Prima Secundae
212. Beginning the Treatise on Law: Wisdom, the Axioms, and Whether Law Belongs to Reason
Class of 2015-03-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/212-beginning-the-treatise-on-law-wisdom-the-axioms-and-whether/

[0:00] To rest our dimmed minds, right? Consequently, we're not to consider about the what exterior what beginnings of acts, right? Reference back to the first thing way back in question forty-nine, there, right?

[0:28] If you look at the proemium to question forty-nine, right? After the acts and passions, right? We're not to consider about the beginnings of human acts, huh? And first about the inward beginnings, right? Secondly, about the extrinsic beginnings, and now we're beginning that second part, right? Huh? The inward beginning is what the powers and the what habits, huh? But because we have spoken about the powers in the first part, when you talk about the soul and so on, it remains to consider about the habits, right?

[1:10] And first in general, secondly about virtues and vices, and other things of the sort which are beginnings of human acts, right? Now we come to the second part here, right? Huh? Which is about the extrinsic ones here in question ninety, right? Okay. So that's a distinction of two, I think. Okay. Okay.

[1:36] But notice when he says exterior, doesn't mean that they don't become interior, but they come from an exterior what source, in them? Because grace is something inside of us too, right? Huh? Okay.

[1:48] Now he says the outward beginning inclined to evil is the diabolus, right? Of whose temptation it has we have spoken in the first part, huh? So what does the word diabolus mean there? I think I mentioned it last time what it means.

[2:12] What? I only mean the deceiver. It's adversary, I think it was, yeah. So. Satan's adversary. Yeah. Just a diablo's slang from the old French and the almost devil, and that doesn't help me. Not adversary. It was what is it? The.

[2:52] Accuser, slanderer. Slander is the word, yeah. Slander is the word, yeah, yeah, yeah. And then seed is more like like adversary or enemy. Sometimes he called the enemy. Shakespeare calls them the common enemy. Literally, we throw something against someone. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I think I looked up in the dictionary. I think diabolus was slander, something like that. The word, you know, for the the noun, you know.

[3:16] And I don't know that's referring to his his slandering God, you know, and he says to her, you know what? No, you'll be you'll be like gods, you know, you eat this stuff. That's kind of slandering God, right? That God's a trying to harm you in a sense, but keeping you or holding back and you. I think the Greek word, the first sense, is slanderer. Yeah, yeah.

[3:43] So he's an outward principle, right? Okay. But the exterior principle moving to the good is God, right? Who both instructs us by law and aids us by what grace? Grace, huh?

[4:05] So you ask for grace to follow the law, right? Whence first about law, secondly about grace, why not to what speak, right? I guess grace begins, it says here in what question.

[4:27] One o nine, huh? So there's going to be quite a few here. So all about law, all the way to one o nine, huh?

[4:59] So he begins the the premium to question one o nine. There he says, consequently, we're not to consider about the exterior or outward beginning of human acts about God, in so far as by Him we are aided by grace to acting well, right? And then he divides that into what three, yeah. First, we're not to consider about the grace of God. Secondly, about its cause. Third, about its effects.

[5:27] He looks before and after, doesn't he, this guy? He has an avid of doing that Yeah. Okay. Not very original, is he? He just blazed his own trail. Yeah.

[5:44] He doesn't kind of spin his own philosophy. Yeah, yeah. I told you how he how he compares. He complains about the the the verists if wisdom began with them.

[6:00] Sounds like it's personal experience. Yeah, yeah. Okay, so we got a lot of things to say about law, then I guess. It's lawful to say that I guess. Okay.

[6:25] So let's go back to the premium here to question ninety, right? When's first about law? Secondly, about grace. Why not to speak, right? And about law, we're not first to consider about law, in what, community in general, right? Secondly, about its what? Parts. Yeah. Now, what kind of parts is that? What do they call those parts?

[7:01] Subjective parts. They call them subject parts, you know, because the subject here you talk about the universal whole, which is said of many, right? Now, so like the genus said of the species, or the genus said of things that are less universal, right? And the other kind of whole is what?

[7:20] Yeah, the composed whole. Yeah. Yeah, so a lot of times they call the integral whole, right? Now, okay. And somebody was writing me from Rome. There, you know, he's writing on on

[7:37] the a little bit of metaphysics and so on. And one thing that's come up there, I sent him a letter, and then he sent me another letter back. He ends, I am going to reply to the reply, but Aristotle will say, and Thomas will say this, that the wise man judges the beginnings, right? And not only the beginnings in the sense of the beginning causes, right, the first causes, but also the beginning statements, right.

[8:01] And Aristotle spends a lot of time defending the axiom of contradiction there, in the fourth book, right. And so, but Boethius also speaks of the what axioms as being the statements that are known to themselves by all men. And this is tied up with the virtue of reason called understanding, right? Aristotle just calls it nous. Thomas calls intellectus. I call it natural understanding, you know, to distinguish it from this reasoned out understanding, right?

[8:44] Well, if these statements are known to themselves by all men, to some extent they're judged by all men to be true, right? Well, then, what's the difference between that and wisdom, right? Why can Aristotle or Thomas say that the wise man judges these beginnings, right? Talks about them, right?

[9:10] Because he knows the reason the reason why? Well, you see, Aristotle is not going to say that the wise men can demonstrate these things because these are the starting of all our knowledge of these things. He's only going to what make them known by distinguishing

[9:31] the words that make them up, right? And since the words make them up are known by all men, that's what he does in natural understanding. What's what's the difference then, right? But he knows them as the beginnings where I mean everybody knows them but maybe not as the beginnings Okay, part of that, yeah. He knows them not as the beginnings, huh? And Aristotle, I think, discovered that the words in the axioms are all equivocal. Equivocal by reason, not by chance, but they are equivocal by reason.

[10:08] And does the man who has natural understanding know that? No, see. And so the wise man has a little more universal judgment, you might say, about the axioms. And I always say that the fifth book of wisdom, where Aristotle distinguishes, right, the

[10:31] meanings of these equivocal words, right. Usually, when Thomas explains the division of the metaphysics. He says because he said in book four that the subject of wisdom is being and one, and these are said in many ways, right. Then, in the fifth book, he starts to distinguish the words, and this is the beginning the consideration of of being as being, right? To distinguish the senses of these words, but it's also useful for what defending the axioms, right?

[10:59] I used to use this one in class. I told you this one, but it's kind of a clear example because people are always giving the whole is more than a part as a example of an axiom, right? And it's in the Euclid, you know, it's an axiom. And

[11:17] Aristotle will often refer to the axioms in the context of mathematics, right? Because they're more obvious there, and everything goes back to the axioms more clearly there, right? And so I'd always begin by by quoting a certain conversation between my mother and myself, right? Now my mother never went to college; never studied philosophy, and she didn't like it when she heard me say that man is an animal.

[11:41] She didn't like that it didn't sound right to her. And so she would kind of protest when I said man is an animal. And I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal; he's an animal that has reason. Oh, she says that's better. She said.

[12:00] I don't know. So I think it's kind of a marvelous conversation, right? So I say to be an animal, then is not the whole of man, it's only a part of man, right? And then I said, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant. So sometimes a part includes more than the whole. And my students say, oh yeah,

[12:24] yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. So the whole is not necessarily greater than the what part, right? Well, see what was going is confusing these two different senses of what whole and part, right? Because if you take animal as a integral or composing part of the definition of man, the definition of man is an animal that has reason, something like that. Then man is only a part of that definition, and the definition contains more than animal.

[12:58] As my mother was happy to know. Namely, what reason, right? But then, if you consider animal as a universal whole, which is said of man, dog, cat, and horse, right? It's said of more than man is said of, or the dog is said of, or cat is said of, right? And so, now you're confusing those two different senses, right? Of whole and part, right? And you know, to be a little more precise with the statement, you can say a whole is more than a part of itself, right?

[13:35] A whole is not always what greater than just any part, you know? So, you could say that New England is a part of what of the United States, but it's bigger than the whole of what Massachusetts, right? But then you're not taking part in whole of the same thing, right? Or part of the same thing that the whole you're talking about. And so, the way that the wise man has a little more what universal judgment, a little more distinct judgment, right?

[14:10] And and a judgment that enables him to defend the axiom against an argument, right? And and in the second book, you know, of natural hearing, the physics, so-called.

[14:25] Aristotle is talking about nature, right? And he works out a thinks out a definition of nature, right? And then he says, now, shouldn't we have shown that nature exists before, right? We consider what nature is, huh? Because the question does something exist, right? Comes before the question what it is, right? Aristotle says, well, we didn't have to do that because it's obvious in our experience, right? That nature exists.

[14:58] But there are some people who want to prove that nature exists, huh? And so, Aristotle says, they think they don't know what they do know. And that's an odd state of mind to be in, to think you don't know what you do know. How can you possibly, you know, how can this be possible, right? And Aristotle manifests it by something more known, that Socrates was always showing, that men do in fact think they know what they don't know.

[15:31] If they can make that mistake, can't they make the reverse mistake, huh? Yeah. So if you can think some effeminate man is a woman, you could make the opposite mistake of thinking some masculine woman was it was a man, right? Um. If someone could think that Millers is Budweiser, someone could make the mistake of thinking that Budweiser is Millers, right? Because you make the mistake because you can't quite separate always Millers and Budweiser, let's say, or even man and woman.

[16:05] And so. If you can make the mistake of thinking you know what you don't know, it must be hard sometimes to distinguish what you know what you don't know, right? So then the opposite is possible, right? That you can think you don't know what you do know, and it's because of a sophistical argument like the one Parmenides gave to his students that makes them think that they don't know what they in fact what do know, right?

[16:30] That's the state of mind of our world today. Yeah, yeah, yeah, very common thing, right? So the the the wise man doesn't make the mistake of thinking he doesn't know what he does know, right? But the man who merely has natural understanding of the axioms, right? And if he asks the average person on the street does the whole, you know, have more than the part? Yeah, oh yeah, he'd admit, right?

[17:03] But then when he gets this objection, you know, kind of a doubt, right? Like a like like you have a faith or a sudden movement of doubt, you know, maybe it isn't so, you know. But it's because you can't solve that objection, and the wise man of course sees that, right? It's been kind of marvelous thing that Aristotle saw that these things are what equivocal by reason, right?

[17:30] And then he wanted to distinguish the meanings and and show the order of them, right? Of the meanings, and that way he confirmed which is the foundation of all reasoned out knowledge, a marvelous thing. You say that Descartes saying I think therefore I am was thinking that he knew what he didn't really know because apparently he really didn't understand himself and his human nature considering the tangent.

[18:09] Yeah, but but in sense he was not wrong saying I think therefore I am, you know, in his thinking, you know, he knew that he was, right? I mean that's something obvious, right? But he thought maybe understood what thought was more than he did, right?

[18:24] You see, he didn't say I think therefore I think I am. No, no. That's the moderns. Let me give a little thing here, just another example of this thing. Suppose someone said to you, "Do you have a body?" You say, "Yes, I have a body." Do you have a soul? You say, "Yes." Now, is the soul the same thing as the body? Okay. Okay. Now, once you say the soul is not the same thing as the body, then you think the soul and the body are two different things, right?

[19:07] Well, if there are two things and one is not the same as the other, right? Then which am I? And probably the only reasonable answer is to say I'm the soul. See, and this is what Plato says, right? So the soul is somehow in the body, like in a prison or whatever. I don't say it's in there, but it's not the body, right? And you know, in the famous conversation there, Socrates in the last day of his life, where shall we bury you, Socrates?

[19:37] You know, and Socrates says you'll have to catch me first. You see, because Socrates is thinking of himself as being what the soul, right? And they have a hard time catching the soul, right? When it leaves the body, right? And therefore, you know, what's this question? We're going to bury me, you know. It's kind of beautiful, you know. So I used to, you know, love to explain. why Socrates is saying that you have to catch me first, you know, or And and the even though the the associate of Socrates is still thinking who kind of the body, right?

[20:12] You know, and so on, and but what what's the defect in that argument? It seems to be good, right? So I have a soul and I have a body. They're not the same thing, right? There are two different things: the soul and the body. Then which one am I, right? And then then you got these. What? A false imagination of what? the soul is What? Was the soul something or nothing?

[20:55] It's kind of something, but it's not something that, as it were, let me think how how we put this. It's not unrelated. It's not equivocation on the thing. Yeah, yeah, yeah. In other words, the soul and the body are two things, but not in the sense which a man and a dog are two things, right? Think it's God one thing, everything. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Aristotle talks about how the the the soul and the body are one thing, right?

[21:28] And how the soul is the what first act of a natural body composed of tools, and how matter and form are one, right? Huh? Because that's hard to understand, right? Huh? And so they're not they're not two things in the way that a what man and a dog is, Is this uh one way that Descartes uh aired in that uh he was saying, "I think therefore I am," but his understanding of "I am" seem to imply, if not I don't know if he was definitely saying that the uh soul is a prisoner of the body, but his his uh thought pointed Western philosophy in that direction, sort of uh separating the soul from the body, uh losing the understanding of the unity of the soul

[22:21] and body. Yeah, yeah, he didn't understand the unity of the soul and the body, right? Right. And I mean, the soul is kind of I know some gland in the brain. The connection is, you know, yeah, but can't really understand the substantial unity of man, right? Huh? You have to understand matter and form, right? Huh? It's a little bit like you know, we don't understand at first substantial unity, but we see at least the union of what if you have a wooden chair, right?

[22:52] Are is the wood and the shape of the chair two things? Like the chair and the table are two things. Say. Are they two things?

[23:07] Not like the table and the chair. Yeah, yeah. I mean, the the chair. I mean, the the wood and the shape of the wood, right? That makes it a chair. One is the actuality of the ability of the other, right? So, while in the case of the table and the chair, right, one is not the actuality of the other, right? They're really two distinct things, right? So the distinction between the the wood of the chair and the shape of the chair is different than the distinction between the table and the chair, right?

[23:39] Huh? That's kind of a stepping stone. I. But that's not a substantial unity, but it's a stepping stone to understanding the union of the soul and the body, right? Huh? And I am one thing, right? This union of soul and body, right? That's why Thomas will say that Saint Peter is not in heaven. Soul, Saint Peter is in heaven, right? Huh? But Saint Peter, when you say Saint Peter is in heaven, that's a what?

[24:09] Figures Peter synecdoche Is that synecdoche I think so. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. And the second you say, "And the Word was made flesh," right? You mean what the Word was made man, right? Huh? But using flesh there for man, right? There's a reason why you do that. You want to say, "Oh, you went all the way down to the lowest part of us," you might say. But it's not.

[24:34] It's a uh synecdoche, right? he's a brain, you know. He's not just a brain, right? They want to emphasize that that part of him, right? Huh? You know, or so and so, you know, he kicks all the field goals. You know, he's called the toe. You know. I heard that one. Yeah, yeah, yeah. We have a we have a lady friend whose name is Corazon. Yeah. Father Robert says she's all art.

[25:10] So I mean, you know, things like like whole and part, and things like thing, even you know, they've got many what meanings, right? Huh? Okay. I always talk to my students. You know, now when you leave the classroom or you leave my house or whatever it is, you will cease to be. You know. In some way, you will cease to be. You'll cease to be in this room and so on.

[25:32] But you're kind of forced to distinguish these things, huh? And Aristotle is kind of the the first man to see really clearly that these fundamental words, the words we use everywhere, and especially in the axioms and especially in wisdom, right? These words are all equivocal by reason, right? And sometimes you hear me try to explain, you know. Kind of the different ways that a word can be equivocal by reason, right?

[26:03] And you have to kind of understand those things. But only Aristotle really understood that fully, you know. And other people kind of, you know, followed him like Thomas and people like that. But

[26:17] but Aristotle says in the book on Sophistical Refutations that the most common fallacies are the ones that arise from speech, right, and especially from equivocation of the words, right.

[26:31] So only the man who distinguishes in order the senses of these words equivocal by reason the axioms can defend them, right, from the most common arguments against them, right.

[26:44] Okay. So I'm going to talk about law before we talk about grace, right? And about law, we're going to first consider it in common, and secondly about its parts, right? I was mentioning that parts they call those parts sometimes subject parts, right, as opposed to composing parts, right.

[27:07] So a a composed whole, the name of the composed whole is not said of its parts. So the arm of the chair is not said to be a chair, right? And the why the universal whole, of course, is said of its what parts, right? But it's not put together from them, right? So when you say a man is an animal or a dog is an animal, you're not saying a man is composed of dog, cat, horse, and all these things, right?

[27:36] See, so but most people, you know, even when I develop that specific argument class, you know, the people, you know, for from what does a

[27:49] class. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, Yeah, Yeah. Okay. Of course, the principle here is to go from the general to particular, right? Because we know things in a confused way first. Okay.

[28:10] Now about law in general, three things occur to be considered, huh? So two and now three, right? First, about its very essence or nature or substance, right? Secondly, about the difference of the laws, and third, about their what effects, huh?

[28:33] So the first thing he's going to do is going to be to define law, right? Okay. And about the first four things are asked. First, whether law is something of reason. Not today. So not the laws that that.

[28:58] Secondly, about the end of the law, right? Third about its cause, and fourth about its what. Yeah. Okay. So you want to take a little break now before we undertake. First, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that law is not something of reason.

[29:23] For the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans, chapter seven, "I see another law in my members, law of incubus and another lex fomitis I guess they call it, but nothing that is of reason is in the members of the body, right? Because reason does not use a bodily what organ. Therefore, law is not something of what reason.

[29:55] That's a good one. Moreover, in reason there is only the power, the habit, and the act. But law is not the power of reason itself.

[30:12] Likewise, neither is it a habit of reason, because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues, which are what natural understanding, reasoned out understanding, wisdom, art, and foresight, about which one is said above. Nor is it an act of reason, because then when the act of reason ceases, the law would cease, as in those sleeping. Therefore, law is not something of reason. All laws are suspended after.

[30:49] Yeah. So this is an either-or argument, huh? The disjunctive syllogism. Now an error can come because you what don't reason correctly, or because something you reason from is not true. So what is it in this case?

[31:18] I think he seems to me he's missing the fourth possibility of something pertaining to the Okay, then then the either-or statement would not be correct, right? Because it's got to exhaust the possibilities. It's not suspicious

[31:35] Moreover, law moves those who are subject to the law to acting correctly, rightly. But to be moved to acting properly pertains to the will, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore, the law does not pertain to reason, but more to the will.

[31:59] What the what the our friends the Muslims would say, right? The law, kind of the assertion of the divine will, right, rather than something of reason, you know.

[32:12] Hmm. How many ways can you have? It's obviously searching a will rather than a reason. According as the Eurus presutis, oh, the one law, yeah, like the scribes, the Pharisees.

[32:38] What is pleasing to the prince has the vigor of law. The answer, but against this is that to law it pertains to what? Command, you might say, prohibit. But to command is a reason, as has been said above.

[32:59] Therefore, law is something of what reason. The answer should be said: the law is a certain what rule and a measure of acts by which one is induced or led into acting, right? Or yeah, taking away drawing away Yeah, refraining from acting, huh?

[33:36] For it is said, for the law is said from what binding, huh? Because it obligates, huh? It necessitates one to acting, huh? But the rule and measure of human acts is reason, which is the first beginning of human acts, as is clear from the things fore said.

[34:04] For it belongs to reason to order to an end, huh? Which is the first beginning in things to be done, according to the what philosopher? So Shakespeare, right there, defining reason by looking before and after, right? That's what order is, huh?

[34:28] So when Thomas explains the sixth attribute of the wise men, that he orders everybody else around, because it's the highest perfection of reason, right? Which is proper to to order.

[34:45] Now, in each genus, that which is the beginning is the measure and rule of what? Genus. Yeah. Just as unity in the genus of what number?

[35:01] In the first motion in the genus of what? Motions. Whence it remains, the law is something pertaining to what reason. That's pretty clear, isn't it?

[35:24] You know how Thomas, there, he takes up the substance of God, and he takes up in the in the Summas five attributes of the substance of God. That the substance of God, take the word in the Summa Theologiae, that's simple. That he's perfect, right? That he's infinite. That he's unchanging, and that he's one, right? And then some of these he has something attached to that, right? So to God being perfect, he attaches the consideration that God is what good, and to God being infinite, that he's everywhere, and to God being what unchanging, that he's infinite, right?

[36:08] He doesn't attach anything to his being simple or to his being one, right? But it seems to me, you know, that you could attach to his being one that God is the measure of all things, huh? He had these famous words of Plato in the the Laws, you know, where he quotes the Greek philosopher to say, "Man is the measure of all things." And he says, "Well, that's not true.

[36:29] God is the measure of all things, right?" Aristotle says it's a property of the one to be a what a measure, right? And that's why the virtuous man, you know, is said to be right. The most virtuous man, shall we say, is a measure, right, for other men, right? Huh? So Homer, in that sense, is the the measure of all poets, right? Sure. Mozart is the measure of all musicians, you know.

[37:01] Mary is kind the measure of all women, right? And so on. But sometimes, you know, Plato will say that the perfect is the measure of the what imperfect, right? So if you put these two together, God being perfect and His being one, you could have something falling upon them that God is the measure of what of all things, huh?

[37:36] So does anger know whether it's enough? Remember the this guy, you know, the little Bratnick store, right? Comes over and he had a potted flower plant there, you know, in the back, you know, of the house there, and so on. And the boy already looked up at my friend, and he knocked it over like that and smashed it. They require something, right? Intervention. So he couldn't give it all.

[38:08] And of course, the neighbors were indigenous that their boy had been, you know. Yeah, yeah, but you know. You know, if George gives example there, if you're walking down the hall and somebody bumps into you, should you get angry? No. And you have to say, well, why did they bump into you? It just just just happened, you know. And if they go down the hall, some of the kids who go in high school, you know, properly knocking everybody, you got a little bit of anger, right?

[38:41] And now, but now if you're using my kids, say for target practice, right? that that that that really requires some anger, right? And but only reason can can what measure you know and see which how much anger is or is not what suitable, right? Huh? You know.

[39:03] So how can the emotion be the measure of itself, right? To sleep, know whether you're sleeping too much or or too little. You know, some people are sleeping too little, some people are sleeping too much. Okay.

[39:33] To the second, it should be said, That's the one. that had the disjunctive syllogism, remember? To the second, it should be said that just as in exterior things, one can consider operation and the thing worked out, right? Huh? As, example, building and the built. So, in the acts of reason, this is a beautiful comparison that Thomas does. We often refer to this in logic, right? So, also in the works of reason, we can consider the act of reason, as, for example, to understand, right, and to reason, and something constituted to this act, right?

[40:23] Which, in looking reason, first is what definition, second is what enunciation or statement in English, third syllogism or in general argument. Okay. So I used to always say, you know, say first thing you got to understand in logic is what is a speech and what is a what name, because logic is mainly about to be speeches, definition, statement, and what syllogism, huh? Now, what is what is a speech?

[41:12] White horse. And what's the name, right? Well, the definition of speech and name is the same, except for one part, right? They're both vocal sound, signifying by human agreement or custom, right? But in the case of speech, having parts that signify something by themselves, and a name not having parts that signify by themselves, right?

[41:48] So we used to have people next to us called Johnson, right? Johnson was the family name, right? Now, do the parts of Johnson signify something? Name.

[42:05] See, well, when it functions as a name of the family name of these people, does John mean one thing about them and son another? In the very beginning, when the name was first coined for that particular family, started with John's. Yeah, yeah, that's the etymology of it, right? Huh? But is that the meaning of the name? See, see, see.

[42:30] Carol, you know, she's a Johnson, right? Well, she's the son of John. No, that doesn't mean at all, right? See, so just the whole the name Johnson means what? Her, her family, right? Huh? See, my name is Bergquist, which is originally Bergquist, right? And Berg, I guess, comes from mountain in Swedish, like in German. And Quest means branch, right? So I'm a mountain branch, right? I always pun on that.

[42:58] I'm a little branch off your Astolfo tree. Off the base of mountain, I'm a little branch, right? But is that really the meaning of my name? No.

[43:12] So a name is a vocal sound, right? Signifying human agreement, no part of which signifies by itself, right? While in the speech you have at least two parts that signify something by themselves. Yeah. So white horse is speech, right? A statement is speech, right? Um. So in a definition, when you say that you know square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, you have parts that signify something by themselves, right?

[43:48] And the genus signifies something by itself, and the differences do. And the same thing in the statement, right? The same man is an animal, right? Man signifies something, an animal signifies something, right? And then when you say when you syllogize, you put together statements, right? Huh? See, the first thing you got to understand is what speech, right? Because logic is mainly about three speeches: definition, statement, and syllogism.

[44:16] The logic of what? Definition, and then the logic of what? Statements, which is the Peri Hermeneias, and then the logic of syllogism, or you could say argument, more generally. Okay. So you make a beautiful comparison there, right?

[44:36] And because reason, practical reason, huh? Uses a kind of syllogism, right? Huh? In things to be done, as has been said above, huh? According as the philosophy teaches us in the seventh book of the Ethics. Therefore, it is necessary to find in practical reason, which has itself to operations, something that has itself, like the proposition in speculative reason, to what conclusions? Now, poor Thomas, you know, he got into the habit of using the word propositio for what?

[45:15] Statement, right? And it actually proposition is maybe more properly the name for premises in. In the syllogism, right? Because propositio placed before, right? Now, but you know, we'll we'll forgive him this this this little slip on his part, right? The other place where I get Thomas, you know, is he he will follow the question. Moderns say that what's a proportion, right? Well, my friend Euclid says proportion is a likeness, a ratios.

[45:48] Four is to six as two is to three. That's a what proportion? What is two to three? That's a ratio, yeah, yeah. I think that would be if they had kept that, they would avoid a confusion, right? But now they tend to call a ratio a what proportion, yeah, yeah. And then yeah, and then Thomas says, what's what's then four to six is two is to three?

[46:14] Well, that's proportionality or something. He doesn't know what to do with it, you know. No, and I I'm going to correct him when I get to heaven, but I mean.

[46:31] After all, we should follow, you know, the what the geometry because they they're the guys who first see these things clearly, you know, ratios and proportions and you know. Same time as going to study Euclid. He did, yeah. But I mean, maybe the bad habit they've done already, you know. You know.

[46:51] So some days I like to go back to these things, right? I could call you know the the eight books of natural hearing. That's what they're called in Greek, right? Natural hearing, and they usually call it the physics and all that. Doesn't get the you know. It's lost, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And metaphysics, you know, meta metaphysics, there, right? You know, after the books of natural philosophy, that's what it is.

[47:38] And because practical reason uses a kind of syllogism, right, in things to be done, as has been had above, according as the philosopher teaches in the seventh book of the ethics, right. We know, no, sir. Aristotle is honored by Thomas always, you know, and Augustine is honored, right? And these are like what fathers, right? Huh? Just like like my friend here, Washington, right? Huh? He's a father of his country.

[48:04] That's what we call him. But these are fathers of the life of your mind, right? Huh? You know. So they are a father in some sense, huh? Yeah. They call Aristotle, you know, the father of logic, and he's been called father of other things, but. He's kind of a father of our mind, and Augustine is too. Yeah.

[48:37] And therefore, is necessary, huh? And therefore, there has found something in practical reason that is thus towards operations or doings, as the yeah, or the premise, huh? In speculative reason, is to what conclusions, huh? They're using propositions more correctly, huh? That's okay, Thomas. Okay. And these universal propositions of practical reason, or to action, have the notion of what law. Okay. So just as the just as the geometry, you know, from the axioms and the postulates, you know, deduces something, right, huh?

[49:19] So from the law, we deduce. What we should what do right now, you know. Okay. Which statements, propositions? Okay, we do it again. And these universal propositions of practical reason, order to action, have the notion of what law. Which propositions are sometimes actually considered? Sometimes are held habitually by what reason? Right. Okay. Ten commandments. Right.

[50:12] To the third, it should be said that reason has the strength of moving from the will. The will is a cause in the sense of the mover, the kind of cause.

[50:25] From this, that someone wills the end, reason commands about those things which are towards the end. But the will about those things commands to which what?

[50:42] From which law takes its character, I guess. Yeah. It's necessary that be something ruled by reason, right? And in this way, is understood that the will of the of the prince has the vigor of law. Otherwise, the will of the prince would be more iniquity than law. As we don't like to.

[51:12] Yeah. Better stop now. I get some. But now we see we're going to see what the law is always ordered to the common good, right? That goes back to the honor I was trying to bestow upon the father of our country.