Prima Secundae
239. A Second Definition of Reason: Understanding, Order, and Whether the Decalogue Admits Dispensation (I-II q.100 a.8)
Class of 2015-10-15
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/239-a-second-definition-of-reason-understanding-order-and-whether/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, open and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray, amen. help us to understand what you have written. Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. I was thinking of another definition of reason, right? How can there be two definitions of reason?

[0:43] Well, of course, they obviously have to be in harmony, right? Huh? But the other definition of reason I'm thinking of is this one here. It's the ability to understand, huh? Reason, huh?

[1:05] And order itself and others, or rather, direct itself. I mean, and direct itself and others, huh? So it's the ability to understand, reason, and direct itself and others. Okay. Now the word "understanding" is what a great word, huh? I told you about the linguist up at Laval there, who says the greatest invention of the human mind is the English language.

[1:42] But my teacher there, Monsignor Dion, used to say, and you have to look at the languages, and sometimes the word is better in one language than another, right? Although for some other word, the other language might have something, right? And so on. In which case, went forward and used an English word in talking about logic. But anyway, word "understanding" is an English word, right? And

[2:12] I was reading a text of Thomas there, you know, where he's talking about. It's kind of an odd where the text is. Whether the sinful act is a substance, right, or substantial. And of course, Thomas distinguishes two senses of the word "substance. " One is in the categories, huh? When Aristotle distinguishes between substance and accidents, right?

[2:45] And but the other meaning of substance is what a thing is. Okay. Now it strikes me, you know, of course, the word "substance" has the same etymology as the word "understanding. " And substance kind of names the object of what? Yeah, yeah. What is said to stand under something, right?

[3:12] A lot of times we say that the proper object of reason is the what it is, huh? Sometimes we make it more particular and say the what it is is something sense or imagined, right? But that's the object. And but that separates it from the senses, right?

[3:32] Because the eyes don't know what color is, huh? They don't know what sound is, right, huh? They don't know what a dog is, and so on. And but the other sense of substance, as opposed to accident, right? That's also something characteristic of reason, huh? That reason alone knows substance that stands under the what? Accidents. The senses know only what? Accidents, right? So if you begin to define reason by the ability to understand, you include both senses of what substance, right?

[4:09] One is more general, of course, than the other one. huh? Aristotle in the in the uh in the uh book on the places there the topics that go in English it's kind of about it's use of words, but instead of saying "ousia," which is the word for substance there in Greek in the categories, he says "to ti esti," right? What it is, right? Okay.

[4:36] So, but you can extend the word understanding to other things besides these two, right? Like, what does it mean to understand a word, right?

[4:55] To know what's meaning of definition or Yeah, but I mean going back to etymology, huh? It's to know what stands under the word, right? Okay. And so you think of the the thing or the meaning as standing under it, right? And of course in Latin, of course, there always is the term Thomas says "impositio nominis," the placing upon the name, right, huh? But English we can say that too, right?

[5:24] You know, you place a name upon something. Put a name upon something. Put a label. We say upon something, right? So the thing that is named is, as it were, under the name, right? And so to understand the name means to know what stands under it. That kind of separates the the senses from reason from the senses again, right? Warren Murray was telling me he saw he saw on TV something A parrot saying the Hail Mary.

[5:52] And you can get brothers to look through the Hail Mary every time of May, he's done. He said, "but he doesn't understand what he said. He's got the sounds down, though, right? You know, it's kind of, kind of a. " He does. Why don't you hire that one? You know, to remind you to say your prayers. He'd be woken up with a parrot there in the morning, there, reciting the Hail Mary.

[6:20] But, but to understand an effect, what does that mean? Yeah. Now, do we speak in English as if the cause were under the effects, holding it up?

[6:41] What? Yeah, the causes under the effects. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, you often mention about the ground. Yeah, we speak of two things that point to ground as one thing as kind of a word. We use English for cause, but also we speak of the underlying cause, right? Underlying cause. You know, if you're you run into your friend some day, and from the tone of his voice, he sounds like he's sad.

[7:09] You know, you wonder what's underlying this sadness, right? So what's happened or something, you know? You want to find out, right? huh? So that's a beautiful word to describe. It's an awful lot. when you say reason is the ability to what understand, right? huh?

[7:29] Um now you could also say, as Thomas does in the premium to logic there in the beginning of the Thomas, that the first two acts of reason are kind of understanding, right? The first being understanding what something is, Right? And then the second act, understanding the true or the false, right? Making a statement, right? So the ability to understand, you can understand what a what a square is, and understand what a quadrilateral is, and understand what a circle is, right?

[8:02] And you can go on understand that a square is a quadrilateral and a square is not a circle, right? And so on, right? And you're you're all set, right?

[8:13] It's a beautiful way, right? But then the third act of reason is is reasoning, right? So you can add that, right? That the ability of reason is an ability to understand, but to what

[8:31] reason, right? Okay. That kind of leaves out a little bit the practical reason, right? Now, and leaves out, you know, but actually we can say, and to direct itself, which it does when it knows what logic and so on, right? And others, and by others we mean both what the other parts of the soul, right? Like the will and the emotions and so on, and the even exterior actions, right?

[9:02] Right, directed. And then even other men sometimes, right? Like the father rules the children, and the general rules the army, and so on, right? Huh? And so that covers, you know, both logic and the practical order, right? So I think it's pretty good definition, right? Now, if it's so good, how can there be two definitions? Because reason is one thing, right? And then we have Shakespeare's definition and the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right?

[9:43] Well, discourse in its strictest sense, they're full of senses, coming to know what you don't know, right? To what you do know. Of course, that's touched upon in this other definition by reason, right? Because that's a discourse itself. But in terms of understanding, right? In English, yeah, this marvelous language called English, right? What's the distinction between thinking about something and understanding it? What's the distinction between those two?

[10:16] Are they the same thing? Thinking about something and understanding it? If you understand it when you know the cause or something you know but you don't necessarily you're thinking about it, you might not understand it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But is there a connection between thinking about something and understanding it?

[10:38] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you're thinking about it, you're trying to understand it, right? And then in English we say you think it out, then you what? Understand it, right? So you can think out a definition, right? And then you understand what the thing is, right? You can think out a division. You can think out a distinction. You can think out the order of something, right? See how wealthy.

[11:08] See how how Shakespeare's definition agrees, right? But he's emphasizing the fact that what reason has to think about something for the most part before it understands it, right? And but there's an harmony these two definitions, right? Even even more so when you say reasoning, because that is is a kind of discourse, right? Okay.

[11:32] And then when you add that reason directs itself and other things, well, how does it do that? By knowing what order, right? And Shakespeare's taught you to look before and after. It's trying to see an order, right? We look before and after. So the two definitions, it seems to be our harmony, right? But some things are brought out by one; they're not brought out by the other, right?

[11:58] And especially the wonderful word "understanding," right? And I wonder who could even say you know that reason understands the order of something, right? I don't know. what something is what something is, but reason is able to what understand the order of things.

[12:26] I was thinking of a beautiful example of this here. Philosophy has two main kinds. There's two main kinds of philosophy, and one is called looking philosophy by Berquist. In Latin, they say speculative philosophy, and in Aristotle, they call theoretical philosophy. But speculative and theoretical, they they for looking, right? Looking meaning trying to see, but see in the sense of understanding, right? So, looking philosophy is one of the two chief kinds of philosophy, right?

[13:07] And it has, of course, three parts, right? And the first part is mathematical philosophy, as is found in my favorite book, there, Euclid of Athens and Alexandria. And then, second part of looking philosophy is natural philosophy. And then the third part of the last part of what

[13:37] looking philosophy is first philosophy or wisdom, as Aristotle sometimes calls it, right? Now, let's take this one sense of order, which is the fourth sense, which is better, right? Okay.

[13:59] Do I understand what a square is or what a circle is better than understand what a cat is or what a dog is? I

[14:13] kind of fully know what a square is. I'm pretty sharp, you know. Pretty exhausting. Yeah, and I fully know what a circle is, right? I know how to inscribe a square in a circle and a circle in a square, and circumscribe one of. Yeah, I'm really I'm really up on that, you know. I don't think I understand the dog that well, right? If you say to me, "How would you define the dog?"

[14:35] you know, I say, "Well, a four-footed animal that barks and gets irascible or something like that." But I have a hard time, you know, fully bringing out the nature of the dog, right? By the square, you know, equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. Boy, I know much better what the square is. Got the hole by the horns there. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But I understand what a dog is or what a cat is better than understand what God is.

[15:08] Or an angel. Or an angel, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, but it's better to understand God, however imperfectly, than to to understand what God is, however imperfectly we do. Maybe, maybe negatively, He's not composed anyway, et cetera, et cetera, than to understand what a dog or a cat is. But it's better to understand what a dog or a cat is than to understand what a square or a circle is.

[15:42] The cat and the dog; these they're alive, right? Every six months walks around here, you know. What's his name? Habibi. Habibi. Habibi. Habibi, or he's got a. My beloved. Yeah, Habibi. Isn't he? He's nice, nice dog. He spends a whole morning at mass. The whole time we're in church, he's barking his head off. He goes way down the pew, barking. The whole time we're in church, barking.

[16:06] The whole time, telling the whole neighborhood, "Be quiet! They're having mass." Ros and I went up to New York. They were staying in a motel, you know, and so on. And they have a little kind of quasi-breakfast, you know, they have in the morning there. You know, get your thing. And she came down one morning there, and the woman was there with two dogs, right? And we came in, and the dogs started barking.

[16:29] I said, "I said, she couldn't shut them off. If I she, she said she couldn't, you know." We had two dogs there. So, notice I used to work better there, right? I understand what a square is better than understand what a cat is, and I understand what a cat is better than understand what God is. But it's better to understand what God is than to understand what a cat is, and it's better to understand what a cat is than to understand what a square is.

[17:10] So when you say I have some understanding of the order of these things, Aristotle has this beautiful passage in the proemium to the Three Books on the Soul, where he's talking about how desirable it is to know about the soul, right? And in order to show this, he says that one knowledge is better than another because it's about a better thing, or because Because we know the thing better, right?

[17:42] And he speaks of the excellence of the soul because you have kind of indirect knowledge of the soul, right? And both ways you have some excellence, right? Well, he doesn't say there which of these criteria for saying one knowledge is better than another is what more important, right?

[18:00] But as Thomas often points out, and you can see in the beginning of the Parts of the Animals, Aristotle is very clear that the main criterion is that the object is better, right? Okay, so it's better to have a what even imperfect knowledge of a better thing than to have a a full knowledge of a what lesser thing, yeah. So Aristotle sees that, right? That's why we say it's better to know God even imperfectly, right, than to know the square perfectly, right?

[18:34] It's more perfect knowledge, right? Even that Aristotle has a beautiful example there, right? He says just to see a glimpse of someone we love is better than a long view of something, you know. And you were talking about how beautiful that tree was out there, right? Now, just to see that tree for a brief moment, right? Than to see some ugly, you know, ash can or something.

[18:58] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I can sit, you know, look at this ugly, you know, thing all day long, and I get more joy of that brief glimpse, you know, huh? I used to give an example to kids in class, you know, where you're you're working in the office all day long, right? And you got this boss over there, you know, keeping his eye on you. And then you see your girlfriend over in the in the building across the lane, just brief glimpse, you know, and see waves, you know, and you enjoy it much more than that long view of the boss all day long.

[19:32] So Aristotle's done a beautiful, beautiful way of you know just leading us by the hand, right? To see that, huh? He had a beautiful text there today. I said I could have sent this to Warren. You could see a delightful thing, but he's comparing reason and the will when they go wrong, right? And he says the goodness or badness of the will depends upon. its what object, right?

[20:03] So if I desire something that is good, that's good, right? If I desire something that is bad, right? If that's the object of my desire, then my my will is bad, right? What Thomas says, the goodness or badness of the reason doesn't what depend upon the what object, right? So if I know what is good, that's good. If I know what is bad, that's good too, right?

[20:29] You know. And so it goes back to what Aristotle says in the in the sixth book of wisdom, right? That the good and the bad are in things. And so if the thing in itself is good or bad, then the will going out to the thing in itself is good or bad, right? But truth and falsity are primarily in the mind, right? And the mind, these are really objects of the mind insofar as they're in the mind, right?

[20:57] And known in some way by the mind. If the mind knows things as they are, that's good. If it knows as they are not, then it's bad, right?

[21:09] And then his beautiful text where he says, you know, that if the the good, if if the reason knows something to be true, it's because it sees it in the light of the what first beginnings which it actually knows, right? But when is it mistaken?

[21:29] And he says, when it follows imagination. Ah, there you go. Let's just say Teresa, on her priest calls. Yeah, she calls imagination the crazy one. Yeah. Oh, yeah. So you have Teresa today? Yeah. Yeah, we have that. Yeah, yeah. And the priests get very good. It's the new young priest that's staying at the just you know ordained this year, I guess. But he's he's very good. He gives very good sermons, and he he gives a little sermon on on Teresa, you know.

[22:00] And then he gave this prayer for you know we did beautiful prayer for us, you know. I've heard it before, but it's really beautiful prayer, you know.

[22:10] Rosie was Rosie was the dynamic. So it's all about. Rosie was praising him for his for his sermon. And Chris, I said, yeah, we're used to these good sermons. I said, you know, we we don't know how to handle. What was the sermon? The priest did not do good, you know. Well, the pastor's pretty good too, you know, but but this guy's really very good, you know, very good.

[22:29] What's the name? It's Gadero. It's Gadero. It's Gadero. It's his last name. Going to some retreat here? Portuguese. Portuguese. Ah, no, he's from Colombia, I think. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Juan Jose Jose Juan Juan, I guess it is. Wait, you know, he's going back. Well you can always fall back on his father. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He's very good, though. Very good. I've been fortunate, there, are priests.

[23:12] But could you say that reason understands order, right? Is order sometimes said to stand under things, right? Now, sometimes we say the first sense of order is what the temporal order, right? Yesterday is before today, and today is before tomorrow, right? When I was a little boy I used, to hear this sometimes. Once upon a time,

[23:40] okay. And since you're kind of putting things in the order of time, right? But you're speaking of being, what, under? the event, right? Once upon a time. Just like you said before, putting a name upon something, right? Impositio nominis right? You know, I see the arms of all that toys. Oh, the impositio nominis you know, and not the another imposition of the name you know So imposition of the name, you know.

[24:09] So I'm, but placing upon the name, huh? You missed the new definition of reason. He was in camp later. Reason is the ability to understand, reason and direct itself and others. Now, trying to show the harmony of this with Shakespeare's definition, huh? Shakespeare's to be respected for his great definition. But this word "discourse" that you have in Shakespeare is is like the words "what thinking about," right?

[24:52] And you're trying to understand, right? But the other definition is tucking the in product there, just understanding, right? But you have to think about something. Shakespeare's bringing that out, right?

[25:06] Okay, now we got the horrible dialogue here coming up here, Article Eight here, huh? Whether it precepts, the Decalogue, or what? Yeah, yeah. Okay. Now you've got to master this before you hear confessions, right?

[25:24] Rosie heard something awful there, and and on the Catholic Channel there, you know, they're talking about. Is it Hess there, the Nazi Reverend? I guess he was born a Catholic, right? Raised a Catholic, and he was going to confession. His father wanted to know what what he's confessing, and and the confessor told the father, and this was the occasion for him to turn away from the church, right?

[25:51] Although I guess he went to confession before they executed him, you know, because he was in the Nuremberg trials, you know, huh? But I mean, what do they tell you about it? I mean, the seal of confession is something you can't break. I mean, that's a isn't that a mortal sin or what is it? No, it's it's automatic excommunication reserved to volume speed.

[26:13] Yes, yes, th th the the, the Nazi, right? And I guess he was in the Nuremberg trials, and I guess he was probably sentenced. But that was it's turning away from the church, right? When when they broke. Yeah, it's an occasion, man. That's for sure. Yeah. Enough to scare the woods out here, you know. Because sometimes they put pressure on priests, you know, when they think that a guy who's committed a crime, you know, they want him to say, "What are you doing in confession?"

[26:37] Well, you can't do that. You can't even before the trial, and they would try to. They tried that down south, where some of the priests, I guess, some criminals. But in this case, sometimes I I've heard this, of course, I I have to verify it. Yeah. But sometimes also people will.

[26:57] I I don't want to distrust their sincerity, but often people exaggerate what happened, and then they'll say the priest told was in confession. He may not have said it, and people will you know they'll speculate about what he said, and then it gets around the priest told. That's why I don't go to confession because you know I've heard that before, and that sounds more like an excuse.

[27:15] But still, at the same time, even if it even if it's just some you know somebody's imagination, it's traumatic to people to think that this is even possible.

[27:31] So to the eighth one goes for it. Thus, it seems that the precepts, of the Decalogue, are dispensabilia. They're Able to be dispensed from, right?

[27:42] For the precepts, of the Decalogue are about the natural what law. But the justum natural, naturally just, in some things fails and is changeable. Just as human nature is what changeable, as the philosopher says in the fifth book of the Ethics, huh? But the defect of the law in some particular cases is the reason for dispensing, as has been said above. Therefore, in the precepts, of Decalogue, there can be a what.

[28:13] Dispensation, huh? Of course, Thomas wants to point out that you must understand Aristotle when he's up to there. But anyway, but that's that's not the most difficult of the objections.

[28:30] Moreover, just as man has himself to the human law, so God has himself to the law given divinely. But man is able to dispense in precepts of the law which man has what established, and therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue are instituted by God, it seems that God in them is able to what dispense. But prelates hold the place of God on the earth, right?

[29:05] For the apostle says, "For I also, right, if what I give something, on account of this, I give it in the person of Christ."

[29:18] Therefore, also prelates are able to dispense in the precepts of the Decalogue. Yeah, these these guys are the religious here. Father Albert's a prelate. Maybe we should find out. Yeah.

[29:35] Moreover, among the precepts of the Decalogue are contained the prohibition of homicide. But in that precept, there seems to be dispensed by men, right? As example, when according to the precepts of the human law, men are illicitly what killed, like we're talking there about the Nuremberg trials, right? As example, malefactors, evildoers, or the enemy, right, Hostess. Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable, right?

[30:17] Yeah, I knew a colonel there who used to always pray for his the enemy before he shot him. You know, he's going to shoot that day. You know. That's what the late great Leo Alvarez said to me once, "Is it good moral theology to say, 'God have mercy on you'?"

[30:33] I said, "Yeah, that basically. He was in the Korean War. That's why he was an expert. Memories was war experience." Moreover, the observation of the Sabbath is contained among the precepts of the Decalogue, right? But in this precept, there was a what dispensation, huh? For it said in one Maccabees, huh, and they said in that day, huh, that every man who comes against us, right, in war on the day of the Sabbath, right, we will fight against him, right, now.

[31:11] So a soldier doesn't go to mass maybe on the day that the enemy is invading, right? Therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue are dispensable, huh? So you're all convinced now, temporarily?

[31:27] This is the order of time, right? Temporarily, you're you're you're all convinced. But against this is what is said in Isaiah 24, and he's a prophet. Some are what criticized or reprehended, huh? About this that they what changed the just, the dissipated the eternal what covenant, yeah. Which seems most of all to be understood about the precepts of the Decalogue. There, as they say, written in stone, right?

[32:03] That expression started, right? They say somebody's stuck written in stone, something, you know. Yeah. And therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue are not able to be changed by dispensation, right?

[32:32] Well, let's see what the master says, sir. I answer it should be said that as has been said above, that in precepts there ought to come about dispensation, right? When there occurs some particular case in which, if the word of the law is observed, it would be contrary to the intention of the legislator.

[32:57] That comes up even in the Supreme Court things, right? Now, the intention of the lawgiver, of any lawgiver, is ordered first and chiefly to the common good, and that was in the definition of law too, right? Second, however, to the order of justice and virtue, by which the common good is conserved, huh? And by which one arrives at it, huh?

[33:36] So you got to have soldiers who are brave, right? You're going to obtain victory, right? And there's no substitute for victory, as MacArthur says, huh?

[33:49] I was rejoiced too when that's up there. What's point again, you know? And we took a little tour with the grandchildren there, right? Thing, and of course you get the usual anecdotes and so on. And of course, when MacArthur was a student there, Ulysses S. Grant's son was there also, right? And they were in competition as who would be first, right? Well MacArthur won out as being the what?

[34:10] academically, was tops, and then he was the cadet colonel, whatever the top officer is, you know. So he beat out the son of the president, right? From Grant, to the great general of the Civil War. so, And MacArthur's father, you know, fought in the Civil War, but he was like almost a teenage officer, you know. He was really got the Nobel, not the Nobel Prize, but the Medal of Honor, you know.

[34:38] They had these two sons of men who fought in the Civil War, and so on. The one who became president. If, therefore, precepts or commands are given which contained the what preservation, right, of the common good itself, right, or the order of justice and virtue, these precepts contain the what intention of the good lawgiver, and therefore they are what indispensable.

[35:21] As if it be laid down this precept in some community, that no one would destroy the republic, nor would he what hand over the city, I guess, to the enemies, or that no one should do something unjustly and and badly, right? Precepts of this sort are what indispensabilia.

[35:47] But some other precepts are ordered, ordered to what to these precepts, by which are determined some special what modes or ways. In such precepts, dispensation can be what made, right?

[36:12] In so far as through the omission of these precepts, in some cases, there would not come about a what prejudice to the first precepts, which contain the intention of the lawgiver. If, for example, for the conservation of the republic, there would be statute or established that in some city, which what,

[36:42] which some guard right among the the individual villages right, to the what. It could be dispensed with some on account of some greater what usefulness,

[37:13] or if you had the wall there that you couldn't hold, they said we'll move back to the other wall, right? Now Thomas goes on. The precepts however, of the Decalogue contain the intention itself of the lawgiver, to to wit, God. For the commands or precepts of the first table, the first stone, which order to God contain the order itself to the common good and the last good, right?

[37:45] Which is God Himself. It's kind of beautiful. Thomas's understanding, you know. He's saying that God is the what summum bonum, right? And I think I mentioned how in Thomas's treatment of the goodness of God in the Summa Contra Gentiles, which is in some ways more complete than in the Summa Theologia. He has what five articles, right? And thirty-seven, thirty-eight, thirty-nine, forty, forty-one. And the first one says, and reasons out that God is good.

[38:24] And the second one reasons out that God is goodness itself. And the third one, that there can't be anything bad in God because He's as good as itself. And the fourth one is that He's the good of every good. That's the one left out in the summa theologiae. And then finally, he's the summum bonum, right? The highest good, right? Huh? Well, then Thomas says, going back to Aristotle, right, that the good and the end are ultimately the same thing, right?

[38:55] And so, if God is the summum bonum, He must be the what? Last end. It's kind of beautiful. He sees that, you know. But he was taught by Aristotle, right? Huh? That connection between the the end and the good, right? Aristotle saw that.

[39:13] So the bonum commune in finem in the finale, right? Huh? Which is God Himself. Huh? He's last. He's the summum bonum, so he's the.

[39:24] Aristotle also speaks that common good is being superior to, right, to the private good. And the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice among men to be observed. That to no one, what? Something that's not owed should be what? Given. And to each one ought to be rendered what is owed him, right? And according to this argument or this reason, should be understood the precepts of the Decalogue.

[39:55] And therefore, the precepts of the Decalogue are omnino, entirely indispensable, right? Huh? Now he's got to untie these knots, huh? Because you won't let him go until you untie them. Won't get his dinner until he unties these. Huh? And the first one was this text quoted from Aristotle, right?

[40:19] To the first, therefore, should be said that the philosopher does not speak of the naturally just that contains the order itself of justice. For this never but fails, huh? That justice should be observed, right? But he speaks as regards some determinate ways of observing justice, which in some what. Fail, right? So if they don't play hail to the chief when the president walks in, well, there might be some reason to dispense with this, right?

[40:50] Maybe the conductor or the band leader is quite sick today or something, you know, so we dispense from playing that, huh? They say some presidents really like that that knowledge, man. Yeah, it's really felt good when they. He's been ambitious enough to stick it out to get there. You take great satisfaction hearing that song.

[41:14] We got it in there, you know, in the morning. There's a football game that afternoon between West Point and Duke, but you see some people duke things around, you know. But they, when you got there, they around nine o'clock in the morning. There, they had the the drill squad out there, you know, and they're, you know, you seen those with the rifles spinning around and so on, you know, and no no mistakes at all, right?

[41:43] And I was remembering, I I went to Saint Thomas Military Academy in Saint Paul, Minnesota, you know, and we had a crack drill squad too, right? And they were so good, they got on the Ed Sullivan show, you know, in the old days, right? And they performed without any didn't drop any guns or whack together the gun accidentally or anything like that, you know. And so that was quite a nice little thing for the school, you know, and you know, just just uniform, you know.

[42:07] But then then the the band starts up, you know, and then they have the all the cadets marching out of their their dorms and so on, and all you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah, and the they're they're they're the graduates, two different classes, I think it was I don't know 2015 and some was 1995, I forget, but two two different years, right? Quite a large group, you know, on both sides, you know, 'cause we ought to clap for them, you know, and so they they find they they march around, you know, and so on, and find they march off the field, and but you have all this nice music, you know, and so on, and the and then they had the plane fly over, you know,

[42:51] and some of the cadets go to jump out, you know, and there's six of them, right? And they they they do these they have these big you know things come down and they they do twirl you up in the air, you know, and smoke and so on, and and and they land you real precisely, you know, and they like that, you know,

[43:11] like that. Nobody's allowed to trip. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Rosie's brother's doing some work in the house there, you know, they're putting something in there that Rosie wanted, and so I said, "I'll take you a little West Point music, " in case he's doing a little physical work there, you know, in the kitchen, and yeah, he said, "Yeah, so I've done the West Point on the march, " you know, and so on.

[43:31] Still with the spirit of this thing, well, it's kind of impressive the kids, you know. What you like the most in the the marching, or you like the these guys coming out and so on? Impressed the little kids, but I guess coming down to the going driving up from Williamsburg, you know, they had some little movie they could watch in the car, you know, about education West Point, you know, and they see all the things.

[43:52] Did Daddy go through all that? It's funny, yeah.