Prima Secundae
256. The Judicial Precepts of the Old Law: What They Are, Whether They Are Figurative, Whether They Still Bind, and How They Are Divided
Class of 2016-01-14
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/256-the-judicial-precepts-of-the-old-law-what-they-are-whether/

[0:00] New question, huh? New question. Can't be any worse than that. Consequently, one ought to consider about the what judicial precepts now, huh? You thought you were free, huh? Not really. And first, we're not to consider about them in common. Secondly, about their what reasons, huh?

[0:34] About the first four things are asked. First, what are the judicial precepts, huh? Second, whether they are what figurative, huh? They signify something. Thirdly, about the duration of them, right? And fourth, about the distinction of them.

[1:00] Okay, to the first one goes forward thus. It seems that the ratio, the reason for the judicial precepts, does not consist in this, that they are ordering us to our neighbor, right?

[1:16] So you see, on one's neighbor, huh? In Latin, proximum, huh? Yeah. Yeah. For the judicial precepts are called from what judgment, but there are many things by which men are what ordered to their neighbor that do not pertain to the order of the judicial precepts. Therefore, the judicial precepts are not said to be those by which man is ordered to his what neighbor.

[1:55] Moreover, the judicial precepts are distinguished from the morals. This has been said above. But many moral precepts are by which a man is ordered to his neighbor. As is clear in the seven precepts, the second tablet. That's clear enough, and I can understand that. Not therefore. Not therefore, I just find Latin word order right. We used to joke about it because people eat too much Latin and you start speaking in the Latin word order.

[2:28] People recognize, oh, by the way, give yourself away, you know. When I first read Father Robert's dissertation on morals, I said he reads too much Latin.

[2:42] Therefore, the judicial precepts are not said to be such from the fact that they order us to our neighbor. Moreover, just as the what ceremonial precepts are have themselves to God, so also the what judicial precepts to one's neighbor. But among the ceremonial precepts are some that pertain to oneself, as the observances of what, food and clothing and so on. Therefore, judicial precepts are not said from this that the order man to his what, neighbor.

[3:20] But against this is what is said in Ezekiel chapter eighteen, verse eight. You forgot about that text, didn't you? Among other goods, works of the just man, if you make a what, good judgment between man and man, right? But the judicial precepts are said from judgment. Therefore, the judicial precepts seem to be, said those which pertain to the ordering of men to each other. This is not too too obscure, abstruse.

[3:54] Do you think so? No, don't strain your minds too much. I think too. This is abstruse. Hence, it should be said that as is clear from the things foresaid above, that the what, Whatever precepts of the law, have a force of obligating from the dictative reason, because natural reason dictates this ought to be done or to be avoided, right? In these precepts are called the what, morals, in that they are what.

[4:33] From reason. By reason, right? It's interesting. I mean, Aristotle would say, you know, that adultery is always wrong, right? And there's no mean of the extreme, right? So it's not a question of don't commit adultery too much, or too little, but just the right amount. No, any of it is is is it's already by definition, right? Okay, the same thing you say about murder, right? Don't kill too many people or too little, just the right number of people, you know.

[5:03] Not too early in the morning, not too late. Yeah, yeah. You hear about this guy that that escaped, you know, and they caught him down in Mexico, Chapo. Yeah, it's been a news story, you know, big, and so anyway, he was being interviewed by Sean Penn or whatever the actor you know who's gonna, yeah, but anyway, you know, he says, "Why don't you kill any people? You know, just you know, line of business once in a while, you know."

[5:29] It kind of idea, you know, that you know you don't do too much. It's not extreme. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He hits the mean, you know. I mean, and killing a lot of people, right? It's kind of funny the way he he saw things. He would make Obama look like an extremist in terms of killing people. because Obama kills lots of things Yeah, yeah, yeah. Two questions for you: Is how did Sean Penn get the interview, and how did he respond to that statement?

[5:55] Well, that's the question, you know, because they think that maybe that's given some clues as to where Chapo was, you know, even though it was a secret meeting. I mean, you know, but that he's trying to get. Sean Penn was in a secret meeting with him Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Because he had been, he was closing up to Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War, the Second Gulf War, trying to prevent the war, and was sort of an apologist for Hussein.

[6:22] Yeah, yeah. From a liberal perspective. Yeah, right. So it's stealing and so on, right? Huh? Okay. So Aristotle's example, you know, the universality there we hate all thieves, so on. So okay. So that's the morality. Other precepts there are which do not have the strength of obliging from the dictate of what reason itself. Because considered in themselves, they do not have absolutely any reason of something being old or not old, right?

[7:07] Huh. But they have the strength of obligating from some institution, either divine or human, huh? And determinations of this sort are what? Some moral. precepts. Yeah, some of the moral precepts.

[7:25] If, therefore, one determines the moral precepts by divine institution in those things by which, through which, man is ordered to God, then such are called what ceremonial precepts. In those, however, in which pertain to the ordering of men to each other, such are called what judicial precepts. In two things, therefore, consists the ratio of judicial precepts: that they do pertain to the ordering of men to one another, but that they do not have the power of obliging from reason alone, but from what institution?

[8:04] Right. Okay. It's clear enough, huh? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the judicial exercise, right, Or exercised by the office of some what Princes princes, huh? Who have the power of what judging, huh? To the prince pertains not only to order those things which come into what litigation, but also about the voluntary contracts which come about among men or between men, and about all things pertaining to the community of the people, the the rule.

[8:54] Hence, the judicial precepts not only are those things which pertain to what the fights the judges, it is, but also whatever pertain to the ordering of men to one another, which. Are under the ordering of the prince, is the word the supreme what judge? What kind of government he's got? I don't know.

[9:21] Now to the second, now is objection taken from the moral precepts, right? We've already made that distinction, right? The body, the article. To the second, should be said that that argument proceeds about those precepts ordering one to one's neighbor, which have the strength of obliging us from only the what? Dictated reason, kind of natural reason, right?

[9:47] To the third, it should be said that even in those things which order to God, some are what? Moralia, because reason itself. formed by faith, dictates them, right? Has God to be loved and to be what? I used to always say that thing, you know. You, you got commandment to love God, you know, above all other things and so on. You say, well, now, is that kind of strange notion of love?

[10:17] I says, you know, that I command you to love me, you know. It raises kind of question, doesn't it? To think about it, right? How lovable is he? You know. Yeah, yeah. I say, I have a loving people should love me, you know. I command you to love me. So you say, well, that's not the way to get men's love, and and maybe you shouldn't be commending that, you know.

[10:39] huh? Sometimes I always fall back upon the fact that that the definition of law, right, is for the common good, right, huh? Okay. So to love God is loving the common good, right? That's one way I would. It's one way to answer the other is to say that What are we going to answer the others? We're just that stupid that we need to be told. Yeah.

[11:03] That's why I liked about that prayer of Richard Chester, right, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. We got it on there. These men haven't heard it, so let's see. He

[11:20] says, "Prayer of Saint Richard says, 'Thanks be to you, our Lord Jesus Christ, for all the benefits which you have given us, for all the pains and insults which you have borne for us, most merciful Redeemer, friend and brother. May we know you more clearly, love you more dearly, and follow you more nearly day by day. ' "

[11:45] It's from the musical Godspell. Well, then it's actually a prayer of distinction. It's actually a prayer of St. Richard. Is it based on a song? I thought? I don't know. that's his prayers. Richard of Chichester from the mid thirteenth century? I think the songwriter made up cryptic lines. You never know, but that's what it says, and he spoke English, some fashion, I suppose. Unless that's a translation from Latin, something he did very well.

[12:15] Whatever it is, I don't know. It's quoted, yeah. They shared it. Seems a very good prayer, yeah. Um. We're in the third. Applied the third objection here, right? God to be loved and worshipped. Yeah.

[12:42] Some things are ceremonial which should not have the strength of obliging, obliging, except from the divine institution, right? To God pertains not only that sacrifices be offered to God, but that some things that pertain to what those offering. In worshiping God, now men are ordered to God as to an end, and therefore to the worship of God it pertains, and consequently to the ceremonial precepts that man have a certain what suitability respect to divine worship.

[13:23] But man is not ordered to his neighbor as to an end, so that he must be what disposed in himself, nor to his neighbor. For this is the comparison of servants to their masters, right? Who are who? What they are are something of their lords, right? According to the philosopher in the first book of the Politics, and therefore there are not some judicial precepts ordering man in himself, but all such are moral precepts.

[13:59] But reason, which is the beginning of moral things, has itself in man respect to those things which pertain to himself, just as the prince or the judge in the city. It should be known, however, that because the order of man to his neighbor more is subject to reason than the order of man to what God, more moral precepts are found by which man is ordered to his neighbor than through which he is ordered to what God.

[14:31] And in count of this, also necessary for there to be many what ceremonial in the law than judicial things to be more ceremonials than judicials.

[14:47] Okay, now we go on to the second question. Whether the judicial precepts figure something, huh? It's kind of curious that idea of figure how it

[15:04] came to mean sign, right? I ran across a text, and I was reading the sentences, you know, where Thomas talks about it, right? And he says, "Figure has two meanings. The first meaning it's the limit of what? Quantity, right? Okay. Now how do you get from there to sign, right? Well, Thomas says that the equals to the idea of statues, right? Huh? And how the figure of a man is taken as being a what?

[15:38] Sign of the man, right? Figure more than anything else, right? So when Lafayette came back to the United States, and his good friend George Washington had died, right? There's all these what? Statues of Washington, right? But he got down and saw the statue in what? Virginia, there, right, in the state house down there. He says, "Ah, that's the man, right? That's Washington, right? A lot of these ones are not so good, right?

[16:09] Huh? But the statue maybe would have what? A likeness of the man only because of what? His what? His figure, his shape, right? You know, wouldn't have his color necessarily if it was in marble, but the shape. And that's that's kind of generalized then, right? You know, just as the shape of the statue is a sign in some way of what? Washington, right? Huh? So now we generalize it and say that the sign of anything, right, is a figure, right?

[16:48] Huh? Kind of stretched a little bit, right? But that seems to be as far as he goes to explain it in this text in the sentences. Forgotten text, you know, the odd one

[17:06] say, imitating my master, you know, but find little texts, you know, sometimes you find in the oddest places, right? But they indicate other things. So to the second, one proceeds thus. It seems that the judicial precepts do not figure something. He's going to probably take the opposite side, right? Being contrary, right?

[17:35] For this seems to be proper to the ceremonial precepts that they are what instituted in the figure of some other thing. We saw that before, right? Ceremonial precepts, right? So the lamb is a figure of what? Behold the Lamb of God, right? It's a figure that, right?

[17:56] If therefore also the judicial precepts figure something, there will be no difference between the judicial and the ceremonial precepts. Well, they may not figure the same things, though. I mean, it's a little bit.

[18:14] However, just as to that, people of the Jews are given some judicial precepts, so also to other peoples of the what, Gentiles. But the judicial precepts of other peoples do not figure something, right? But the order of what to come about, right? Therefore, it seems that neither the judicial precepts of the old law figure something, right? Yeah okay Then they make Jews make laws about gay marriage that only figures the disorder of the mind

[18:48] Moreover, those things which pertain to the divine worship, it is necessary to what treat of them by certain what figures. Why? Because those things which are of God are above our what reason, right?

[19:06] That's more closer to the idea figurative when we speak of what. Yeah, I figure you know. scripture, yeah. Yeah, I mean, when Thomas gives us the reason for for metaphors, right, in scripture, right, because you're something above our mind, right? Metaphors in poetry are something below our mind, right? But something outside of our mind, right?

[19:37] But those things which are of our neighbors do not exceed our reason. Therefore, through judicial things which order us to neighbors will not not do what figure something, right?

[19:51] But against this is Exodus chapter twenty-one, which I'm sure you're all familiar with. I should ask you guys, what what book of the Bible you've recently been reading?

[20:13] Okay. So in Exodus twenty-one, judicial precepts allegorically and morality are expounded, right? Well, I answer that is Thomas, not me. I answer that it should be said that in two ways it happens that some precept is figurative. That's interesting. One way, primo et per se, right? Because it was what chiefly instituted to figuring something. And in this way, the ceremonial precepts are what.

[20:54] For for this they were instituted, that they might figure something pertaining to the worship of God and to the mystery of what Christ. So primo et per se.

[21:10] Some precepts are figurative, non primo and per se that's up front, but ex consequente. Now see what that means exactly. And in this way, the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative,

[21:28] for they were not instituted to figuring something, right, but to ordering the status of that people according to justice and what equity. But ex consequente they figured something, in so far as the whole status of that people, who were disposed through these precepts, was figurative, according to that of Saint Paul, the first epistle to the Corinthians. Omnia in figurum contingebant. illis everything happened to them was in a figure, right?

[22:07] I always think of that passage of Thomas there when I think of how we're always going astray, right? The Jews, you know, going astray, right? I know you don't have the reading that we had this morning there in the mass, but it's from the Book of Samuel, right? And the Jews were what they lost to the Philistines, right? Well, then they went off and they got the figure the what the Ark of the Covenant, right?

[22:35] They went to battle again, they lost again, and the Ark of the Covenant got taken over by the Philistines. I know what's going to happen the next reading. Sounds pretty bad, right? No, but but they're always getting in trouble, you know, the Jews, right? Well, we're always getting in trouble too, you know. I mean, you go down read the church councils, you know, and you know always the thing need to be corrected, you know, even even in the priesthood, right?

[23:03] I think Doctor Carroll points out it's kind of ironic that the Jews lived in those days in Palestine, which the name was taken from Philistine, that's actually corrupted. Their own land was named after them. It's interesting, yeah. Interesting. Okay.

[23:31] Okay. So they're not instituted to figuring something, right, but to ordering the status of that people according to justice and equity. But ex consequente they figured something, in so far as the whole status of that people, who were disposed through these precepts. Was what figurative, according to that of the first epistle to the Corinthians, omnia, all things in what figure happened to them.

[24:02] To the first objection, therefore, it should be said that the ceremonial precepts, in a different way, are figurative than the judicial right, the one primo and per se right, and the other ex consequente. eh? So is the

[24:23] nation of the Israelites that kind of a figure of the church? Let's say, figure of the church. The Israelites themselves. Yeah, yeah, yeah. As kind of ex consequente, isn't it right? Yeah.

[24:44] To the second, it should be said that the people of the Jews was chosen. By God, that from them Christ would be born, right? And therefore, it's necessary that the whole status of that people would be what, both prophetic and figurative, as Augustine says in his book against Faust. Manichean, Faust.

[25:14] An account of this also, those judicial things, were treated to that people, are more what, figurative, and judicial things treated for other people. Just as the wars and the deeds of that people are expounded what, mystically, which means in a spiritual sense, right? Not over the wars or just the Assyrians and Romans,

[25:46] although what, much more clear according to men. That's interesting. That's very interesting. I always like what it says in. Think about it with spiritual warfare. That's what says the Book of Judges. that God got some of the enemies of Israel, so they would learn to fight. To the third, it should be said that the order to the neighbor in that people, considered by itself, was what, open to reason, you might say.

[26:22] But according as it refers to the worship of God, it was above reason, and from this side, it was what, figurative. Time for one more article here, I guess. Whether the judicial precepts of the old law have a perpetual what obligatory character, right? The third one precedes us. It seems that the judicial precepts of the old law have a perpetual obligation, for the judicial precepts pertain to the virtue of justice, for judgment is said to be the carrying out of justice.

[27:05] But justice is perpetual and immortal, as is said in the book of wisdom, chapter one, verse fifteen. Therefore, the obligation of the judicial precepts is perpetual.

[27:22] Moreover, the divine institution is more stable than human institutions. Aristotle talks about the best form of government. He says, calls it the government according to a prayer. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. As if you know that the circumstances that make such a government able to be instituted would require one to what more to pray than to expect them to come in the ordinary.

[27:55] But the judicial precepts of human laws have a perpetual what obligation. Therefore, much more the judicial precepts of the divine law. Moreover, the apostle says in the epistle to the Hebrews that the what disapproval or reprobation of the what foregoing or preceding mandate came about on account of your what weakness and your what its uselessness. Which was true about the ceremonial precept, because it could not make something perfect according to what conscience, serving only in food and drinks and various what baptisms and justices of the flesh, as the apostle says.

[28:52] But the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious for that to which they ordered, to what constituting justice and equity among men. Therefore, the judicial precepts of the old law are not what disreproved, yeah, but still have their efficacy. But against this is what the apostle says to the Hebrews, chapter seven, that the priesthood being what translated is necessary that the carrying over of the law come about.

[29:25] But the priesthood is translated from Aaron to Christ. Therefore, also the whole law is translated or carried over. Therefore, judicial precepts do not still have their obligation.

[29:42] Now, what is Thomas going to say to this? huh I'm sure he'll have something to say See my footnotes here, that the sentences in the fourth book, which I'm not up to yet here, going through editing the text. I'm up to the I'm up to the 20th distinction of the starting the 20th distinction of the third book, because there's about 40 distinctions in a book, so I'm just about the halfway mark, you know.

[30:13] But if I'm going to get 20 down all, you know, then I've gone halfway, you know, and I get 20 more to go. I think I'm going to be seduced into going back and reading the first book again, because that's really about the Trinity and so. It's a very exciting thing to read.

[30:41] Yeah. Okay. Hence, it should be said that the judicial precepts do not have perpetual obligation, but they are evacuated through the advent or coming of what Christ, but in a different way than the ceremonial. Now, this is interesting. A difference that Thomas sees, son.

[31:09] If he sees a difference, then he can grasp. For the ceremonial are so evacuated that not only are they dead, but they are mortiferous, causing death, right? To those observing them after Christ, and especially after the Gospels have been divulged.

[31:35] But the judicial precepts are dead because they do not have the force of obliging, but they nevertheless are not dead, causing. Because if some prince orders in his kingdom these judicial things to be observed, he does not sin,

[31:58] unless perhaps in this way he observes them or commands them to be observed, as it were, having the strength of obligating from the institution of the old law. Then such an intention of observing would be deadly, deadly, yeah, deadly. That's good. Yeah, that's that's a good translation. Take your translation, Father.

[32:20] But the difference, but the reason of this difference can be taken from the things fore said or fore sent. For it is said that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primo et per se, right? As were instituted chiefly to figuring the mystery of Christ as something in the future, and therefore the observation of them prejudices, right, the truth of what faith, according to which we confess or by which we confess these mysteries do not already be completed.

[32:59] But the judicial precepts are not instituted to figuring, but to disposing the status of that people who are ordered to what Christ, and therefore that status of that people being changed, Christ already having come or coming, the judicial precepts lose their obligatory character, right? For the law was a what pedagogue, leading us to Christ, as is said in Galatians chapter three. But because these judicial precepts are not ordered to figuring, but to bringing something about, then their observation does not absolutely prejudice the truth of faith, but the intention of the one observing them from the obligation of law would be prejudicial to the truth of faith.

[33:53] Whence through this is had that the status of that people what could still endure, and that Christ has not yet had come, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that justice is to be sure perpetual to be observed, but the determination of those things which are just according to institution, human or divine, is necessary that they be varied according to the diverse status of men, right?

[34:25] So should women be given the vote or not? What do you say? Everybody, that's my determination. The women are really elected Obama, right? I don't think the men men didn't vote for Obama in their plurality.

[34:44] And married women, you know, vote better than than unmarried women, right? Because they have you know the guidance of their husbands a bit, you know. The husbands have some influence over them, you know.

[34:55] Yeah, yeah. A philosopher, Windshuttle or something like that, has written an essay in the New Criterion some years ago, asking, well, what are the actual fruits of women's suffrage? And I've mentioned before the fruits are few and you could say bitter. And for saying that, he's probably living in some witness protection program somewhere.

[35:25] But it's yeah, it was a very interesting essay, a very courageous one, I think, for him and his publisher. Okay. Um. Okay. Second. the second should be said that judicial precepts instituted by men have a what? Yeah, meaning that status of the regime, right? But if the city or the nation, or if the city or the nation, the tribe comes to another regimen, it is necessary for the laws to be what changed.

[36:10] For there is not the same laws that are suitable in democracy, which is the power of the people, and in oligarchy, which is the power of the wealthy, right? Is as clear through the philosopher in his politics,

[36:28] and therefore also the status of that people being changed necessary for the. Judicial precepts to be changed. To third, it should be said that those precepts, judicial precepts, dispose the people to justice and to equity according as they belong to that status, right. But after Christ, the status of that people must be changed, right? As that in Christ there would no longer be the discretion of what Gentile and Jews which were before.

[37:06] In account of this, is necessary that judicial precepts be changed. Do we have time for one more? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that the judicial precepts do not have any certain what division. Who could think that? The judicial precepts order men to one another, but those things which must be ordered among men coming into use do not fall under any certain distinction, since they are infinita.

[37:44] Therefore, the judicial precepts cannot have any certain distinction. No science, no art about the infinite, right? Unfeeling. Moreover, the judicial precepts are determinations of moral things, but moral precepts do not seem to have any distinction except according as they reduce to the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore, the judicial precepts do not have any certain distinction. Moreover, the ceremonial precepts, which because they have some certain distinction, their distinction in the law is what?

[38:31] This depends. Is brought out in the law, right? Or when some are called sacrifices and some observances, right? But there is no distinction hinted upon in the law of the judicial precepts. Therefore, it seems they do not have any certain what distinction. Ah, what is this? Look at the beautiful text here in the said contra. I, my goodness, who would have thought of that? Sed contra ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio.

[39:05] Oh boy, do I like that text. Oh boy, that's. kind of like ubi caritas est Yeah, that there's no delight that casts upon the definition of reason by the great, by the great Shakespeare.

[39:21] But the ratio of order most of all pertains to the judicial precepts through which that people was ordered. Therefore, most of all, they ought to have a certain distinction. Boy, Boy, Wow, Well, I like that.

[39:41] I think, it should be said that since law is a certain what art of instituting human life or of ordering it, right? Just as in any art there is a certain distinction of the rules of the art, so it is necessary in any law for there to be a certain distinction of the what precepts. Otherwise, there would be a what confusion, taking away, huh? useful of the law.

[40:09] And therefore, it should be said that the judicial precepts of the old law, through which men are ordered to one another, have a what distinction. According to the distinction of the ordering of what human things. Now, there's a fourfold order found in any people. I didn't know that. They asked that they're going to have the Republican candidates are going to be tonight. You know, at nine o'clock, you know, they'll be.

[40:38] order nine at eleven o'clock Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. They're talking there. The rumor was that that Bush and what's his name from New Jersey there. Yeah, that they were going to gang up on. No, no, no, no. Rubio tonight. Yeah, he's going to. You know, I don't know. Attack him. These things, these rumors going around. But Bush is celebrating on Trump. That's for sure. Yeah. Okay.

[41:17] So a fourfold order is able to be found in any people. So I'm going to ask them what that fourfold order is tonight. I get my chance to ask a question. What is the fourfold order?

[41:32] One of the what princes of the people to the what subjects, huh? Another of the subjects to each other. The third of those things which are the people to the extraneous ones, huh? And fourth to the domestics, huh? And those are three: the father to the son, the wife to the husband, and the lord to the servant, huh? You find in some of the Saint Paul's epistles, you know, that threefold distinction there, right?

[42:09] And according to these four orders, are distinguished, can be distinguished the judicial precepts of the old law. For there are given certain precepts about the institution of princes, right? And there, what? Yeah. Get the word principality, and about the reverence to be what shown them. And this is one part of the judicial precepts. Hail to the chief! President comes in. They're given also certain precepts pertaining to what citizens with respect to each other, as regarding buying and what selling, huh?

[42:50] I was reading in the sense of about you know the Christ should be called the Redemptor, you know, but this is a prophet, you know, to buy us back, you know, that way of speaking. Because that's the first meaning of redemption, I guess. And judgments and punishments, right? And this is the second part of judicial precepts. There are given certain precepts pertaining to extraneous, as about war against what enemies.

[43:17] And about the receiving of foreigners and what? Yeah, yeah. Strangers Travelers. and strangers Okay. Yeah. And this is the third part of judicial precepts. And then there are some given precepts pertain to domestic conversation about servants and wives and sons, right? And this is the fourth part of judicial precepts. Okay, that's good confirmation. To the first, therefore, it should be said that those things which pertain to the ordering of men to one another are, to be sure, in number infinite, right?

[44:14] Huh. But nevertheless, they can be reduced to some certain things, according to the difference of the ordination, that is, of humans. Huh. This has been said in the body of the article, I guess. To the second, it should be said that the precepts of the Decalogue are first in the genus of what? Moralia, huh. This has been said above. And therefore, conveniently or suitably, other precepts of that are moral are distinguished by them, right?

[44:43] Huh. But the judicial precepts and the ceremonials have another reason of obligation, not from reason, natural reason, what? Yeah. But from institution alone, and therefore there is another reason of their distinction. To the third, it should be said that from those things which are ordered through the judicial precepts and the law, one what? hints, at the the law, hints at the distinction of the judicial what? precepts.

[45:19] So there is texts in there that pertain to that. Okay. Shall we stop there? Yeah. I'll be an 80 year old man when I see you again, but I'll enjoy your steak and.