Prima Secundae
270. Summa I-II q.110 a.2–3: Grace as a Quality of the Soul, the Categories and the Five Predicables, and How Grace Differs from Infused Virtue
Class of 2016-03-03
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[0:00] Okay. Now we're going to find out where the grace is a quality of the soul, right? Now, what are the two fundamental books in logic? Do you remember what they are?

[0:24] What's the first books, though? The first two books. First books, logic. Categories. Before the categories comes the Isagoge, right? I guess the real title of Porphyry's book was the Isagoge to the Categories of Aristotle, huh? But someone was reading the Categories of Aristotle and says, "What do you mean by genus and species and difference and these sort of words?" And so

[0:55] Porphyry wrote this book, huh? Introduction to that, but got shortened to the what? Introduction, right? Just like Newton's book became known as the Principia, right? And they said you know well it's called the Isagoge by antonomasia right because it's the beginning of logic right it's the leading into of logic which leads you into all these sciences right so this is the Isagoge right so that's kind of a nice use of the word heard that figure of speech right now what's his name Porphyry says you know to his friend there that it's useful not only to understand the categories right but also for what division and for understanding of demonstration too right and definition right now the

[1:55] Hellenistic philosophers the Greek philosophers they called these two books the um Isagoge and the Categories Of Aristotle, sometimes the book of the five names,

[2:11] Isagoge, and the categories, the book of the what, ten names, right? I'm going to take out a five dollar bill, or a ten dollar bill to make concrete this thing, huh? Because in the premium to the what, Isagoge, Porphyry says, you know, to understand genus, difference, species, property, accident, it's necessary to understand that. Not only to understand the categories, but to understand definition and division and demonstration and so on.

[2:48] And I mean the categories are just ten highest genera, right? Substance, quantity, quality, relation, so right. That's very nice, concrete, right? Huh? Now, when you ask the question here, um, whether grace is a quality of the soul, right? Quality is one of the what, ten names, right? In the book of the categories, huh? Next, Aristotle is kind of more concrete. He'll say, you know, substance, how much, how towards what, you know.

[3:32] But sometimes we say more abstractly, substance, quantity, quality, relation, or something like that, right? Okay. So scandalous, huh? That Thomas is going to ask whether grace can be put in one of Aristotle's categories, right? Huh? Everything comes under one of these ten. It's a Boethius, you know. It's a return, reverting

[4:02] opinion. But is God in any one of these ten? Well, when Thomas takes up the simplicity of God, right? That's one of the things you take up. Is God in any genus, right? And you find out that God is not in any genus, except perhaps as a cause, but not as a you know species under that genus. So I mean, if grace is something divine, maybe you know, so question: is it?

[4:29] Is it also not in any genus, or is it in the genus of substance or quantity or quality or something, right? Okay. Now, when you get down to the fourth article, of course, then the third article, I should say, in the fourth article, then we've got to think more about the book of the five names, right? Okay.

[4:56] Okay. How does Aristotle distinguish those ten names? Do you remember that at all? Well, Aristotle begins by distinguishing between substance and what accidents, right? Okay. So there's one category which is substance, right? And the other nine are accidents, right? But Thomas, when he divides up the ten, he likes to divide them into what three, right? Now, Aristotle points out that everything else is existing in individual substances, right?

[5:40] Or is said of them, right? So something is said of individual substances by reason of what they are. That gives you the category of substance. Some things are said of individual substances not as regards what they are, but by reason of something in addition existing in them. That's quantity and quality and relation, right? And then the last six, right? Something is said of individual substances by reason of something what outside of them, right?

[6:12] Okay. And that's like we're in this room here, right? Okay. And in the 21st century, I guess. I'm clothed, right? Well, my cloth, my being clothed is not my substance, right? And it's not something existing in me like my knowledge or my my health, right? So that

[6:41] it's man's categories to kind of see is to give a whole lecture on that public lecture. Okay. Habitus. Okay. The two fundamental ones in that second group, though, are what quantity and quality, how much and how, right?

[7:08] So if I just ask, you know, how are the grandchildren? I'm looking at their quality, right? They're healthy and so on, right? If I say, you know, we get to see them after him, see them every while. They shot up, right? My, how tall she is, and so on. They're all, you know, we talk about those things. So it's how and how much, two different.

[7:30] To the second, then one proceeds thus: It seems that grace is not a quality of the soul, for no quality acts upon its own what subject.

[7:47] Because the action of a quality is not without the action of the what subject. So does my knowledge teach you? Or do I teach you through my knowledge? See, yeah. So the action of a quality is now without the action of the subject, right? Okay.

[8:10] Is my love love you, or do I love you through my love? Yeah. Okay. But grace acts upon the soul, justifying it, right? The justificatio impii. It says in Latin, now. Therefore, grace is not a what quality, right? Huh. Okay. Now, let's apply that.

[8:39] Here again, what does Aristotle say in the book on sophistic refutations? Huh? That the most common kind of mistake is the fallacy of equivocation, right? Huh. And

[8:54] it's curious how we use the word "make" sometimes and apply it to what form and other things, right? So, this is wooden. This thing here, I guess, and this is wooden, right? Huh. But this is a table and this is a chair, right? Well, is it wood that makes it to be a chair or a table? No, you might even have a plastic. We got plastic, you know, lawn chairs and so on, right?

[9:23] So what makes this to be a chair? Shape. Yeah. Yeah. See, but now is that the cause in the sense of the maker? See, That's interesting.

[9:37] Okay. Yeah, we say it makes it to be what it is. Yeah, yeah. One thing that annoys me about grandchildren is you know if they buy you know cereal or they're they're if they like the cereal they get that sugary cereal you know and I don't like that you know that sugary and then when they leave the house and there's there's some cereal left over so gotta eat that awful stuff

[10:03] so what makes the the cereal that the grandchildren pick out disgustingly sweet huh Sugar. yeah yeah okay so Thomas is pointing out here this is equivocation right grace according as it is a quality huh is said to act in the soul not by way of a what efficient cause but by way of a formal cause huh just as whiteness is said to make something what white and justice just right okay what makes you to be a just man justice yeah but that's a form right is that a you know what

[10:59] Yes, a maker in the sense of the third kind of cause, right? It's really the second kind of cause, right? Okay. I don't know exactly the reason why we extend the word maker like that, huh? But it's interesting how when

[11:16] Thomas, when Thomas is talking about the three words that Aristotle has—beginning, cause, element, right? And as you can see in the Metaphysics, how he takes up beginning, cause, and element. Beginning is more general than cause, huh? And cause is more general than element, right? Element is really something in the line of material cause, right? One of the kinds of cause. So cause is more general than that, right?

[11:45] But beginning is even more general than a cause, huh? So every beginning, in a way, every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a what? Cause. So the example he always gives is that the point is the beginning of a line, but it's not really the cause of the line, right? Okay. But

[12:11] sometimes when he's commenting on Aristotle, there in the beginning of the Physics, there and Aristotle uses the word beginning, cause, and elements, right? Thomas will explain what I just explained, you know. But then sometimes he'll say, you know, you could you know appropriate beginning to the what efficient cause, right? The mover, the maker, and element to the material cause, right? And then use cause for the form or the what end, yeah, because they have a certain priority there, right?

[12:48] Okay, because the form makes it to be what it is, right? And the end is the cause of all the other causes, you know. So those are the causes, you know. See, okay. And but he, notice how he attributes the beginning to the what the mover or maker, right? So it might be because of that in part, right? Huh? That the word mover or maker rather is what applied to the other causes because they're all beginning, right?

[13:20] And that the maker in the third sense of cause, right, is most obviously a beginning, right? Huh? Okay. When are you going to have dinner? We're gonna make. Yeah, who's gonna make? Right? You thinking? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I'm gonna get dinner on here sometime.

[13:43] Well, if I have to make dinner, I can make time to make this. That's the other. I gotta make time for that. Yeah. Okay. So

[14:00] that's the first objection, then, right? Huh? Notice how Thomas, you know, even reading the sentences, you know, and he often, you know, stick an argument that's based upon, you know, equivocation, right? But it's a way of calling your mind to to attend to words and yeah.

[14:22] Now, second objection, more substantial here now. huh? Moreover, substance is more noble than what quality, right? But grace is more noble than the nature of the soul. It's elevating the soul, right? To kind of partaking in the divine nature, right? For we are able to do many things through grace, for which nature is not sufficient, as has been said above. Therefore, grace is not a quality, huh?

[14:54] Yeah, got to put that in the first before all the rest, right? Put it in the first category, substance, right? Okay, that makes sense to this dumbbell over here. Okay.

[15:09] Now, Thomas is going to give us a little explanation here. To the second, it should be said that every substance is either the what nature of the thing of which it is the substance, right? Or it is a part of the nature, right? In the way in which we say that matter and form are what substance, huh? So sometimes it divides substance into what matter and form, and then the what composite, right?

[15:41] Huh? Okay. You see how closely there the word substance and nature are, right? Because nature, you know, in the second book of the Physics, and Aristotle takes it up. You'll find out that nature is both matter and what form, right? Okay.

[16:01] Was it nature for me to walk up the steps there to church in the morning? In some way. Yeah, but by reason of my matter or by reason of my form.

[16:15] Yeah, but now if I step out the window on the seventh floor and I go down, that's due to my. Would it be natural for me to go down? Wouldn't you say? First, first thing is to fly. Yeah, that's because of the matter, right? So sometimes nature, which is the beginning cause of motion and of rest, right? Sometimes you attribute it more to the form, sometimes to the what matter, right?

[16:39] Huh? Is it natural for man to to have large discourse, looking before and after? Yeah, that's because he's his matter. It's more earth than fire and air.

[16:58] No, it's a form, right? Huh? Okay. Okay. But that he goes down when he steps out the tenth floor, yeah, the airplane, yeah. That's matter,

[17:16] yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Why the helium would go up because of its matter, huh? At least here on Earth, boy. Yeah. Okay. And because grace is above the nature of man, right? Huh? Oh, excuse me. Then nature is also used in the sense of what a thing is, right? Huh? Which is one use here of substance, right? So I mean, the distinction of the senses of substance and of nature are very similar, right?

[17:56] And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be that it is substance or a what substantial form. You would think of it as being matter, but it is, say, what accidental form of the soul, right? Not the very substance of the soul, right?

[18:23] Now that which is substantially in God, right, accidentally comes to be in the soul, right? Now, accidentally doesn't mean now by luck or by chance, right? It means it means accident is distinguished from what substance, right? Where accident is defined as something that exists not in itself but in another, as in a subject, right? You'll come back to this when he talks about what the subject of the soul is in the fourth article.

[18:57] Okay, that which is substantially in God is accidentally in the soul, partaking of the divine what goodness, as is clear about what knowledge. Okay. Now, sometimes you might say that God, that grace is a partaking of the divine nature, right? But when you partake of something, are you that thing substantially? No. Now, when you talk in ethics, now we talk about this a lot, and we say,

[19:31] can anger be reasonable? Yeah. But is it substantially reason, or is it partaking of reason, right? So reason is not the substance of what? Anger. Yeah, Yeah, it's partaking of it, right? Well, likewise, if our soul partakes of the divine nature, right, is that going to be its substance? It's going to be something in the light way of accident, right? Okay, it's something impressed upon the anger in this other example, right?

[20:12] From reason, something of reason has been what impressed upon that, right? Okay. According to this, therefore, because the soul, right, imperfectly, right, partakes, and notice that is the Latin text there, imperfecte participat, right? Going back to what Aristotle says in the third book, I guess it is of the thing that whole and and perfect mean almost the same thing, right? Yeah, yeah, imperfecte participat takes a part, right?

[21:06] Okay. Since the soul imperfectly partakes of the divine goodness, the partaking of the divine goodness, which is grace, that's a very thing, as is Saint Peter in his epistle that says that. The text that they most point to. Okay. Then this partaking of the divine goodness, which is grace, is had in a what more imperfect way in the soul than that in which the soul subsists in itself.

[21:45] Is, however, more noble than the nature of the soul, in so far as it is a what expression. That's interesting expression, or a participation of the divine goodness, but not, however, as regards the way of God's being. I am who am right now Okay. It was God said to uh was it Moses, "I will show you every good." And Thomas says, "It is to myself. That is myself."

[22:24] That's kind of a stepping stone, right, to understanding what grace is, right? Huh? It's not the substance of the soul, right? It's going to be an accident, right? But is it quantity or quality or relation? It's going to be quality. We'll see eventually. Okay. Let's go to the third objection.

[22:54] Moreover, no quality remains after it ceases to be in the what subject, huh? But grace remains, huh? For it would not be corrupted, because thus it would be what turned into nothing, right? Just as it was created for nothing, Whence it is said to be a new creature. Okay. In the Epistle to the Galatians, therefore grace is not a what quality, huh?

[23:30] We're kind of thinking of grace. There's being kind of a substance, right? Huh? And therefore another creature, right? To third, it should be said that just as Boethius says, as Aristotle said before Boethius,

[23:45] the being of an accident is to be in another, right? In itself. Strictly speaking, nothing is in itself, right? Huh? Whence every accident is not said to be a being, right? Which is perhaps the most equivocal word there is, being, as it were, having itself being, right? Huh? But because by it something is. So

[24:20] just like, is does knowledge know or what? Yeah. Whence it is more said to be of being, right, than being, right, something of it,

[24:43] and because it belongs to that which what? Yeah. That which belongs to come to be or to be corrupted, of which there is what being, right? Therefore, properly speaking, no accident either comes to be nor is it what corrupted, right? Huh? But it is said to come to be or to be corrupted, according as the subject begins or ceases to be in act, according to that what, accident.

[25:17] And according to this, grace is said to be created, right? From the fact that men, according to it, are created. That is to say, are constituted in a new what, being. This is very profound. From nothing, right? That is not from the merits. That's beautiful. If it's created, right? Yeah, not from your merits that you have grace.

[25:49] According to that, in the epistle to the Ephesians, created in Christ Jesus in good works. That's a fancy footwork that's it Yeah, oh yeah, he's smart as a Thomas guy. Okay.

[26:08] But against these objections is upon that of Psalm one o three, huh? That your face might be what, exhilarated? Cheered up. Cheered up in oil, right? Says the glass that grace is the what? It's the light, huh? The light, so to speak, and the brightness shining. Yeah. Yeah. But the nitor of the soul, right? How do you translate nitor in terms of the the beauty of the soul Yeah, but his idea of the from the sense of sight too is indigen.

[26:46] Yeah. Yeah, yeah. It's interesting the beauty of the soul ever. But the nitor, the brightness of the soul, is a certain quality, huh? Just as the beauty of the what body, huh? Well, you know how Dionysius always speaks of light as being in the what notion of beauty, right? Huh? Give me some clarity, right? Huh? So Mozart's most beautiful music, some clarity in Mozart's music, huh? An amazing thing.

[27:37] Okay. Therefore, grace is a certain quality, huh? Thomas says now in the body of the article. I answer it should be said, as has been said, in the one who is said to have the grace of God, right? Huh? There is signified that there is a certain. Effect right of the gratuitous right, will of God right.

[28:10] Now it's been said above that in two ways from the gratuitous will of God, is man what aided right, huh? In one way, in so far as the soul of man is moved by God right, huh? To knowing something, or willing something, or doing something,

[28:37] and in this way, the gratuitous effect in in man is not a quality, which would be like a form right, but the motion of the soul right, huh? For the act of the moving mover in the moved is motion, as is said in the third book of the physics right. That's interesting huh? That I was just thinking about you know how Aristotle says in the ninth book of wisdom that act means first of all what motion right, huh?

[29:12] Then that are on is carried over and applied to what form right, huh? And when you talk about those two causes, the mover and the maker right, huh? They're both a cause of act in another right, but the mover is a cause of the act called motion, and the maker is a cause of the act called what form right? So the carpenter is a cause of the chair in the sense of a maker right, huh?

[29:53] He made the chair. Okay. It's this beautiful set there at Assumption there, on the private dining room there you know with these beautiful wooden chairs you're reading, and was told me by one of the the priests that years ago I guess this guy couldn't afford, you know, any money to send his kids to Assumption's like that so, but he he was a he made this beautiful and they had these all these I don't how many years you know they're going to last forever you know I was told until the end of the time I guess and they're really striking you know but he really you know gave this wood a form you know solid and you know these things are you know.

[30:36] I had to ask to go down and look at them Yeah yeah yeah but they're very impressive you know you see where did they ever get this you know and anything like this in a in a department store. And yeah, but I'm struck by the fact that Aristotle speaks of the mover before the maker right, huh? Because that's more known right, just as motion is more known than what form right, huh?

[31:03] And you can see that in words like action and activity and so on. You're thinking more of motion than of form, right? It's kind of strange to talk shape as being an activity or an action, right? Words that are derived from the word act, right? So the first meaning of act is motion, right? And

[31:24] it's funny how you know not only people watch sports all the time, but but you know the some of the modern philosophers are you know the idea that everything's in motion, right? Like Hegel and Marx after him, you know, all reality is kind of in motion, right? And even Heraclitus had that kind of idea, you know, all things flow, nothing remains, you know, that all things are in motion, right?

[31:47] But at least they're hitting upon what's but most known, right? I don't know anybody who says all things are at rest, you. And nothing is in motion. I mean, got a few people, you know, few people deny motion because it's so hard to understand, right? Aristotle says, you know, it's a strange thing, you know. motion he says, but not impossible to be.

[32:10] The thing that has the least being, you might say, right now. Yeah. When you see a director, he says, "Ready, action." What do they call it? It's a movie. Yeah.

[32:27] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. When I go to count money in there on Monday night, now we do it. Monday night, six thirty, and there's always, you know, if it's during the football season, they always talk about the game, you know, and and about so and so about this, you know, so on. It's kind of a common topic we we bring up, you know, and so on. Like everybody's watch that, right?

[32:44] You know, something at rest, you know. I guess you don't watch somebody rest. Somebody sleeping. Okay. Okay. Okay. So sometimes God is a mover, right now. Okay.

[33:24] I think I was mentioning how you know my favorite book, though, the Summa Contra Gentiles. The second book is more about God as a maker, right? Huh. And the third book is more about God as a what? Mover, right? Huh. Because in the second book, you're talking about God as, like we say in the creed, huh? Beginning, God made heaven and earth, right? You know, He formed these things, right?

[33:48] But then He's going to what? Not leave them, you know. He's going to move them towards their end and towards Himself, ultimately, right? Okay. Another way, man is aided from the gratuitous will of God.

[34:09] The graceful move of God. What would be the good way to say that in English? The gratuitous. Habitual gift that's what I'm saying According it, according as some habitual gift by God is poured into the what? Soul, huh? Okay. Gratuitous will Well, he says the gratuitous from the gratuitous will of God, right? Man, for the gratuitous will of God, um, according to which or by which, right?

[34:43] And habitually, huh? But a habit now is some kind of a what? Form, as opposed to emotion, right? Huh? Okay. And is that word "infunditur" poured in? Is that taken from the continuous?

[34:59] Yeah. And this is because it is not what suitable, right? That God should be less provident, right? Or provide less, right? For those whom He loves, to the extent of what having a supernatural good, right?

[35:24] Than those that He loves only for having their what natural good, huh? Now, to natural creatures, he thus provides that not only does he move them to their what natural acts, but also he throws upon them forms, right? And certain what powers, right? Which are the what beginnings of acts, right?

[36:00] The words principia there, right? But applied to the to the maker. of the world. And thus the motions by which what Inclined. Inclined they are themselves inclined to support. moved by God, right? They become what Conatural to creatures and easy. That's because they have the habits, right? The forms and the what powers, right? Okay. Otherwise, it would be simply what. It would be like almost like force in a sense, right?

[36:34] And it wouldn't be according. They often quote this other thing here. Oh, he's going to be quoting. I know he's going to quote that. No, no, I just thought about it because I've seen him quote it other places, you know. And that God disposes all things suaviter, right? He disposes all things sweetly, you might say, right now, because what he moves them to, they are naturally inclined to, right?

[36:59] Because of the nature and the powers he's given them, right? Okay. So that according to themselves they are inclined to these motions, right? Going back there, since he didn't finish. Okay. And thus the motions by which they are moved by God become to the creatures connatural, right? In accordance with their nature, right? And easy, right? Because they have this inclination. And according to that of wisdom eight, he disposes all things what sweetly.

[37:36] Nice guy, huh? Nice guy, huh? He's somebody. Yeah, yeah. He's. But he's not a body. Well, he was too. See how you can't transcend the the continuous, right? He's somebody. Yeah.

[38:01] Much more, therefore, those whom he moves to achieving some what? Supernatural. yeah. Does he pour in some forms, right, with supernatural qualities, right, by which sweetly and promptly, right, they are moved, right, by him, for achieving an eternal what? Good, huh? And thus the gift of grace is a certain what? Quality, right, huh? Okay. No one would think it's a quantity, would they?

[38:40] Maybe something. And any relation is not a quality, right, that would make the action. But notice, you could say that um, uh, if for itsiori, you need some kind of a form to do this promptly and sweetly, right, with pleasure, delight. If it's something above our nature, right, you need something even more, right, huh? If you have this nature, enjoying things that are in accordance with it, so you sweetly and you know the cat moves out very quickly, you know, with the paw.

[39:18] Yeah. Friend of mine, friend of mine, he had rescued a cat from someplace, a tree or something, and he brought it in the house. There, he knew I had liked to play with the cat. He came up, so we were playing with a belt there. I'll tell you that, and the cat just you know playing like that little cat. And finally, put down a belt that was kind of striated, built, you know, and the cat, you know, and I thought that he was the snake is a natural enemy of the cat, you know, and the cat was, you know, and you kind of you couldn't even hold him there, you know, the other person was moving that particular colored belt.

[39:53] The other ones he was playing all the time, you know, and then he just he moved. You know, it's a little kitten. You know, he wasn't probably the older cat would not be deceived by that kind of a belt, you know. But it's kind of striking to see that, you know, the instinct, right, huh? Yeah. Yeah, yeah,

[40:10] yeah. But amazing! I watch these squirrels, you know, when they they run around the tree and this one runs around the other after it. I don't know if they're playing or if the one's mad at the other and chasing them, you know. But you see that, you know. I see it many times, you know, and they're so adept, you know. I mean, the way they run up trees and jump from things.

[40:28] Yeah, yeah, yeah. yeah you see them fall off Better than me. Yeah. Yeah. But is grace never a quantity? Because sometimes you, can't you have more grace and less grace? You can be? Yeah, well, that's that's that's a you know used to be a quantity, right, huh? But then the grace itself is not a quantity, right? It's quality. But they can you know qualities can have more or less, right, huh?

[40:54] But you know there are discussions too of what that means, you know, huh? To be more or less, but it's not like it is itself a quantity, right, huh? Any more? They say, you know, when the children are what is is the body of my grandchild a quantity?

[41:15] Say, well, no, it's a substance, right? But it has quantity, right? Huh? You know, and can be more or less, right? Can be taller than he was, shorter than he was. I'm the age of shrinking now. I'm probably shrinking, you know, going down downhill. Yeah. Okay. It

[41:40] was not a number, right, or a length or a width there, because the soul itself is not a what a body, right? Huh? So how could the soul itself have a what length or width or depth, right? Except metaphorically speaking, right? Huh? Okay.

[42:02] So now you get another categories for. This right now, distinction between substance and quality and so on. Now we're going to get into the book of the five predicables.

[42:23] See, if you have something like, let's say, you have a triangle, right? And if you say a triangle that it's a rectilineal plane figure, right? That's an example of the genus of triangle, right? The more remote would be a plane figure, right? Even more general would be figure, right? Which of a figure, plane figure, rectilineal plane figure, right? That's kind of approximate genus, right? Now genus is a name what?

[42:58] said of many things, univocally, right? Signifying in common what they are, right? Then you have to add differences, right? To distinguish one from the other, right? So the genus is being said of what they call species, right? And the differences separate one species from another under the same what? Genus, right? Or the species is the difference is what the species has in addition to the genus, right?

[43:29] So that's three of the names, genus, difference, and species, right? But then the other two names are property and what? Accident, right? And property and accident are something outside the nature of the thing, what it is, huh? Because the genus signifies what it is in general, right? The species in particular, right? And the difference signifies how it is, what it is. Well, the property and the accident signifies something outside what it is, right?

[44:02] But the difference between property and accident is that the property follows in some way upon the nature, right? And the accident has no connection with the nature, huh? So if I say the triangle is a rectilineal plane figure, I'm giving its genus, right? They say it's three sided, you know, I'm giving it's difference, right? If it's a triangle, that's the species itself. But now if I say the triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles, that's a what?

[44:39] Yeah. That's why Porphyry says it's good for knowing what demonstration is, huh? Because in a demonstration, like that's the proposition 32, is in, Book 1 of Euclid? You're going to prove that every triangle has its interior angles, right? Equal to two right angles, huh? But if the triangle is green, let's say, right? That's not part of what it is to be a triangle to be green, is it?

[45:03] No, and is it connected with the nature triangle? Doesn't follow upon the nature, right? Okay. So this is important to see that distinction, right? Huh? I say, what is what is the soul to the powers of the soul?

[45:24] It's like which which predicables they call these five, in Latin. It's like which predicable to what predicable? See, I say, what is what is the triangle to uh rectilineal plane figure? You say it's a species to genus, right? What is it to three sided? Well, there's a difference, right? What is it to uh uh interior angles to right angles? Well, it's a property, right? Species to a property.

[45:55] What is it to green? Well, it's a species to it's an accident, right? What is the soul to the powers of the soul? Species to property? Yeah, species to property, right? And the more noble the soul, the more powers it has, right? Huh? So the plants, right? Huh? Just have the vegetative powers, right? Powers of nutrition and growth and reproduction, right? Huh? But then the animal soul has what?

[46:26] Sensation and and the emotions, right? That dog is out there barking at something. What's he barking at me? He's barking at you. I saw the monks. One monk said, "Send him over," I think, you know, to greet me or to bite me. What was it? But you know, a dog is is known for his anger, right? And his you know his aggressiveness and so on. And so what is the soul to its powers?

[46:53] What says species is to its what properties, right? Now get to man. Man has got the the full soul, right? Huh? So sometimes Aristotle speaks of the soul of the plant or the animal, or the beast. That is to say, is being what part of the soul, right? Huh? Only man has got the full powers, right? But Aristotle in the three books on the soul, there he takes up the vegetative powers first, and then the sense powers, and then finally the intellectual powers, right?

[47:26] Huh? So this would be important now. I mean, is grace and and the virtues or grace and faith, hope, and charity, right? How are they related, right? Huh? Well, more like the species is to the what property? We'll see, right? Huh? So just as you know, from from receiving this soul from God, I had certain what powers that followed upon that naturally, right? Like properties of my soul.

[47:56] So when I received grace, right? There follows from the grace, which we'll find out, is in the soul itself, right? Certain properties in the what powers, right? In the higher powers, that is to say, right? Like faith and in reason and hope and what charity and the what will, huh? We're getting ahead of ourselves here, right? But just talk about the importance here, you know. We're a logician here, you know.

[48:21] We're talking about the book of the five predicables and the book of the ten categories, huh? They both figure in here. So philosophy has some use there in theology, huh?

[48:38] Okay. So we take a little break here now before we begin article three. So the third then goes we'll go to the third article here. To third then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that grace is the same thing as virtue, huh?

[49:02] For Augustine says that operans gratia, operating grace, is faith is is the faith which operates through what love, right? As is had in the book on the Spirit and the Letter. But the faith which operates through love is a virtue, right? Therefore, grace is a what virtue, huh?

[49:33] Now he explains what Augustine really means, huh? So you need Thomas to know what what Aristotle is really saying, and what Augustine is really saying, right?

[49:49] To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? That Augustine names faith that operates, right? That faith operating through love, right? He up he he calls it grace, right? Because the act of faith operating through love is the first act in which grace making one what Acceptable is made what known, okay? He explains Augustine in the way that the objection doesn't understand what Augustine is saying, right, huh?

[50:32] Okay. Moreover, to whomever, to what, to whatever belongs the definition, right? Also, the thing being defined, right? So this figure is a three-sided plane figure. It's a triangle, right? But the definitions given of virtue, whether by the saints or by the philosophers, fit what grace, huh? For it makes its bearer good and makes his what activity good, huh? That's the definition that Aristotle has, right? In the second book of the Ethics, right?

[51:14] When he's starting to take up the virtues, right? Okay. And it is also, and this is Augustine's definition now, right? A good quality of the mind by which one lives what rightly, because you've picked out a grace now. We got grace as a quality there, but okay. But not every quality is grace, huh? Okay. Therefore, grace is a virtue, right? Okay. Well, so he says.

[51:55] The good that is laid down in the definition of virtue is said according to its agreement to some what nature already what existing, right? Either essential or what partaking of, right? The grace is a partaking of the divine nature. Thus, also, good is not attributed to grace in that way, right? But as to the what? Root of goodness in man, right? Huh? Just like we say human virtues in accordance with human nature, right?

[52:36] Huh? So we say that the theological virtues and the infused virtues are in what harmony with what grace, right? Huh? And they, in a sense, follow upon it, right? Huh? But they're not the same thing, huh?

[52:55] Okay. Moreover, grace is a certain what quality, huh? Now he's going into the species of quality, right? Huh? But it is manifest that it's not in the fourth species of quality, which is form and figure, right? Huh? Standing around something, because it does not pertain to the what body grace, right? So grace is what not the shape of the soul, right? Soul doesn't have a shape, though.

[53:32] Nor is it in the third species. This is the species Aristotle is giving, because it is not a passion or a what undergoing quality, right? That's the third species, which is in the sensitive part of the what soul, right?

[53:49] Like to be warm, right? To be sweet, as is proven in the seventh book of the what physics, huh? Okay. For this grace is not in the body, but principally in the what mind, huh? Nor again is it in the second species of quality, which is a what natural power or lack of power, right?

[54:23] Because grace is what above nature and does not have itself to good and bad as a natural power. Okay. The the the dog. Looks at one. Matthew was barking about. Huh? He was not allowed into class, right? Yeah. Hey, I'll be I'll be as famous as Saint Francis. You know, he preached to the birds, right? And they and they came and you say how's that dog coming

[55:00] You should have been a Dominican Yeah. yeah. Oh, let's get chitter around here. Today, by the way, is our feast of Saint Thomas. Oh, it is very good, very good, very good. Catherine Dressel, yeah, we had you. Okay. Okay. Therefore, remains it must be in the first species, right? Which is a habit or disposition, right? But the habits of the mind are virtues,

[55:45] because also science itself is in a way a what virtue, right? One of the virtues of reason. Therefore, grace is the same as what virtue. So he seems to have gone through, you know, by kind of a process of elimination, right? That it's got to be, you know, manifest reason why it's not the fourth one; it's not shape, right, and figure, and it's not the sensible qualities and so on, and it's not a what natural power.

[56:14] These only habit or disposition, right? What's the answer to that, right? Is it because you know Aristotle didn't know about this kind of a quality, right? Or are going to say that Aristotle has exhausted, you know, the kinds of qualities, right? Or my logic teacher in college thought so. There might be covering some other other species, you know, quality. Okay, I know what Thomas says, huh? To the third, it should be said that grace is led back to the first species of quality, not because it's a habit or disposition, but because it's what like that, huh?

[56:53] It's kind of a disposition of the soul, right, huh? It is not over the same as what as virtue, huh? But it's a certain what habitudo, right? Certain way of having yourself, which is presupposed, right, to the infused virtues, right, in a way like a what like like like to like a property of it, right, huh? So something falling from it, right? Just as a beginning and a root of them, right?

[57:26] Okay. So that's what he's doing, right? He's he he's saying it's not the same thing as the first species, but has a certain what likeness to that, right? Just like I was talking about with equivocal words there, right? You know, I said the fifth, meaning that Aristotle gives there. In the metaphysics, is what causes before the effect, right? But that doesn't seem to be to be fifth in what place, right?

[57:54] And so I put it alongside the what, the the second sense, right? That doesn't mean it's the same sense as that, right? Huh? As a certain what likeness to that, right? Okay. The second sense, if you remember, is something can be without another; the other cannot be without it. That's a little bit like cause and effect, isn't it? But the effect can't be without the cause, right?

[58:18] Huh? Okay. It's not the same sense because you can't have cause without an effect, but you can have something, you know, that can be without something else without that other thing, right? Okay. But if something can be without another thing, but not vice versa, there seems to be a kind of dependence, right, of one upon the other, right? Huh? And I was going to make a joke about that one.

[58:50] When you're teaching in high school or college, you know, if a girl walks by outside, the guys are distracted, right? Huh? But you guys are so cut off on the female thing that the dog walks by.

[59:05] He's digging in the flower bed. That's why. I don't want to do that. Got to chase him up. When my cousin Donald was first teaching, around the Chicago area. there,

[59:27] the place had been used during the war. I guess they had a airport there, kind of, you know, takeoff. And so there's still airplanes that are taking off right now. So he's lecturing on, and the airplanes take off. Everybody's looking out the window, you know. Well, I came and I sat in those class, you know, like those where the kids are being distracted by the airplanes taking off, you know.

[59:48] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Things in motion, so they catch the eye. Yeah, yeah. Had one professor in college, you know, he was a English professor, you know, but he would often, you know, boom, you know, something like that. Everybody jump like that, you know. It's to wake them up, you know. He'd do that. He was a.

[1:00:21] He's funny, funny guy. You go and see him in the office, you know, he'd be very good and talk and so on. He's okay. Don't get the harder he'd say, you know.

[1:00:30] It's funny guy, but okay. Now against this, if grace is a virtue, right? Oh, we yeah we finished that. But against this, if grace is a virtue, it most of all would seem to be one of the what three theological virtues. But grace is not what faith or hope, huh? Because these can be without what grace making us acceptable, yeah. Nor also charity, because grace, what? Yeah, nothing's before itself, as Augustine says in the book on the predestination of saints.

[1:01:26] Therefore, grace is not a virtue. That's a good text there, right? Goes back to my axiom of before and after. Nothing is before after itself, which I use to show that you have to. Have what distinction before? Can see order, right? Can see it before and after.

[1:01:45] Okay, that's what the master says now. That's a pretty good one there. That convinces me. Gratia praevenit. It comes before charity. Well, nothing means it's better than charity. It means it's before cause, right? I answer. It should be said that some lay down that they are the same grace and virtue in their very what essence or nature, but that they differ only according to reason.

[1:02:22] That grace is said according as it makes a man gracious in God's eyes, right? Pleasing to God, right? Or according as it is given gratis, right? But virtue, according as it perfects one to doing well, and the magister of all people, right,

[1:02:44] seems to have thought this in the second book of the sentences, huh? Okay. But if someone rightly considers, huh, the notion of the definition, the ratio of virtue, this cannot stand. That's what Thomas likes that phrase. So you say this is nothing. Some things just cannot stand. You know, that's another phrase you use. Somebody will say it's frivolous, but those are very common ones.

[1:03:16] Because as the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Physics, huh, virtue is a disposition of the perfect, right? I say perfect what is disposed according to its nature.

[1:03:35] From which it is clear that the virtue of each thing is said in order to some pre-existing what nature. When a thing is thus disposed according as is fitting or in agreement with his what nature.

[1:04:02] For it is manifest that the acquired virtues, huh, through human what acts, about which we have spoken above, are dispositions by which a man or man is suitably disposed in order to that nature by which he is a man, accordance with reason, right, and so on. Now the infused virtues dispose man in a higher way, and to a what higher end, huh? Whence also it is necessary that they be in order to some higher what nature, and this is in order to a to the divine nature partaken, right?

[1:04:49] That's how he uses Aristotle there, right? To argue from one to the other, right? The human virtue must be in accordance with what the nature of man, right? Well, then the theological virtues must be in accordance with higher nature of man, right? And this is the the higher nature is not the fundamental nature of man, but the nature of God partaken of in man, okay?

[1:05:21] And this is in order to the divine nature partaken, according as it is said, huh? Hey, it is from Peter, huh? I knew it was from Peter. Okay.

[1:05:34] He gave us maxima, greatest and precious things promised to us, that we might be made what consortes, I guess, the idea of partaking there of the divine nature, right? Okay, so that's the Pope himself, huh? First one, yeah. And according to the receiving of this nature, we are said to be regenerated as sons of what God, huh? It's interesting, huh? When Saint John talks about seeing God as He is, he first talks about we are the sons of God.

[1:06:14] We are said to be the sons of God, and we are the sons of God, right? Huh? And then he says we know when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as He is, right? Huh? That's something in the line of what nature, right? Rather than the line of what habit, right?

[1:06:35] Thus, therefore, just as the natural light of reason is something apart from the virtues what acquired, which are said in order to this what natural light, so also the light of grace, which is a partaking of the divine nature, is something apart from the infused virtues, which are derived from that what light, huh? And are ordered to that what light, huh?

[1:07:10] Whence the apostle says in the epistle to the Ephesians, "You were once darkness, huh? For some time, but now you are light in the Lord. Walk therefore as sons of the light, huh?

[1:07:26] For just then as the acquired virtues on the natural virtues perfect man for walking in a way in accordance with the natural light of reason. So the infused virtues perfect man for walking, in a way that's in agreement with the light of what grace. What could be more clear than Thomas, huh? Doctor Clarissima.

[1:07:54] Kind of funny how it was. The Jesuits are calling their their teacher the Seraphic you know, Thomas, this is the Angelic Doctor. This is Seraphic

[1:08:10] Okay, we got to stop there or whatever. Yeah. Okay.