Prima Secundae
213. Law and Reason, Law and the Common Good (Summa I-II, Q. 90, Articles 1–2): 'Beginning' and Its Meanings, Ways to Divide Sacred Doctrine, and the Wise Man's Judgment of Axioms
Class of 2015-03-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/213-law-and-reason-law-and-the-common-good-summa-i-ii-q-90-articles/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:30] Let's look at the body there, the respondio, in the Article One again, huh? Just a little bit here. Some of you have the English text. Yeah. How do they translate principium in English text?

[0:48] You know, they say the reason is the first primum principium. The first principle. Yeah. Okay. Now, why did they translate? And then, because later on, the second place when they say that

[1:04] the end, which is the first primum principium in agendis they probably translate principle too, don't they? Well, that's where I was looking. Okay. Well, right above there, where it says the reason is the principium of human acts.

[1:21] The rule and measure of human acts is the reason? Which is the first principle. Yeah. Okay. Now, why do they translate the word principium by principle, which is the Latin-derived word, right? We get the word prince and so on, rather than by the English word for principium, which is beginning, right? Why do they translate it that way?

[1:53] Which sounds closer It sounds closer Well, you see, the problem is that the word beginning, right, or principium in Latin, or the word arche in Greek, is a word that is equivocal by what reason, right? And there is a order of the meanings, right?

[2:16] But sometimes the carrying over of the word from its first meaning to its later meanings, right, is interrupted, right, in those of us who have learned from the Latins or from the Greeks, right? And the English word has not been carried over, you see, and that's a little problem, right? I remember in grade school how we used to be taught, you know, the difference between the principle with the P-A-L and the principle with P-L-E, right?

[2:52] And those are actually the right now the third and the fourth senses of beginning. See. So, when Aristotle distinguishes the senses of beginning, huh? The first sense of beginning is the limit of a what something continuous, like the point is the beginning of the line, right? The line is beginning of the surface, the surface is the beginning of the body. That's the first meaning, right? And the beginning in that sense is in the thing of which it is a beginning, right?

[3:24] Although it's not a beginning of itself, right? It's beginning of the line, right? Then the second sense of beginning is also of something that is in that of which it is a beginning, right? But it's not that of which it is the beginning, and that's the what fundamental part of a thing, right? So the foundation of the house is the beginning of the house, right? And the what he called the thing of the ship there, you know, they build all things off.

[3:54] Yeah, anyway. And then there's some questions: what is the beginning of the body, human body? But anyway, the foundation of the house is the beginning. Then the third sense takes a beginning that is not in that which is the beginning, and one of those would be the principle with P A L, right? Okay, because the principle is not in the students, right? Or in the other teachers, but the principle what commands and moves the other and is the source of their what actions, right?

[4:27] Huh? And therefore you get these words like monarchy or arche comes the Greek word for beginning, but this is the extrinsic thing, right? Okay. And then the fourth sense of what beginning is more removed from the senses, right? And that is the beginning in knowledge, right? Okay.

[4:55] And then the what after that Aristotle says that every cause seems to be a what beginning, right? Well, those early senses of beginning has something like like like matter and something like the mover, which are obviously a beginning, right? But that the form is a beginning is a little harder to see, and it's very strange that even an end should be said to be a what beginning.

[5:25] But we call the end a beginning. You seem to have moved the word beginning as far as you can. What move it, right? So when he says here that the end, the finis finem, is the first beginning in things to be done, right? Huh?

[5:46] That's the last sense almost of what beginning, right? But because you've lost, they carry over the word, right? Then they substitute the word principle, right? Um. But principle in the sense of P A L would be pertained to the third sense of beginning. But it seems strange to call the principle of the school the beginning of the school, right? Because you're stuck on the earliest what meanings, right?

[6:17] Now, you know, in beginning of Saint John's Gospel, it says what? In beginning was the word, right? Is that the first sense of the word word that you have in mind there,

[6:37] where the word is a vocal sound, signifying by human agreement, no part of which signifies by itself, and that's that was God, you know. Now the Greek word, of course, is logos, and the word logos in Greek is first placed upon the word, right, and upon speech, and then is carried over and applied to what? The thought that the word signifies, right? But has the English word word been what carried over, right?

[7:10] So there they keep the word, right? But then you have to kind of move it over, right? Huh? Because the word word there is more the meaning of logos, which is thought, than the meaning of logos, which in English is is stopped, you might say, is forward progress, huh? With what? Word word yeah, or speech yeah yeah yeah. So, but here you see they don't they don't translate it that way you see.

[7:42] So, you always got a little problem there, right? Huh? Okay. But if everything that is done is done for the sake of some end, you can see why you call the end a what? Beginning, right? Huh? But notice he uses the word, or actually two words, primum principium, the first beginning, right? Both of reason and of the end. Well, which is the first beginning then? You might say, right?

[8:15] Because the reason is not the end, right? So how can they both be the first beginning? Yeah yeah. And the reason is the one that knows the end, right? And can direct things towards the end, right? But maybe it might be easier to see that law is something of what reason, just by saying that law what directs, right? People to some course of action, right? To some end, right?

[8:51] And to direct, as in a sense, is to order things, right? And then you see right away from the definition of reason that looks before and after that this reason then is going to be. Responsible for law in some way, right? It's something of reason, right? Okay. Thomas here is a little more. um I don't want to say abstract. I don't like to use that word. don't really use the word, right?

[9:16] But okay. So I just thought we'd talk a little bit about that again. Okay. Okay. So law is something of reason, right? That's what we've been we've learned so far, right? Now we're in what is called a what discourse, right? So when Shakespeare says that reason is the ability for large discourse, what does the word discourse mean?

[9:56] Process of reasoning Well, more generally. It means coming to know what you don't know through what you do know, right? And the two main kinds of discourse that are studied in logic are defining and then what reasoning, which is named from reason, right? Kind of the last thing, right? But the discourse we're in a sense involved in in this question is what defining, right? And you have to really define before you can reason, huh?

[10:33] Socrates, I mean Aristotle says Socrates was trying to syllogize, and a sign of this was that he was trying to define. Okay, so you have to be able to define before you can really have syllogism, right? Middle term in syllogism tends to be a definition.

[10:56] Albert the Great, huh? Albert the Great divides logic into two, and and Thomas divides it into what three, huh? You know my rule, you know. I sometimes say two or three or both, right? And I give my favorite example there. Aristotle divides what plot into beginning, middle, and end, and praises Homer for seeing that that's what a plot needs. It's Not about one man and what happened to him, but it's about what.

[11:41] Yeah, course of actions that have a beginning and end, and he taught all the Greeks that's the way you write a plot, you know. But then later on in the in the book on poetic art, he says that the plot has two things, right? Tying the knot or knots and untying the knot or knots, right? That's why they marvel at the end of Cymbeline there, you know, where Shakespeare unties.

[12:06] They keep on adding how many how many knots he unties in one scene, you know. How does he do this so so naturally, right? You know. But notice is one of these divisions good and the other bad? No. So sometimes you can divide into two and into what three, both, right? Well, it's interesting that Albert the Great divides logic into two, huh? And one is the art of defining, huh?

[12:35] And the other is the art of what reasoning, right? Now Thomas divides it into three, huh? According to the three acts of reason, understanding what something is, and then composing or dividing into statement, which is the second act, and then putting statements together to conclude, right? Now Albert will put the the Peri Hermeneias, which is about the statement, right, with the Remaining books, right, and so he'll divide just into two, two kinds of what, discourse, right, and there's not to be three kinds of discourse corresponding to three acts, right, but Thomas brings out something.

[13:12] He goes back to Aristotle in the book on the soul, where Aristotle distinguishes the first two acts of the mind, right, understanding what something is, and then understanding the true or the false by composing or dividing, affirming or denying these simple things you've understood, right, and then you add the third act, which is reasoning, right, that we study, especially logic.

[13:38] So we're trying to define this, right. How do you distinguish sacred doctrine as a whole into two or three? The three main distinctions of sacred doctrine.

[14:10] What is that? The divinity and humanity. Well, you see, I was graduating from Revolve there because I've been working on this Rhodes and all this sort of stuff. So I was thinking about theology wasn't part of my thesis, but sacred doctrine. It seemed to me to be three main distinctions of sacred doctrine as a whole, right, and one was that followed by Augustine in the Enchiridion, right, on faith, hope, and charity, and followed by Thomas in his Catechetical what, instructions, right, and that's a distinction into three, right, and so Augustine and Thomas, who are kind of our greatest minds, it seems, with faith they would talk about the the creed, right, and then with hope they would talk about the Our Father and maybe the

[15:09] Hail Mary, but mainly the Our Father, right, and then with charity they'd talk about the two commandments of love and the Ten Commandments, right, and so this gives you kind of the whole sacred doctrine, especially for a beginner, right, huh? Thomas has these these I guess it was in Naples there, you know, part of his life, but he he did the Catechetical Instructions, right, huh, and he also followed that in his thing for his you know his friend there, that was his confessor, I guess, but he wanted a little bit of a short kind of thing, and he wrote the Compendium of Theology.

[15:45] He didn't quite finish it, but he was divided according to faith, hope, and charity, right, and that kind of covers everything. But it's kind of interesting that division into three, right. Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, which, as you know, is my favorite work, how does he divide sacred doctrine into two or three? Three, yeah, yeah. That's a little complicated because he he divides these three by what?

[16:14] Two, right. But the basic distinction of three is you consider God by Himself, right? And then God as the Arch, the beginning, and then God as the what? The end, right? So that's the first, second, and third book of the Summa contra Gentiles, right? So far as those three things can be known by natural reason as well as by faith, right? And then the fourth book, right, is those same three things, but as you're known only by faith, right?

[16:49] So you take the Trinity up there, and you take up the Incarnation and the last things there. So now, is there any division of sacred doctrine as a whole though into two?

[17:15] You see, and you see hint right here where we are now, see? Because the part we're in right now, I mean, before we talked about the distinction of the theological virtues into faith, hope, and charity, right? And that was used by both Augustine and Thomas, following his master Augustine there in the Catechetical Instructions, right? Okay. But now you have the distinction between what law and what grace, right?

[17:45] And so, is the Bible, you know, kind of a complete sacred doctrine? Thomas will quote the words of the of the Scripture there that the law was given by Moses, right? But grace and truth came through Jesus Christ, right? And so he divides the Old Testament as a whole on the basis of law, right? And the New Testament on the basis of what grace. But the Old Testament he first divides into what two?

[18:22] With the distinction between the law of the King, right, which is given in the Pentateuch, right, and reminded of in the Prophets, right, and then the law of the Father in the Sapiential books and so on. And even in those Sapiential books, it says my son, you know, says it's law of the Father, right? Why, this this one on mountain there, that's the law of the King, right?

[18:48] And. I think it's kind of interesting because as you go from the king to the father, you're getting a little more gentle, right? And then you get Christ, you know, saying, "I call you now friends," right? But the New Testament is divided into three parts, right? So the Gospels, the origin of grace, Thomas says, right? The Epistles of Saint Paul, the nature of grace, right? And then the Apocalypse, the Catholic Epistles, and the Apocalypse, the effect of grace, which is the Church seen in its origin and its development and its final what stage, right?

[19:27] Huh? It's beautiful, right? Huh? But I used to, you know, think about those three, you know, when I got my doctorate there, and it really struck me how wonderful that is that you have those three different ones, right? And and they're all wonderful in their own way.

[19:48] I was laying in bed this morning and I got thinking of the two Summas, you know, and how they take up the substance of God, and they both have the same five parts. But they're not in the same order. And one time I gave a talk on this, and

[20:10] I didn't think one should try to say that one order is better than the other, right? But you should point out the difference in order, right? And then show what is brought out in one order that's not brought out as well in the other order, and vice versa, right? And it's really beautiful what Thomas does in those two places, right? I'm not sure why he he he does them, but each order is very illuminating, and something comes out better in one order, and something better in the other orders.

[20:40] I wouldn't say the one is better than the other, right? But you can do both, right? Now, the Gospel of Saint Matthew, Thomas divides that into what? Three. But the Gospel of John into what? Two. Yeah. That first chapter is really divided

[21:08] against that, huh? So, okay. Let's look at the second article, right? What is this end to which the law should be what directed, right? Was the good of the king or the good of the ruler?

[21:33] Or should be ordered to the good of some part? Okay. Now it's talking about the bad forms of government, right? Huh? Tyranny, right? And oligarchy and democracy in the pejorative sense, right? But you're aiming at the good of a part, right? Either the ruler himself, or the the rich, right? Or the the mob, the multitude, right? And each case is something unjust here, right? Something unjust. Well, then they said, how is it possible that one part can direct the whole state to its good?

[22:15] Well, they must be more powerful in some way than the rest of the city, right? Well, how can one part be more powerful? Well, by military force, and that's a tyrant. Or by wealth, and that's the. Or by simply by numbers, and that's the. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[22:39] Just heard there, Obama lost his marbles, you know? He went crazy. Yeah. He he he had the Pentagon release a a classified document on the atom bombs of the of Israel.

[22:56] See, Israel's never admit they has Adam bonds. Everybody kind of knows they do, you know. But he's he's said no. I was sort of pick at it, pick at it. This is really kind of cause trouble, you know. Yeah. And Israel, I mean, I mean, we have a right to him and so.

[23:14] Well sounds like he's the most I know but this is really terrible. I mean, he's really lost his marbles, you know. Yeah, he is yeah it's like he wants to cause trouble Yeah, yeah. See how much trouble he can do before it's pretty out. He should

[23:32] be impeached, but I don't think they'll do it. No, they don't have congress laws. Yeah, not enough of them anyway. Okay, to the second one proceeds thus. It seems that law is not ordered always to the common good as to an end. Okay, for to law it pertains to command and to what prohibit, right?

[23:57] But precepts are ordered to some singular what goods, right? And therefore, not always is the end of law the common good. Moreover, law directs man to acting, but human acts are in the particular, and therefore also law orders to some particular good.

[24:34] How can he answer these objections? My goodness. There must be some distinction. we're not seeing Yeah. Moreover, Isidore says in the book on etymologies, right, that if a law stands by reason, right, that will be a law whatever is what Constituted by reason.

[24:58] But by reason consists not only what is ordered to the common good, but also what is ordered to the what private good. Therefore, law is not ordered only to the common good, but also to the private good of each one.

[25:20] But against this is what Isidore says. I'm quoting him again now. In the fifth book of etymologies, that the law is in no way what. Private utility. Yeah, useful to something private, but it is written down for the common usefulness of the citizens, right?

[25:43] Well, what does Thomas say? Answer. It should be said that as has been said in the first article, that law pertains to that which is the beginning of human acts. From this, that it is the rule and the what measure.

[26:01] So also reason is the beginning of human acts, and that also in human reason something is the beginning with respect to all the what others. Whence to this is necessary that chiefly and most of all law what pertains.

[26:24] Now the first beginning in things to be done, of which practical reason is concerned, is the last what end. Now the last end of human life is felicitas, felicitas or beatitudine. Now felicitas comes from the Latin word for what fruitful, and we kind of speak the way only a person who's had a fruitful life, right? Come to some or beatitude. Now they've been blessed, right? Okay.

[27:10] Aristotle says if anything comes to us from the gods, it would seem you know especially happiness, right? Huh? Beatitudine. Whence is necessary that the law most of all regard the order which is to what beatitudine or to happiness felicity.

[27:31] So when I first picked up the Nicomachean Ethics in my last years of high school, right? They're going to find out the purpose of life, you know.

[27:41] Okay. So if you don't know the purpose of life, you can't aim at it, right? Like a man going out there and shooting his arrow without even you know if you look at the target, you might miss it, but if you just shoot your arrow without aiming at the target, you're the chance they're going to miss it, obviously, right? You know. So if you don't know the end or purpose of human life, so Aristotle to have a great effect upon life, you have to actually know what the purpose of it all is.

[28:19] Then you find out, as Thomas says, that virtue is the road to happiness, and vice is the road to what misery, right? There's always somebody. There's an example of someone taking the road to misery every day when you pick up the newspaper, you know. Actually, probably more than one. Yeah.

[28:42] Yeah. Whence is necessary that the law most of all regards the order which is to what beatitudine or happiness felicity. Moreover, since every part is ordered to the whole. As the imperfect to the what perfect.

[29:07] One man is a part of the what perfect community. Is necessary the law properly regard the order to the what common happiness? Huh. That's my friend George Washington was looking for his country, right?

[29:26] And who was the English? Was the English king said that if he doesn't make himself dictator, he'll be the greatest man ever. There's some who wanted to convince you know Washington to make himself the the king, the new king, right?

[29:47] But he wouldn't listen to him? He wanted to go back to his farm. Yeah. Can't blame him. Okay. Whence a philosopher, in the aforesaid definition of legal things, mentions what makes mention of both felicity and the what political communion, right? So, even the guy in the ethics, he talks about this as being what the elements of political philosophy.

[30:27] He says in the fifth book of the ethics that legally what just legal things we said things that are what productive of and that preserve happiness, right? And the parts of it, huh, in the community that is political, right? For the perfect humanity is a city, as has been said in the first book of the politics.

[30:56] So political philosophy gets its name from the polis or city, right? It's about only to rule, right? I was in the car with my old professor Kasurik there when I was in college. I said to him something like, "I wish I knew what was going on in Washington." And he said, "That's a laugh." He says, "They don't know themselves."

[31:21] And he talked about how St. Paul is in my home town. It's almost too big for somebody to to make sense of. Yeah. That's how they change.

[31:44] Now, in every genus, huh, that which is said most of all is the what beginning of others, huh? That's a famous principle. It takes a hard time to understand that. And others are said according to their order to it, huh? And the old standard example in the old physics, just as fire, which is most hot, right, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, huh? Which, to that extent, are hot insofar as they partake of what fire, huh?

[32:18] Let's take the example then of the what the fire burning in the what fireplace, right? That's warming the whole room, huh? And as you approach the fire, it gets what warmer, right? And then you see that the source of heat is what is most what hot.

[32:42] Whence is necessary that the law most of all be said according most of all, he says, maximi, right? Not as if it's alone, right? Is if there's not some law that is talking about some part of the city, right?

[33:02] Talking now about the uniform court of military justice, right? Okay, well you need that. You know, if there's a traitor here he's going to be sentenced, I guess. Ah, the one that that Obama substituted five hardened criminals for for a guy who's, you know, kind of could be put away for life. Whence is necessary that since the law most of all is said according to the order to the common good, any other precept about a particular what work does not have the what character of law except according to the law.

[33:40] according to its order to the what common good, huh? Okay, and therefore every law is ordered to the what common good, huh? So is geometry part of philosophy, huh?

[34:03] It's got to be ordered to what wisdom, right? Which is, you know, the wise man most of all knows. Somebody was writing me from Rome there, and he's working on some doctoral thesis, I guess, and

[34:20] you know, he's talking about how he's trying to see how the the wise man judges the axioms, right? Huh? Gotta be very careful about that though, because natural understanding knows the axioms too, right? So I said you got to distinguish between the way that natural understanding judges them, right, and the wise man does, right? And

[34:46] in general, you got to see that in a way that they both judge them or know them is similar, right? Because the way natural understanding knows that a whole is more than a part is by knowing what a whole is and what a part is, and the way the wise man knows that the whole is more than the part is by knowing what a whole is and what a what part is, right?

[35:10] So we have two judgments here. Why? Because they both judge in the same way, right? So why why are there two judgments here? Or in what way is the wise man's judgment of the axioms superior to that of every man? Because Boethius says, huh, that

[35:32] the axioms are the statements known to themselves by all men. So what do you need the wise man to judge the axioms? Huh? Or why is the wise man got more superiority in his judgment of the axioms than every man has through his natural understanding of them? Since he he knows that the terms, the common terms are equivalent, right? Yeah, yeah. The wise man knows that the words and the axioms, like whole and part, right, are equivocal by reason.

[36:08] And the man of natural understanding only doesn't know that, right? And further, the wise man distinguishes the central senses, the chief senses of these words, and thinks out their order, right? And therefore, he knows more distinctly, more universally, might say, the axioms. But he can also defend them against the what? Yeah, yeah. And

[36:39] I used to use, you know, the most common sophistical argument is the one for equivocation, right? So I used to, you know, I've given you that example. I used to lead the students, you know, to think that maybe it's not always true that the whole is more than a part, right? You heard me say that, huh? And in that sense, the why the man of mere natural understanding might be taken in by this argument and say and think he doesn't know what he does know, right?

[37:11] That's a very subtle thing, right? Can a man think he doesn't know what he does know? Well, it's a very subtle thing, you know. I say, if you know something, right, is it the same thing to know something and to know that you know it? And they're connected, but they're not exactly the same thing, right?

[37:38] So you might know that the whole is more than a part, but because you can't answer this objection, you might think you don't know it. That's to be in a bad what state of mind, right?

[37:51] Aristotle talks about this possibility in the second book of the Physics of Natural Hearing, where he says those who wanted to prove that nature exists, right, act as if they didn't know what they do know. He says, is such a state of mind possible? Well, he shows it's possible by taking the opposite, which is to think you what know what you don't know. And Socrates had made that perfectly, you know, well known that people are in that state of mind.

[38:25] Well, if you can make the mistake of thinking you know what you don't know, it's because you can't always separate what you know what you don't know. Well, you can go either way, right? As I'd say to the beer drinkers in the class, you know, if someone can make the mistake of thinking that Miller's is is Budweiser, then someone can make the mistake of thinking that Budweiser is Miller's, right?

[38:57] So the wise man doesn't demonstrate the axioms, right? Doesn't do them that way, but he can he can defend them, you know. And when he when the wise men say demonstrates, though, that um

[39:16] they're immaterial things, right? Then he would realize that those who think that whatever is must be somewhere in some place are in fact what mistaken, right? But someone might take that as being obvious that if something exists, it's got to be somewhere.

[39:40] You know, when the Russian astronauts went up into the sky, there's no God up here. A message coming back from the heavens. Heavens declare the glory of God, and they're up there.

[39:59] Um. Poetics says this is per se known to the to the wise, right? But not to not to all men. So you might think that's an axiom, right? And so the wise man knows what is and is not an axiom, right? And can see this, which is better than what the matter of mere natural understanding is.

[40:26] So if you can't tell what you know, what you don't know, how can you proceed from what you know to what you don't know by discourse, right? Huh? Terrible, terrible, terrible situation.

[40:45] I was talking to the students there last Tuesday night. There, we read the sixth book of Natural Hearing, right? Huh? And I was touching upon something that comes up later on that the where there seems to be a contradiction in becoming, you know. Of course Hegel says it's there, right? So they think they don't know the principal contradiction: something cannot both be and not be at the same time, the same way.

[41:13] He thinks that what? Yeah, yeah. This what becoming involves. But it's hard to solve that argument, right? De Koninck has a beautiful article there on the paradox devenirparle de contradiction. And he points out even in the Middle Ages, you know, they had a hard time with the Eucharist because of this. And

[41:39] okay. So is the whole for the sake of the part, or is the part for the sake of the whole? Yeah. Is the chair for the sake of the arm or the seat?

[42:00] The arm and the seat and the back here and so on. It's all for the sake of the what? The chair. Yeah. The whole chair is ordered to sitting, obviously, but you know, but the part is ordered to the what? The whole.

[42:17] Is the whole of your dinner for a part of your dinner? That's what this is called dessert. If you say the part is for the sake of the whole, then the whole has the character of a more ultimate end than the part, right? So if the everything is ordered ultimately to the last end, then the part has to be ordered to the whole. And therefore, the laws got to what take into account that priority, right?

[42:54] And when you do something about the part, it's for the sake of what? Yeah. Got a chair in the house there. One of the arms has fallen off. I'm going to have to have a gorilla glue glue or something to get that thing to stay, you know. But so I'm going to do something about a part, right? Just for the sake of the whole chair, you know.

[43:14] People are tired of having that arm fall off, you know. If I, it's fallen off. At least not me. Yeah. He's used the kind of trick chair for a while, you know. You see some. Watch your embarrassment as the as your arm falls off. No, I'm not quite that mean, but I'm tempted to kind of

[43:44] find some use for the chair in its its prison condition. Okay. What about the first objection here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that a precept or command implies the application of the law to those things which are the same Which are ruled from the law, right?

[44:08] But the order to the common good, which pertains to law, is applicable to what singular ends, and according to this, also precepts are given about some particulars, right?

[44:26] So, can I practice medicine without a license? You can illegally Illegal yes No, but they might make a law about not practicing medicine without a what? Yeah. Yeah. Okay.

[44:45] Or the court of you know the universal what do you call it thing of military justice, right? You know this guy's going to be tried by the.

[44:59] Yeah, yeah, yeah. They had the the military man on the thing they're talking about the the law they applied. The guy that was traitor for five top agents.

[45:14] Okay. They knew he was he was you know declared as a traitor and they had you know. But anyway, I guess if a man you know they're trying to find him you know but if someone got him killed trying to find him then he's subject to death you know but under form military code. As it is now, he could be subject to imprisonment, you know, for life.

[45:38] I don't know what they would do, but. And Obama's calling him a hero. He wants to get credit, you know, for bringing somebody back, you know. These losses are marbles. Anyway, be had in the beginning. Um.

[45:58] To second, it should be said that operations, right, are in particulars, but those particulars are able to be referred to the what common good, not by a community of genus or what species, not a universal in predication or being said of, right? But by the community of a what final cause, according as the common good is said to be a common what end.

[46:38] Now the third objection here, right? Textum, Isidori out of context maybe. To the third, it should be said that nothing is firmly what according to speculative reason except by being resolved to the first beginnings, indemonstrable beginnings, right?

[47:08] That's why why geometry is kind of like most certain for us, right? Because you can see very clearly it goes back to the first beginnings.

[47:17] Aristotle introduces the topic of axioms. He gives example in geometry. You know where the axioms are very manifest and things are very much known by that. I mean, what's always a simple example? You know, when straight lines intersect, the opposite angles are what equal, right? That goes back to a previous theorem that when a straight line meets a straight line, it makes either two right angles or angles.

[47:42] You get two right angles. It's not too hard to see. Well, then you said what? This angle and this angle are what two right angles, in the same way for this one here and this one, and quantities equal to the same, right? If add equals add equals, results equal, right? Then you take the one that's common to, and then the you know, but you're using the axiom very clearly, right?

[48:07] Huh? Very very simple theorem. Even I can get that into my dim white head, right? Okay, but it goes back to these very obvious things. Aristotle is

[48:21] always comparing the beginnings, huh, in the axioms with the the end in practical matters. Huh? The end is like the beginning, right? Okay. Interesting when Aristotle, you know, in the fifth book of wisdom, he talks about the word beginning, and that's the word he begins with, right? Then later on, he talks about the word end, right? And of course Aristotle says, well, we first of all think of the end as being the opposite of the beginning, right?

[48:52] But then he says later on that sometimes the word "end" though was used to cover what both. So we might speak of a line there as the endpoints, right? Yeah. But also the beginning, the end can be called a beginning too, right? In the beginning and end, right? Huh? In a way, the beginning of the road is the end of the road, isn't it? Going one direction, right?

[49:14] But then the end is the beginning of action, right? Because for the sake of some end that you act, right? And so the end is the beginning, huh? So,

[49:26] but they're two different words, right? I think it's one of the last things Chester had said My end is my beginning Yeah, yeah, Yeah. That was very clear stuff.

[49:44] So this is this is a proportion, right? Huh? So he's saying that the end, the the last end that you're acting for, and the what axioms, right, are analogous right? Huh? The To the speculative reason, you've got to go all the way back to the axioms and be in harmony. With them, to be sure, right, and everything's got to fit into the what ultimate end, and be judged by by that.

[50:11] He says, just as that's a comparison here, nothing stands firmly according to looking reason. Don't use that word; speculative reason, theoretical reason. You know, Shakespeare uses the word looking, right? Because I know Zeno Aristotle talks about you know the reasoning he'll use the word theoretica, You know that it's it's a looking. You know that's what it means in Greek. Got

[50:42] to move these words, right? Montaigne says he can't. move this guy can't move the word. And people are like that all the time, right? And that's what they use these words, right?

[51:03] This morning I see the horrible use of the word metaphysics there. I saw the news magazine. It doesn't have nothing to do with with the with the origin of the word, right?

[51:20] So just as according to looking reason, nothing is what stands firm, except by what being led back to the first indemonstrable beginnings, like the whole is more than the part, right? So likewise, nothing stands firmly by practical reason, except by being ordered to the what last end, which is the common good.

[51:51] Whatever, however, in this way stands by reason has the aspect of law, right? Okay. So now we know two things about what law is, right? We're not yet able to define it, right? It's something what a reason for the common good, right? Just two parts of it.

[52:16] Now, can just anybody make the law?