, right?

[23:41] Huh? But against all, this is what Augustine says in the Enchiridion that evil is not able to be except in the good. And but the good of what guilt cannot be except in the good of virtue or grace, because it is what contrary to it. Therefore, it must be in the good of what nature. Therefore, it does not totally take it away, huh?

[24:14] Okay, he's confused the issue sufficiently, Thomas. Now, can we get some clarity from you? I answer: It should be said that as has been said, the good of nature that is diminished through sin is the natural inclination to virtue,

[24:36] which belongs to man from this that he is reasonable. It's always a question how you translate "rationality," right? Because "reasonable" sometimes seems to be that you not only have reason, but that you live in accordance with it. Maybe you could have reasonable just in the sense of that you have reason. Yeah.

[25:12] From this, that he has, that he acts according to what, or by reason, right? Which is to act according to what virtue. So, for a man to be good means for him to be reasonable, right? You're not being reasonable. How many times you heard that said, Theo?

[25:41] But to sin, there cannot be taken away only from man that he is what. Yeah, that he has reason, because already he would not be capable of what sin. Hence, it is not possible that the fore said good of nature can wholly be taken away, right?

[26:06] Now, when they found, huh, that this good, what could be continually right diminished through sin, right? Some to the manifestation of this use a certain example, in which is found something what finite to be diminished in infinitum, but nevertheless is never totally what consumed. For the philosopher says in the third book of the physics, that if from some magnitude finite is continually taken away something according to the same quantity, wholly finally, it will be what consumed.

[26:49] As for example, from some quantity that's finite, one always subtracts the measure of what. How much that is That's in the hand, I guess.

[27:00] He always takes a handful. He always takes a handful. Let's put that way. Make it English. If, however, the subtraction happens according to the same proportion, and not according to the same quantity, you always take half of what's left, or a third, or whatever. It can be subtracted in infinitum, huh? As example of quantities divided into two parts, and from the half is taken a half. Likewise, in infinitum, one can what proceed?

[27:35] Okay. That's shown in the sixth book, actually, of physics, right? That the continuous is divisible, what? Forever. Forever, right? You know, there's two definitions of the continuous, huh? And one is given in the

[27:51] book called "The Categories" in logic. The continuous is a quantity whose parts meet at a common what? Boundary, like the parts of a line meet at a point, or the parts of a surface at a line, right? Or the or two bodies at a surface, right?

[28:14] Now that definition is recalled when you get to the sixth book, which is the philosophy of the continuous. There in the sixth book of of natural hearing, the physics. But then Aristotle brings out this other definition of it. The continuous is that which is divisible. What forever? This is contrast to what they call discrete quantity, like number, right? Because a number, the parts of a number don't meet anywhere, and a number is not divisible.

[28:44] What forever? Eventually you get down to one, right? So we have these two definitions, and one is more proper to logic because it's in terms of the wholeness. Form is like the whole, right? And the other is more proper to natural philosophy, which deals with matter, right? Because parts are like matter. And

[29:10] when I take the first act of reason, which is understanding what something is, and I take the kind of the perfect example of understanding what something is, like understanding that a square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, when I understand in the form of a definition distinctly what a thing is, right? Well, is the definition of square divisible forever?

[29:39] No. This is something shown on logic. That's when you show that the categories exist, right? It's the highest genus, right? And do they meet at a common boundary? No. And then I argue, well, this is a rather strange situation, right? Because you're understanding something continuous, like a square, in an uncontinuous way.

[30:10] Now, is that because of what you're understanding, or because you're understanding? What can't be because of what you're understanding, because that's continuous. So it must be because of your understanding that you understand continuous things in an uncontinuous way. Now, does that show that your mind is a is a brain? Continuous thing? Nope. No, that the reason is a what? Non-continuous thing, right? It's not what material.

[30:46] That's one way, huh? The other way they argue sometimes is in the fact that you know things in a universal way. Of course, if you say, why are there? Why can you have many tables of the same kind here in this room, right? Matter? The simplest answer is because you have enough wood.

[31:16] Why can everybody have a piece of the pie? Because you have enough pie, right? To give everybody a piece. So wood or some other kind of matter, subject to quantity, right, is the source of what individuation. How can you have many men here in the same room? Because you have flesh and bones and to go around, right?

[31:42] So you need some kind of matter, right, that is. Divisible, right? And so, then, why does reason understand these things? What universally, right? Like, I understand what is a square, right? Or what is a sphere? What is a cube, right?

[32:02] What's being separated from this matter that is subject to one quantity, huh? So something is singular when sensed, as Boethius says, but universal when understood, huh? Our mind is not what material. Our mind is not what material, yeah.

[32:27] Interesting. But this, in the thing proposed, does not have place, like I was saying earlier, for it does not what the subsequent sin does not less diminish the good of nature, right? Than the preceding one, but perhaps more because it is more what grave, right, huh? So I start off by stealing candy from as a kid in grade school, and then I go on to steal money from somebody else, and you know, and keeps on getting more and more grave what I'm doing, right, huh?

[33:09] And so, if anything, it diminishes even more, right? And therefore, in another way it ought to be said that the force at inclination is understood as a middle between two things, huh? For it is founded as in a root in the rational nature, right, huh? And it tends to the good of virtue as to its what term or limit and end. In two ways, therefore, can be understood its diminution.

[33:47] In one way, on the side of the root; on the other way, on the side of the what end, huh? In that the sin does not diminish the nature itself, huh? This has been said. But it diminishes it. Oh, excuse me. In the first way, it is not diminished through sin, right? In that sin does not diminish the nature itself, huh?

[34:17] But it diminishes in the second way, in so far as it lays down an impediment to attaining to the limit or the end. If it were diminished in the first way, it would be necessary that sometime it was totally what consumed the rational nature, totally consumed, right? But because it is diminished on the side of the impediment, which is placed before it, lest it attain or arrive at the limit, it is manifest that it what can be diminished in infinitum, because in infinitum impediments can be what.

[35:01] Yeah. So if the snow kept on coming down, does it seem like it was never going to stop, right? The impediment to getting out of my driveway was becoming greater and greater, right? And you know they're running out of places to put the snow, right? So for the more snow that falls, the more impediment to getting my coming up here today. I didn't know I would be able to come up here today, right?

[35:24] I didn't know what what just between impediments to to that, huh? Not that my car was getting worse and worse, but impediments of getting to some goal, right? You were still reasonable.

[35:45] Couldn't get out the door. But because it is diminished on the side of the impediment, which is what placed before it, lest it arrive at the term or limit, it is manifest that it can be diminished in infinitum, right? It's about how evil the devil is by now, huh?

[36:09] Because in infinitum, without end, right, impediments able to be what? Yeah. But before it, huh? In so far as a man can in infinitum add sin to what? Sin.

[36:29] But nevertheless, one cannot be totally consumed because there always remains the root of such a what inclination, huh? Just as in a what transparent body, which has an inclination to receiving light, from this that it is transparent, huh? Because I mean diaphanous to shine through, I guess, huh? Yeah. But this inclination or ability, disposition, is diminished on the part of the what clouds? Superimposing. Yeah. But nevertheless, it remains always in the root of what nature.

[37:09] So you know it's like it is like a blizzard, right? And if you looked out, and if you looked out, just you know you could hardly see. I can't see down into the block, you know, and so on, and it got worse and worse, right? You know. So you're not that your eyesight was was inquisitively being diminished, but the impediments of seeing to the end of the block.

[37:30] Superimposing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's now snow piled up even more impediments. So the first objection then is answered in this way, and that that first objection proceeds according to the diminution per subtraction, right? But this comes more A diminution to addition, you might say, right? Through the positioning before of an impediment, which neither what takes away nor diminishes the root of the inclination, right?

[38:17] To the second, it should be said that the natural inclination is wholly what uniform, but nevertheless it has respect both to a beginning and to a what end, according to which diversity in one way is diminished and another way is not what diminished.

[38:39] To the third, it should be said that even in the damned there remains a natural inclination to virtue. That's very striking, isn't it? Otherwise, there would not be in them the remorse of conscience.

[38:56] But that it is not reduced in act happens because they lack grace, according to divine what? Justice. Just as in the blind man there remains an aptitude to seeing, in the very what root of nature, in so far as the animal naturally has what sight. But is not reduced in act because there's lacking the cause which would reduce it, right? By forming the organ which is required to seeing.

[39:32] So what is that thing there? The the isn't the worm? Is it that you know kind of said metaphorically, right? That's supposed to be the remorse of conscience, isn't it? You know. But then that question came up whether it can be answered here. but if the devil is still doing bad things, Mm-hmm. is he still sinning? So is he still then he's still um growing in guilt or demerit.

[39:58] Yeah. Yeah. Getting worse and worse every day. Wow. He must be, you know, you know they're not sure how high he was in the hierarchy, you know, Some say he was highest, you know, some he was just highest in one group or something, but

[40:25] his mind really could have driven himself crazy, you know. Hell. Don't you find people, you know, even this life, you know, they do something kind of stupid, you know? How could I be so stupid? No, I I've seen that many times in life. Haven't you seen that, right? How could you do something stupid, you know? I do better than that, you know. I mean, maybe it's not a sinful thing, particularly, but it's some stupid thing that's.

[40:53] Yeah. You kick yourself. Yeah. How could I have done that? you know. I could have I could have had it so easy. Yeah. But I went and did this. Yeah. yeah. That's very small compared to what you have next next life. Yeah.

[41:15] Frightening. Okay. To the third one proceeds thus. It seems inconvenient that it lay down as the wounds, huh? Vulnerable, you vulnerable, you woundable, right? To be of nature from falling from sin, right? Which are infirmity, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence, huh? Now this sounds familiar, so I've heard about these things before.

[42:01] For the same thing is not the effect and the cause of the same. But these are laid down as causes of sin, as is clear from the things foresaid, right?

[42:17] Therefore, they ought not to be laid down as effects of sin. Moreover, malice names a certain sin. Therefore, ought not to be laid down among the effects of sin. It seems like a similar

[42:36] Moreover, concupiscence is something natural. Doing what comes natural? Isn't there a song about that. Since it is an act of the concupiscible power, but that which is natural ought not to be laid down as a wound of nature, right? Therefore, concupiscence ought not to be laid down as a wound of nature, right?

[43:04] Moreover, it is said that the same what thing to sin from infirmity and to sin from what passion? But concupiscence is a certain passion. Therefore, not not to be divided against what infirmity, right? He's making a mess of this position, right?

[43:30] More of, Augustine, in the book on nature and grace, lays down two what punishments, I suppose, of the to the soul what sinning, to which ignorance and difficulty, from which arises error and what torment, torment, I guess, yeah. Which four do not agree with these four? Therefore, it seems that one of them is laid down insufficiently. Okay. Now, contrary to this is the authority of Bede.

[44:10] So the argument from authority is strongest in theology, right? Bede's a good authority, isn't he? Yeah. This article is going to be very, very good to carry out the advice of the Greeks. Know thyself, right? You know, you can know yourself pretty good for this article.

[44:37] I have to do that Aristotle's Nicomachian Ethics, you know, where he has you know the various virtues he gives there. You know, say now, do I have this one? I don't think so. Do I have this one? It's pretty, pretty discouraging, you know, huh? And then the verses of Scripture say, you know, you look yourself in the mirror, and then you turn around, you forget, forget, forget how how defective you are, right?

[44:58] So here is a little mirror for you to see yourself, huh? Answer should be said that through original justice, perfectly reason contained, right? The inferior powers of the soul, right?

[45:24] That's one of the things promised for us in heaven, right? Our reason will be in perfect in control of our emotions, right? And reason itself was perfected by God being what? Subject to Him.

[45:42] My wife ran across something by Father Dalzon you know who's kind of the founder of the Assumptionists. He's talking about faith there, you know. Faith enables us to see things as God sees them. I said that's kind of a beautiful little statement, right? You know the way that's what faith really is, huh? Seeing things the way God sees them, right?

[46:09] Subsistence of things hoped for. Yeah, yeah. I mean, seeing things you know the way God sees them. We're a long way from original justice.

[46:24] But this original justice was subtracted, huh? Through the sin of the first parent, has all has already been said, right? And therefore, all the powers of the soul remain in a certain way destitute of their own what? Yeah, lacking in their own order, by which they are naturally ordered to what? Virtue. Because when Aristotle talks about the moral virtues, huh? It's the lower powers partaking of reason, huh?

[47:01] He divides the soul in into the part that's reasonable essentially, and that is reasonable by participation, right? But if they're not perfectly subject to reason, then they don't partake fully of reason, right?

[47:18] And so they're destitute of their proper order, by which they are naturally ordered to what virtue. And this destitution is is called the what? Under nature. Yeah. That's interesting, huh? It's maybe a little taken from the body, right? A wound, right? But it's maybe a little metaphorical, you know? But the wound of the soul, right? Huh? The powers of. Now there are four powers of the soul, which are able to be the subject of the what virtues.

[47:54] As has been said. To wit, reason, in which is foresight, huh? I noticed my good friend Winston Churchill. He calls it foresight. He doesn't call it prudence. So he's my authority for this matter.

[48:15] I was reading a book there, and they're referring to the famous speeches, you know, on after the battle battle there. Um. In Pennsylvania. Gettysburg. Gettysburg. I guess Everett you know, Spoke for about two hours, huh? And after you heard Lincoln speak, he said,

[48:47] "He put him out." He said, "It took me two hours to say what you said in two minutes." It's a beautiful example of the brevity as the soul of wit, huh? You know, that that Abe Lincoln there, in two minutes said as much or more than the other guy said in two hours. He's a great orator. Going on, that's a beautiful example. I'm going to bring it and read the little text where he said that to him.

[49:14] But it's a beautiful example of what the differences are. Okay. But there are four powers of the soul which are able to be the subject of virtues. As has been said above, reason, in which is what foresight, right? The will, in which is what justice, taking the cardinal virtues here, right? The irascible, in which is what

[49:52] fortitude, courage, and the concupiscible, in which is what temperance, huh? I mentioned, you know, that people can see the difference between reason and the emotions, right? And even between the irascible and the concubusable, right? Better than they can see the distinction between the will, in these right, and so in Plato in the in the Laws or in the Republic, is talking about the parts of soul. He's just got three parts, right, and and the reason and thumos and what, epithumia, right.

[50:24] He has no no will. They're distinct from them, right. So he has no place to put justice, right. He has you know foresight or prudence in reason and courage in thumos and temperance in epithumia, but he's got no place for justice. So he's got something like original justice, you know, the harmony of these three parts, right. But Aristotle is seeing more clearly the distinction there, right.

[50:54] As I mentioned before, I know myself in teaching, you know, the hard time people have seeing the distinction between the love that is an emotion and the love that is a what, yeah. You know, it's interesting the way we we speak of, you know. Talking earlier there about how if your parents had not met, you would not be, you know. Remember saying to my mother one time, you know, without you, mother, I would not have. been well.

[51:20] Thank you, she said. Yeah, yeah. But we use the expression there, you know, unless your parents met and fell in love, right? Why do we use that word to fall in love, right now? I used to ask students in class sometimes, why do you say fall in love, right? You know, I mean, is it downfall? I mean, I mean, what do you use the word? We all use the expression, you know, fell in love, and

[51:51] sometimes we even use it, you know, without persons. We, you know, we saw this house. You fell in love with this house or something, you know, this fell in love with this place. So, what does that mean, fell in love? Why do you say that?

[52:07] Because your reason becomes subject to emotion initially. Yeah, you kind of fall into the power of love, right now. So love is, you know, if you look at the two German of Verona there in the beginning, you know, Proteus is what in the power of love, right? He can't be wise, you know. His friend is talking about is in the power of love, right? You know, but would you say that in terms of the will, you know, huh?

[52:32] So much, right? It's almost like your images of combat where one falls in love. It's almost like one is knocked down by the force of something, and the wind is knocked out of you It's so, powerful. Or one is smitten. Yeah. You're wounded. You could be so smitten you're decapitated. It's interesting how there's these sort of images, the metaphors, and the test is the word in there?

[53:03] In the power. Yeah, yeah. So you're trying to, you know, see the distinction between those. So, so insofar as reason is what destitute of its order to the true, there is the wound of what ignorance.

[53:28] I think I was mentioning was it in Saint John's epistle there, right? The pneuma planes, right? The spirit of what error, right? The word error comes from the word what to wander, right? Like a knight errant, a wandering knight, and the Greek word is the same thing. Planet, we get the word planets, right? Because they seem to wander around the sky, right? As distinguished from the fixed stars, right?

[54:03] So the wound of ignorance. Insofar as what the will to good is the wound of what. Malice. Yeah. Because the object of the will is the good in general.

[54:23] Insofar as the irascible is destitute in its order to the what difficult, the arduous, there is the wound of what Infirmity. What did St. Benedict do? Jump in the the push.

[54:45] Yeah. And in so far as the concupiscence is destitute of the order to the delight delectable, moderated by reason, right? There is the wound of what. Yeah.

[55:04] I had a delectabulae moderatum ratione this morning. Yeah. Well, that too, but I had I listened to what's his clarinet quintet, huh? And then his horn quintet, and then his oboe quartet. Very beautiful. Delectabulae moderatum ratione. That's what it was. It's a wound of concupiscence, right?

[55:38] Thus, therefore, these four are the wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature from the sin of the first what parent. And because, but because the inclination to the good of virtue in each one is diminished through what actual sin,

[55:59] as is clear from what went before. And these four what wounds. What. Yeah. Insofar as through sin, reason is what. Yeah. Especially in things to be done. And the will is hardened towards the good. Hard hearts, huh? Doesn't Christ get angry there with the Pharisees and so on? You see how hard their hearts were, you know. One of the few examples you see Christ get angry, but it's a it's a reasonable anger, right?

[56:37] But it's about the hardness of their hearts, huh? And the will is what hardened towards the good, and the more difficulty in acting well.

[56:57] yeah. And concubiscence more what Burns. burns, yeah. There, know thyself now. You see how you're wounded, huh? Mm-hmm. You know that that story of he tells of the man going down from the Jerusalem to Jericho, right? And he fell among robbers, you know, had all these wounds, you know, and. Finally, the Good Samaritan took him up and brought him to the inn, which I guess is the church, right?

[57:29] And gave the guy some money to take care of, you know, And anything is massive when I come back I will. That's kind of interesting, huh? You know,

[57:45] so many people go out of the way, you know, to help somebody, you know. And God comes back and he'll, he'll pay you what you overspent Here's what Bishop Sheen said about that: Why did the priest and Levite pass him by? Because they saw he'd always beaten up and robbed.

[58:22] Now, to the first, it should be said that nothing prevents that which is an effect of one sin to be the cause of a what? Another sin, right?

[58:34] From this, that the soul is disordered through a preceding sin, it more easily is inclined to sinning, right? Huh? As they say, this is the basis of our experience, you know. It's a starting place in ethics, right? Experience, right?

[58:54] Thomas gives the order of the sciences. He says you should, you know, learn geometry before natural philosophy, natural philosophy before ethics, and ethics before what? Wisdom, right? But ethics requires more experience than natural philosophy, right? So the old man is supposed to have some wisdom, I guess.

[59:16] As they say, no fool worse than an old fool. But you expect wisdom in age, right? Huh? You know, that's why Shakespeare in in was it King Lear, you know, the guy says, "You're old before your your age." What do you mean? You're old before you're wise. It's bad not to get old, but not to get wise. Get some wisdom with age.

[59:58] Now, the question of the words here and these other objections. To second, should be said that malice is not taken here pro peccato for the sin, right? Huh? But for a certain proneness of the will to what? Evil, right? According to that which is said in Genesis eight, prone are the senses of man to evil from his adolescence.

[1:00:27] If you're a misanthrope, I say you're getting plenty of material here, right? To hate mankind even more, right? To the third, it should be said that it has been said that concupiscence, in so far as it is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to what reason, right? But that exceed the limits of reason, this is to man against what nature. I tell you, I was reading.

[1:01:11] My son sent me for a birthday there, a biography of of John Quincy Adams, right? Kind of interesting. You know, but a number of of the people in the Adams family, you know, and relatives, died of of alcohol, you know. So it's kind of a. It's the genes. I don't know. Maybe it is, but you know, he had sons and brothers. I think a brother died and a son who died of this, you know, and

[1:01:42] the other famous people in the family tree, so we say, you know, but but that's obviously a you know. I mean, to me, it seems you know. I mean, to drink too much is is to be own punishment It's its own punishment, you know. You know, I mean, the man can go on, you know, and and end his life by drinking too much. That seems, but it's a sign of how bad off we are.

[1:02:15] There were some studies that seem to indicate that in cultures where alcohol has been present for longer periods of time, yeah, there seemed to be a resistance that developed within the population to alcoholism, whereas populations that had been more recently introduced to alcohol, for example, Irish, also American Indians, yeah, there was a much greater problem with drunkenness because there seemed to be a lack of resistance to this, yeah,

[1:02:49] yeah. I heard people say too. There's something about the Indian, you know, is more subject to this. I don't know. I mean, the man who drinks to excess doesn't enjoy it more. I don't think, and he suffers more from from drinking to excess.

[1:03:16] John Quincy Adams was considered to be the greatest of all Secretary of States in American history. John Quincy. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. He was secretary to one of the guys that run these ten, I think, you know, to Moscow, you know. Yeah, he did a lot of good things. There's a slab of country here, you know, from Minnesota over, you know, that belongs to us now because of John Quincy Adams.

[1:03:42] You know, yeah, everybody's going to give it up, and he saved it and caught the the Adams land there. It's the northern part of Minnesota and right across. You know, I've seen it on the. I have a map in the book here that I read you. Yeah. At one point during his term in office as Secretary of State, some of the Latin American republics had petitioned to join the Union: Guatemala, Honduras.

[1:04:08] I think maybe Costa Rica as well, and he was vehemently against it. He said that culturally and religiously they're just too different. Yeah. this would not be a happy marriage He really formulated the Monroe Doctrine, though, you know, because he was Secretary of State under Monroe, so he formulated the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, he wrote some Monroe speeches, you know, when he had the whole Congress against him, and he's an incredibly good speech, and they all turn around, you know, the attitude.

[1:04:36] He was a good speech, speech writer, you know. Okay. To the fourth, it should be said that infirmity commonly can be called every passion, right, in so far as it weakens the what strength of the soul and impedes reason, right? But B takes infirmity what strictly, strictly, according as it is opposed to what fortitude, which is a kind of of strength, right, which pertains to the what irascible.

[1:05:36] Now, to the fifth, it should be said that the difficulty which is placed in the what Book of Augustine, right, huh, includes these three things which pertain to the appetitive powers, to wit, malice, infirmity, and concupiscence, right? For from these three it follows or happens that someone does not easily tend towards the good, huh? But error and what pain are wounds, fouling, right?

[1:06:11] For from this someone what doles sorrowful that he is infirm about those things which he is what. Yeah. we Should take a little break there, because.