Prima Secundae
206. Venial and Mortal Sin: Loving God Enough, Repairable and Irreparable Sin, and Analogical Division (Summa I-II, Q. 88, a. 1)
Class of 2015-02-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/206-venial-and-mortal-sin-loving-god-enough-repairable-and-irreparable/

[0:00] De peccato veniali and mortali There is the sinful character. Then, because sin is are distinguished, what? Venial and mortal sins are distinguished according to what? Guilt, I guess, or punishment due to them, right? It ought to be considered about them. What? Data punishment. Okay. And first, one ought to consider about venial in comparison to mortal. Secondly, about venial secundum se. My goodness. Let's say says it belongs to Thomas to treat everything formally.

[0:50] He certainly does. About the first six things are asked. First, whether venial sin is suitably divided against mortal. What kind of a distinction is that?

[1:11] Secondly, whether they are distinguished in genus. That opposed to being distinguished in species. They have the same genus. Third, whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal. I know that it is. Fourth, whether venial sin can become mortal. I hope not.

[1:42] Five, whether circumstance aggravating the sin can what? Mortal okay. Six, the other side, whether mortal sin is able to become venial. Wouldn't that be great? Get

[2:14] to the first, then one proceeds thus. Or to speak in other words, to the first one goes forward thus. It's a wonderful word, processus. Remember how back in the treatise on the Trinity, right? He said the what persons are distinguished by the relations of proceeding, and then. I think it goes back to proceeding, right? So the first thing we take up is the processus, right? The proceeding.

[2:47] Of course, you know the logic professor up there was talking about the way of proceeding, common to all the sciences studied in logic, right? And the way of proceeding that's private to this that science. And then Monsignor Dionne came into class next day or so. You got two more to proceed. So I really had a proceeding, huh? Thumbed into my head, you know, the importance of the word, right?

[3:14] Of course, it goes back again to the continuous. For Augustine says in the twenty-second book against Faust. See why Augustine insists upon the importance of heretics for the development of theology.

[3:36] That sin is something said, or done, or wanted, desired against the eternal what law? It's a theological definition, huh? But to be against the eternal law gives to sin that it be what mortal. Mortal. Therefore, every sin is mortal.

[4:08] Therefore, venial sin is not divided against mortal. Moreover, the apostle says, one Corinthians ten. Whether you what eat or drink or do something else, do all for the glory of God.

[4:34] But against this precept, whoever sins. Yeah, whoever sins, but against this precept, right? One acts, whoever sins, right? For sin is not an account of the glory of God, huh? Since therefore to do something against the precept is a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins sins what mortally.

[5:12] Moreover, whoever adheres by love to some things, inheres in it as what, or as enjoying it, huh? Or as using it, huh? Is as clear to Augustine in the first book about what Christian doctrine, huh?

[5:33] But no one sinning adheres to a what commutable good as something to be used, huh? For he does not refer it to the good which makes us blessed, which is properly to be used, as Augustine says there.

[5:56] Therefore, whoever sins enjoys the what changeable good. But to enjoy things that should be used is human perversity, right? Or to use things that should be enjoyed, to enjoy things that should be used, as Augustine says in the book of the eighty-three questions. Huh? Wasn't there a book of eighty-eight questions too? Eighty-three. There's a book on the questions on the gospel. Yeah.

[6:33] Since therefore perversity names a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins sins what mortally, huh? If you eat too much candy, I wouldn't say you're perverse, but it's it's too much. Yeah. Now the seven wise men of Greece said what? Nothing too much, huh? May done again. So I always like to ask people, you know, can you love God too much? He said nothing too much. So you shouldn't love God too much, right?

[7:25] You don't want to be a man. You monks love God too much, right? And but no, Saint, that's an important thing to say. I mean, it's a nice question to ask, right? But but the answer is you can't love God too much, right? Why can't you love God too much?

[7:45] There's always more of him composing. Yeah. You can never love God as much as He's lovable, right? So you can therefore never love God too much, right? Okay. I sometimes like to ask the same question about: Can you know God too much?

[8:04] You think about God too much, but you can never know God too much, right? Okay. The next question is: Can you love God enough?

[8:25] Enough for what? Enough for. Or can you know God enough? Say, I'm. I like to think about God, you know, but don't you know enough about God now, Brian? Can we stop now? I think you had enough. Ah. Aren't you always supposed to be trying to love God more, right? So can you ever say that? Well, now I love God enough. I don't have to strive to love God any more than I do.

[9:06] I know God enough. If someone you know maintained you know that he loved God enough, right? And I love God enough. I can turn to other things now.

[9:24] Would that be an example of pride? What would you say? Would that say what kind of a disorder is that? Is that a disorder of pride?

[9:42] Anyways, aren't you attributing to your your will, right? This excellence, right? You know, obviously, if you said you love God as much as He's lovable, you'd be attributing to your will an excellence that you don't have, right? In the same way, if you said, "I know God as much as He's knowable," right? I know all about Him. In both of those, I would be attributing to myself an excellence that I don't have, or an excellence to my will or to my reason that they don't have, right?

[10:24] But if I said, "I know God enough," right, or "I love God enough," I shouldn't try to love God any more than I do.

[10:35] I shouldn't try to know God any more than I already know Him, right? Aren't you, in a sense, still trying to to make level your your will and reason with God? Aren't you trying to do that? Isn't that really kind of kind of, isn't that pride in the bad sense? Huh? You can't you can't

[11:04] love God enough, right? Huh? Can't you can't know God enough? Huh? I think you can love candy too much. Love wine too much. I shouldn't love wine enough. I think I don't think I should. I need to love wine more than I do. It's proportionate. I mean, if anything, I love it too much. But I certainly don't. So you love it enough. Maybe I love it too much.

[11:39] I don't know. Maybe I love tea too much. I don't know. I actually go on with my reading in the morning, so maybe maybe it's okay for that. Drink tea.

[11:53] I don't drink a mug or two a day. You know, when you come to God, I don't think can ever can ever be enough, right?

[12:06] Let alone too much. Let me see. Toasted. That was the second, the third objection, right? We're looking. Moreover, whoever exceeds to one term, from this he recedes from the other. But whoever sins exceeds or approaches a changeable good, right? Therefore, he recedes from the unchangeable good. Therefore, he sins mortally.

[12:53] Therefore, not suitably is venial sin divided against what moral. Now Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? We said that just as when he says it's the ability for a larger discourse, this includes what? Yeah. And when we say its ability to look before and after, right? We include the ability to look for what? Distinctions, right? So here now you're raising the question about: is this distinction, you know, valid, right?

[13:33] It's really a distinction between mortal and venial sin. I remember, I remember, you know, was it somebody in the academic world? There, I can't remember. He is in doubt about the distinction between commands and and

[13:53] councils. Yeah, he says he doesn't see that distinction as any good. You know, that's a real problem. That's a real problem. For some people. Well, if you don't, if you don't make that distinction. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But he was he was denying that this was, you know, you know, a meaningful distinction, or you know, he was kind of questioning that, you know. What you do with these people, you know.

[14:19] So does that mean he was going to move all the counsels then? Yeah, usually I know the process objection is yeah is to eliminate the councils because it's presumption that you can do more than what's commanded. So they always use this is built into the Anglican confession to this day. It's built that this presumption and arrogance to say you can do anything more than you're commanded because that's what our Lord said.

[14:43] At the end of the day, the servant said, "I've done nothing more than I'm commanded. They commanded. Okay. So, self to see is commanded, then we should be silent. Well, that's what they'll get out of it and say it isn't commanded. Blah blah blah. Whatever. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know how many can count it up, but they, but they, they reject works of supererogation.

[15:03] Now, thou shalt not kill is a council. Henry VIII really thought that was not even a doctrine. It's just a good idea. That's not really binding on anybody

[15:17] But against this is what Augustine says in the 41st homily upon the Gospel of Saint John that crimen, I guess, which I guess might be used used here for mortal sin. Yeah. So we get the word criminal, though, isn't it? But it's kind of a serious thing to be a criminal, I guess. I mean, if you go over the speed limit, you know, five miles, that makes you a criminal.

[15:47] You rob the bank, then you're a criminal, right? Because that's where the money is. Yeah. But a crimen is what is merit damnation, right? Huh? But the venial is what does not merit damnation. That's a pretty big distinction, if you ask me. That's all. Enough. But crimen names mortal sin. Nah, there. That's what we interpreted here. Therefore, venial sin is suitably divided against mortal. It seems to me that's a very important distinction.

[16:20] Don't hear about much to these days, do you? I remember Kasurik talking to me. He's talking about some guy he was talking to, and this guy says, "I don't think God's going to punish me for not going to mass on Sunday." You know, Kasurik says, "You know, he thought he wasn't going to punish him. You know, pretty severely. You know, but isn't that a mortal sin to not go to mass on Sunday?"

[16:41] I'd be surprised. Surprised how many people think that way. How many Catholics think that way? Yeah, yeah, it's a nice thing. Somebody, somebody said to me, "That's what you're doing for Lent." I started going back to church. I said, "Going to church is being Christian. That's not Lent." I said, "Thanks." I want to do. I want to church for Lent. So he said, "I don't think God's going to punish me."

[17:06] Kasurik said, "I told him I thought he would punish him." What do you think, Dwayne? I said, "I think so too." The answer should be said that some things, according as they are what properly taken,

[17:26] do not seem to be opposed, huh? Which, if they are taken metaphorically, yeah, this is a strange way to begin. Where is he going? Okay, I'll give him the benefit of the doubt. Thomas, I give him a little slight Yeah, yeah.

[17:47] Just as to what laugh, right, is not opposed to that which is to what dry up dry up. But according as to laugh is said more metaphorically, Thomas often gives this example of a metaphor, right, for various purposes, huh? About the field, right, huh? An account of its what flourishing and its like the figure, yeah, is opposed to that which is to what. dry up. Likewise, if mortal is taken properly, insofar as it refers to the bodily death, right, it does not seem to have opposition with what venial, nor to pertain to the same genus, huh?

[18:41] But if mortal is taken metaphorically, according as it is said in sins, mortal is opposed to that which is what venial, right? Because one is mortal, now there is immortal, huh?

[18:59] Since sin is a certain infirmity of the soul, as is had above. Some sin is said to be mortal to the likeness of what? Sickness, which is mortal, from this that it brings in a irreparable defect through the what taking away of some what beginning, right? As has been said, huh? This is a thing here. I have a whole collection of texts from Plato and Aristotle about the importance of the beginning in philosophy, right?

[19:34] So this is a thing that is talked about a lot. Now, the beginning of the spiritual life, which is according to virtue, is the order to the last end. That's the beginning of the whole thing. Which, if one is destitute of that, one cannot what be repaired through some. intrinsic beginning, but therefore only through the divine power. This has been said above.

[20:14] Because the disorders of those things which are towards the end are repaired from the end, just as the error which happens about conclusions through the truth of the what beginnings, premises. Aristotle often makes that comparison, right? The beginning is in practical matters, what the premises and first premises.

[20:42] The defect, therefore, of the order to the ultimate end cannot be what through anything else repaired, which is more principal than that. Just as neither an error which is about the principles. Aristotle says, if you're mistaken about the principle contradiction, then the only alternative is to turn to the state of a plant, right? My aunt Margaret thought that was very funny, you know.

[21:14] Yeah, you can be a plant, right? You can grow without taking a position about this. And therefore, these sins are said to be mortal as being irreparable.

[21:32] But the sins which have a disorder about those things which are towards the end, with the order to the end being conserved, are able to be repaired, right? And these are called what venial,

[21:50] both because the sin has what is venial, I guess, forgiveness. Whence the what? When the debt of punishment is taken away, who seizes which which seizes with the sin sitting right? This has been said.

[22:08] According to this, therefore, mortal and venial are posed as what? Repairable and every rare. Yeah. Of course, the distinction into two, right, is very common according to Plato, right? And Socrates is in the dialogues there that are like the Sophists and so on, where he emphasizes the tool of division, right, as a way of approaching definitions. He always divides into two, right? And Aristotle criticizes that one should always divide into two, right?

[22:44] But there's a good reason to divide into two, and that is that you divide by what opposites, right? So you can divide, you know, men into human beings into good and bad, or maybe male and female, right? But Good and white, or something that would make any sense to the opposites, right? And so, if you divide by opposites, the opposites are two, and it makes a lot of sense to divide by two, right?

[23:16] So there's great probability that one should always divide by into two, right? Okay. Now I can say for dividing into three is that what? Three is the first number about which we say all, which is a very weaker argument, right? Just a sign, right, that maybe three is necessary sometimes, huh? Because we say all about three, right? If you and I are going to the store, we're both going, right?

[23:42] But for you and I and you are going, we're all going, right? You know, three of us are going, we're all going. And Pythagoras has the beginning, middle, and end, saying that's three, right? That's complete. Leave out the beginning or the middle or the end, you left out something, right? So,

[24:11] and I say this, he says, okay, repairable and irreparable by a what? Inward beginning, right? Not, however, by comparison to a what? Divine power, right? Because even the mortal sin is repairable, right? Through the divine power, right? But I'm saying inside of us, right? Huh? Which is able to repair every what? Sickness, both bodily and spiritual, right? Huh? And so, when these, when God's, when Christ cures somebody's body, right?

[24:50] Huh? There's sometimes apart from the sense of the letter a what? Spiritual sense, right? Huh? You see that in the commentary in Matthew, right?

[25:03] So that the thing that the thing which is signified by the sense of the letter, in turn, signifies something else, right? Okay, like leprosy might signify sin and so on.

[25:23] Okay. And account of this opposition, then, right? Huh? You could say, huh? Pope Holk, and account of this, meaning this opposition, of repairable and irreparable by an inward beginning, right? You got it. You can add that, right? Huh? Suitably venial sin is divided against mortal sin, right? Well, I'm convinced by that, right?

[25:48] Now, what about these opposite arguments? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the division of mortal sin and venial sin. Is not a division of genus into species, which equally partake of the definition of the genus, right? So this is not a division of the genus into species. So when you divide numbers, say, into odd and even, is one of these more a number than the other?

[26:24] No, they must be equally so, right? When you divide triangle into scalene, isosceles, and equilateral, is an equilateral triangle more a triangle than a scalene triangle?

[26:41] Or you divide quadrilateral into square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and even trapezium, right? Are they what one more quadrilateral than the other?

[27:00] When you divide animal into dog and cat, is the dog more an animal than a cat, Or a cat. Cat was like he was more an animal Yeah. So that's the very importance now this this this little reply to at primo, right? And and and from the point of view of Monsignor Dionne used to say you've got to read the other works of Thomas to get a full understanding of logic, right?

[27:25] Because it belongs to logic to distinguish the kinds of what division, right? And kinds of distinction, so on, right? And so the division of mortal and venial sin is not a division of genus into species. It's not the same as a division of number into odd and even, right? It's not that kind of division. Why not? Because they don't equally partake, right, of the idea of sin, right?

[27:57] Why species partake equally of the what genus, right? And you know one of the beautiful examples of that is is even with numbers, right? Two is before three, and three is before what four, right? And three is more than two, and four is more than three, right? But is four more a number than three? See, because the definition of number is a multitude composed of ones, right?

[28:27] Well, three is just as much as four a multitude composed of ones, even though four is composed of more ones, right? See, but they're equally a number, right? Even though two in some senses before three, right? That's kind of a striking thing, right? But here they're not equally right. So this this is part of the idea of what are in the strict sense a division of a genus into species.

[28:55] They have to equally partake of the. Nature of the genus, right? The ratio of the genus, huh? But of analogy in which something is said of things, secundum prius et posterius. See the importance of our great friend there, Shakespeare, right? Looking before and after, right? Thomas is seeing before and after here. He's definitely doing that, yeah.

[29:30] And therefore, the full or perfect ratio, huh? The full perfect definition of sin, which Augustine lays down, belongs to what? Mortal sin, right? He's talking about the definition there in the first objection, right? Okay, it's against the eternal law, right?

[29:56] So, eating too much candy against the eternal law. Seems. kind of funny to say that, doesn't it? Huh? The adultery or murder—that's against the eternal law, right? Huh?

[30:15] But venial sin is said to be a sin secundum rationem imperfectam notion of it, right? And in ordine ad peccatum mortale, right? And in order to

[30:32] mortal sin, just as accident is said to be being in order to substance, but according to an imperfect ratio of being, so it's the distinction of sin into what? Moral sin and venial sin is more like the distinction of being into accident and substance, than like the distinction of number into odd and even, say, or you know,

[31:02] okay, or even habit into virtue and vice, right? Habit into virtue and vice. Well, vice isn't as much a habit, unfortunately. Yeah, as virtue is, right? Huh? You know, that's beautifully says that, right? Huh? See, and so you can kind of see that, right? You would say, you know, if you leave this room, where you cease to be? What would you say? I want to qualify that bit, right?

[31:34] Because that would refer to your substantial being, right? Huh? Okay, that's that's being in the full sense, right? Huh? See, but if you leave this room, you will cease to be in this room. If you stand up, you will cease to be sitting, right? We got to qualify it in essence, right? But if you, you know, some some terrorist out there shoot us for for admitting the Trinity, he's like, um, uh, then you will cease to be, right?

[32:04] Your soul will still be, but you will cease to be. Yeah, that's beautiful, huh? Okay. Just as accident is said to be being in order to substance, right? It's something that exists in substance, right? Huh? But not by itself, huh? According to an imperfect ratio of being, right? Huh?

[32:39] For it's not against the law, right? Because the one sinning venially does not do what the law prohibits, right? Is there a law to not eat candy too much?

[32:56] Nor does it what? Yeah, overlook that to which the law obliges by precept, right? But it does something apart from the law, right? Because it does not observe the mode of reason which the law intends. Huh?

[33:20] Now you learn some real logic, right? See, the genus is before the species, right? But one species is not before the other, right? So a dog is not said to be an animal before a cat, and a cat is said to be an animal by some border to the dog. Don't go again. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[33:55] Aristotle has a discussion there in the the eleventh book of the excuse me, the tenth book of the wisdom, right, about whether why the distinction of male and female is not a distinction of species. He must have a lot of fun doing with his wife. What the heck are you teaching now, Aristotle? There's a need to address that Monsignor, you know, we got to text you like this, you know, you know, if he's teaching that, right, You know, he'd say that was important, you know.

[34:41] No teacher, it's very good saying. When Aristotle wrote this, he scratched all over the line. But he's talking about the brevity, you know, Aristotle, you know, and even Thomas, you know, maybe brief sometimes when he's explaining something, you know, but from these texts like this.

[35:07] You know, sometimes when he's you apply an objection, you'll say, you know, he'll he'll name the the kind of of error, kind of mistake being made, right? You go back to those thirteen kinds of mistake. Oh, it's one of those, you know. You know, but it kind of get you, you know, get you kind of a little worked out there, you know. The good or bad says that.

[35:28] Remember Dion talking about is it logic be an art, you know, and how the word art is not being used in just that using just one sense, you know. It's not an art in the way in which the art of carpentry is an art, right? You know, it's taking a lot of time, you know, and pointing out that this is a word that is not a genus, right?

[35:57] Said these things. Okay. To the second, it should be said, as the one now says, whether you eat or drink or do anything else, do all in the glory of God, right? And notice what Thomas says here. To the second, it should be said that that precept of the apostle is affirmative, huh? What's important about that? Whence it is not obligatory ad semper huh So you may say, you know, precept you know you should pray, right?

[36:33] And you know, who doesn't pray is going to be lost, right? So it's very important to pray. But you supposed to be praying always, actually?

[36:43] Is it that kind of precept? What does Jerome say? You know, whether he eats or drinks or does anything else, always comes to mind. You know, venit ad judicium But you always have to think about that every time you eat and drink? But not a bad thing to do, right? You know, you know, pick up the bottle there and you know, to have a drink and venit ad judicium you know, from the height to life.

[37:14] Yeah. It suffices, therefore, that someone habitually, right, refers himself and all his things to what God. So you should do that from time to time, and especially when you go to what Mass, right? Because then you're you're offering up these things to God, right?

[37:38] So it suffices that someone habitually refer himself and all that he does, all his things to God, in order that he not always what mortally sin, right, huh?

[37:52] Even though, in what he does not refer some act actually to the glory of God. Seems to me you could say the same thing if you say, you know, you should always thank God for everything good, right? You know, we try to say, you know, thank Him, you know, before meal or something, right? But you thank God for your bed last night, or you thank God, I thank God for this chair.

[38:23] You know, but I don't just stand there; I can sit down and yeah, you know. Heat in the house this time of year. Yeah, yeah. Did you thank God for the heat in the house today? I don't like it today. Yeah. See, was that it? Yeah.

[38:37] For venial sin does not exclude the habitual order of the human act to the glory of God, but only what actual, because it does not exclude charity, which habitually orders us to God, right? That's part of the reason why charity has to be a a virtue, a habit, right, and not just an act, huh? Whence it does not follow that the one who sins venially sins mortally, which is what the guy was.

[39:08] That was a close one. To third, it should be said that the one who sins venially adheres to a temporal good not as what fruens enjoying it, because he does not constitute in it the what in. So they pick up the glass of wine and say, "This is my purpose in life to drink this. This is what life is all about—drinking some wine, right?" Well, then I would be mortally sinning, right?

[39:43] See. But as using it, referring it to God, maybe not in act, but in what habit? Huh? Now, what about the distinction between the commutable? good and the incommutable good, because those are what opposites, aren't they? Right? Okay. He says the changeable good is not taken as the term contrapositus. That's being opposed, really, right? Okay. To the unchangeable good, except when it is the end is constituted in it, right?

[40:30] When it's made the end, right? For what is towards the end does not have the notion of the what the end, yeah. So if you're pursuing that as the end of your life, drinking the wine, then you would be what opposed to God being the end of your life, right?

[41:04] My son's got a biography there of Chairman Mao. What a what an awful guy he was. Was that the more recent one by a husband-wife team? I think it was. No, I think it's a different one than that one. I think. Yeah, yeah. That's the one about his love life or his woman or something. Yeah, but you know, burying people alive, one of the nice things he did, you know.

[41:26] He's a nice guy. Real nice guy. You know. Can't imagine he could be quite that quite that bad, you know. Wasn't he the one that you told us was sad when Maximus was uh Um resign Yeah, yeah, because it kind of like you know, it's like a fellow, you know, person in power, you know, losing power, you know, because the idea of losing power was just the end, you know.

[41:52] Yeah, I remember one time when Nixon was being interviewed, you know, this was some years after he had got the pardon, you know, from from

[42:02] from what? Ford. Yeah, from President Ford. Yeah, yeah. And so somebody was saying, you know, wishing you had been punished, you know, something. He said, well, to lose all that power, he says, was punishment in itself. You know, it was, you know, having to lose that that kind of position was was something, you know. And

[42:26] then what's what's his name? Who's the guy that did all those photographs of Mother Teresa there? Mugridge, you know. He said the reaction to press, you know, this whole thing was was much more worse than anything Nixon did. You know, this kind of

[42:42] self vaunting that they had. Yeah. Anyway. Okay, that's into that article, right? We got to stop now, or what? Four, thirty three, huh?