Prima Secundae
221. Aquinas on Law, Part 1: Who Is Subject to the Eternal Law, and Is the Natural Law a Habit? (Q93 a6, Q94 a1)
Class of 2015-06-04
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/221-aquinas-on-law-part-1-who-is-subject-to-the-eternal-law-and/

[0:00] Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias God, our enlightener, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain luminary images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:33] Okay, so Article Six, I guess, Question Ninety-Three. To Six, one goes forward thus: It seems that not all human things are subject to the eternal law, for the Apostle says, "Epistle to the Galatians: If we are led by the Spirit, we are not under the law." People have abused that text. Yeah. Oh yeah. But just men who are sons of God by adoption are led by the Spirit of God, according to that of Romans chapter eight.

[1:17] Who are led by the Spirit of God? These are the sons of what God? Therefore, not all men are under the what eternal law. That seems like an equivocation.

[1:37] I was reading in what is it, chapter sixteen there of Matthew there, where Peter makes a profession of faith, Thou art the Christ, the Son of Living God, and then Christ gives him, you know, his praise there and what he's going to be, the rock and so on. Well, of course, the church fathers there discuss the fact that some other people before in the New Testament, like Nathaniel, call him the Son of God, huh?

[2:04] But he argues that that Son of God, in the broad sense, that even we could be the Son of God, and it's the other sense, you know, that the the Son is uniquely, the divine Son, that that's why Peter is being given the promise and so on. Interesting. Moreover,

[2:30] the Apostle says, "Epistle to the Romans, chapter eight: The prudence of the flesh is an enemy to God, huh? And therefore, it's not subject to the law of God. But there are many men in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates, huh?

[2:55] I've been recalling my youth history all the time. No news is good news, right? Well, of course, the opposite of that is what you hear when you turn the radio on or the newspaper, right? Now there's all kinds of mad, crazy things going on. They just arrested some guys here in Massachusetts who running around chopping the heads off of of policemen, you know? Really? Yeah. And in honor of the, you know, ISIS and so on.

[3:24] So people are asking, is ISIS now in the country? So, but so many people who are inspired by them. On the something kind of shocking about that way of killing somebody and. kill policemen. Is it multiculturalism, Brad. More of Augustine says in the first book on free judgment that the eternal law is that by which the bad merit misery and the good eternal life. But men already beatified or already damned are not in the state of meriting.

[4:09] Therefore, they don't come under the eternal law. But against all this is what Augustine says in the 19th book about the city of God. In no way is something what subtracted from the laws of the highest Creator and orderer, right? Sapientis est ordinare first I'll say. From which the peace of the universe is what minister, which is tranquility of order, right? Peace.

[4:47] Well, I answer, Thomas says, huh? Don't pay attention now to Burkis, but this is what I answer. I answer that twofold is the way in which something is subject to the eternal law, as is clear from the things foreseen. In one way, in so far as he partakes the eternal law by way of knowledge. And another way, by way of acting and undergoing, in so far as he partakes in the way of a mover, beginning.

[5:26] And in this second way, the irrational creatures are subject to the divine eternal law. This has been said. But because the rational nature, with this which is common to all creatures, has something proper or private to himself, in so far as he is what rational.

[5:58] Therefore, in both ways, he is subject to the eternal law, because he has, in some way, a notion of the eternal law. This has been said above. And again, there is a natural inclination inside of each what rational creature to that which is in agreement with the eternal law. But it's kind of hidden, you see. Today, you know. See, read what's going on there Yeah it's covered.

[6:33] For Aristotle says in the second book of the Ethics that we are what inborn to having what virtues. And Cicero says, you know, natural mode.

[6:51] Now, both ways is imperfect and in some way corrupt in the bad. In whom both the what natural inclination to virtue is depraved, yeah, yeah, yeah, down through a vicious what habit, huh?

[7:16] And likewise, and also, the natural knowledge of the good in them is darkened over through passions and the habits of what sin. Now, but in the good, both ways are found more perfect, because above the natural knowledge of the good, there is added above a knowledge of faith and of wisdom. I suppose that's a gift of the Holy Spirit. And above the natural inclination to good, there is added also to them inwardly a mover of grace, and I suppose this is infused virtue.

[7:57] Here he's talking about. Thus, therefore, the good are perfectly under the eternal law, as it were, always acting according to it. But the bad are under the eternal law, imperfectly as regards their actions, in so far as imperfectly they know, and imperfectly are inclined to the good.

[8:28] But what is lacking on the part of action is applied on the part of what passion or undergoing. In so far as to that extent they undergo what the eternal law dictates about them, in so far as they fail to do what is in agreement with the eternal law. Whence Augustine says in the book on free judgment, I estimate that. Those who what act under the eternal law, that the just act under the eternal law.

[9:04] And the book on Catechizing the rude, he tells it that way. catechizandis rudibus yeah, you always gotta take out of that. He says that God, according to what,

[9:24] mercy on the souls of those what. Deserting him, right now. By what suitable laws, he knows how to what adorn the lower parts of his what creature. Just a strange quote there.

[9:52] Okay, now what about this word here from Saint Paul? Now he's going to defend that. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that word of the apostle can be understood in two ways. In one way, that it comes is understood to be under the law, the one who what,

[10:17] not willing so right, is subject to the obligation of the law, as it were to a certain what, weight. Hence the gloss says that under the law is the one who fears the what, who by the fear of punishment,

[10:37] that the threatens, and not by the law of justice. He abstains from a what, yeah. And in this way, spiritual men are not under the weight of the law, right?

[10:56] Because through charity, which the Holy Spirit pours into their hearts, they voluntarily fulfill that which is of the law, right? Another way that can be also understood, in so far as the works of man that are done by the Holy Spirit are more said to be the works of the Holy Spirit than of the man himself.

[11:31] In which case, since the Holy Spirit is not of the law, just as neither the Son, as has been said above, it follows that these works, in so far as they are that of the Holy Spirit, are not under the what law.

[11:49] And to this attests what the apostle says in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter three, that where there is the spirit of God, of the Lord, there is liberty.

[12:03] Okay, so you freely obey the law, right? Don't seem to be under the law, right? Yeah. Or fear. Old school teacher used to say there was a category of, different ways of evaluating a student, and the last category was me prodding.

[12:34] Now, to the second objection, it should be said that the prudence of the flesh is not able to be subject to the law of God on the side of what action, because it inclines us to actions that are contrary to the law of God.

[12:52] But they are subject, nevertheless, to the law of God on the part of undergoing, because they. Merit to undergo punishment, according to the law of divine justice.

[13:08] But nevertheless, never in no man is prudence of the flesh so dominant that it corrupts entirely right the whole good of nature, and therefore there remains in a man an inclination to doing those things which are of the eternal law. For it has been had above that sin does not take away the whole good of what nature diminishes so much. That's what Saint Maximilian Kolbe used to say about

[13:46] certain ways of divine providence. When we ask, like Jeremiah, why why does the way of the wicked prosper? Why do the just suffer so much? Why do the wicked prosper? He says, well, there's nobody so bad they never did anything good. So God, knowing that their future is in hell, eternal damnation, misery, he rewards them for whatever good they did. He rewards them in this life because that's the only time they're going to have to enjoy any rewards.

[14:17] Whereas God loves the just so much, and nobody's so just they never did anything bad, so he wants to speed up their punishment in this life so they don't have to spend so much time in purgatory in the next life. So it's one way to understand, it But it is yeah, nobody's so bad they never did anything good.

[14:40] To the third, it should be said, it's the same through which one is what preserved in the end, right? And through which one is moved to the end, just as the heavy body by its weight rests in the place below, by which gravity or weight it moved also to the place itself. And thus it should be said that just as according to the eternal law some merit beatitude or misery, so by the same law they are preserved in either beatitude or misery.

[15:23] And according to this, both the blessed and the damned are subject to the what eternal law. Christ calls Peter, pinching that text there earlier. He says, blessed are you, right?

[15:40] Because flesh and bone, blood did not reveal this to you, but my father who is in heaven, there is the Christ, the Son of the Living God. But how does the Hebrews, how do the the epistle how do they define faith? I always want to use I I think the Latin was argumentum, but I was forget the. Now you could translate that as conviction, maybe. But the first part is the substance of things hoped for, right?

[16:23] So the things hoped for is beatitude, right? And the substance means what substance? The sense of foundation, right? So you already have a certain foundation in beatitude, you might say, huh?

[16:37] Yeah, yeah, hypostasis. Yeah, which is the you know the Greek word that corresponds etymologically to substanti, right? To stand under, right? Hypostasis. Okay. Now we got to the natural law, right now.

[17:07] I noticed that the the order here is just the opposite of Aristotle, who, in the rhetoric, he speaks of the human law first, and then he goes to the natural law, right now. These people are more aware of the human law, you know. I didn't see any natural law signs as I drove up here, but I saw some forty-five. You know, policeman pulled out behind me. I said, "Gee, who is?

[17:28] I think I'm okay here. It's forty-five." And he finally turned off. He said, "He's following me," you know. Yeah, that's why. Yeah, because he knows I'm a

[17:44] yeah. What's interesting is I think the framers, the Constitution, were influenced by Aristotle to a certain degree, and they had assumed that the only way this type of political system could work was with a virtuous citizenry. Yeah. And now we're in this modern experiment where virtue has been thrown on the wayside, and it's more of a hedonistic kind of thing—a society without virtue. But the problem is, the laws then have to change.

[18:14] You have the person who's afraid of the punishment if he commits some sort of transgression, so he'll follow the law out of fear. That's what we're more getting into because the virtue is no longer instilled in people, so that out of love of virtue they will follow the law cheerfully. And it's a time of great transition. It seems for that year. What Thomas says very concisely that virtue is the road to happiness, and vice is the road to misery.

[18:45] Right. Well, you see people going down this this road of vice, right? You know they're heading towards misery, right now. In Autobahn. Write a great book, the Autobahn and misery. Okay, then we're not to consider about the natural law, and about this four things are asked. I mean, six things are asked. First, what is the natural law? Secondly, what are the precepts of the natural law? Third, whether all acts or virtues are under the what natural law?

[19:41] Fourth, whether natural law is one among all peoples, and the fifth, whether it's changeable, right? And sixth, whether it can be deleted from the mind of men. Well it seems to be Twentieth century? watch the news? Yeah.

[20:06] To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the natural law is a what habit, right? Because, as the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics, there are three things in the soul: the power, the habit, and the passion.

[20:29] But the natural law is not one of the what powers of the soul, nor one of the what passions, as as is clear if you go inductively by enumerating one by one. Therefore, the natural law is a habit. There you get a division into three and two are eliminated, so, let's get a third one.

[20:58] Moreover, Basil says that conscience or synderesis. Synderesis is often used for the what natural knowledge in the practical order, right? In the order of prudence, right?

[21:17] So do unto others as you have been doing unto you, right? Like this is kind of naturally what known. How would you like if if someone did that to you? You know that's what we say to kids. That's the thing, and they really have no answer to that, right? Because they wouldn't like if someone did it to them.

[21:39] Okay. So Basil says that conscience or synderesis is the law of our understanding, which cannot be understood except as regards the what natural law. But synderesis is a habit, as has been had in the first book. Therefore, the natural law is a what habit.

[22:13] Moreover, the natural law always remains in man, as will be clear below. But not always the reason of man, to which law pertains, thinks about the what natural law. Therefore, the natural law is not an act but a habit.

[22:37] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the good of the conjugal life, huh? That the habit is that by which something is done when what? Necessary. Yeah. But the natural law is not of this sort, huh?

[22:58] For is found in the little ones and in the damned, who are not able to act through it or by it. Therefore, the natural law is not a habit.

[23:12] Well, let's see what the master says. I answer: It should be said that something can be called or said to be a what habit in two ways.

[23:26] In one way, properly and essentially, and in this way, the natural law is not a habit. For it has been said above that the natural law is something constituted what by reason, just as also a proposition is a certain what work of reason. So, in the looking reason, right? The second act there is what the form of statement, right? Affirmative or negative, huh?

[24:02] Thomas has picked up this bad habit of calling the statement a what proposition, right? But proposition is really what like a premise, right? Because it's placed before for something, right? But a a

[24:21] statement, a proposition in that sense is also a statement, right? So it's got to be called, you know, take kind of synonym of the statement. I prefer calling a statement.

[24:47] Now it is not the same that someone acts and that by which someone acts. For someone through the habit of grammar makes a what suitable speech, grammatical Horatio Now. Since therefore habit is that by which someone acts, it cannot be what be possible that the some law is a habit properly and what essentially.

[25:24] Another way that can be called a habit that which is what held by habit, just as what faith is what that which is held by faith, right? Yeah that's called faith which is happening Yeah Yeah. There's kind of ambiguity there, right? What is our faith, right? Is it a habit or is it the things we what believe, right? I mean, they always have this kind of profession of faith there on Easter or something like that, or some important day like that, and.

[26:01] This is our faith. This is the announced that you know the words, you know, huh? And in this way, because the precepts of natural law sometimes are considered an act by reason, right, huh? And sometimes they are what in it only habitually, huh? In this way, it can be said that the natural law is a what habit, huh?

[26:38] He makes a comparison now, right? Just as the indemonstrable principles or principia beginnings, speculative matters, huh, and looking matters, as Boethius says, are not the very habit principles, right, huh? But they are the principles. Of which there is a what habit, huh Okay.

[27:01] Kind of like uh attributing the name So I think that's a good idea. Now, what about this text of Aristotle, right? It seemed to be only those three, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher intends there to investigate the genus of what virtue. And since it is manifest that virtue is a certain beginning or source of act, right?

[27:45] Those only things he lays down which are beginnings of human acts. It takes Thomas understand what Aristotle is saying, right? To wit, the powers, the habits, and the what passions.

[28:03] Now, apart from these things, these three things, there are some other things in the soul as certain acts, right? As to will is in the what one only, and things known are in the one what knowing. And natural properties of the soul are what in it as immortality and others of this sort.

[28:43] So, what is the natural law? Is it something known in the knower? Yeah, so it's not so much the habit, is it, right? That's

[29:04] more clear in the reply to the second objection, right? That's kind of an unusual word that cryptic speech. To the second, it should be said that synderesis is said to be the law of our understanding, in so far as it is a habit containing the precepts of natural law, right? Which are the first what beginnings of human deeds, huh?

[29:39] Just as Aristotle will speak, I call it natural understanding, right, Aristotle sometimes calls it just nous, right? Or Thomas will call it intellectus, right?

[29:54] But this is a habit of those things that are known what naturally, right? You naturally know something cannot both be and not be, right?

[30:07] Although the sophists can make you kind of wonder, right? When I was a little boy, I remember wondering what would it be like if there was nothing, absolutely nothing.

[30:27] Well, of course, as a little boy, right? I didn't realize, you know, if there was absolutely nothing, maybe nothing to imagine. It would be like. You're trying to, in a sense, picture what it would be like if there was absolutely nothing, right? And so, apart from the fact to be nobody there to imagine anything, and no imagination to imagine things, can you really imagine nothing?

[30:57] Now you start to ask, "What is nothing?" Right? Is nothing something, or what would you say? Hmm. The average person would say that nothing is the opposite of something, right? And therefore, nothing is not something, is it?

[31:21] And then you say, "Well, can you talk about nothing? Can you?" In philosophy, no. Now my old teacher Casaubon used to tell you that I think before used to joke about that. Now philosophy is the only course where you can get paid for talking about nothing.

[31:46] But you can actually make what true statements about nothing, can't you? You can say nothing is nothing. And as Boethius says, nothing is more true than a thing is said to be itself. A dog is a dog, right? A rose is a rose. What can be more true, right? So it's true that nothing is nothing, right?

[32:13] And it's true that nothing is the opposite of something, right? So then, nothing must be something, huh? Yeah. Now, notice the ambiguity there in English. You know, if we say,

[32:31] "I asked somebody, what did he say?" And the person said he said nothing. Okay. Now grammatically, it's an ambiguity in that, huh? Yeah. Because could he say nothing?

[32:50] See, is that a way, possibly misleading, of saying he did not say something? Or he said he didn't say anything Yeah, Yeah, But we say he he said nothing, right? That's kind of you know, you kind of play around that a little bit and take it the wrong way, right?

[33:13] But can reason talk about nothing, right? Well, then is it talking about nothing? Does that mean simply that it's not talking about anything, like we're interpreting that's you know to say nothing? Or is he really talking about nothing and saying something true about nothing?

[33:40] So that's the last sense of is when you say nothing is nothing, right? But it's true, true, right? And therefore you seem to be talking in some way about something, right? And you say, well, then nothing is something, right? And then you seem to have a what contradiction, right? Okay.

[34:06] Well, when Thomas discusses Aristotle at the beginning of the fourth book of the the Metaphysics, and Aristotle is showing there that the subject of what wisdom is being, right? And he gives a plethora of meanings, right? And Thomas comes into our rescue, right? And he says basically there's four meanings of being that Aristotle has here, right? And the first meaning of being is substance, like a man or a dog, right?

[34:41] The second meaning of being is accident, like the shape of a man, the shape of a dog, or the health of a man or the health of a dog. It's not a being in the same way that a man is or a dog, but it's being in some way, right? Okay.

[35:03] And or we're sitting, you know, that's an example of accident, right? Okay. And we are in this room, right? Something accidental there, right? You can go on distinguish maybe among the accidents some are are more real than others, right?

[35:27] What's the third meaning of being? Well, is there such a thing in this world? Does it exist in this world? Such a thing as coming to be.

[35:43] And that's a way of being. Coming to be, It seems like it Yeah. That's kind of funny though, right? See, it's a diminution there, right? Coming to be is a way of being, one a very imperfect way though, right? Huh? Because you're not, you haven't quite arrived at being yet, right? You know. And is there such a thing as ceasing to be? Such a thing as dying, let's say, right?

[36:15] Is that not to be? Not quite yet, you know. And then the fourth sense is what, where things like nothing and and ignorance, right? And and negations, huh? Said to be right. Yeah.

[36:36] So that fourth sense that nothing is is something, right? Yeah. So I was profoundly wondering what it would be like if there was nothing. There was a book by Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. I guess he's a psychiatrist. Mhm. I don't know what he does. Mhm. We had a book of his years ago, it's interesting stories of these people he met in mental home, mental institutes. Yeah, yeah. And one was a woman had been in a catatonic state for like 20 years or something.

[37:11] Mhm. And the doctor was asking her, like, do you remember what you were doing before you like... And she says, oh yeah, I was trying to think about nothing. So how did you do that? She said, I just said nothing, nothing, nothing.

[37:27] Next year she was in cast on state for years. Yeah. Wow, don't do that. There's some sense of is, like when someone is blind, right? Someone is ignorant. And even nothing is nothing, right? You use the word is, right? There's some sense of being there, right? Strange. Because, but I remember we can't even think about non-being though, except in terms of being. Yeah, yeah. Yeah.

[38:01] I was looking at the article in the sentences there, you know, where Thomas asks whether God knows bad things, right? Mala. And the arguments against it, that God does not know mala, is kind of interesting, huh? And one argument goes like this, it says,

[38:24] knowing takes place in just two ways, right? Either you are the cause of which you know, right? And you know it because you're the cause of it, right?

[38:38] Or the thing itself acts upon you and is the cause of you knowing it, huh? Like with us a lot, right? Well, it says, but God doesn't know by things acting upon him. Okay? Well, then if you knew the bad, you'd have to be the cause of it. But God's not the cause of bad things. Therefore, God doesn't know bad things, right? Okay.

[39:08] Yeah, it's an interesting argument, isn't it? So, and then he gives another argument saying, um, that the knowledge takes place by way of what? Likeness, huh? Okay. There's got to be a likeness, you know, of the thing known in the knower. Just like when you imagine something, right, you have a likeness of this thing. Well, there's no likeness of God to the bad, because God is entirely good, right?

[39:40] Perfectly good, huh? So he can't possibly know what the bad, huh? See? And, uh, goes on giving other arguments, but in the body of the article he mentions Averroes had said that God doesn't know the bad, right? Now, hearing all this bad news, as I was mentioning earlier today, um, you say, well, maybe that's partly the way Averroes understands the happiness of God, right? He doesn't know anything bad.

[40:12] Yeah, yeah, they couldn't know anything bad, right? Now, so you mind that saying, in some way, these things go back to what? Empedocles, right, huh? Because Empedocles has, we have a famous fragment of Empedocles. He says that by earth we know earth, and by water we know water, and by air we know air, and by fire we know fire, and by love we know love, and by hate we know hate.

[40:41] It's because we have these in us, right, huh? So, um, in a sense, the thing we know is what? In the knower, right? If your mind can't grasp something, can it know it? Now, if you grasp something, if I grasp this thing, it's in my hand, right? So the mind has to grasp the thing to know it. So you've got to have the thing you know in your mind, right?

[41:09] Well then, Anaxagoras, I mean, Empedocles said that, uh, God, though, is incorruptible, right? Therefore, there's no hate in God, because hate is what separates things, huh? See, love unites things, but hate separates them, right? But since God, unlike other things, is incorruptible, right? Can't be divided up. There's no hate in God, right? Therefore, God doesn't know hate because he doesn't have any hate in him. Aristotle, in the third book on the soul, the second book, he he criticizes, Empedocles for saying that, right?

[41:49] And again, the metaphysics, you know, that we would know something like hate, which is a source of badness and so on. Um, we know something God doesn't know, right? Well, this is like this other position that Thomas is talking about, you know, Averroes and so on, right? Um...

[42:11] Well... How do you reconcile, you know, the truth, you know, God will know everything we know and more, and, uh, to say that, uh, these objections say you can't know the bad, huh? How do we resolve that, huh? Is it because bad or evil is a negation? It's an absence. Yeah. He's saying that God, you see, by knowing himself, knows everything good that he has made, right?

[42:41] And by knowing the good that he has made, he knows the opposite of that, what? Good, right? So he knows, as it were, at first, uh, the good, right? And through the good, he knows what? The bad, right, huh? Which is the absence or lack of it, right? But if God knew only himself, he wouldn't know the badness in things, huh? He might know badness in some general way because, you know, it's opposed to his goodness, right?

[43:12] But he wouldn't know, um, the sickness of man or the ignorance of man, because he'd have to know the knowledge of man to know the ignorance that is opposed to it, right? He'd have to know the health of man to know the sickness that is opposed to that, right? So Thomas says, by knowing himself, he knows the good in things, and by knowing the good in things, he knows the evil, what, opposed to them, right, huh?

[43:39] So it's not the first thing he knows, right, but the second thing he knows, right? But it's not, as Aristotle or Shakespeare would say, a discourse in God, right, huh? He doesn't, like we know the premises, and then one day we magically put them together and we know the conclusion, right? But God always, in knowing himself, knows the good in things, and in knowing the good in things, he always knows the evil opposed to them, right?

[44:04] But we have to go, right, further. And that seems very much to apply to today, right? You know, they talk about homosexual unions, they want to call it a marriage. People don't know what a marriage is. Therefore, they don't know that this thing is not a marriage, right, huh? You know? Um...

[44:24] I used to always say, who knows better the ignorance of the students, the student or the professor? Now, if the professor knows what the student doesn't know, then the professor knows the ignorance of the student more than the student knows his own, what, ignorance, huh? In fact, is it really possible to know your own ignorance?

[44:50] If you don't know what you don't know, how can you be what? How can you know your own ignorance, huh? You know? It- it's kind of in a roundabout way you might know your ignorance, but there's no direct way to know it, huh? See?

[45:11] Was it Noah didn't know his ignorance of alcohol, was it, or wine? Didn't know his measure. Yeah, didn't know what the, the power of the, of the juice, huh? Yeah.

[45:27] It's interesting how, how the difficulty of Empedocles comes back in the medieval thinkers, you know, like Averroes and so we to the reply to the second objection there, right? To the third should be said that that argument concludes that the natural law is habitually held, right, huh? And it's not the same thing, right, huh? If I grasp the thing, my hand is not what is grasped, right?

[46:19] But to that which was objected in the contrary, it should be said that that which is habitually within us, sometimes someone is not able to use on account of somewhat impediment. Just as a man cannot use the habit of science on account of his sleep. And similarly, the boy is not able to use the habit of the understanding of beginnings, or also the natural law, which is habitually within him on account of the defect of, what, age.

[46:53] Kind of scare. The conclusion then to this first article is not that the natural law is the habit, but it's held by this natural habit.