Prima Secundae
218. The Eternal Law as the Highest Reason in God: God as Maker and Mover, the Logos, and the Divine Ideas (ST I-II q.93 a.1)
Class of 2015-04-23
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/218-the-eternal-law-as-the-highest-reason-in-god-god-as-maker/

[0:00] Then we're not to consider about what each one of the laws, right? singulis legibus, right? This is the premium now. The beginning of question ninety-three, and first we'll talk about the eternal law, right? Secondly, about the natural law, which is our partaking in some way of the eternal law, right? Third, about the human law that man has, instituted, and then fourth, about the old law, I suppose, in the Old Testament, right?

[0:35] Fifth, about the new law, which is the law of the what, gospel, right? And then this strange use the word law, which is the lex fomitis, right? That's because of that famous text in Saint Paul. He sees another law in his members, right? That's opposed to the law of his reason, huh?

[0:58] But about the sixth law, which is the lex fomitis it suffices what has been said about it when one treated about original sin, right? So we can forget about that. Thank God we don't have it. How about that? Now about the first, which is the eternal law, which is in this question ninety-three, six things are asked, right? First, what is the eternal law? Quid sit, right? Secondly, whether it's known to all.

[1:32] Third, whether every law is derived from it in some way, huh? Fourth, whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law. You can see a problem there, right? Huh?

[1:51] Whether contingent natural things are subject to the eternal law. Let's give a problem there, right? And finally, the sixth one, whether all human things are subject to it, huh? Well, that's a very thorough six questions, right? Huh?

[2:11] Notice the first thing is what is the eternal law, right? And the second one is about its what? Who knows it, right? Huh? And then

[2:26] the remaining ones about what is derived from the or subject to it, right? Huh? Kind of divides into three if you wanted to do that, but Thomas is not so pedantic that he always does that explicitly, right?

[2:40] Just like in the beginning of the commentary in the Summa, I mean, on the commentary on the Ethics there, Thomas wants to divide human knowledge, right? And of course, it goes back to Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? He wants to divide the knowledge of reason, where reason looks before and after, which is a definition of order, and therefore you either distinguish the knowledge of reason by the order it considers, right?

[3:05] Well then, Thomas says, order is compared to reason in four ways, right? It's four, not three, right? And he says, first, there is the order which reason does not make, but only considers, right? And this is the natural order of things, right? It's an order which reason can know, but reason itself did not make, right? Okay. Then there is the order which reason makes in its own acts,

[3:40] and this is considered in logic, okay? And then there is the order which reason makes in the acts of the will, and then our actions follow upon those, and this belongs to ethics and practical philosophy. And finally, there is the order which reason makes in exterior matter, like it makes in wood, right? Or it makes in marble, or it makes in some other exterior matter, right? I see.

[4:10] There he's got a division of order in comparison to reason into four, right? But who does not see, right, that the first order can be distinguished against the last three? Because the last three are orders made by reason in its own acts, in the acts of the will, which is next to reason, and then in exterior matter, right? And that's divided against the first order, right? Which is the order that reason does not make, right?

[4:41] The natural order, right? But Thomas doesn't bother to divide into two and then subdivide one of the two into three, but it's obvious, right? But he is he has in mind that difference there, right? And that's why he begins with the natural order, right? Because that's most fundamental too, the order which reason did not make, huh? Okay. So if my head's above my this part and my feet below, right?

[5:08] That's that's the natural order, right? Okay. So to the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the eternal law is not a what? Highest ratio, huh? It's always a question how to translate ratio from the Latin, right?

[5:35] It's the highest what? Thought existing in God, or it might be more particular than thought. Highest rule. They use type. Hmm. Yeah, but it's a question you may have to think about that to say what is the thing. I remember in graduate school someone asking Jacques de Molénon for Paris, "What does Thomas mean by ratio? "

[6:04] You can't really answer that question too directly, right? Because you can only understand based on the surrounding world See, I mean ratio. You might translate in English as reason, right? And reason can be both this faculty, this ability that Shakespeare defined for us, right? Or reason can be something that that faculty knows, right?

[6:35] And if I'm proposing that we do something, and you might say, "What's your reason for doing that?" You know, well, that's just different meaning of reason, isn't it? Now, what sense the reason is here? Is it is it the the the? It's more like the second, right? Okay. And the geometry gives a reason why you know the interior angles of a triangle equal to two right angles, right?

[7:06] I sometimes define geometry that kind of knowledge as a reasoned out knowledge, right? Or you know something by the reason you give for it being so, right? Right. And Euclid gives very good and not too hard to understand, right? Reasons for what he says, right?

[7:31] There's a reason for the Pythagorean theorem, right? There's a reason for why intersecting lines these angles equal and so on, right? Opposite ones. So,

[7:48] see, the eternal law is the highest reason existing in God, right? It'd be more like the reason in the sense that we just talked about, right? Rather than the what divine mind, right? Okay.

[8:08] Now, let's see the first objection here. For the eternal law is one only. It's only one eternal law. But the reasons of things in the divine mind are many.

[8:33] For Augustine says in the book on the eighty-three questions that God does each thing by its own what reasons, right? So the reason why he gave the bird wings and give give me wings. The reason why he gave me what two legs and then give the tree two legs, right? God has a reason for everything he he made or did, right? Okay.

[9:03] So if there are many reasons for the things that God did, right? Huh? There's a reason why he chose a virgin for the mother of Christ, right? There's all kinds of reasons he got, right? There's a reason why he gives us sacraments, right? I was thinking about the sacraments the other day there, and the way Thomas divides them and so on. Of course, he follows the rules of two or three.

[9:32] But I got thinking of the Hail Mary, right? And what two sacraments are connected with the Hail Mary? Well, stop and think. See, the first half of the Hail Mary, of course, is is more praise of Mary, right? Than the asking her, you know. But the second. Half is saying, "Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners." Right, that's the key word, sinners. Right, but pray for us both now and at the hour of our what death.

[10:15] Right, what sacraments are ordered to us as sinners? Well. and well there's also the sign of healing Extreme unction Yeah, yeah. If you talk, if you talk to us about sinners, right, huh? Yeah, if you talk to us as sinners, you're not talking about us as having original sin so much, right? But as by reason of the act that we've we committed sin, right? I didn't commit original sin, but I'm subject to it, right?

[11:00] And I need baptism, you know, for that reason, right? Okay, but because of the sins I commit, I need to go to what we used to call confession, we call reconciliation, right? But naming it from different parts of the sacrament, right? And then the extreme unction is to call it the last anointing. What do you call it now? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But extreme unction is last, right?

[11:31] The last anointing, right? We'll call it that. That's because you have sins maybe you've forgotten about, right? Or sins that you really haven't worked off the the punishment due to you know, or haven't you know purged yourself completely these things, and so you really need this sacrament of the last anointing before you depart, right? Huh? Okay. My my teacher there, Kasurik you know he always wanted to receive the last sacrament, right?

[12:04] Huh? So you say, "Holy Mary, Mother of God, pray for us sinners now and at the hour of our death." Right? It seems to touch upon those two sacraments, right? And kind of the difference between them, right? There's a special reason why you need this last anointing because you've accumulated all this weight of sins, right? Some of which you may be forgotten or didn't confess, you know, fully or you know didn't remember everything about them or just forgot about them, or that you haven't really purged yourself of, you know, sufficiently, and this prepares the way, right?

[12:48] Okay. So there's a reason for those. What? One reason for confession, another reason for the last anointing, right? Another reason for the Eucharist, you know, I can go on. So there's many reasons God has for these things, right? But the eternal law is only one.

[13:12] Moreover, it's of the definition of law, but when I'm translating, sometimes the ratio, right? That it be promulgated by what word, right? But verbum divinis, that's the capital V now, here is said personally, as has been had in the first book when we discovered and talked about the Trinity. But reason is said what essentially. Therefore, it's not the same thing. The eternal law has the divine reason.

[13:49] Moreover, the great Augustine says in the book on true religion that there appears above our mind, right, to be a law which is called what truth. This is really mixing things up, right? But the law existing above our mind is eternal law. It's the law which the natural laws are partaking of, right? Therefore, truth is the eternal law, according to that text of the great Augustine, right?

[14:22] Don't mess with Augustine, right? Don't mess with Texas, we say, but don't mess with Augustine, I say. But it's not the same ratio, not the same definition of truth, right? And of a what reason? Therefore, the eternal law is not the same thing as the highest what reason, right?

[14:47] But now the same Augustine now in the sed contra. What a marvelous! Moreover, begins is what Augustine says in the book on what free judgment, right? I mentioned I was quoting earlier Thomas's Augustine and you know who else was it?

[15:08] Remember now. But they all say that the what free judgment is based upon reason, right? He says that the eternal law is the summa, the highest what reason, to which everything ought to be what tempered, right, or measured, right? Okay.

[15:32] Now what's the master going to say here? We're going to learn for the wit now, huh? We're just we're just dim wits, right? I answer it should be said that just as in any what artist, right? There preexists the reason of those things which are going to be constituted by what art, huh? Is a reason for what he does right now. He knows what he's doing right now.

[16:03] He's a real artist, right? I listened to Mozart this morning, his first symphony, his first early one, sixth symphony, the first one in four movements. Oh, beautiful things! He knew what he was doing, right? The reason why he did what he did, you know. So, also in any one governing, huh? It is necessary that there preexists the what reason of the order of those things which are to be done by those who are subject to his what governance, huh?

[16:45] And just as the reason of things to be done by art is called art, right? Or it's called the exemplar, right? or it's called the exemplar right Of what artificial things, huh? An exemplar is the form that is what outside of the thing that the thing outside is modeled on, right? Huh? Okay. So he's saying

[17:13] that just as the reason of things to be done by art is called art, or the exemplar of artificial things, so also the reason of the one governing the acts of those subject to him obtains the what definition of law, observing the other things which we said above pertain to the definition of law, right? Okay. I used the translated ratio there by law, but by definition, because you frame back the definition of what

[17:50] of law, right? We had four parts in it. Remember? It's what? Yeah, yeah. It's for the common good. Remember? Promulgated, right? Huh? By the one whose authority, right? Huh? So, okay. For the common good and so on, right? Okay. Okay. Now, in Greek, you know, the word Greek for what ratio

[18:20] would be what logos, right? Huh? Which is sometimes used for definition, right? Huh? Sometimes for reason, sometimes for something a reason for some for something is true. Hmm. What? I didn't know it could be extended to. Oh yeah, yeah. Well, actually, logos first in Greek means word, right? Huh. Okay. Yeah, and then it can mean thought, right? Huh. And then the mind that has the thought, right?

[18:47] Huh. So it's a word that's equivocal by what reason? Yeah, yeah. You see, it's interesting how that in the beginning of St. John's Gospel, you know, we've translated the Greek word "logos" there by by what word, right? But in English, has the word "word" been carried over and applied to thought? It has in this context but normally no See, see, but is the meaning of "logos" there in the beginning of John's Gospel is that

[19:31] word? See, the spoken, written word—he's talking about there. No, it means what thought. Yeah, yeah. Now it seems to me that when John says in En arche en ho logos," right now you've got the article, the thought, right? Huh? It involves this way of speaking we call antonomasia, and you're just stopping it, you know. We don't know much about this thought when it's first mentioned, right? But it's called the thought, right?

[20:06] Okay. And then you, what I have to do is to unfold why, among all thoughts that have ever been had, why is this the thought? Okay. What is so, you know, just as we call Homer the poet, Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right? And the Greeks called him the poet. And and the Federalist Papers called Shakespeare the poet. You know, he's a poet. Why is this called the thought, right?

[20:37] You know. What is so excellent about this thought that is not just called, you know, doesn't say in the beginning was a thought, but in the beginning was the thought. You know. Why is this the thought? Like Aristotle is called the philosopher, right?

[20:59] What what is there? See. Well, I think you start to gradually unfold it, right? Huh. First thing you say, why is one thought better than another thought? Well, it's because it's about a better thing. And this thought is a thought of the best thing. Okay. That's only beginning to unfold its excellence, right? Huh. It's not only a thought of the best thing; it's the only thought of the best thing that's adequate to that thing, right?

[21:33] It's the only thought that expresses what the best thing is fully and completely and perfectly, right? That's quite a thought, right? Huh. There are more surprises coming, right? Because you're going to find out that this thought is not only a thought of the best thing and a thought that perfectly expresses the best thing, right? But it is also itself the best thing. You know, because later on you say that it is God, right?

[22:04] huh? God's thought of of himself, or his uh comprehension of himself, his uh self-understanding. Well, we probably see it's it's a thought of what God is, right? Huh. Then we find out that the thought is itself God too, right? Huh. So it's a person, right? Huh. This is a very unusual thought, right? You know. So it's the thought of the best thing, adequate to the best thing, the only thought that is a person, and the only thought that is what?

[22:32] God himself. I wonder it's the thought, right? Huh. It's got all that. I mean, my God, you know. And and so we have a little problem there in translating it by the word word, right? Because we do have to follow the how the word is carried over from word to thought, right? In Greek, but the English word has not been carried over, right? Huh. You know, so we have a little problem there, right?

[22:57] Huh. So, I think it's kind of interesting that that they're customarily translated by word rather than thought, right? Even though you might say thought is a better translation, right, than word because that's the meaning of the word in Greek there, right? It's not the first meaning of the word, which is word, right? But the meaning of thought. But in English, the word thought, the word has not been, you know.

[23:22] I told you I was a little nasty guy there, a college student, you know, and my English professor had his book, you know, and he says words spoken or written are thoughts, and I said to him, strictly speaking, that's false. They signify thoughts. I said, no, no, I'm a poor English professor, but in English, you know, but but there's a connection there, right? You know, and the fact he should do that is a sign that maybe you could, you know, but but it hasn't been done there, you know.

[23:51] It's not customary in English. Okay, so, um, okay, let's go back to comparison here. And just as the reason the things to they're going to come to be through art is called art or the exemplar of artificial things, so the reason of the one governing the acts of those subject to him obtains the reason of law, right? Huh? The definition of law, observing the other things which is said above in the definition of law, right?

[24:37] Okay. But God, huh? Through his wisdom is the what creator you might say of what all things, right? Huh? Okay. To which he is compared as an artist to what artifacts, the things made by him, right?

[25:04] But he's also the governor of all actions, right, and motions which are found in individual creatures, as is said in the first, right? Okay. That's interesting. I'm going back to these words I was talking about before. There, um, you know, mover and what maker, right? Huh? These two names used there in regard to the third kind of cause, Aristotle, right? Huh? And he starts with mover for the reason I gave before, right?

[25:38] That things in motion soon catch the eye and what not stirs. But when you talk about God, right? When you talk about God as like a artist, huh? Then you say he made the universe, right? See. So in talking about God's creation of things, that's maybe a more strict word, right? But in the creeds and so on, we use the word what, maker, right? Um, and then these things that He's made, He moves them, right?

[26:12] Okay. Um, now He says, you know, I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end, right? Well, when He says I'm the beginning, He means He's the what, maker of all things, right? But because He's also the the end of all things, the purpose of all things, He's also the one who moves everything in the direction of himself, yeah, yeah.

[26:42] And there you might call God a what? Yeah, yeah. My mother would sit at the dining table after dinner there, and there are dishes out in the kitchen, you know, because we had dinner and so on, huh? And she was kind of taking a rest a little bit at the dinner table, and she'd say, "I'm waiting for the Spirit to move me," she says. Did your mother say that, Maybe, too?

[27:05] I don't know. It's kind of a phrase that's always stuck in my mind, you know. But we speak of the Spirit as what, moving us, right? Okay. So God not only made us, but He moves us, right? And moves us towards Himself, right? Well, insofar as He's a maker, He's like the artist, right? But insofar as He's a mover, He's more like the the the ruler, the prudent man, right?

[27:31] Aristotle distinguishes between the what, the art and and foresight, right? Huh? And art is defined as right reason about making. And foresight, right reason about doing, right? And that's closer to what we mean by law, right? Huh? Because law is about what you should do or shouldn't do, right? And what you're allowed to do, and so on, right? What you're not allowed to do, right? And so on.

[28:06] Um. So in terms of developing that, right? Now, he first compares it to art, but it's more compared to the to the the doer.

[28:19] For also He is the governor of all the acts and motions which are found in singular creatures, and there you could speak of Him as being a mover, right? Rather than maker, more, right? Huh? Okay.

[28:34] Whence, just as the reason of the divine wisdom, in so far as by that divine wisdom all things are created, right? All things are made. Has the ratio, the definition of art, right?

[28:53] Which is the right reason about making them, or of an exemplar, which is a form after which you what model things, right? Or even in Augustine's understanding of the idea, right, where you see in what particular way, right, you can model something after God, right? Okay, and that everything in creation, in some ways, is modeled after God, right? But in different ways, the, ideas. Okay, so the reason of the divine wisdom moving all things to a suitable end, right, obtains the notion of what law, because law is not concerned with making things, but things that are already made.

[29:41] Yeah, yeah. In the case of you know human law is going to be in terms of things already made by by the mother and father, right? And and then you're going to move these things to the end of the city, right? So it has the ratio or the reason of of law. And according to this eternal law is nothing other than a what reason of the divine wisdom, not according as it is making things right, but according as it is directive of all acts and what motions, yeah.

[30:27] So sometimes God as a maker is said to be making things by his what wisdom, right? Huh. So insofar as his his wisdom is the art which he made all things, right? Um, then it's like human art, right? But in a much more perfect plane, right? Huh. But insofar as he's what his wisdom is directing all things, right? Belongs to the wise man. Aristotle says to direct things, right?

[31:02] So it belongs to God in His wisdom to direct all the things that He has made towards Himself ultimately, right? Huh. Has the end and purpose of the whole universe, huh? And in particular, you know, to direct the rational creature towards this end because the rational creature can obtain this end in a way that no other creature can, because he can both what know and love God, right?

[31:30] Huh. While the dog can't really know God, right? Not even in the perfect way that we know God, right? In this life, right? Let alone the you know beatific vision, right? And he can't love him in himself, right? In the way that we can, right? Love God in himself, huh? So insofar as the divine wisdom now is directing us towards the whole of creation, right? But especially the rational creature that it has the aspect of what a foresight more, right?

[32:02] Huh. Of prudence, right? Huh. A kind of universal prudence, huh? When Aristotle talks about foresight, you know, or prudencia, or in Latin prudence, we speak sometimes of the foresight of the individual man, right? What should I do with myself today? Ah, and then the foresight of the of the human father or mother, right? Huh. Over the children, right? Huh. And then the foresight of the king or the you know legislator and so on, right?

[32:37] And you know the foresight of the of the father is more universal than that of the individual man, right? Huh. You know, and sometimes you know we have problems with children, right?

[32:54] And it it requires a More foresight, right? Than just over yourself, right? Huh? And you know, you got boys and girls, right? You know, you don't have the same, uh, uh, you don't rule them the same way, you know. But you don't rule the, but it's more difficult to rule the the city, right? Or the nation, right? But God's foresight is over the whole what universe, right?

[33:26] Huh? So he he moves the whole universe, um, not only towards their immediate end, but ultimately towards what himself, right? Huh? That's what the divine law is, right? Huh? The reason of the what divine wisdom, right? Huh? So far as it's moving all things to the end, right? So the other case, it's what it's it's like art. So notice last sentence here in the in the body of the article, and thus, and according to this, the eternal law is nothing other than the reason of the divine wisdom, according as is directive of all acts and motions, right?

[34:12] Now I like to go back to know in English there and to distinguish between God as a maker and God as a what mover, yeah, because maker is more what showing the what divine wisdom as it's the art of all of all things and making them, right? But in so far, but the other one, the divine law, I mean, excuse me, the eternal law is the reason of the divine wisdom in so far as it is moving all these things that he's made towards their what towards their own ends, but also ultimately towards the end of the whole universe, right?

[34:57] Which is himself, right? So it's not the only ratio summa existing in God, right? If you go back to this, right? The question here is whether the eternal law is what a ratio summa existing in God, right? Huh? Well,

[35:28] you got to distinguish, huh, between God as a maker and God as a mover, right? Okay, and the one would be the more the divine art, right? Huh? Which would be a reason of making things, right? How they should be made, right? And then the other is how they should be what moved into what they should be moved, right? What way, right?

[35:58] Now, what about this first objection? Augustine says there are many reasons in the divine mind, right? Okay. Well, he says to the first, therefore it should be said that Augustine speaks there about the ideal reasons, right, which regard the what private natures of singular things, right?

[36:27] And therefore, in them there is found distinction and plurality, according to diverse respects to things, as is had in the first book. None of you study that part of the first book there about ideas, right? But what it means is that God knows in what way a tree can imitate Him,

[36:51] and what way a dog can imitate Him, right? In what way a man can imitate Him, right? And what way an angel can imitate Him, right? And even more particular, in what way, you know, a seraphim can imitate Him, what way the cherubim can imitate Him, right? Okay. So in that sense, these are said to be different ideas in God, not because there is any multiplicity in God's what mind, thoughts, but because by understanding Himself fully, right, He understands every way in which He can be what imitated, right?

[37:29] And He chooses to be imitated in these ways when He can choose other ways in which He could be imitated, right? Okay. You know, something more proportioned to us. You know, you take a man like, like Christ. You know, um, we can all imitate Christ, right?

[38:00] Although none of us can imitate Him perfectly, right? You know, but somebody wrote a book called The Imitation of Christ, right? Okay. And one of the reasons why He became man was to give us something to what imitate, right? You know, Saint Augustine says God should be imitated, but God cannot be seen, right? Men can be seen, but they're not. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But then, if you take the different saints, right, sometimes you imitate a particular saint, right?

[38:36] Maybe because he's what closer to your occupation and life, right? You know. So I might imitate Thomas Aquinas, you know, more than Saint Francis of Assisi, right? Huh? Because I'm kind of a philosopher, you know, kind of a theologian, right? Huh? And so I can imitate maybe Thomas more than Francis, right? Huh? Okay. Or Mother Teresa, right now. I probably wouldn't be very good at imitating Mother Teresa, right now, in her particular occupation.

[39:10] You want to put that way, right? You know. But someone else who goes into her order, right, might imitate her, right, more than Thomas Aquinas, right? But Christ would be, you know, kind of universal one to be imitated, right? And we could all find something, right? Like I guess was one of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux's favorite books was the Imitation of Christ, and I haven't looked at it for a long time.

[39:35] I remember reading things in there, you know. Seems like a very good book, but she's kind of a witness as to the goodness of that book, you know. It was kind of her guide, one of her guides in life. So,

[39:49] but you're learning how to act in a sense, right, by imitating her. Aristotle, you know, has some very interesting things to say about imitation there in the book on the Poetic Art, right? Because He has to talk. About the imitative arts, right? So he talks about imitation, and he says that man is the most imitative of all the animals. And at first, he says we learn by imitation, right?

[40:12] We all naturally delight in imitation. That's why you know you know fiction and so on, right? And plays and so on, right? But that's kind of a marvelous thing. So he says Augustine speaks there in that text quoted there from the thirty eighty three questions that he spoke of the what ideal reasons. Now you have to be very careful, right? It doesn't mean that there are many thoughts in God.

[40:40] There is only one thought in God, right? But these regard the what private natures of singular things, right? Okay, and therefore in them there is found a certain distinction for a plurality not of thoughts in God, right? But because God understands the diverse ways in which things can be what like Him, right? He understands the diverse ways in which things can what imitate Him, right? And he knows the way in which a tree can imitate Him, and therefore he can make a tree, right?

[41:15] Which is an imitation of Him, right? He knows how the cat can what imitate Him, right? And the lion, right? Because you know it's a real lion, metaphorically, right? The lion, right? He knows how a man can imitate Him. He knows how a woman can imitate Him, right? He knows how what an angel can imitate Him, right? And the different kinds of angels they all imitate God in a what different way, right?

[41:42] Huh? So those are called his his ideas, right? Okay. Doesn't mean a multiplicity in Him, but multiple multiple ways understood by Him, right? But in a simple way, huh?

[42:02] But law is said to be directive of acts in order to the what common good. This has been said above, huh? And those things which are in themselves diverse, right, are considered as one according as they are what or to something common. So what do they say in the dollar bill? Doesn't it say pluribus. Yeah, yeah, that's what he's talking about here, right? See, so that's why we speak of one law, right?

[42:34] So we don't speak of one idea in God, right? It's just only one way that he'd understand it could be imitated, right? Can be imitated in an infinity of different ways, huh? And every creature imitates them in a different way, right? Especially creatures of different kinds, right? So the tree and the dog and the stone and the man and the angel they all imitate God in different ways.

[42:58] And God, before He made these things. He understood these different ways in which you could be imitated, right? But in the case of law, you're thinking of the fact that we're all ordered to one common good, right? And in that sense, we're all what? Something one, right? And therefore, you would speak of the eternal law, which orders us to the common good, as being what? One, okay.

[43:26] And therefore, the eternal law is one, which is the reason of this what? Order of all things to the common good, right? There's only one eternal law, but there are many what? Ideas, according to which God is said to have made what? Creatures, right? Huh? There are many ways in which we can imitate God, but they're all different. But we're all ordered to one common good, which is the common good of the whole universe, is Aristotle's saying, right?

[43:57] Okay. That's a beautiful teaching there. Now, what about this word there, the capital V, right? Huh? To the second, it should be said that about the word,

[44:21] about any word, right? Two things can be considered, right? Huh? To wit, the word itself, and those things which are expressed by the word, right?

[44:43] For the vocal word, the spoken word, is something put forth from the mouth of man. My words are coming out of my mouth. We didn't know where they're coming from. Maybe down below, they're being formed. And by this word are expressed, right? The things that are signified by human words, huh?

[45:10] And he says it's like that with the thought, right? Which is sometimes called the what? The mental word, right? In Latin. And the same reason is about the mental word of man, which is nothing other than a certain thing conceived by the mind, by which a man expresses mentally those things about which he what? Thinks. Thus, therefore, in divine things, the word itself, that's the capital V now, right?

[45:44] Which is a conception of the eternal, of the paternal understanding, right? At said personally, right? Because it's proceeding from the Father, right? Okay. Now, some days, you know, when we explain this, you know, we have to go back to our own mind in a weak way to get a starting point, right? And

[46:11] when I imagine something, right, it's a little bit like a thought, right? It's not the same thing; it's more singular. But when I imagine something, there proceeds from my imagination an image, right? And then when I think about something, there proceeds from my mind or reason a what thought of that, right? And so when the Father thinks of what He is, right, there proceeds from the Father, to our amazement, a what mental word, right?

[46:48] And this is the second person of the Blessed Trinity, right? And He's called His Verbum or thought for one reason, and He's called His Son for another reason because He proceeds both by as a thought, but also as what naturally He proceeds, right? And as the Son of the Father, right? Okay, that's extremely interesting, huh?

[47:18] Thus, therefore, in likeness of what you find in man, the what there is the Verb, which is Verbum, which is the conception of the eternal or the paternal understanding, and it's said personally, right? And that's how you distinguish these. If you go back to the treatise on the Trinity, Thomas divides it into what three parts, and he says the the persons are distinguished by these what relations, yeah, and these relations are distinguished by the way the one proceeds from the other, right?

[47:56] So you begin from the processions right? You know, the procession of the Son from the Father, and then the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

[48:12] But all things which are in the knowledge of the Father, whether they be essential things or personal things, huh? Or even the what works of God are expressed by this word, as is clear by Augustine, right? Huh? You read my little poem about this, right? Yeah Sometimes I have to remember

[48:35] God the Father said it all by one word, right? No wonder when this word became a man, He spoke in words so few and said so much. He was the brevity and soul of it. A little borrowing there from my master Shakespeare. So you know. God the Father said by this one word, right? Everything He understands. He understands not only Himself and everything that's in God, but He understands what creatures too, right?

[49:08] So He said by His word, not only Himself but all things. Okay, and Augustine talks about that, right? Okay. So words, you know, some things are out by word; they're not out by by Son, right? Okay.

[49:29] Otherwise, the exemplar for our sonship, huh? Okay. So he can quote the great Augustine there. But all things which are in the knowledge of the Father, whether they be essential things or personal things, are also the works of God, right? I don't like even the creatures are expressed by this word, as is clear by Augustine in the fifteenth book of the what Trinity, right? So Thomas, you know, follows Augustine most most of all in. Studying the Trinity, right?

[50:02] He quotes some other people from time to time, but Augustine most of all. And therefore, among other things which are expressed by this word, also among them is the eternal law, right? Which is expressed by what? The word, right?

[50:23] But does not nevertheless follow from this that the eternal law is said personally in God, right? Okay. Just as the creatures are not said personally in God, even though they're said by the word, right? But is appropriated, right? Nevertheless, to the Son, on account of a certain what? Agreement that a reason has to the what word, right? Okay. Just as in English, right? You might say, you know, reason that gives you is a thought, isn't it?

[50:58] So the father appropriates the eternal law to the Son sometimes, right? Mm hmm Makes sense Yeah Sometimes he appropriates the art to him too, right? It's kind of like it's the art by which the Father made the world, right? Okay.

[51:20] Yeah. Now, what about the last one here? To the third, it should be said that the reason of the divine understanding has itself in a different way to things than the reason of the human understanding, right?

[51:42] Now, as as said in Fourth Lateran Council, right? And I remember Paul the sixth quoting it. You can never find the likeness of the creature to God without a greater what? Unlikeness, right?

[51:59] For the human understanding is measured by things, because our knowledge is derived from things, right? For the concept of the of man is not true on account of itself, right? My thoughts are not a modern philosopher think that way. But is said to be true from this that it is in what? It sounds with things, right? Huh? It's consonant with things. For as Aristotle says, from this that a thing is, there is not the opinion is true or false, right?

[52:36] So if I say that what is is, and what is not is not, I'm speaking truly, right? If I say that what is is not, or what is not is, then I'm speaking what? Falsely, right?

[52:53] So if I say two is half of four, I'm speaking truly. If I say two is not half of five, I'm speaking truly, right? But if I say that two is half of five, or two is not half of four, then I'm speaking falsely, right? So my thoughts are measured by things, right? But in the case of God, it's just the reverse, right? God is the measure of all things.

[53:22] But the divine understanding is the measure of things, because each thing, to that extent, has truth in so far as it imitates the divine understanding, as has been said in the first book. And therefore, the divine understanding is true by itself, right? Whence its reason is truth itself. Okay. Kind of amazing thing, right? To put that in your pipe and smoke it for, twice a year.