Prima Secundae
272. Grace in the Essence of the Soul, and the Division of Grace: Gratum Faciens and Gratis Datum (Q.110 a.4 – Q.111 a.1)
Class of 2016-03-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/272-grace-in-the-essence-of-the-soul-and-the-division-of-grace/

[0:00] Now against this is that by grace we are born again, right? Generated again. That's interesting. I'd seen them being born again, but here now saying regenerated into being sons of God. But generation before ends with what essence, right? Then to the powers, huh?

[0:25] So nature is another word for generation in living things. First arises the nature of the thing, right? And through that you come to the powers. Therefore, grace is before in the essence of the soul, then in its powers, huh? And this had kind of been anticipated. We said from the third article, right? Huh? Where we saw that grace was in the soul, totally. So he says, "I answer right at the beginning.

[0:55] It should be said that this question depends upon the preceding one, right? For if grace were the same thing as virtue, right? Differing ratione, in definition. Let's take a simple example, and I'd say is a line thirty-six inches long and a line three feet long the same line? Was three the same as thirty-six? Is a foot the same as an inch? So the three feet and thirty-six inches aren't the same length, are they?

[1:33] Well, now you have to say they are the same length, right? The same length. Yeah. And they're just defined a little bit differently, right? One by thirty-six and foot, and the other by you know. That's kind of simple example, but it's easy to see, you know. Okay.

[1:54] So if grace is the same thing as virtue, differing only in definition, it would be necessary that in the power of the soul, that was in the power of the soul, as in a subject, right? For the powers of the soul, for the power of the soul is the proper subject of a virtue. Different virtues in different powers, right? So I've got geometry in my reason and Justice in your will, yeah, and courage in my irascible appetite, huh?

[2:35] My father's nickname for me was Tuffy, huh? My wife thinks that's very funny, but everybody tells. I mean, my father would tell that to me. My father's nickname for me, Tuffy. I don't know why. I remember up the doctor's son across the way. They've been on the way because we became quite friendly, you know. Good,

[3:02] he's got a vineyard now in California. Anyway, if, however, grace differs from virtue, right, huh? It cannot be said that the power of the soul is the subject of grace, huh? Okay.

[3:27] Because every perfection of a power of the soul has the notion of a virtue, right, huh? As has been said above. Hence, it remains that grace, just as it is before virtue, right? So it has a subject before the powers of the soul. So that's based upon the axiom of before and after, as Boethius says, right? That nothing is before or after itself, right?

[4:03] So if reason was the virtue of the soul, it would be before itself, which is impossible, right? It's kind of interesting because Thomas is talking today. I think I was reading the sentences there. He's talking about the Ten Commandments, right? And the first, the first article, the first question is whether they should have been put in stone, right? They should be written down, written down, right? And one of the objections is that the Ten Commandments pertain to the natural law, which is written in our hearts.

[4:47] Therefore, what you need to write it down, right? Yeah. And Thomas points out you don't have to write down the axioms in speculative philosophy, like the whole is more than the part. Put it on a thing. But he says because of our what passions and so on, and our bad customs, right? The natural understanding of the what natural law is what darkened over, right? You don't quite see anymore, right?

[5:18] I was reading there that Hillary Clinton, you know, she even accepts partial birth abortion, right? Which is pretty gross, you know. And but it's clouded over, you know. It's kind of. You heard about this thing at the at the Super Bowl, right? They had a thing for Doritos, right? Doritos. And and the mother was had a baby in here, and of course they're showing the little baby in there.

[5:44] He was moving. and we talk about things that are exciting. And NARAL, you know the national abortion rate is there. This is humanizing, the thing, right? And I guess you know some women, you know, they know they're pregnant, but they don't really fully realize until they see that, right? I guess some mothers started, you know, they have a picture of the of the little one in there, and they started sharing these pictures, and they're very angry about that because it's humanizing, you know.

[6:19] It shows you how perverse the area is, you know. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Actually, a young lady, young mother, she had a baby last fall. When she was expecting, she sent me a photo of the sonogram, ultrasound, whatever it was. I don't know, maybe it's the same thing, but she was so excited about the baby. She wanted me to see the first picture she had, which is just a blurry thing, but still, she was so excited.

[6:47] This is the baby. Yeah. Yeah. The story about Bernard Davidson, the beginning of his conversion was seeing abortion performed on ultrasound and actually seeing that that's a human life. Yeah. Yeah. That was the title gave that documentary. It's called "Silent Screen." Has the the child? It sees opening its mouth when they're pulling its legs. Yeah. Was that the movie that that Reagan had shown to the staff of the White House?

[7:14] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That was we saw that on the cover when it first. came out Yeah. We're some professors at school. here So so moving. to see it

[7:26] Trying to escape. the thing that was coming after him You can see the baby was terrified. I was hearing about a case there, you know, where the abortion clinic, you know, because they did the ultrasound because they want to see where the baby is to to grab it, and but the they don't show it to the patient, right? I guess the the in this particular case, it revealed there were twins in there.

[7:47] He just couldn't go through it, so he came back and showed it to the woman. She's out of the abortion clinic, you know, but but I mean, you know, need two babies, but that's just just two babies. It just something's striking. At least she couldn't she couldn't you know keep it hidden from the woman. Who was it? Who was it? The mother went. Was it one of these pro-life activists now?

[8:13] The mother went in for an abortion, and they did the abortion. Went home, and some weeks later, they went. Whatever happened, I think I know the story of what this was, but they they didn't realize there were twins in there. Yeah. They left one of the babies. Oh yeah. And that baby came to her and was born. Yeah. And and basically now I think I can't remember who this is.

[8:35] I heard about this testimony somewhere, and I said because I should be dead, but my mother didn't know I was still in there, and the doctor didn't know. I was still in there Yeah. Yeah. That's really yeah. And if I people you know you know even so-called nice people you know I mean people see it pretty good in many ways but they think you can have an abortion because you've been raped right?

[8:56] And I noticed that the pro-life marches now they have a bunch of women who were the product of a rape you know and they've got a right to be too you know and and and someone's talking about you know eliminating some because it was a product of rape you know that they say I mean I don't have a right to be you know and and that's really powerful when when when when when they don't realize someone might be there who's actually the yeah yeah.

[9:28] Once remains at grace just as it is before virtue, so it has a subject before the powers of the soul. There's a proportion there right? A portion of before right? Thomas looking before and after I'd say. He's obeying Shakespeare right? His definition, his reason is is in harmony with. Look, he's looking before and after. It has a stable disposition to do this. Yeah, looking before

[9:55] and after. Okay. Thus that is in the essence of the soul right? Huh? Once remains at grace just as it is before virtue, so it has a subject before the powers of the soul. Thus that is in the very what essence of the soul. But that's also because the regeneration whereby you become a son of God right? Like a new nature Yeah. Now, since when John talks about the beatific vision, recalls the fact that we are called the sons of God, and we are, in fact, he says right.

[10:32] He's very explicit, huh? Just then, as through the understanding power, man partakes of divine knowledge through the virtue of what? Faith. And according to the power that is called the will, right? Huh? He partakes of the divine what? Love. Through the virtue of charity. So also through the nature of the soul, he partakes according to a certain what? Likeness of the divine nature through a certain regeneration or recreation.

[11:13] Why does he add that recreation? Because it's restoring something that was given to us in creation, but it's not. Yeah, yeah. We don't get our our soul. The soul of the dog comes from his parents, right? But the soul of man doesn't come from your mother and father, but it comes from God immediately, right? So, I have my body. I get my body from my mother and father.

[11:45] In fact, I get my body from God, but through my mother and father, right? But do I get my soul from God through my mother and father? See, no. I get my soul is created by God, right? At the time when my body is disposed to receive it, right? So the preparation of my body and it's being disposed to receive this kind of a thing—that's a proper subject for this kind of a form—is due to my mother and father, right?

[12:15] Due to God in a remote cause, but my soul is there, right? By an act of what creation, right? So it's interesting that he uses the term there, recreation, right? As if I've been what created again, right? Born again. Yeah, yeah. But if he just said regeneration, you might say, well, okay. Then you might think the other day, right? So it's just. St. Paul uses the new creation.

[12:44] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that's beautiful the way Thomas takes the care that he has. How is it that a animal soul comes from parents through natural generation? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because it doesn't transcend the body. See, see. In other words, for a soul to come from its parents, it has to come to be through the transformation of matter, right? But our soul can't come to be that way because then our soul would be what tied to matter, right?

[13:18] Which is what an animal soul is, right? And Aristotle, you know, in the book on the generation of animals, he says that the human soul doesn't come from the parents, from the other, from the parents. So he knows that. See, he knows that because of his study of the soul in the third book of the soul, right? Where he argues that the that the soul doesn't depend upon what matter for its being, right?

[13:44] The way it goes is, you know, that if the soul had existence only in the body, if its existence was tied to the body, then it would have only operations in the body, right? And he proves that the understanding universal and so on, the large discourse, one sense, is what not in the body. Therefore, its being can't be what immersed in the body, right? Huh? Yeah. In a very concrete way, Thomas uses a term, you know, that the the soul of the other animals is entirely immersed in the body, right?

[14:24] But ours is like something, you know, partly in the body, but partly above the body, right? Huh? Okay. Yeah. Between animals and angels. Yeah, yeah. But Aristotle says at the beginning there, when he's raising the problems, right? We all want to know whether the soul is immortal or not, right? Whether it can exist. When the body ceases, and this is dependent upon this other question, right? Is there any soul in the operation of the soul, right?

[14:53] That is not in the body, because that other question has to be solved by by whether there is or not, right? Okay. I remember one time I'd have a guy in the course on the De Anima there, you know, would be a a brain, brain, is, your mind, and so on, and so I'd kind of you know restate their arguments, you know, more forcefully than they could, you know.

[15:20] I'd say a blow on the brain, you know, blow on the eye interferes with seeing, right? Therefore, the eye is the organ of sight, right? A blow on the brain interferes with thinking, right? And alcohol going to the brain interferes with thinking, and so therefore the brain is the organ of thought. Is that a good argument? And they'd all say, Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean The guy was convinced that the brains are in a thought, "I Said okay, now suppose you and I are in a room that has no windows, right?

[15:54] And there's one light there, in the middle of bulb there that's on. And as long as that light's on, we can see each other, right?

[16:04] Now, a blow on the light bulb interferes with my seeing you. Therefore the light bulb is the organ of what? Sight. No, no, that's not right. That's all right. Yeah, no, see, okay. So I say then there's two ways of interfering here with sight, right? One is to attack the organ, right? Other is to attack the what? Object, huh? You take away the light, you take away, yeah, the sense object, right, for the for the eye.

[16:36] So which is it in the case of the understanding, right? Aristotle will point out that the proper object of our mind is the what it is, right? A something sensed or imagined. So when you interfere with the image, right, huh? You interfere with the thinking, but on the side of the what? And the side of the object, not in this. but then, by separating, he's going to argue that the power itself and the act is not in the body, right?

[17:09] Because if it were, it would not be universal, right? But would be what? Singular, right? I can't I can't imagine triangle in general, can I? See, if I imagine a triangle, I can imagine a triangle in my head, and can imagine another triangle next to it. Well, am I imagining triangle in general? No. I only imagine an individual triangle, right? But my reason understands something what? Universal, right?

[17:41] Huh? And that singular imagined is just something that reason understands the what it it is of that thing, right? So that's not in the body that understand universal. You know, when my friend Shakespeare there says that reason is the ability for large discourse, you might recall that there were three reasons why a discourse could be called large. One was that it's about the large. Another is that the beginning or the end of the discourse is large.

[18:21] And the third thing is that the discourse itself is large or long, right? Huh? And you know, like in Euclid there in the long. This proves this and this this this this this and you know try to get to the Pythagorean theorem, it's proposition 47, right? But you're capable of that long discourse, huh? Now sometimes the beginning or the end is said to be large, right? And I see people who don't even think of Shakespeare.

[18:46] They talk about a large induction. A large induction is a large discourse from its beginning, right? Or you know, the you get a thing and take an example from science. There, the you get an equation, right? Force equals mass times acceleration, right? You can plug in all kinds of masses and all kinds of acceleration all day long, and so the end is what large, right? All the things that can be what, yeah, yeah, see?

[19:20] And you know, in philosophy, you know, principle like like we using the definition of reason here, looking before and after. I mean, places you look before and after, you know, you know, you can go on forever. But now the first sense of being about the large, there's two senses of that, right? In one case, large could mean what? Covering a large area, so to speak, right? To to go back to continuous, right?

[19:46] You know, Socrates, you know, speaks the universe like a big, you know, blanket covering all these things. But a discourse about the universal, right? That's a large discourse, right? When I discourse, you know, and I say, you know, no odd number is even. How many numbers am I covering in a way? Infinity of them, right? So you can have a large discourse, a discourse about the universal, right?

[20:11] You have a discourse about man, right? What? How many men there are? I keep on coming to be, right? It's a large discourse. And the other sense of large would be great things, right? Large as opposed to small talk, right? Talk about small things, right?

[20:30] Mother said my father liked her small talk because it helped relax him a bit. She's a good understanding woman, you know. She didn't take too seriously what she was telling him, you know. But little things that happened in the neighborhood that day or something, you know. Sometimes small talk and you know, small talk, you know, just just to recover. And but but the other part part I was tangled.

[20:57] A discourse about the universal, right? Now that's beautiful, right? Covers a large area, right? Infinity of things, right? So it's because reason can discourse about the universal. That's one way that you realize that it's something immaterial. The senses and even the internal senses, like the imagination, they're tied to the what singular, right? If I'm going to demonstrate, for example, that the triangle has interior angles of two right angles, that's something said universally of every triangle, right?

[21:30] But the triangle I imagine will be either isosceles or scalene or equilateral, and I'm not understanding that, right? Understanding triangle and even more universally than the species of the genus. Triangle,

[21:48] but there are other ways of showing this too. You know, I mean the fact that you can know some immaterial things, right? I know that God is immaterial. How could I know that by, you know, any bodily power, right? Yeah, yeah. Is it

[22:10] like knows like in that immaterial knows immaterial? Well, yeah. I mean, our knowledge of our soul and the immateriality of our soul is the gateway to knowing about the angels and God, right?

[22:28] I mean, this eighth book now of the physics there with the student comes on Tuesday night, you know, and we're going to be coming up. There is going to be material things coming up here now. This is kind of the this kind of seen at the end of what of natural what philosophy, right? Huh. Once you get to the immaterial, and talk about immaterial things as such goes up to wisdom, right?

[22:51] You know, but that's why it's called metaphysics, right? First great editor of Shakespeare's works there, you know, for the civilized world, right? Called it the metaphysics. Aristotle didn't use that term, but metaphysica comes after natural. In regard to the Aristotelian mystic understanding of the soul, is there any strong modern refutation of it, or attempt to refute that understanding, or is that teaching just ignored? No, there's there's there's maybe ignored in some cases, misunderstood in other cases.

[23:29] You know, the the a lot of you read the the English purists, you know, they don't really understand the distinction between the reason and the imagination and so on.

[23:45] You know, I imagine that so. Yeah, the English you see that that's like a custom in Newman. He often, I don't know about his grammar of assent because I haven't looked at that, but I think he often speaks that way when he means thinking about something, he's imagining something or feeling something. Yeah, yeah, the English are very concrete that way, you know. The famous contrast between the the French and I talk about the the abstract there, you know, like anymore because for another reason, you know, that preparing for it, you know.

[24:17] But in Thomas, we'll show you, like I was saying before, there in the text of the De Potentia, right now, all our words go back to the continuous, right? And we start to talk about life, right? And the growth of the plant and the walking around of the dog is running under the cat and so on is not the highest example of life, even in this world, right?

[24:41] Huh. But to know even sensing is example of life, right, or sign of life. An understanding is a much fuller knowledge of life, right? What life can be? It's an a knowledge much fuller life than just moving around and. And but he starts there, you know. Yeah, starts with that, right? And then later on, we carry it over, right? The word motion to, you know, operations. Thomas uses the term operations.

[25:16] We do something that is not a motion, right? You know, Kasurik used to always quote Thomas The man sitting makes wisdom, quote Thomas: "The man sitting makes wisdom." you know, But I think the actual translation is: "The man sitting becomes wise." Right? The man running around, you know, he doesn't quiet down enough, right? But

[25:38] you know, the Greek word for science is episteme, right? Which comes from the Greek word meaning "coming to a halt" or "a stop."I always Take the example, you know, of Archimedes. Was it? I guess in the bathtub taking a bath, and then finally, he was relaxed enough that he thought something, he thought, "I found it Eureka without getting fully dressed, and so on." And but he's what?

[26:07] He's what? He stopped thinking now, right? He's just all excited, right? because of what he thought, but he was relaxed. He was thinking, you know. Okay.

[26:22] So this is beautiful looking before and after Thomas. Whence remains that grace, just as it is before virtue. So it has a subject before the powers of soul. Do you see the proportion there, right?

[26:39] The grace is before the supernatural virtues, right? Just as the soul is before the powers, so it must be in the what essence of the soul. And just as through the intellectual power, the understanding power, man partakes of the divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and according to the power of the will of divine love, right, through the virtue of charity, so also through the nature of the what soul, according to certain likeness, the divine nature through a certain regeneration or recreation.

[27:19] What precision, you know, in these guys? Sometimes you kind of stop, you know, when he's explaining Aristotle's examples and ex- explain the order of the examples and how well they're chosen, and so on. This, is if I was reading a modern Thomist, I wouldn't bother to see some reason for their examples that they chose or the order of the examples. I mean, it's just it's kind of ad random, you know.

[27:40] But these guys. uh they're just kind of writing on and on and they need an editor. Diarrhea of the mouth, is used to call it. Yeah. Okay, so we should take a little break there now before we. Okay, first let's go recall back the where we are now. Go back to the proemium here at the beginning of question one o nine. Okay,

[28:07] we divide the consideration of what grace into three parts, right? And then he divides the what first part into three, and we're about to start the third part of the first part. Okay, just look at the necessity of grace here in the question one o nine. Consequently, we're not to consider about the exterior beginning of human acts, to wit, God, in so far as we are aided by his grace to acting well, right?

[28:38] And first, we're not to consider about the grace of God. Secondly, about its his cause, right? And third, about his effects, right? That's very easy to understand that distinction, right? I remember when I was teaching the course on love, right? And Thomas did something like that. You passion talked about love itself, and then talked about the causes of love, and then the effects of love, right? Okay, now the first of those three about grace itself, he divides again into three, right?

[29:09] This guy's taken up with three and two, this Thomas guy. For first, we will consider about the necessity of grace, and that was in question one o nine, right? Those articles, and then the one we just finished. Secondly, about grace itself as regards its what essence or nature, we just finished that, and now we're getting the third part, which will be its what division. Now this guy coming in will ask him, right?

[29:37] Is the consideration of grace here in the prima Secundae divided into two or three parts? I would hold three. Okay, what are those three parts?

[29:50] On the divisions of grace. No, no, no. It's grace itself, the causes of grace, and the effects of grace, right? That's good. So he looks at grace itself, and then he's going to look before grace at its causes, and then after grace in its effects, right? Good example of looking before and after, right? Now the first of those parts, grace itself, right? He divides into two or three parts.

[30:22] Um, three. Yeah. And the first part is the necessity of grace, which we've read already, and the second part is the what nature of grace, right? Okay, which we just finished now, right? These four articles. Now we get the third one, the division of what Grace, huh? Okay? There's no part on the demonstration of grace, right?

[30:57] Thomas sometimes describes the philosophical method as defining, dividing, and demonstrating. That's what Euclid does, right? Defining, dividing, demonstrating. And Porphyry, in the in the proemium that he has to the Isagoge, right, says it's useful not only for the categories, my friend, but for definition, for division, and for demonstration. To know what genus is, and what species is, and what difference is, and what properties, and what accident is.

[31:27] So now we're down to division of grace So now I can get. Away with too too simple understanding of grace. So let's look at question one eleven now. The division of grace. This is the third part of the first part, right, for the consideration of grace. Got that? The third part of the first part. We're in the prima secunde, but that's a different thing. Yeah, this is the first part of the second part of the summa.

[31:55] There's only two parts to the second part. But the whole summa is divided into three parts, right? So we're in the first part of the second part. Okay.

[32:12] Then we're asked to consider about the division of grace, and about this thing, five things are asked. First, whether it is suitably divided, grace by the grace gratis datum and the grace gratum facientem, right? The grace you might say freely given, right?

[32:37] The grace gratuitously given. If I just stick closer to the word gratis, right? And the grace making us what acceptable, right? Okay. Now, as an old acquainted with these things, I suspect that this naming here should be understood in what kind of naming we've talked about before.

[33:10] Because isn't all grace gratis datum. So how can you distinguish grace, you know, given gratuitously from grace? Doesn't seem make sense, right? See? But don't we sometimes distinguish between man and the animals? But isn't man an animal too? So how can you distinguish between man and the animals? Doesn't make any sense, does it? It's like distinguishing between numbers and even numbers.

[33:48] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So you have animals, right? Who have the ability to sense, right, and so on. Okay. But then man is something in addition to being able to sense, and that is reason, right? So he gets his own name, right? Man, and we sometimes keep the name animal for the. animals lacking reason. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And there's many examples of that. We've talked about that with the enemy before.

[34:21] This is very common. Very common. Very common. You see it all kinds of places, huh? Okay. So I suspect that grace gratum facientem is going to be superior, right? Huh? Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Now, now sometimes you have another way this takes place, and that is when the common meaning, right, is found fully in one, right, and imperfectly in the other. Then the one that is fully found and keeps the common name, and we give another name to the what deficient one.

[35:03] So sometimes we see that reason is a kind of understanding, and the angels have understanding, right? But then sometimes we keep the understanding for the name of the angel's power, and we give man a new name, which is reason, right? Because he has an overshadowed, you know, understanding. Yeah, doesn't understand too well, right? And he has a hard time understanding. He's got to reason things out, think them out, right?

[35:32] Huh? See? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So let's see what that division is, right? But you can see a little bit about the naming of it, right? Okay.

[35:53] Then, secondly, about the division of grace gratum facientis. That's the second of those two that he first right through operantem, operating and doing, and co-operantem. Okay. Now, what the heck is that? But that's a distinction of the second sense of the second kind of grace in that previous.

[36:18] Now, apparently, he's going to a division of the same thing. What the division of the same by going before grace and following grace? Now, what the heck is that? Huh? Grace, come over these things, huh? They're all in the tradition, right? Come back and read them. Yeah. Now, those apparently the second and third are divisions of the second of those two that were mentioned in the first question.

[36:47] Second, in the order of the words. Now, the fourth one is about the division of grace gratis datis, which I guess is a famous one is given by my friend Saint Paul, right? Okay. I'm from Saint Paul, Minnesota. You know. Yeah. Special connection. Yeah. You read about the original name of Saint Paul? It was Pig's Eye. And of course, we're the capital of the state of Minnesota now.

[37:11] And I said, if they had kept the name Pig's Eye and not given the name Saint Paul, it never would have become the capital of Minnesota, right? Oh.

[37:21] Yeah. Shows you the importance of names, right? You know. Yeah. Now, what's the fifth article? What's the comparison of those two kinds of grace? Which is is better, right? Which is let me be a comparison of them in terms of the fourth sense of before and after, right? Which is better, huh? Maybe that would confirm what I kind of suspected from the way they're named, right, huh?

[37:53] Okay. Well, it's another example that first way of naming there is the word disposition and habit that's kind of relevant to us here. Sometimes Aristotle will distinguish between disposition and habit, and then he'll speak of habit sometimes as a stable disposition, right, or a disposition not easily lost, right. So what does habit have that the other dispositions don't have? Well, that's stability, right, huh? So it gets a new name, habit, and the ones that are easily removable keep the name disposition, right?

[38:37] So my mood today might be my disposition, right, because it's easily removed, right, huh? You know, if you have these cut flowers, you know, disposition. I mean, now they call it the attitude, re-adjustment or something, you know. But but but a mood. I think a mood is is a disposition, right? You know, you start the day and being a good mood or a bad mood, or and it disappears in the day when those things happen.

[39:03] Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Okay, so let's look at the first one here. To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that grace is not suitably divided by grace making us what acceptable. You want to put it that way, the good graces of God and grace given gratuitously. For grace is a certain gift of God, right, as is clear from the things said above. But man, therefore, is not pleasing to God because something is what.

[39:47] Given to him by God But rather the reverse, huh? Therefore, something is given what to someone gratuitously by God because He is what. Acceptable. Yeah. Therefore, nothing is the grace gratum faciens, huh? It's coming out objection here. I would compare that expression, even though the ending is different because of the Latin, but we speak of somebody whose persona non grata. Yeah. Not accepted. That's the opposite of.

[40:25] Yeah. Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that grace is not said that grace is not said to make one gratum, acceptable, effectively. That means as a efficient cause, but formality. And we met this before, haven't we? You see, you say, what makes this is wooden, and this is the table, right? Okay. Well, why is this a table, and why is this a chair? What?

[40:56] See, I might ask that question in a different way and say, what makes this to be a table and this a chair? What would you say? Carpenter, the shape.

[41:07] Well, it's using two different senses, right? You said you probably table in the context here. You'd say it's the shape that makes one a table and another chair, right? But you might say like this wise guy over here, is a carpenter, right? And that's good. That's goodly brought in though, right? Because you see the two different senses of what. Yeah, and one is formally is form, and the other is really the third kind of cause, right?

[41:34] We did the second kind of cause, right? So he says grace is not said to make one gratum effectively, right? Is an efficient effect, but formaliter right? Is a form, right?

[41:51] To it that through this a man is what justified, reordered, right? And he is worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to what is said in the Epistle to the Colossians. He made us worthy, right? On the part of the what?

[42:12] Yeah. In light, in light, huh? Text there. Okay. So I'm just taking off the example of what you know. In times, a lot of times he he will he will clear up different words, right, by an objection, right? So it's a way of of formally making you see a certain distinction or see the importance of this distinction.

[42:39] Now the second one is the objection that I was given. Whatever things are not given from what preceding merits are given what gratis. But even the good of nature is given to man without any preceding merit, huh? Because nature is presupposed to merit, huh?

[43:02] Therefore, nature itself is given gratis by God, huh? But nature is divided against grace. Oh, here we go. Yeah. Unsuitable, therefore, is it said to be gratis datum? Is laid down as a what difference of grace? Because it's found outside the genus of grace, right? Aristotle says in the categories, right? That different genera have got different kinds of what differences, right? So. Ah.

[43:49] You might divide animals by what two-legged and four-legged, right? Huh? See. But would you divide numbers by two-legged and four-legged? No, they have a different kind of differences, right? Huh? Okay. Would you divide habits by two-legged habits and four-legged? See. Okay, so this is argument, huh? Even nature is what gratis, right? So how is this a difference of this is more universal? That's a serious these difficulties here.

[44:21] The second, therefore, it should be said that grace, according as it is given what gratis, excludes the notion of what Debt, huh? But there can be understood. What a twofold debt. Okay, this guy sees distinctions. What you have to do to see before and after. So,

[44:50] one proceeding from merit, right? Huh. Which is referred to the person himself, right? Of whom it is to act or to do meritorious deeds, right? According to that of Romans four, and who what acts, right? Huh. Reward is what. According to debitum, according to kind of owed to him, not secundum gratiam. Another is what is due from the condition of nature. If, for example, we say that it's owed to man that he have reason and other things which pertain to what human nature.

[45:37] In neither way should a debt on account of this be said that God is what. Yeah. Yeah. But rather, in so far as a creature ought to be subject to God, so that in Him, right, the divine ordering might be fulfilled, which is that such a nature has such conditions or such what properties, right?

[46:11] And that doing such things, such things will what follow. Natural gifts lack the first debt, right? But not do they lack the what? Second debt. Debt. Debt.

[46:32] But the supernatural gifts lack both debts, and therefore specialius. Yeah. They vindicate for themselves the name of what grace. So that's the other kind of what.

[46:59] Yeah. Where one has more fully, right, the common meaning, right? Huh. And so it keeps the name, right? And the other one that has it less so gets a other name, right?

[47:19] Okay. Okay. Now I'm just going to come back to the other one. Look, the third objection now. Every division ought to be. By opposites,

[47:42] but even the grace that is gratum faciens, that making us pleasing to God, to which we are justified, is given to us gratis. That was my objection, right? Thomas has placed that third here, right?

[48:02] According to that of Romans chapter three, verse twenty-four, justified gratuitously, right, through His grace, right. Therefore, grace ought not to be what divided against what? Grace gratum faciens against grace gratis datum, right? Okay. Remember that in the in the logic there, you know, where Aristotle is talking about definition and what property, right? And he speaks of definition sometimes as a property, and sometimes he divides definition against property.

[48:42] Well, what do definition, property have in common? Well, in strict sense, they're convertible with the thing defined that has a property, right? But definition brings out the nature of the thing, so it's a more perfect thing, right? So it gets a new name, right? Definition, and the other properties, right? Properties Keep the name property, right? Okay. That's the kind of naming that you have, right?

[49:16] Just like you know, the dispositions. Some dispositions are easily lost, and some are firmly kept, as we said. or have some stability. that's kind of a noteworthy thing. So we give a new name to that call it habit, and we'll keep the name disposition for those, right? That's taking place here, right? Okay.

[49:38] The disposition of the wind sock. Yeah, yeah. It seems to me that that therefore you might say, you know, in one way a habit is a disposition; another way, it's not. Well, how can you can affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing? The word disposition must be what equivocal. It's equivocal by reason here, right? There's a reason why this happened, right? Okay.

[50:08] How many fingers? Hmm. Four fingers and a thumb. See now, why did this finger get a new name? Yeah. It's very important when I grab my glass, right? Indispensable.

[50:30] Yeah, yeah. So. So that's a good example, though, right? Because it's right right in your face, right? Instead of me, so there's a reason why we do that right now. There's a reason why this, why these keep the name finger, and this one gets a new name, which is thumb right now. Not because it isn't a finger. Yeah, yeah. But because it has something. But now the word finger becomes, you know, equivocal, right?

[51:01] One sense, the thumb is a finger, and in a sense, it's not, right? Yeah. It runs through, you know, our speech. You know, you can see that.

[51:19] Is the boy a man? Yeah. But since he's given a different name, right? He's not a man. He's just a boy. You take easy on easy on? him Okay So, so

[51:42] you shouldn't divide something against this. Does make any sense to divide number against odd number? Let's see, Thomas, response to the third. To the third, therefore, it should be said that grace gratum faciens adds something above the notion of grace given gratuitously, right? Which also pertains to the notion of grace, because it makes man what? Yeah, it's a little easier to see in the Latin than in English.

[52:17] And therefore, grace gratis data, which doesn't do this, right, retains to itself the common name, right? Just as in pluribus aliis contingent, I can give you examples. I've done that already, right? Okay. And thus are opposed the two parts of division, which are gratum faciens and non faciens gratum. So there you can see the opposition when he states it that way, right? But the one non faciens gratum just keeps the common name.

[52:53] So that's beautiful. That way of naming things makes you think both what they have in common and what one has that fits it apart from the other, right? Because of its super excellence, or because of its in other cases, you know, for its its defect, huh? Okay.

[53:18] Okay. Now, against all this is the great authority of the apostles, so maybe Saint Paul, you know. And I think you know that who's the what did Pope say about

[53:29] Augustine? You know, the church has made you know the doctrine of Augustine on grace its own doctrine, right? You know, the teaching of Augustine on grace is the teaching of the church on grace, right? But Saint Paul is very much in in what the thinking of Augustine, right, about grace, huh? Because it's very explicit compared even to the Gospels in some way, right? Okay. And so it's interesting that that the that the texts here, right, and the sed contra, which are authoritative arguments, right, huh?

[54:03] They don't take a text from the Gospels, but from the what? Yeah, I mentioned how when Thomas divides the the Bible, right, he divides it on the basis of what? Power, I mean, not power, but law and grace, right? You know, and it's because of the words of the great Saint John, there, right? For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came to Jesus Christ.

[54:33] So he divides the Old Testament sometimes into two: the law of the King and the law of the Father, right? But it's about the law, right? And in the New, he divides in the basis of grace, right? Now he divides the New Testament into what three parts, right? The origin of grace, which is Christ, and this is in the four Gospels, right? Then the nature of grace, right?

[54:59] Which is in the Epistles of Saint Paul. He pulls them out, right? And then the effect of grace, right? Which, in one word, is the Church, right? And then you have the Acts of the Apostles, which about the origin of the Church, the canonical Epistles, which is a the growth of the Church, and then the Apocalypse, the final state of the Church, right? So in that division, you can see the importance of the what Epistles of Saint Paul for grace, and now for the texts, he goes not to the Gospels, even though the greatest books of the of the New Testament, even as the Vatican teaches, but you go to Augustine, right?

[55:41] I mean, to Saint Paul, to the Epistles Saint Paul, right? And one is from the Ephesians, and the other is from the Romans, right? So all things fit together when you have the truth, and you divide, you know, some understanding as Thomas does, huh?

[56:00] But against this is that the Apostle, and he's the Apostle by what? antonomasia he and Peter. What is it? John, Paul, the second is always called them the princes of the Apostles, right?

[56:15] But against this is what the Apostle attributes both to grace, huh? Both gratum faciens right? et esse gratus datum, right? To make one, yeah, and to and to be given gratuitously. He says, as regards the first, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, he gratificavit, huh? He made us acceptable in his beloved what son, right? As regards the second, it is said in Romans eleven six, huh? If it is grace, it is not from our works, huh?

[56:58] Otherwise, grace is not grace is not gratuitous, huh? Okay, but there are many other things about grace in there. Okay, it can therefore we can distinguish grace because it has one of these things only, or what? Utrumque, right? And that's going to be grace in the fullest sense.

[57:22] Okay, let's look now at the body of the article here. The answer should be said as the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans:

[57:38] the things which are from God are ordered, right? Quia a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Yeah. So as Aristotle says, God must be a friend of the philosophers, huh? Because he's using their reason all the time. But reason looks before and after, right? And therefore likeness is the cause of love, right? Quia a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt, right? So he must be the friend of those who look before and after.

[58:08] So he must be a friend of Thomas, we saw, looking before. He must be a friend of Shakespeare. I think so. Yeah. Yeah. You're going to set up Shakespeare's grave there in church, dear, his hometown.

[58:28] In this, however, does the order of things consist that some things, through other things, are led back to what? God. As Dionysius says in the book on the celestial hierarchy, huh?

[58:45] Oh, with the Greek commented on that. Thomas commented on the divine names, huh? Okay, but they both knew they both worked. Since therefore grace is ordered to this that man might be led back to what? God. Huh? That's interesting. He doesn't say that man might be led to God, but led back to God, huh? Okay, because he had left him kind of. Since therefore grace is ordered to this that man be led back to God in a certain order in which this is what done, huh?

[59:22] That some are led back to God through others. Okay. According to this, therefore, there is a twofold grace. This is interesting. One through which a man himself is joined to God, and this is called grace gratum faciens. The other by which one man cooperates with another in order that he might be what led back to God, and the gift of this sort is called grace gratis data, because it's above the what faculty of nature and above the mere of the person, it's conceded to a man.

[1:00:09] But because it is not given for this that the man himself be justified by it, but rather that he cooperate for the what Justification of another, therefore it is not called gratum faciens. Doesn't do that, huh? And about this kind of grace, the apostle speaks. I guess when the place of the division of this is given, we come back. I guess in the next article, when we next, I mean, the fourth article.

[1:00:42] To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, ad utilitatem right? Of others, right? It seems to me. Now, I was talking to my student Tuesday night there about the division of two and three, you know. And I was saying, you know, you can't understand the division of the seven sacraments. I mean, by one division. Say, but I would distinguish what five and two, right? And seems to me that matrimony and holy orders, right, are not primarily ordered to the good of the person being ordained, right?

[1:01:21] Or or the person is being married, right? It's not us. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's about children, right? I I I told you it tells you my. My uh sister-in-law, Dolores, my brother Rich's wife, you know, she talked about when they—I don't know when they moved to Saint Paul or someplace—but she went over to kind of register them in the parish, right? And so she was fairly newly married, then, and but they already had, you know, children, and so the the priest, of course he asked them, you know, Do you have any children?

[1:01:49] And she said, yeah. And I said, well, now you know what it's all about. She just laughed, you know. and so, or it says about the priest, you know, that he's taken from men, you know, to offer sacrifice, right, to the name of the people and so on. So it seems to me that that those two sacraments are ordered to the to to utility, right? You might say to the the good of the church or the good of the children, right?

[1:02:22] Huh? And the the children are really the kind of the common good of the mother and father, right? Huh? And so the father, we call him a father, right? You know, okay.

[1:02:38] Big discussion, whether you should call the pastor, you know, father or or uh, Monsignor. We, we, we never call Monsignor Dionne, you know, father, we always call him Monsignor, You know, you know, a guy said, well, if I'm in public with my people, I call him Monsignor, but if I'm with them privately, I call him father. The one guy said in the counting house. Yeah. Uh, so so, but the other five sacraments seem to be ordered to the good of the person receiving the sacrament, right?

[1:03:08] Then you just distinguish the three and the two there, right? Huh? Because the two are removing evil. Thomas does the first three, you know, that the baptism and confirmation and Eucharist. It goes back to the vegetative soul to illustrate, you know, because the likeness there, right? Because there's there's birth and there's growth, which is like confirmation, and then you know, yeah, the three powers of vegetative soul, right?

[1:03:39] So these things are given according to the likeness of these things, huh? You need those three things. That's a marvelous body of the article there, Thomas. Do we have time for another article or not? No, I think we're good. Okay. So, I'd like to go on to next time, then, huh?