Prima Secundae 241. Aquinas on the Moral Precepts: Charity, the Other Moral Precepts Beyond the Decalogue, and Whether They Justify (ST I-II Q.100, aa.10-12) Class of 2015-10-21 https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/241-aquinas-on-the-moral-precepts-charity-the-other-moral-precepts/ [0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. [0:38] Up to Article Ten, I guess. To the tenth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the divine law. For it is said in Matthew chapter nineteen, if you wish to enter into life, observe the what commands. [1:02] From which it seems that the observation of the command suffices for the induction to life. But the good works do not suffice for introducing us to life unless they come about from charity or by charity. For it is said in one Corinthians chapter thirteen, if I distribute food to the poor, right, all my faculties is food for the poor, and if I hand over my body, right, that I might be burnt up, I guess. [1:35] But I do not have charity; it doesn't profit me anything. Therefore, the mode of charity is in the what precept. Moreover, to the mode of charity properly pertains that all things come about in account of God. But that comes under the precept, for the Apostle says in the first epistle to the Corinthians, "Do all things in what glory for the glory of God." Therefore, the mode of charity falls under the what precept. [2:15] Moreover, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, therefore someone is able to fulfill the precepts of the law, not having charity. But what is able to come about without charity is able to come about without grace, which is always what joined to charity. Therefore, someone is able to fulfill the precepts of the law without grace. This pertains to the error of Pelagius. This is clear by Augustine in the book on heresies. [2:51] Therefore, the mode of charity is in the what precept. But against this is that whoever does not observe the precept sins what mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that whoever does something and not from charity sins mortally. That's a problem But whoever does not have charity works not from charity. Therefore, it follows that whoever does not have charity sins mortally in every work that he does, no matter how much that thing he does is of the genus of good things, which is [3:37] inconvenient. Inconvenient though he's saying this, doesn't fit, huh? Now what does the master say? I answer: It should be said that about this there were what contrary opinions. [3:58] Now, some say absolutely that the mode of charity comes under what the precept. Nor is it impossible, they say, to observe that this precept, this precept, the one not having charity, because is able to dispose himself that charity might be poured into him from God. [4:24] Nor, whenever someone not having charity does something of the genus of good things, does he sin mortally? Because this is an affirmative precept, huh? That one act from charity, and that does not obligate one always, but for the time in which one has what charity. So that's kind of a common thing that the negatives cover all cases, right? But the affirmative ones are ones that should be [4:58] exercised when it's appropriate to do so, right? Huh? But not all the time, right? But then there are others of the opinion that said omnino, huh? Altogether that the mode of charity does not fall under the what precept, huh? Now what is Thomas going to say? Is he going to choose one and reject the other? [5:23] He says, in some respect, as regards something that they're saying, what both of them, right? Huh? Say the truth, huh? Now what's the distinction Thomas sees, huh? Well, the act of charity can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it is an act by itself, and in this way it falls under the precept of law that it is given about it in a special way, huh? [5:55] As one of the commands. For it is said, you shall love the Lord your God, right, and you shall love your what, neighbor, huh? And as regards this, the first group of opinions, opinionators, say what, the truth. Nor is it impossible to observe this precept, which is about the act of charity, because a man is able to dispose himself to having charity, and when he has it, is able to what, use it, huh? [6:28] In another way, one can consider charity according as it is the mode of the acts of other virtues, right, as opposed to being per se, right, the act of charity itself. And this is according as the acts of the other virtues are ordered to charity, which is the end of the command, as St. Paul says in the first epistle to Timothy, that the intention, the end, is the formal mode of the act ordered to the end. [6:59] And in this way, it is true what the second say, right, that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept. That is to say, that in this precept, honor your father and mother, right, is not included that you honor your father from charity, but only that you honor your what, father, right. Whence the one who honors his father, although he does not have what, charity, he does not become a transgressor of this command, huh? [7:31] Although he can be what, the transgressor of the precept, which is about the act of charity, on account of which transgression he merits some what, punishment. Okay, is that the distinction that is he sees, right? [7:48] See, am I disobeying the command to honor your father and mother when I honor my father and mother? Am I disobeying the commandment to honor your father and mother when I honor my father and mother without having charity? No. No. See. [8:07] So in that sense, the mode of charity is not part of the command to honor your father and mother, right? But but that act of honoring your father and mother, even if you don't do it out of charity, you do it out of fear or something else. That act is still falls under love of neighbor, though, right? Because you're doing something good to your neighbor. Yeah. Yeah. [8:27] But you're not doing it in a charitable way. Yeah, you're not doing it out of charity. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I've been impressed, interesting little thing there, in Thomas, in the sentences there. A lot of times, you know, you've got one thing, and then you find something else out that he brings out, you know. And this one comes in the form of an objection, right? And the Thomas is talking about the the various divisions of sin, right, huh? [8:54] Of course, from the point of view of logic, he's got a nice objection, you know, huh? There's only one division of a genus into species, right? You know, because the differences are essential, so there can't be all these different divisions. Well, Thomas goes back all the way back to the treatise on division, right, that you have in logic, where you have the division of a genus into species by differences, but then you have the division of a subject by its accidents, right? [9:19] And accident by accident, and so on. And I used to always say, you know, those aren't very important; those divisions, you know, we always say in logic. But here you can do this; you can divide sin in this way, right? And Thomas says the per se division of sin is according to the what the virtues, right? So what virtue is this again? It's the sin. And but then you can divide them in other ways, right? [9:42] And this one of the divisions that's in the sentence is right that that comes from the fathers is you can sin against God, right, or against yourself, or against your neighbor, right? So that's a nice division. Explains how it is to fight against each one of these. One of the objections is that sin is against what? Charity, right? But there's only two commandments of love, right? Love God, love your neighbor. [10:10] So it shouldn't be against God, against your neighbor, and against yourself, right? Well, we used to always sometimes discuss that thing, you know, why isn't there a command to love yourself, right? And sometimes we'd say, you know, well, it's a what? Um, something natural to love yourself, right? So why do you need a commandment for it, right? And we'd point out, you know, that with the, the, uh, commandment to love your neighbor, it says love your neighbor as yourself, right? [10:44] Well, then there must be a way that you love yourself that you should love yourself if you're commanded to love your neighbor as you love yourself, right? So it's kind of implied in that right? But anyway, apropos of this, Thomas, uh, brings out how the command that's not stated here, apparently, right, to love yourself is included in the two commandments that you have. Now, how would you tie it in with the two commandments, or with which one would you tie it in with? [11:18] May- I- I would think, at least my initial impression, you tie it to your neighbor, not only because it says you love your neighbor as yourself. Yeah, yeah, you see that- that's kind of implied. That's- that's one, but also you say because, well, if I love my neighbors for the sake of God, Yeah. because that's the image, Yeah. well, then so am I. Yeah. So you could say- you could say for the same reason that I should love myself. [11:39] Yeah. Not because I love my neighbor, but for the same reason Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. The question is, is the love of oneself, you know, a part of the commandment to love your neighbor, right? Or is it really, according to that statement, right, something presupposed to the commandment to love your neighbor, right? In other words, is it, if it already presupposes that you love yourself, right, in a certain way, as you should, right, and you shouldn't love your neighbor in that same way for his own sake and so on. [12:10] Um, then it's really not a part of that second commandment, right? But it's presupposed to it, right? Anyway, Thomas does the text, he says that it's in understood in the command to love God. If you don't love God, you don't really love yourself, he says. That's kind of interesting, right, huh? Because you probably, because of the of this thing, the command to love your neighbor as yourself, you'd say it's tied up with the second one. [12:33] Well, there's a indication that it's, it has something to do with that, but it's really looking before and after, right? Something presupposed to that. What's presupposed to in the commandments? Or in the love of, of God. So it must be included in the love of God, that you don't love yourself unless you love God. [12:53] And they can see that here, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? Probably has to do with the end or something. So it's not that he's talking about charity as such that he brings out this, you know, but he's talking about this, this particular division of sin, right? Against God, against yourself, and against your neighbor, and what it is to, you know, explain that to one, but apropos of the answer to this objection, right? [13:18] Based upon there being just two commandments of love, so it should just be sin against God and sin against your neighbor. There should be sins against yourself, right? And, uh, but he answers that, huh, by pointing out how the love of oneself is included in the love of God, right? Because unless you love God, you don't really love yourself. That's really interesting, I think. Those are the kind of things I try to put in my notes, you know, because I say you wouldn't know that where you'd find that text, you know, and uh... [13:55] Sat- Saturday we went to the, uh, to this, uh, conference on the, um, uh, physician-assisted suicide, you know, which is held at Assumption there from about 9 to 12 in the morning there. And the two speakers, one was the bishop, of course, of Worcester, right? And then this, uh, um, Jesuit who's both a, um, uh, priest and and a doctor, right now. So the bishop spoke first, you know. [14:24] And of course, when he talked about in the beginning, talking about the natural law, right now, of course, he used the definition of the natural law that you have in the, what, Summa, right? The natural laws are partaking of the, what, the, uh, eternal law, right? The law of God. And, but you can also say that there's a definition of, that's a theological definition of it, huh? [14:46] But what would be the philosopher's definition of natural law, right? What does natural law mean, huh? I think it means natural in two senses, right? That the natural law is about what is naturally good or bad, right? Like it's naturally good to honor your father and mother, naturally bad to murder your neighbor and so on, steal from your neighbor, but also that it's, what, naturally known, right? [15:15] You don't have to have a discourse, huh, to do it, huh? But he was saying, you know, that, uh, you can know these things both by reason and by what? Faith, right, huh? Okay. But then you can have a definition of, of, you know, that's in theology and one that's in philosophy, huh? [15:41] And the, and the theologian would go back all the way back to God because everything is defined in reference to God, right, huh? But the philosopher kind of considers things in themselves, right? And so he look at the natural laws being, um, uh, defined in terms of nature, right, huh? It's things that are naturally known and things that are, what, uh, naturally good or naturally bad, right, huh? [16:06] What's naturally known about what is naturally good or bad. See? And that's, you know, it's not defined by God, but I mean, it's still a reference to God ultimately. One of these earlier questions, St. Thomas mentions that some of these things are known as, I don't know if he used the word conclusion, but he uses the expression modica consideratione with the least little consideration. Yeah, he'll do it again in the next, next, next article, you know, talk about that, you know. [16:37] But I mean, the natural law is really about things that are naturally known, without having to, to reason them out, right? So... Now, what is they're saying? There is, uh, 350, 000, uh, what, abortions by, by Planned Parenthood this last year, you know? And, uh, so when, when, uh, Obama or Clinton is supporting it, you say, Obama supports the murder of 350, 000. Well there's a headline, you know, Obama supports the, the murder of 350, 000 babies. [17:10] You know, they they never use the headline, but At least, at least. When when I have my night job there with the with the printing press, it's all in the morning press, and, you know, it kind of, you know, it's kind of make you stop and think, you know, but if you're supporting Planned Parenthood, you're supporting the murder of 350, 000 babies a year. Is there any more developments from the baby part sales, that scandal? [17:38] Well, they're still talking about it, but... You know? Yeah, it's terrible. Okay. So now we're down to what? First. First objection, right, eh? To the first, it should be said that the Lord does not say, if you wish to enter life, observe one command, but observe what? All the commands, among which are contained the command about the love of God and what? One's neighbor, huh? To the second it should be said that under the command of charity is contained that you love God from your whole heart, to which pertains that you refer all things to God, right? [18:28] And therefore the precept of charity a man cannot, what, fulfill unless he refers all things to, what, God. Therefore the one who honors his parents is held to honor them from, what, charity, but not by reason of this precept, which is to honor your parents, but by reason of this precept, to love the Lord your God from your whole, what? Heart. [18:57] And since these are two affirmative precepts, not obliging one all the time, right? They can oblige one for diverse, what? Times. And thus it can happen that someone fulfilling the precept about the honoring of parents does not then transgress the precept about the omission of the mode of what? Charity, huh? He avoids some of the inconvenience that he's talking about. Yeah, this I didn't really understand it, but now I think I see. [19:33] To the third, it should be said that to observe all the precepts of the law, a man is not able unless he fulfills the precept of charity, which does not come about without grace. And therefore it's impossible what Pelagius says, that a man fulfill the law without what? Grace. [19:55] I used to read that in high school. My cousin Donald had these, these English volumes, you know, of the works of Augustine. You know that they have, and used to read all these things about Pelagius and so. So his his name stinks in your mind. [20:11] But okay, go on to article eleven here. To the eleventh, one goes further. Thus, it seems that unsuitably are distinguished the other moral precepts of the law, apart from the what decalogue, right? [20:36] For as because first of all, as the Lord says in Matthew chapter twenty-two, in the two precepts of law, the whole what law and the prophets are what hanging right on the two precepts of charity. [21:00] But these two precepts are what unfolded, expounded, huh? By the ten precepts, the decalogue, right? Two tablets, the three and the seven. Therefore, it is necessary to have other moral what precepts, huh? Well, this objector is not looking before and after, right? Because there are some more particular than the ten, right? Huh. That's why I'm told Francis de Sales wanted the sisters that the visitation only to take one vow of charity, and the church said no. [21:45] Moreover, the moral precepts are distinguished from the judicial ones and from the what ceremonial ones, huh? As has been said. But the determinations of the common precepts of the moral ones pertain to the judicial and ceremonial precepts. For the common moral precepts are contained under the what decalogue, or even presupposed decalogue, as has been said. Therefore, unsuitably are there treated other moral precepts apart from the decalogue, right? [22:25] Precepts are not precepts should not be multiplied without necessity, as they would say. Command should not be ordered without. Moreover, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the what virtues, as has been said above. But just therefore, as in the law are laid down moral precepts apart from the decalogue pertaining to the worship of God, liberality and mercy, right, chastity. So also there ought to be laid down other precepts pertaining to other virtues, right? [23:00] To fortitude, to sobriety, and others of this sort, huh? Which nevertheless is not found, right? Therefore, not suitably are they distinguished in the law. The other moral precepts, which are apart from the Decalogue, like they were, just for some of them and not all, right? [23:21] Okay. But against this is what is said in Psalm eighteen that the law of the Lord is immaculate, converting what souls. But through the other moral commands, which are added or above the Decalogue, superaddunt added above, man is conserved without what the stain of sin, and his soul is conferred to God. Therefore, it pertains to the law that other what moral precepts be treated. [23:57] Okay. Now, what's Thomas going to say here? The answer should be said that just as is clear from the things foretold, the judicial precepts and the ceremonial have what string or force from their institution alone, right? [24:25] Because before they're instituted, it would not seem to differ whether thus or otherwise they would come about, huh? Is that true about about the priesthood being restricted to to the man? Well, that's a good question. Before it was instituted that way, yeah. See, I think it would be a figure, maybe a figure of Christ, so maybe. But [24:53] you know how people, you know, in some of these funny churches, you know, they they might have some communion service with soda pop or something, you know, instead of wine, right? Well, God could have, you know, introduced it in in beer if He wanted to instead of wine. I would be kind of shocked if He did. [25:13] I mean, isn't that something He instituted in in bread of this sort and and wine of this sort, right? And that's it, right? But He could have done it in beer or in something else, right? Fudge or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Milk of human kindness, right? So, so that's kind of idea. Some things are what from their institution, right? [25:44] Yeah. But the moral precepts, huh? From the very what dictated natural reason have their efficacy, huh? Even if they were never what, Established in law. in law, yeah. And of these, there is a threefold grace, huh, or grade rather. [26:15] For some are certissima, most certain, right? Most sure to use English word for certain. And therefore they are so what manifest that they do not need what, yeah, yeah. [26:35] Uncle Sirk's story says the word manifest like catching somebody with the hand, right? He's got his hand on the money in. You catch him, you know, no question about. I thought he'd be guilty, right? [26:57] For some are most certain and so manifest that they do not need a what to be edited, right? To be established or thought out, as the commands about the love of what God and one's neighbor and others of this sort as has been said above, which are, as the word, the very ends of the what precepts, huh? Whence in these none is able to err by judgment or what reason, huh? [27:27] Seems that many do? Some are more determined, whose reason at once, huh? Anyone, even the what, the yeah, is able easily to see. And nevertheless, because in fewer of these, right, it happens for human judgment to be perverted. It happens sometimes. These need some addition, right? And these are the precepts of the what decalogue, right? I think that first one, where some people seem to call wrong, is not by a judgment of reason. [28:10] They'll go wrong by judgment of reason. It's like the Supreme Court when the gay marriage—that wasn't a judgment of reason. And some are whose reason is not so manifest, but only to the what wise. And these are the more difficult precepts that are added above the decalogue, treated by the what. And in order by from God to the people Moses and Aaron, yeah. So he has a distinction into three here, right? [28:42] He's looking before and after, right? What comes first, second, then what? There we do. Yeah, he said that earlier about the decalogue given by God to the people, and all the other precepts were handed by Moses. The [28:59] Decalogue is pretty certain, you know. I mean, even you know, when Aristotle's in the Nicomachean Ethics, and he's talking about how virtue lies in the middle, right, and so on, and then he says, but there's no, you know, mean of the extreme, right? So he says there's no mean of adultery, for example, right? You know, if you do too much or too little, you know, it is wrong, right? [29:27] I mean, that's because obviously Aristotle, right? And you can find Aristotle saying things like that about theft or about, you know, so murder and so on, right? So and honor your father and mother, right? They see that, right? Even the old pagan Aristotle, right? He sees that. [29:48] Then you have things that are even more what particular than that, right? Now, because those things which are manifest are the beginnings for knowing those things which are not what manifest, then the other moral precepts added above the Decalogue are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue by way of a certain what addition to them, right? For in the first precept, of the Decalogue is prohibited the cult of what? [30:36] Strange gods, huh? Which are superadded, huh? Other precepts prohibiting those things which are ordered to the cult of idols, right? As is had in Deuteronomy chapter 18, you will not find what among you one who what? [31:00] Sacrifices Sacrifices his son or his what? Yeah. What? Yeah. But leading them through fire, right? Huh? Nor a evildoer, right? Or incantator right? A singer. It doesn't mean an opera singer, I hope. Nor the what? Consulting the pithon. Python. singers or itself. Yeah. And seeking from the dead truth and so on, huh? Okay. Okay. So that's quite a queer, weird world out there. condemning that, right now. [31:45] Yeah. The second precept prohibits what? Perjury, right? Huh? To this is added the prohibition of what? Blasphemy, and the prohibition of false teaching, Deuteronomy 13. Bring that one back. Yeah. [32:06] To the third precept are added above all the ceremonial precepts, right? Huh? To the fourth precept about the honor of parents is added the precept about the honoring of the old, right? Huh? According to that of Levite chapter 19, huh? Before what? The old one. Yeah white haired White haired, yeah. Rise up. Rise up and honor the person of the old, right? Huh? Okay. And universally, all precepts inducing one to the reverence to be shown to a greater, or the benefits to be shown to equals, or even to what Less lesser ones, huh? [32:49] To the fifth precept, which is about the prohibition of homicide, is added the prohibition of hate and. Violation against what? Any kind of violation against one's neighbor, right? According to that of Levite nineteen, you will not stand against the what? The blood of your neighbor, and also the prohibition of the hate of brothers. Huh? You will not hate your brother in your what? Heart. Yeah. That where the molizionis is from grinding. [33:25] It's like we're grinding an axe, holding a grudge. To the sixth precept, which is about the prohibition of adultery, is added above the precept about the prohibition of that being a woman of loose, of loose. Yeah. And the according to that of Deuteronomy twenty three, it will not be a what harlot among the daughters of Israel, nor a fornicator, right, about the sons of Israel. And also the prohibition of the vice against nature, right? [34:02] Huh? So you don't seem to have forgotten about this. So this is not quite as obvious, right? Edited out in the current edition. Yeah. According to that of Levite eighteen, chapter eighteen, with the male you were not mixed, right? And with the beast you are not well going together. This seventh precept about the prohibition of theft, there is joined the precept about the prohibition of usury, right? [34:32] According to that of Deuteronomy twenty three, you will not what? Make an agreement or pact for usury. And the prohibition of fraud, according to that of Deuteronomy twenty five, you will not have in your what? [34:48] Your bag diverse weights And universally all the things which pertain to prohibition of calumny and and Stealing stealing. To the eighth precept, which is about the prohibition of false testimony, there is added the prohibition of false what? Judgment, according to that of Exodus twenty three. Nor in your judgment of many will you acquiesce to the sentence of the many, right? That you deviate from the truth, huh? [35:21] Go with the poll says, right? Most men, I know people are. Yeah. That's they have the stability of a wind sock. Yeah. Mental stability of a wind sock. That's my favorite line. [35:42] Tom Rosser, Tom Rosser, very long hand. And the prohibition of what of a lie, right? Huh? Flee from the lie, right? And the prohibition of detraction, right? You will not be a what criminator and a whisperer in the people. That's a beautiful word, Cicero. To the other last precepts, nothing, nothing else is joined because through them universally all bad desire is what prohibited, right? [36:18] So he replies to the first objection that to the love of God and the neighbor are ordered the what precepts of Decalogue according to the manifest notion of what is owed to God or to your neighbor, right? And then the other ones that we just talked about a bit according to a reason more what hidden, huh? [36:47] You could make that same kind of thing, I suppose, in looking philosophy too, right? You could say that there are some things that are manifestly following, right? And then some other things that are more hidden, right? He comes up with some magnificent things. [37:09] Some things, even hard reason them out, you kind of agree, right? How do you how do you find the center of a circle? You know, how do we begin to see? How do you find the center of a circle? Two lines or diagonally drawn at right angles. Yeah, yeah. You draw one line in the circle, then you then you bisect it and draw at right angles, you know, and then you then you bisect that. [37:34] Yeah. Now, I haven't proved that that's going to be the center, have I? Right? And you can see how Euclid does it, but but you kind of you know see that, you know. But other things, you know, that angles at the extremity and at the center, you know, are on the same circumference, or you know, double, double, you know. Those are more hidden, you know. Okay. [38:03] To the second, it should be said. Now, the second objection is saying, well, you got these other ones, you know, like the the judicial laws and the judicial and the ceremonial, right? He says the precepts, the ceremonial and judicial ones, are determinative of the precepts of Decalogue ex vi institutionis huh? By way of the institution, right? Not however by way of what natural instinct, as the moral precepts are added, right? [38:32] So he sees that distinction. Forces the same, but you have to reason to them to make them more known. Well, I mean, some some have their authority from the institution, right? And some from natural instinct, right? They can't go back to natural. An actual law. These ones that are added still have the force of the natural instinct Yeah, the ones he gave here in the body of the article. [38:59] Yeah, But they have to be made known yeah, yeah, yeah. Are you going to go into the ceremony of the next couple? of days Yeah, I looked at it It'd be beautiful. [39:11] Yeah. Okay. Okay. Now, what about you know the the irregularity of the? Not all these ones are being taken up, right? Kind of picking and choosing their scripture. To the third, it should be said that the precepts of the law are ordered to the common good, and because the virtues ordering one to another directly pertain to the common good, and likewise the virtue of what chastity, in so far as the act of generation serves the what common good of the species. [39:57] Therefore, about these what virtues directly are. given precepts and what? Added to it. Yeah. And s- and one's and one's added to it. Those precepts are always added to it. But to the act of fortitude, huh, is given a precept proposed by the what? The one leading one to battle or exhorting one to battle, which is undertaken for the common good. [40:31] Once is clear in Deuteronomy twenty-three, where he's commanded to the priest, do not what? Fear, right? And do not give way, huh? Similarly, also the act of what? Gluttony, prohibited, is committed to paternal munition, right, huh? Because it's contrary to domestic good, huh? There you go Don't eat them out of the house and home Yeah. Once the Deuteronomy twenty-one on the person of parents remain the what? [41:03] They contemn to listen to our. Yeah, yeah, and they're giving away selves over to eating and luxury, which is sexual, I guess, and banquets and so on, huh? [41:25] Yeah. because they used to have these city dinners, you know, that they talk about, you know, and make fun of, you know, Dickens, and the ones, you know, describing these people you know overeating on these things and just stuffing themselves, huh? But uh That's what in the real Rheims New Testament defines a little word transliterated from the Latin commessatio, and they define it as [41:55] something about immoderate banquets and belly cheer with riotous. Coming riotous, riotous. That's a great definition. Belly cheer, I like. With wanton riotousness, that's immoderate banquets and belly cheer with wanton riotousness. That's worth remembering Yeah. Some of the English novels you have the description of banquets, you know, just as. That's one of the best things. kind of funny too But Dickens or other English writers saw it in uh what's his name James Herriot They just describe food so well. [42:40] It just really gets you off when you read these descriptions Yeah, yeah. Okay. Twelve here now, do the moral precepts of the old law justify? Right. [42:56] To the twelfth, when one precedes us, it seems that the moral precepts of the old law are what justify. That's probably the problem with the word here, right? For the apostle says Romans two, for not hearers of the law are what just before God, but doers of the law are justified. But the doers of the law are said those who fulfil the precepts of the law. Therefore, the precepts of the law fulfilled do in fact justify. [43:33] Got the authority of St. Paul there, right? Of course, the devil can quote scripture. He say, "Even Shakespeare, even Shakespeare taught us that." Yeah. Moreover it said in Leviticus eighteen, keep or guard my laws and my judgments, judges, judgments, which a man doing will live in them. Right. But the spiritual life of a man is by justice. Therefore, the precepts of the law fulfilled do in fact justify. [44:16] Moreover, the divine law is more efficacious than the human law. But the human law justifies, for there is a certain justice in this that the precepts of the law are fulfilled. Therefore, the precepts of the law justify. [44:34] It seems equivocation is running through this somehow here. But against this is what the apostle says in the second epistle to the Corinthians: "Litera occidit, the letter kills." [44:49] Which, according to Augustine, the book on the Spirit and the Letter, right, is understood about the moral precepts. Therefore, the moral precepts do not justify; they kill. [45:12] Well, Thomas begins with something. that if you're familiar with Aristotle, this is the famous example of Aristotle. He's talking about equivocal words that are equivocal by reason. Hence, it should be said that just as healthy is properly and first said about what has health, right? Pros hen huh? No, sir. You're talking about a word here that is equivocal by reason, right? Huh? So, in logic, we distinguish first between an equivocal word and a univocal word, right? [45:52] What's that distinction? Mm hmm Then what word that means I guess only that's one word Yeah. Okay. And then they divide equivocal into equivocal by chance, right? And equivocal by what? Reason, right? Huh? [46:14] So I have a guy comes to my house and usually on Tuesday night. It's going to be Wednesday night this week because he couldn't make Tuesday. But his name is Richard, right? And why he's saying, you know, my brother Richard. But you know, does someone look at these two guys and say we'll give them the same name because they have the same something rather? No. You and my brother are what? [46:40] Equivalently named Richard, right? If it's equivocal by reason, there's an order among the meanings, right? Huh? That's the way they kind of talk about it, right? So you got prior and posterior here. The first meaning of of healthy is the body that has a good condition, right? Huh? And then something else is called healthy because it's a sign of that, or because it produces that, or preserves that, or something, right? [47:09] Huh? Okay. That's the example Aristotle gives there, right? In the in the metaphysics, I use the example of the of healthy, right? Huh? So this example is a is a common example that's easy. [47:24] Prior posterior, it signifies uh uh you know what what signifies health, right? Okay. Getting healthy complexion or something, right? Huh? Or vice versa. Or what conserves health, right? Like you know this diet or or this exercise or something, right? Huh? Yeah. But not but not. That's not. Yeah, yeah. That's that's not. That's not healthy food. Probably commission somewhere in the law, wasn't it? Yeah, have to find it. [48:00] So thus justification, first and properly, is said to be the what? The doing or making of justice, right? Secondary and quasi what? Improperly, what is what? That is called justification, the signification of justice, right? Huh? Or the disposition to justice, right? Huh? In which two ways is manifest that the precepts of the law justified? In so far as they what? Dispose men for the grace of Christ justifying, right? [48:37] Which they also what? Signify, right? Because, as Augustine says in his work against Faust, he's a Manichaean, right? Faustus, Dion, once and again, always takes the fact that Augustine was going to meet Faust the first time, you know, and he didn't know whether what Faust was saying was true or false because he couldn't judge it, right? But he discovered that Faust didn't know the liberal arts, so he was, you know, something wrong with this man, right? [49:11] He said, "When it comes to talking about the importance of the liberal arts, what if Augustine hadn't introduced the liberal arts? How would he have seen through Faustus, right? Importance, [49:27] okay. Because, as Augustine says in his work against Faustus, the what life of that people itself was prophetic, right? And figured Christ, signified him. [49:49] What's the word? Figurative. We speak of figurative speech, right? Signify something else. But if we speak about justification, propriae dicta right? properly said. Thus, it should be considered that justice can be taken in so far as it is in what habit, or in so far as it is in what act. And according to this, justification is said dupliciter, with duplicity, right? In two ways, getting an [50:29] inappropriate translation to amuse you, gentlemen. In one way, according as man becomes just by what acquiring the habit of what justice. In another way, according as he does what works of justice. And according to this, justification is nothing other than the carrying out of what justice. [50:59] Now he's going to make another see another distinction here. Just as other, just as the other virtues can be taken either to that acquired by our reputed acts, right, or that poured in by God, right. [51:14] Now the acquisita is caused from what works, but the infused is caused by God Himself through His what grace, and this is the true justice about which now we're speaking, right? So now he's trying to clean up this confusion here, right? According to which someone is said to be just before God, [51:41] according to that of Romans four two. If Abraham was justified from the works of the law, he would have glory, but not but before God. For this justice cannot be caused by the moral precepts, which are about what human acts. And according to this, the moral precepts are not able to justify by causing what justice. But if one takes justification for the carrying out of justice, thus all the precepts of the law justify, although in different ways. [52:18] For the ceremonial precepts contain justice in itself in general, in so far as they exhibit what in the worship of God, shown in the worship of God. But in a special way, they do not contain in themselves justice, except from the determination alone of the what divine law. [52:45] And therefore, about precepts of this sort, it is said. That they do not justify, except from the devotion and the obedience of those what. Doing them right. [52:59] Because by the institution that they are, required, right. But the moral precepts and the judicial ones contain that which, in itself, is just, either in general, or also in what. Particular right. [53:18] But the moral precepts contain that which is in itself just, according to the general justice, which is all virtues. Aristotle says in the fifth book of the Ethics, that's the book of justice. That's one sense of justice. [53:36] Plato, in a sense, is kind of approaching that now because Plato sees that temperance is in what the concupiscible, right, and courage is in the irascible, and prudence is in reason. Then he's got no place for what. Justice. It doesn't mean to have the will separated, you know, from [54:00] kind of mixed up with the reason. He didn't see it as separate from that any things, so he doesn't know what to do with it, right? And then he talks about, well, it's the coordination of all these parts, you know, and this is kind of a little bit like we speak of justice, you know, in Adam and Eve before the fall, right? You know, the parts are in harmony with each other. [54:19] You know, all the parts of man and so on, and that's an effect of each part having its virtue, right? And they're all in harmony. So he doesn't have to have a special part for justice. So Aristotle's got to distinguish all these senses of justice because he spent all this time in the school of Plato, great guy that Plato. First man to show by word and deed that the happy life is the virtuous life. [54:46] That's what Aristotle put up to. Honor his teacher. Okay. The judicial precepts pertain to special justice, which consists in what pertains to the what. Contracts of human life, which is among men towards each other, right? [55:34] Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the apostle takes their justification for the carrying out of justice, right? To second, it should be said that the man making or doing the precepts of the law is said to live in them because he does not incur the punishment of what death, which was inflicted upon the transgressors of the law. In which sense is induced this? [56:03] The apostle induces this. To third, it should be said that the precepts of human law, what, justifies by acquired justice. Yeah, the acquired justice justifies the precepts of human law, about which we are not asking for the moment, but only about the justice which is offered to them. So that's a bit of do justice that text right. You have to distinguish a number of senses of justice. [56:44] Okay, take a little break here now before we start the ceremonial things.