Prima Secundae
201. Death and Defects Natural to Man (Q85 a6): Universal vs. Particular Nature; Scientia in God and Words Taken from the Body
Class of 2015-02-12
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/201-death-and-defects-natural-to-man-q85-a6-universal-vs-particular/

[0:00] Son Holy Spirit Amen Thank you my God Our God Thank you Guardian Angels Thank you Thomas Aquinas Deo gratias God Our Enlightenment Guardian Angels bring the lights of our minds Ordain our images and arouse us to consider more correctly Saint Thomas Aquinas Angelic Doctor Help us to understand all that you've written holy spirit amen now we look at article six here again just to refresh our minds a bit here In Question eighty five Whether death and other defects are natural to man Right To the sixth then one goes forward Thus It seems that death and defects of this sort are to man natural Right Now In the second book of Natural Hearing Right But People Call the Physics Right Aristotle He Works out the definition

[1:04] of what Nature Right Which is What Nature is the beginning and cause of motion and rest And that which it is first as such and not by happening But then he goes on to say that nature is said both of what Matter and What Form And First of all it's said of matter because that's more obvious Right Okay

[1:32] And Then He goes on to show that it's said of form even more so Because by matter something is a natural thing only in ability Only in potency But through what form it's actually this or that natural thing So if nature is that for which something is natural then that for which something is natural actually is even more what Nature Right Huh Okay Well as Thomas will point out in the reply to the objections here in the body of the article it's a little different the way it is The first three objections are taken from nature in the sense of what Matter Right And the objection on the other side from nature as form Right So it's kind of interesting you know if you think

[2:20] of that in terms of these being the two main senses of what Nature Right Huh And This is brought out again in the Fifth Book of Wisdom Right Where he talks about the word nature among the names of causes and so on

[2:39] So he says corruptible in the first objection It seems that death and defects of this sort are natural to man That's according to nature in the sense of matter Corruptible and incorruptible differ in what genus As is said in the tenth book of The metaphysics, huh? Now, sometimes you know, even what's his name, Porphyry says that in the in the Isagoge, that genus is to difference as matter is to what form, okay?

[3:13] And so, corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, so that's tied up with matter, right? But man is of the same genus with other animals who are naturally what corruptible. So, animals said, univocally, of man and what dog, okay? I mean, sometimes you keep the word animal to man to the animals, right? Because that's all they have, right? We have something godlike, namely reason, right? But in general, animals said univocally the two, living body with senses, huh?

[3:53] Therefore, man is naturally corruptible. That's perfectly convincing, right, to me. Moreover, everything that is composed from contraries, huh, is naturally corruptible. Change is between what contraries, as we learn in the first book of natural hearing, as having in itself the cause of its own what corruption. But the human bodies of this sort is composed of hot and cold, wet and dry, and so on. Therefore, it's naturally corruptible.

[4:27] That's convincing too. If you weren't convinced by the first argument, you're soon convinced by the second argument, right? Third one's a little more, but your ideas here of the ancients. Moreover, the hot naturally consumes the what moist. But the life of man is conserved by hot and cold, huh? For since the operations of life are carried out through the act of natural what heat, as is said in the second book about the soul, it seems that death and defects of this sort are to man natural.

[5:04] Now, nature meant only matter and not form. We'd be what? Yeah, we'd be we'd be completely, you know, mortal. But against this, whatever is natural to man, God has made in man. God is responsible for human nature, right, for man. But it says in the Book of Wisdom, chapter one, verse thirteen, that God did not make death. Therefore, death is not natural to man.

[5:44] Because Adam or the devil or something, it made death. It wasn't God, right, huh? Okay. Moreover, that which is according to nature should not be said to be a punishment, nor something what bad. For to each thing is suitable that which is natural to it. But death and defects of this sort are the punishment original sin. Didn't he say something like that to him? He's gonna die because of his sin.

[6:22] Well, therefore they're not natural to man. Therefore they're not natural to man. It's a nice argument, huh? I'm convinced of that, right? I'm getting thoroughly tied up. Yeah, yeah.

[6:41] Moreover, matter is proportioned to form, and each thing to its end. But the end of man is perpetual beatitude, as has been said above, huh? And the form of the human body, huh? Substantial form is the reasonable soul, right? Which is incorruptible, as is had in the first book, huh?

[7:13] I'm just starting the sixth book there, natural hearing there with my students that come on Tuesday night, and I was talking about how the first part of the book, the first four readings as Thomas divides it, are concerned with the philosophy of the continuous, right? And Aristotle is going to argue there that the continuous is never put together from indivisible things, right? And of course it can't be something indivisible itself, right?

[7:43] But anyway, there comes out two definitions of the continuous. One which is the continuous is that whose parts meet at a common what boundary, right? So the two halves of a circle might be said to meet at a diameter in the middle, right? And the two parts of a line at a point, huh? And the parts of a body, right, at a at a surface, huh? And that's a definition of continuous given even in the Categories.

[8:12] He distinguishes continuous quantity from what numbers, right? Because in the number seven, the three and the four don't meet anywhere, right? But then in the sixth book he'll develop the second argument for a definition rather of the continuous as that which is divisible forever.

[8:38] I said, now this is an amazing thing to know, not only for understanding the continuous, but for reasoning that our reason is not a what continuous thing, that our reason, our universal reason, that is to say, is not a what body, right? That the brain is not the

[8:59] reason that our friend Washington Irving, no, excuse me, Shakespeare defines right. And now, how do you do that, right? Well, I take the definition of square, right, which is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilang quadrilateral. Now, do the parts of the definition meet at a point, or a line, or a surface?

[9:36] So this is a rather strange thing now, right? Because by the definition of square, I understand very distinctly what a square is, and perhaps the man in the street couldn't define it as distinctly there as as Euclid does, right?

[9:57] Now you're knowing a continuous thing, which is a square, but you're knowing it by definition, that is what not continuous, right? So knowing a continuous thing very well in an uncontinuous way, was that due to the thing being known? Well, no, it's continuous, right? It must be due, therefore, to the knower, right? So why is it that something continuous, once received into the what mind, is received in a noncontinuous form?

[10:43] That's a very strange thing. That continuous thing should be received in a noncontinuous thing. What shows that the mind is what that knows the universal, that knows what a square is, right? Is not what continuous.

[11:05] Now, if you know a little bit of logic, like when we take up the reason why there are highest genera and so on, right? You can see that definitions are not divisible what forever, right? So it's not continuous. You can see from the other definition, right? So I say those two definition, the continuous, right, can be used to syllogize, right? That ability for a large discourse, discourse about the universal, is what

[11:40] not a body, right? Is not something continuous. Is not the what the brain? Kind of a marvelous thing to see, huh? I was talking to Warren Murray on the phone this morning, and he was talking a little bit about you know his experience with you know some recently competent scientists, you know, and how they don't want to admit you know that nature acts for an end, even though they use it in their thinking, right?

[12:17] And he happened to be in the discussion talking about what they call vestigial organs, right? And these organs now are no longer serving the purpose that they originally did, right? Yeah, yeah.

[12:40] Yeah, yeah. See, we can rephrase that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So they're always running into you know something that they got to kind of talk around, and yet that's what vestigial organ means, right? Ah. It's like something you might keep around the house, you know, no longer works, but it's kind of, you know, artistic or something, you know. It must have had a purpose, but no longer it no longer serves the purpose that it had.

[13:08] And so he says, you know, some days he pins the guys down, and they don't want to admit that nature acts from them. And they come right out and they say, well, then we have to admit that there's a God. And the question is, so what? Well, then, then they just get into rhetoric, you know. The argument is, they just, yeah. But this is partly because we're talking about humility right now.

[13:30] And he says, what you really have in these guys is a form of pride, right? And and they're pretty smart guys, you know. I mean, these scientists, some of them are pretty smart, and they're, but they do, you know. But their their whole freedom, you know, of thought and freedom of life, you know, and what they do would be would be changed and and narrowed, you know, because someone had made them, and someone had, you know, holding them responsible to this or that course of action, you know.

[13:59] But it's kind of amazing, you know, that they he's giving other examples of that, you know, from people at Harvard and other places, you know, where they they they fully admit, you know, openly that that they avoid this because we need to God, and we don't want that to happen, you know. God forbid. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But but how yeah how can that be though? You know that they can be so, but it's pride.

[14:26] There is really a cause of deception, right? Huh. I was just reading. I was just reading. I was just reading, St. Thomas does a little book from just in passing, and it's from the prologue of the Gospel of John, I just read the prologue of the Gospel in John. It says the same thing. The philosophers knew these divine attributes, but one of the things he talks about is they knew nature acts for an end, he just used it.

[14:54] He just takes it for granted that the ancient philosophers they recognize this. You don't need divine revelation through super nature; you do it through nature. You see.

[15:05] I read an amazing quote from a modern scientist, and we have this this conviction of everything is material, it's a faith, you know. We just have to believe it. And he was actually saying, you know, like an anti-faith, you know, we have this conviction that we cannot, you know, let go of that everything is material

[15:27] an interesting comment about why Christ worked miracles, so your faith would be reasonable. But these guys demand faith without reason. That's what they're demanding. That's what they're demanding. Yes, contrary to reason, they're demanding faith. That's why it's kind of an anti-faith. anti-reason. So the third argument: there matter is proportioned to form, and each thing to its own end. But the end of man is perpetual beatitude, often known as eternal life, right?

[16:10] And the form of the human body is the rational soul, the reasonable soul, which is incorruptible, as is had in the first book. I'm just showing how you can argue from the two definitions of the continuous, right? So if the human soul, if the body is proportioned to the form, then it should be what naturally incorruptible, right? Only such a body would seem to fit the soul, right?

[16:41] So there's a real problem here, right? How do we resolve this? Now, Thomas starts off here with a difficult distinction. Hence, it should be said that about each corruptible thing we are able to speak in two ways: in one way according to universal nature; in another way according to what particular nature, right? That distinction comes up a lot when they talk about the tides. There, you know, is it natural for water to do this?

[17:18] Well, not water in its particular nature to rise and go like that, but under universal nature, like in this case, maybe the the moon, they say, right? It's natural, right, for the water to be moved in this way. So the rise and fall of the tide, I guess, whatever it is, is something natural, right? But in one of these senses, right, not both, yeah.

[17:49] For the particular nature is what its own act of what power, and it conserves or tries to preserve, right, each thing, right. And according to this, every what corruption defect is against what nature. So all things resist their corruption, right?

[18:15] Remember at kindergarten there with the the sister, was, Sister Aquinas. I always said my first teacher was was Aquinas, and people look at me all the time, you know. But one time, Sister Aquinas got a a coconut, right? And she wanted to show us, I can say, but she couldn't open it open it. It resists being destroyed, though, you know. Bang, bang, bang, It wouldn't break open, you know.

[18:44] Must have been a lot of fun for the kids are cranking away on the colour. And according to this, every corruption and defect is against nature, right? Because the virtue of this sort intends being and the conservation of that of which it is right.

[19:08] But the universal nature is an active power in some universal principle of nature, as, for example, in one of the heavenly bodies like the moon. An example I was giving there, or of some superior substance, right? According to this also God, by some is called what? Natura naturans, right? Nature giving the nature, yeah, yeah. Because God is the source of nature in that sense. Which power intends the good and the conservation of the universe, to which is required the alternation of generation and corruption in things.

[19:47] Because you can see that in the fact that the animals eat the plants, and bigger animals and smaller animals eat them all. And according to this. The corruptions and defects of things are natural, not to be sure according to the inclination of form, right? Which is the beginning of being and of perfection, but according to the inclination of matter, which is proportionally attributed to such a form, according to the distribution made by the universal agent.

[20:28] And although every form intends to be perpetual so far as it can, right? Nevertheless, the form, no form of the corruptible thing, is able to what achieve its own perpetu perpetualness, huh? Yeah. Apart from the what human soul, right? In that it itself is not subject entirely to bodily matter as the other forms are, right?

[21:03] Whence it has its own operation remaining within it, which is understanding, universal, and so on. Grasping that, as was had in the first book.

[21:14] Whence, on the side of his form, it is more natural to man incorruption than to what other things. But because he has matter composed from contraries, from the inclination of matter, there follows corruptibility in the whole what man, but not in his what soul.

[21:40] And according to this, man is naturally corruptible, according to the nature of the matter left to itself, and not according to the nature of the what form. Okay. Now, the first three arguments he said proceed on the side of what matter. The other three, the last three, proceed on the side of form, right?

[22:12] Whence, for the solution of them, it should be considered that the form of man, which is a rational soul, according to its very incorruptibility, is proportioned to its own end, which is perpetual beatitude. But the human body, which is corruptible according to its very nature, considered, is in some way proportioned to its form and in some way not.

[22:46] Now, you can explain this on by going back to something more known, right? In art, right? That sometimes art takes a matter, right? That is suitable to the form you're going to give it and the purpose of that form, right? But the matter has some other quality that is not suitable, right? Okay.

[23:12] For a twofold condition can be noted in some matter: one which the agent chooses; another which is not chosen by the agent, but is according to the what natural condition of the matter. Just as the worker, right, to making the what hammer was it?

[23:37] Knife. Knife. Okay, knife. Uh, chooses a matter that is what hard, ductile. You can. This one bang it out some. Which is able to be made more what? Yeah, more finer. Yeah, that might be apt for the purpose of the knife, which is cutting, right? And according to this condition, iron, I guess, huh, is the matter proportioned to the what knife? But that this form is what breakable or that it rusts, huh?

[24:14] Follows from the natural disposition of iron. Nor does the artist choose it for that reason, right? The artist doesn't choose this in the in the matter in iron, but more he would what reject it if it were possible, right? Then,

[24:34] whence this disposition of matter is not proportioned to the intention of the artist, nor to the intention of the artist. You know, those pianos, you don't think out of tune after a while. So that's chosen. He chose something to get out of tune. That that that that's a that's the end of music. There, to be out of tune. No, it's just some musicians.

[25:06] I suppose it might be due in some part. The wooden frame. Yeah, I didn't thought about that before. Yeah. Moves with the weather. Yeah. So I'm telling that with that. But he's choosing some material that makes a beautiful sound. It's got the right tension, so on, right? But that it gets out of tune, right? Is something he's got to put up with, and that's why they have the tuner.

[25:30] Tuning forks. Okay. Nothing else. He's making. He's making what a likeness there between, or pointing out a likeness, I should say, between art and nature, right? Similarly, likewise, huh? The human body is a matter chosen, you might say, right? By nature, as regards this fact that it is of a what temperate complexion, right? That's why Shakespeare speaks of it too, huh? You know the praise there of Brutus at the end of the play, huh?

[26:14] So well mixed up, okay. That it might be a most suitable organ for what touch, huh? So because you know even the higher animals they tend to get what stable temperature, right, huh? And others don't, right? So this is part of having a body that's suitable for what sense of touch, which is the foundation of all the senses, huh? And the other sense powers and motors, right, huh?

[26:47] You have bones here too, huh? Suitable for their purpose to support the body, right, huh? Can be bones, you if you if you sack the bottom, yeah. But but bones, as you know, can be what broken and other things happen, you know. But that's not why they're chosen, huh?

[27:08] So this body is able to what serve all these purposes is what, but it's also corruptible, and this is a condition of matter. Nor is it chosen by what nature. Strictly, they use the word chosen by nature, right? Because rather nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it were possible, right, huh? Okay.

[27:33] Now the last thing he says here, huh? But God, to whom all nature is subject, right, huh? In this institution of in the very institution of man, supplied the defect of nature, right. And by the gift of what, justice? He gave to the body a quandam a certain incorruptibility. Apparently, the incorruptibility of the Garden of Eden was that as long as you ate of the tree, right, our tree, not the wrong tree, the right tree, you would go on, right?

[28:09] You'd never die, right? So it wasn't the same incorruptibility that you have, you know, the beatific vision, right, huh? Because you don't have to eat anymore to to be incorruptible, right? So that's why he says quandam, right? It's a little different the incorruptibility that Adam had, right, before the beatific vision, right? Okay.

[28:32] And according to this, it is said, back in the objections there, God did not make what Death. death, huh? And that death is the punishment of what sin. Now all things are clear, right, huh? It's a marvelous guy, this Thomas, right, huh? Houdini, Houdini of the mind, huh? Yes. Yeah. So now we go to the macula peccati What does that mean The stain? I guess would be the way to translate it.

[29:23] I was reading Thomas this morning, you know, in the De Veritate, and first article is whether there's scientia in God, right? I said, why does he choose the word scientia, right? Because one of the objections against saying there's scientia in God is that there's no what discourse in God. God isn't. syllogizing reason from one thing to another, right? And yet it's what what Euclid does. when he demonstrates something, right?

[29:54] He reasons from one thing to another. Well, Thomas says when you carry something over to God, you drop anything that's imperfect, right? Now the idea of scientia is that there's

[30:10] you know discourse, right? Also, in the idea of science, is that certain, right? So when you demonstrate, you know, the interior angles of a triangle, right angles, you're certain that this is so, right? So when you carry the word scientia over to God, we drop this idea of discourse, but the idea of certitude, we keep that. you know? So. um...

[30:36] Now one one of the the texts that he that you had there in the uh, said contra, I mean you have the objection saying that God doesn't have it, and then Sid contra was taken from Saint Paul, huh? And was it the First Epistle to the Colossians, chapter eleven, I think, verse 1, where Paul says, "Oh, the treasures of God's wisdom," and of course Latin says, "the sapientia, you know, and scientia of God, right now."

[31:03] I said, I don't think that the Greek word that they had there in the Latin text, the scientia, that's in that quote, would be in the Greek, right? It wouldn't be that word, like episteme, which would be the Greek word for scientia there, you know. And so I was like, go and looked it up in my Greek there, Greek thing, and you have you know Sophia, but then you have instead of scientia, you have gnosis, right, just the common word for knowledge, right?

[31:31] So you don't have this problem about discourse there, right I said, oh, Thomas, there, now I've got you there. Yeah. you kind of went to Greek. It's funny, Being from southern Italy, didn't know some Greek. Yeah, yeah. But I was kind of struck by you know by the fact that that the first article, right, in the second question of the De Veritate, he takes up God, right, is using the word scientia, right, now, kind of interesting.

[31:55] But this is very interesting things in the article. though, nevertheless. I read the Summa Contra Gentiles uh, backwards, huh? I mean, excuse me, the De Veritate backwards. So I did the uh, the 10th question first, right, which is about the human mind, right? And then I did eight and nine, which are about the angelic mind, and the eighth one, especially the ninth one, is about the conversation of the angels, right?

[32:23] They're illuminating and talking to each other. How's an angel talk to the angel? Very interesting stuff, you know. And now going back to the second article where he takes up God's mind, right? I've often thought, you know, if you had to teach, you know, roughly to people who knew not much the Summa Theologiae, I would begin with the treatise on the soul, right, and they get to understand the human mind and so on, and then go to the treatise on the angels, and finally go to God's mind, right?

[32:51] And Thomas often says that you know that the De Anima, right, we take up the first article, we take up the third book, you know, the human mind and so on, is is the gateway for us to to understand in some way God and the angels, right? Even though there are many differences between them and our understanding, right? But you have to have some understanding of understanding, right?

[33:10] And of the fact that it's something immaterial and so on before you can go and study the angels, right? So I'm kind of you know. Yeah.

[33:21] Yeah. I watch these words sometimes. Sometimes I find the the words of Latin they don't correspond exactly to the Greek, you know. I know it's a big deal, but not. But get myself in trouble with Thomas.

[33:45] Before you officially retire, you'll have to come up with the new improved edition of Saint Thomas. Berquist edition, we'll call it. If you knew the word gnosis, you'd say probably just knowledge, you know, probably something like that. But. Do they even have a word like that in Latin? I guess they do. Notitia. Yeah, yeah, yeah, notitia, yeah.

[34:18] You know, when he's considering there the the objections there, to God's knowledge, and he's giving kind of some false understandings of it, you know, first, you know, and then trying to show the difficulties in these understandings and so on. And someone to say that that God is said to have scientia just like he's said to have anger, right? Well, of course, God is said to have anger only what metaphorically, right?

[34:50] And by a likeness in the effect of anger, and some in God's having that same effect of punishing, right? But I was kind of struck by it because he he

[35:05] gives example of anger and mercy. See, then he goes on and he just exemplifies in detail thing about anger and why we we use that metaphor of God. What's interesting, huh? That he first sees mercy like anger, being the name of a what emotion or passion, and therefore they're being said of God by reason of by likeness of their effects or something, right? Rather than the thing itself, right?

[35:34] But seems to me that in the Summa Theologia, when you get to the question on you know mercy and justice in God, mercy is no longer a what being used as a metaphor, right? But is now you know the name. Why anger? It seems to me always always remains a metaphor, huh? We never really say that anger is the name of divine of justice. No, it becomes the name of justice, right?

[36:01] But mercy becomes the name of God's will, right? You know, to relieve the misery of the creature, right? Yeah. So it's very very subtle use of these words, huh? You have to be very very careful how you use them.

[36:20] I was talking to him last night again about the the definition of of reason there, where the word discourse is what used, right? And discourse is taken from what part of our body?

[36:36] Legs and feet. Yeah, yeah, it comes from the the word for for running, right? And the word course is in there, right? And so it's taken from the legs, right? And then I was saying, now I love Friar Lawrence's words on on stumbling, right? And he says two things about stumbling in the in the Romeo and Juliet. Wisely and slow they stumble that run fast. Then later on he says revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.

[37:16] And it kind of struck me. He said, stumbling from what part of the body? The feet. more precisely. Yeah, the same thing as the discourse, right? Both discourse and stumbling, originally named something with the what the legs. You run by your legs, right? And you stumble by your legs. They're on the ice here, you know. I didn't wonder. So, um,

[37:49] it's it's very interesting, you know. But once in a while we use the word, you know, what Grasp? Grasp, That's taken from the hand, huh? But I suppose we identify going from here to there, you know, more with the feet than the hand. Most people don't go from here to there by their hand. The idea of grasping something, we're not going from one thing to another, right?

[38:08] But just getting a hold of it, huh? It struck me. huh? How interesting the words. What? So you're not seeing and looking. too, huh? Yeah, yeah. But I just think, you know, the use of the word stumbling is there because there's two ways you could can understand a mistake in thinking, right?

[38:35] And one is wisely and slow. They stumble. They run fast. Well, your starting point is not necessarily bad, right, or corrupt, but you run too fast, right, huh? And then the other mistake you can make is what? Well, the other mistake is kind of corruption in the very beginning of your thinking, right? So the one who revolts from true birth. Stumbles on abuse, right?

[39:06] So you can, if your principle is wrong, right, or your starting point is wrong, then you're going to stumble. That's the more serious one, right? But even if your starting point is good, not corrupt or anything like that, you can still stumble by, you know. I said we speak of what jumping to a conclusion, right? I said, what does the word jumping come from? What part of the body?

[39:31] Well, that's the legs too, right? Huh? Yeah, yeah, jumping, stumbling, and what? Discourse, right? But all three are taken from the what? Yeah. Now, of course, Friar Lawrence's words to Romeo, wisely and slow, they stumble and run fast, right? He's not using running for discourse, but for what action, right? Huh? Okay. Like in, like in our founding documents, within the course of human events, right? Huh? You talk about human, you know, actions and so on, right?

[40:07] Things being done. But then you can apply it, you know, to the mind, right? Just like in calculating, right? You can make a mistake in adding and subtracting because you go too fast, or because you have the wrong numbers. You know. Friar Lawrence said something like Romeo don't bite off more than you can chew. Ruminate on this. Yeah, yeah. That way you'll, you know, digest it. Yeah, yeah.

[40:34] Properly, sort of using different part of the body. Yeah. Or saying a similar kind of thing. But Wace also talked about ruminating, you know, you know, when you're twisting or when your mind, right? Yeah. Yeah. Because the animals, I guess, have got a, a extra stomach or something like that, and they can bring it up and chew it again, right? And so on. That's what you have to do.

[40:55] It's kind of kind of marvelous to see the way these things are named. That's a difficult thing to say, right? We're talking about the word anger and mercy, right? I was talking about Thomas put them alongside each other there in the text there, because he's saying knowledge is not said of God because He does something like the one who knows. That's like a metaphor, right? Huh? He's rejecting that, huh?

[41:28] And see, but then the word mercy, I think, is not what. Yeah, I don't think in in the Summa there when he talks about the mercy and justice of God, mercy is being used as a metaphor. It's not proper to argumentative thing, is is Dionysius says, right? You know, to use metaphors, right? And so he's really speaking properly when you say, God is merciful.

[42:00] Right? But anger is, you know, it remains a metaphor, right? It, doesn't become a meaning of the word anger, does it? Justice. No. So you got to pay attention to these words, huh?