Prima Secundae
274. The Plan of the Summa Contra Gentiles and Divisions of Grace (Summa I-II, Q. 111, aa. 2-3)
Class of 2016-03-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/274-the-plan-of-the-summa-contra-gentiles-and-divisions-of-grace/

[0:00] I was curious. Summa contra gentilias is written. Is it a great part to try to help the infidel Muslims understand? Yeah, yeah, and you might say, you know, that in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you're a little bit closer to philosophy or natural reason, right? Than the Summa Theologiae, insofar as the division, right? The division of the Summa Theologiae is into how many parts? Two or three. Three, yeah, and we're in the second part, right?

[0:39] Which is then divided into two parts. We're in the prima secunde, and there's this big thick secunda secundae, right? Okay. So clearly the Summa Theologiae is divided into three parts, right? And you look at Thomas's division of each part, you see he divides into two or three.

[1:03] Now, usually, I mean, sometimes sometimes brevities does less. Now the Summa Contra Gentiles is divided into what? I say, what are you doing, your perquest, right? See, yeah, but.

[1:22] If you want to understand the division of the Summa Contra Gentiles, you can understand it by division into four. But you have to divide the first three against the fourth book, right? Now the distinction of the first three books is that you consider God in Himself or by Himself in the first book, and then as He says in the Apocalypse, I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, right?

[1:52] The Arche, the beginning, and the Telos, the end, right? So in the second book He deals about God as the beginning of things, right? The Creator and so on. And then in the third book, God being the end of things, and His providence moving things towards His end, right? So you have those three, right? Okay. Now what does He do in the fourth book? Those three Those three again, but what's the distinction? then Between doing the same thing twice, right?

[2:25] See Natural and supernatural Yeah. What he does in the first three books is those things are going to be known about God in Himself and as the beginning of things and as the end of things by natural reason as well as by what faith. So in those first three books, he's going to proceed usually by natural reason, right? And then maybe at the end of the article or into the chapters he's writing to, he'll give maybe the authorities from what?

[2:58] Yeah. So he argues that God is from God being pure act that He's not movable, right? Huh? And then he'll maybe at the end of that thing he'll quote this passage from our good friend Saint James here, right? Okay.

[3:15] Okay. But in the fourth book, right, he deals with those things that can be known about God in Himself or as the beginning of things or the end of things only by what faith, right? And there he's going to proceed by faith, right? You see the way he proceeds, right, in the chapters, you know. Hey, there's things in the Bible that seem to indicate there's a proceeding in God, right?

[3:43] There's even a Father and a Son, and you know, and you know, you gradually develop it, right? Okay. Or the Summa Theologiae doesn't follow that distinction, right? So in the Prima Pars, we talk about God in Himself, both insofar as he can be known by reason, natural reason as well as by faith, plus the Trinity, where you know that, yeah, yeah. So that's the difference, right? So although the Summa Contra Gentiles divided into four books, to understand that division you have to divide the first three against the what?

[4:25] Yeah. Just like when Thomas, you know, divides philosophy up there in the Proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics, huh? And he divides philosophy according to the order it considers, right? So if you're going to distinguish philosophies or kinds of philosophy or parts of philosophy by the order they consider, you have to begin with the distinction of order, right? But not any distinction of order. It's not the distinction of order in the five senses of order.

[5:03] But you have to distinguish them by what? Distinction of order in comparison to reason. Okay. And then Thomas begins by saying, well, there's an order which reason does not make, but only considers. Like the order of natural things, right? Then there's the order which reason makes in its own acts, and then there's the order which reason makes in the acts of the will,

[5:35] in the actions following upon them, and then the order which reason makes in wood or some other exterior matter, right? And then he says, well, natural philosophy is about the order not made by reason, and wisdom is also about an order not made by reason, right? And then he says, and then logic is about the order made by reason in its own acts, and then ethics is about the order made by reason in the acts of the the will, and then the so-called mechanic arts is the Greek, the Latin word for it, the order made by reason in exterior what matter, right?

[6:17] We see, well, here's a distinction of four, right? Yeah, but the first one is the order not made by reason. The last three are orders made by reason. So that's a distinction into two, and then the second of those two made by reason is divided into three, and then you can place where the ethics is. He's gonna he's into this is the introduction to the ethics, right?

[6:44] And then you're gonna divide that third one into ethics and domestics and politics, right? Okay, but but Thomas doesn't bother, you know, to to divide into two first here, right? You know, it's kind of clear, right? But to understand what he's doing there, he divides it really into two, and then one of the two into what three, and that's what you know. I mean, Aristotle when he when he first enumerates the categories, he enumerates ten of them, right?

[7:17] And exemplifies them, but he doesn't give you any division except into ten, right? See, so then then the commentators have to what? Yeah, now Thomas when he takes up the distinction of the categories, he does so in the third book of the physics because Aristotle is comparing motion with acting upon undergoing, right? And acting upon undergoing are two of the ten categories, but motion is found in quantity and quality and where, you know, and so he's got to explain the categories a bit, right?

[7:53] So there he gives a division of the ten, but he divides what either into two or three, and then subdivides into either two or three, right? Until he gets all ten. And in the fifth book of wisdom, where Aristotle again is dividing being according to the figures of predication, Thomas again explains the distinction of ten, but always dividing into either two or three and subdividing into two or three until he has the the ten, right?

[8:25] He does the same thing with the ten what commandments, right? He divides them into two first, right? Three and seven, right? Those two numbers, right? And then, you know, then you got three. You can divide that into three, right? And then the seven are divided into what? Two or three, right? I think it's more into what? Three, right? Because you have, well, you divide into two first, right?

[8:50] You divide the fourth commandment, which is affirmative, to the against the last six. The last six are divided into what? Deeds and words and desires, right? And explains why you do that. So you're always dividing into two or three to explain this, right? When you deal with the seven sacraments, you have to divide the ones that are ordered to the good of the one who receives the sacrament primarily, right?

[9:15] And the ones that are ordered to preparing you to do something for the church or the and the family or as a priest, right? So you have to divide. It seems almost always, you know. I was. Don't stick in the mud. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean, that kind of sits here, you know, at the order. I gave a talk one time at a convention there on the distinction of the order in the two summas, right?

[9:45] At that time, I didn't try to say either one was a better order, right? But I thought something is made known, right, or more clear in one order than the other order, right? So it's kind of talking the excellence of each one of them, you know. I still would speak that way, you know. But you try to understand in more detail, right? Terms of the rule two or three, you know.

[10:07] Thomas' question about the Summa contra Gentiles it was written at a time where Islam was active in philosophy to a certain extent, and I was wondering though, is philosophy as we understand it actually possible in Islam if their understanding of Allah is arbitrary? Yeah, yeah. You don't have any real theology there to speak of, you know. And God, I mean, God is kind of whimsical in his his decisions, you know.

[10:42] But I mean, part of the reason why Thomas maybe divided theology in the way he did in the Summa Contra Gentiles was that he's replying to the need of the Dominicans there, right? And the attorney, not the attorney general, but you know, master general, yeah, wanted him to do something, you know, to help them down there, right? So it makes natural to separate those things can be shown by natural reason, right?

[11:08] As well as by faith, and then when you get to things that require faith, you don't try to convince by reason alone that there are three persons in God, right? But you learn how to defend what we say is not being contrary to what reason knows, and it doesn't involve saying there's more than one God, right? Because. Is Islam even able to make a valid claim that it can use reason?

[11:37] Because there is nothing really to put the foundation on. Yeah, their God is arbitrary. Well, there, see, there are some Mohammedans that did get involved in philosophy, right? Like the Averroes and Avicenna and so on, and they probably, though actually, the history of Islam got in kind of trouble, right? And so they're kind of in bad grace, you know. That's what we we learned that. Yeah, yeah.

[12:07] So there was there was a rise in this, but it was never a majority, and then it was simply outlawed, outlawed and destroyed. Yeah, yeah. I actually think when I was first doing Yachin, I was kind of interested in the Averroes and Avicenna and a lot of things in common with them, you know, and you I'd go down to the you know the Egypt there to the famous university there in Egypt and uh, and I go talk to these guys I get along with them, probably good you know I probably would be I'd probably change my life change my life and you know that's happened historically right that that they kind of that's what our our friend Benedict was kind of pointing out right that

[12:42] they had given up to some extent right the attempt to Yeah yeah And even some Protestants are a little bit like that you know they think that that we've gone too far you know and using our re what's that predestination they get. That's that's at the root of it itself.

[13:01] the reason why I was asking is I was curious about how do um how do you deal with devout Muslim because rational discourse is very difficult if not impossible or or do you see yeah yeah very diff very very very difficult right because they might rather chop your head off than talk with your head yeah it might it might be better to hope that they're um um they're not as consistent in their with Islam as as as they would be in their reason That's the only th that's the only hope That that they could see the reason for something, which is kind of a work of grace rather than just sticking That's what Chesterton pointed out about it's not it's not say art that you

[13:45] know some people say poets are mad or somebody said the poets aren't as mad as the logicians are because the Muslims are very logical as far as that goes, whatever I'd say, not to say there's something wrong with logic but that if you start with the wrong premise and you're consistent you're going to end up in insanity that's the problem and and that's what you're hoping for is that they're actually going to be more human than they're logical in terms of their religion.

[14:09] I was reading Romeo and Juliet you know Mercutio he talks about the imagination it's really beautiful what Shakespeare has to say about the imagination kind of

[14:26] Queen Mab there I guess it's Queen of the Fairies right She trickles across the the lips of a woman she dreams of kissing you know and he dreams across the the fingers of the lawyers he dreams of fees you know

[14:48] Okay what's a little foretaste of that great work the hymn of Contra Gentiles. shall we take a little break this yeah a little break here Look at Article Two here in Question One Eleven. To the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that grace is unsuitably divided through operating and cooperating. Huh? For grace is a certain what? Accident. Huh? That means like it's a form, right? But an accident cannot act upon its what?

[15:26] Subject. Therefore, no grace is said ought to be called what? Operating, right? Okay. Now, notice the reply here, huh? In ad primum, to the first, therefore, it should be said that according as grace is a certain accidental quality, right? It does not act on the soul as an efficient cause, effectively, but formally, right? Huh? That is just as whiteness is said to make surface white. white, yeah.

[16:08] Okay. So you know, you might say, what makes wood to be a sphere or cube? Well, it's a spherical shape that makes it to be a sphere, and the other shape makes it to be a cube, right? But that's not making in the sense of the third kind of cause, the maker, huh? Yeah, yeah. That's the other distinction of the wise man, right? The four kinds of cause, right?

[16:34] Four distinction of four. But notice when they when they distinguish the four causes, they do sometimes they divide the first two against the last two, saying the intrinsic causes and then the extrinsic causes, right? And sometimes they divide the matter and the maker against the form in the end, right? In another way, right? So you can you can divide four into two twos in two ways, right?

[17:08] And that's not violating the rule two or three. It's good, you know. It's like you have you know men and women and boys and girls. You can divide men and women against boys and girls in one way, right? And then men and boys against women and girls in another way, right? Huh? And both reveal something, right? Huh? And you should do use both divisions, right? In that case, but you're still dividing into two, you know.

[17:35] So it's interesting we use the word make in that sense, huh? But the difference in the way that shape makes the chair and the carpenter makes the chair, right? Because that's the third kind of cause with the carpenter, but it's it's an effect of the formal cause, right? When you say that the Shape of the chair or the shape of the sphere makes it to be that, yeah.

[18:04] Makes it be chairs, yeah, yeah. But you could also say the carpenter made it to be a chair rather this chair rather than a stool. Okay.

[18:14] Moreover, second objection: Moreover, if grace operates something in us or does something in us, it most of all makes justification, justify the soul. But this is not what. Grace alone. Yeah. Does this in us? For Augustine says, upon that of John, the works which I do, you also shall do, right? Huh. And Augustine says, who created you without you? I didn't help to create myself. I don't think.

[18:53] What? I didn't help. No. Yeah. He would not justify you without you, right? Huh. Therefore, no grace should be said to be simply what operating, right? Because that would be you not be yourself doing anything, right?

[19:12] The second, it should be said that God does not justify us without us, huh? Because through the motion of free will, right? Huh. We are justified, right? Huh. Consenting to the justice of what? God. Huh.

[19:33] But that motion is not the cause of grace, right? Huh. But an effect. Huh. Whence the whole operation pertains to what? Grace. Huh. So in what we do, comes grace. Moreover, third objection: To cooperate with something seems to pertain to the lower agent, right? Not to the chief or principal agent. But grace more chiefly operates in us than free will, according to that of the Epistle to the Romans, is not of the one willing or running, right?

[20:24] Notice that word querentis huh. But of the misery, taking misery, taking mercy, God, right? Huh. The merciful God. Okay. Since not belonging to them, right? Therefore, grace should not be said what to be cooperating, right? It's God doing everything, right? Well, that's not entirely true, huh?

[20:51] To the third, it should be said that to cooperate, someone is said to something. Not only as the secondary agent to the principal agent, but as the one what aiding to the end which is presupposed. For man, through grace operating, is aided by God, so that he might what wish the good, right? And there, presupposing already the end, it follows that the grace what cooperates with us, and in so far as it aids the will, right, that it might will the good.

[21:30] So I say, God help us to know and what love you, yeah. Now the fourth one. Moreover, division not to be given through opposites but to operate and to cooperate opposites, but to operate and to cooperate and not opposites. For the same can both operate and cooperate. Therefore, unsuitably is divided grace through operating and cooperating. Why? this is this dummy over here okay this dummy over here, okay?

[22:07] To the fourth, it should be said that grace operating and cooperating is the same grace. Well then, what's distinction? But it's distinguished according to what diverse effects. Now, when I edit the text, I put on one line, grace operating, cooperating is the same grace. Then skip a line, and then but it's distinguished according to diverse effects. Yes, so you kind of see that. No, it's the same grace.

[22:40] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on grace and free will that what. God cooperating in us. Perfects what we begin to do, right, and operating. Because he, that we might will, he begins to operate, and we willing, he cooperates by perfecting it. But the operations of God by which he moves us to the good pertain to grace. Therefore, suitably grace is divided through operating and cooperating.

[23:15] It's Augustine, whoever he is, he's really an important character, it seems to me, right? Yeah, what was it? Said what Pope was it that said the teaching of Aug of Augustine on grace is the teaching of the Church on grace? One of the Pope said that it's a very strong statement, you know. I think I've heard that for now. Yeah, yeah. Forget who said it, but it's really quite a compliment to the authority of the great Augustine.

[23:47] I mean, Augustine's a little bit like Aristotle. You need time to understand them sometimes. To understand them correctly, I should say. I answer. It should be said that as has been said above, grace can be understood in two ways. In one way, as a divine aid by which he moves us to willing well and to acting well. Right. In another way, now more as a form, right, as an habitual gift given divinely to us, right, inside of us, Okay.

[24:31] Okay. Now in both ways, he says, grace is said. It said grace is conveniently divided through operating and cooperating. Right. For the operation of some effect is not attributed to the what, the movable, but to the what, mover. In that effect, therefore, in which our mind is moved, and mind—that doesn't mean just mind—you know—that's it brings the will, right, as well as the understanding, right. In that effect, in which our reason and will, right, is moved and is not moving, only what God is moving.

[25:25] The operation then is attributed to what God, and according to this, it is called operating grace. But in that effect, in which our mind—that is, our reason and our will, one or the other or both—is both moved and what moves, in both move it. That means he moves, right, and is moved. The operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul. And according to this, it is called cooperating grace.

[26:02] So that's an interesting distinction. Now there is in us a twofold act. The first is the inward one of the will. You can see how men got to be understood there, right? Involved more the will here, maybe than reason. And as regards this act, the will has itself as what as moved, God as mover. So sometimes I say God moved me to love you, right? Above all other things and all other things for the sake of you, even myself.

[26:47] Right? I have to stick in to really shove it to me, right? And especially, right, pre certain, right, when the will begins to what will the good, which before it it willed what the bad, then one is really being moved by what God. What's that woman caught in adultery, right? Huh? Go and sin no more, but he's undoubtedly, what moving her will, right? Huh? To will good, moved before the bad.

[27:24] And therefore, according as God moves the human mind, meaning including the will, maybe especially the will, to this act, right, it is said to be grace what operating, right?

[27:38] So God moving our will to love the good or to will the good rather than the bad is grace acting upon our what or moving our will, right? Grace operating, right? Huh? Okay.

[27:54] Another act is exterior, which is commanded by the will, right, as has been said above. And consequently, right to this act, operation is attributed to the will, right? Now, notice he's going to say though that God's going to help us not only in the exterior act but in the interior act itself of the will, right? And because for this act God aids us both inwardly, right, by confirming or strengthening, right, the will that it arrive at this act, right, and by giving an outward way the ability to operate.

[28:40] and with respect to this act, then we speak of grace as what cooperating, right? Whence, after the foregoing words, Augustine adds that we what will will operatur he operates, he works. When, however, we will that we perfect him, right, he cooperates. So,

[29:08] we're really dependent upon God as far as I can see. If thus, therefore, if grace is taken for the gratuitous motion of God by which He moves us to a meritorious good, right, suitably grace is divided into what operating and cooperating. So grace that initiates the movement of the will, right, is operating, it seems, right, and then the will in itself continuing this right movement, and then the exterior act, right, then the grace is what cooperating, right, because we're not just being moved now, but we are moving.

[30:00] Interesting. But now, if you take grace in the other sense for the habitual gift, right? Thus, there is a two-fold, what effect of grace, just as of any other what form, right?

[30:24] Of which the first is what to be, and the second is what operation, just as the operation of heat is to make something hot and to make an exterior heating of other things, right? Calorificio. Thus, therefore, habitual grace, in so far as it heals the soul, right, or justifies, use those kind of synonyms here in this context, right? Going to confession to get my soul healed,

[30:59] okay. Or to make the soul what Acceptable acceptable to God, huh? It is said to be operating grace, right? They translate that working grace or what operating grace or

[31:14] grace. Insofar, though, as this habitual grace is the beginning or source of a meritorious what work, which also proceeds from free judgment, it is said to be cooperating, right? Huh? So that's quite a body of the article, right? Because he distinguishes between the grace that is a what A motion, more, and the grace that is a form, and both of them can be divided into what two, so you get four altogether, right?

[31:50] It's always by dividing into two, right? He has two divisions into two here, right? Or he has one division into two, and then he subdivides both of them into cooperating and operating, right? Huh? Very subtle thing.

[32:10] If you could apply that to teaching, I mean, I think going back though to the more fundamental distinction when Aristotle distinguishes the four kinds of cause, right? Then he gets the third kind of cause. He distinguishes between the mover and the what maker, right? And the mover is a cause of what motion, right? And the maker is a cause of what form, right? Huh? But then he's what?

[32:39] You know, if you take the you take the form of the ball, right? Huh? Bowling ball, let's say, right? Um, that form both is what it gives it a certain shape, right? Huh? Okay, and the ball doesn't do anything more about that itself, right? But then when you roll it, it rolls better if it were a cube, right? You know, because it's got it cooperates with the rolling.

[33:04] They tried that for a little while. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They just played one once, and they said, "Yeah, yeah, yeah." Thank God. I can imagine, you know, if you were playing golf or something, you know, and you had a little cube, you know, to try to. I mean, it's frustrating enough trying to try to get that thing. You like the tricksters to make fun of this, you know, the instrument totally unacceptable, you know, for the for the operation of a conform, because he probably was missing the the the putt, you know.

[33:37] But you can imagine trying to putt with a with a cube, right, rather than a ball. It would not cooperate with what you're trying to do. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[33:54] We tend to do no one then. Now what the heck is this? Another distinction, huh? But these are distinctions into two. To the third, then one goes forward thus. It seems that grace is unsuitably divided into running before, right, coming before, and following, huh? For grace is an effect of divine love, huh?

[34:24] But the love of God is never what? Following, because He doesn't love us because we're good, but we're good because He loves us, right? It's always that was the before and after we're talking about before, right? But it's always what? Yeah, according to that of the first epistle. Now I could go and read the first epistle of John now to see this, right? See how how the divine thing was moving me to read the seven canonical epistles and not as if we love God, but because He before loved us.

[34:58] Therefore, grace cannot be laid down to be running before and going before and following, right, huh? Well, let's look at the reply to this one because it would be beautiful this reply. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the love of God names something eternal. There we get the eternal, there, right? He's unchanging and therefore eternal. And therefore, nunquam—that means what? Never, I guess, huh?

[35:30] Can it be said except to be prevenient? God's love is always before. But grace signifies a temporal effect, huh? It's in the creature, right? Does God have any grace in this sense?

[35:52] Which can precede something, right, huh? And be subsequent to something, huh? And therefore, grace can be said to be before or after, but the love of God cannot be said to be both before and after, right, huh? Okay.

[36:18] Okay. Let's look at the second objection. Grace gratum faciens, huh? Grace making us what? acceptable to God is one only in man, huh? Since it is sufficient, according to that in the second epistle to the Corinthians, that my grace is sufficient for what? You, huh? But the same cannot be before and after. Well, that makes sense to this guy here, anyway, huh? Okay, he's always talking about before and after, huh?

[36:54] Okay. Therefore, grace is unsuitably divided in prevenient, coming before, and going after. Okay. What's the problem? We got to close something up. To the second, it should be said that grace is not diversified through this, that it is itself before and what after, huh? According to its essence or nature, right, huh?

[37:44] But only according to its effect, right? Just as has been said about operating and cooperating, right? Because even according as what subsequent grace pertains to glory, right, huh? Is not other in number from the grace running before, through which we are now what justified, huh? Just as the charity of the road, huh? That's that's translation, concrete translation of Bruegelst. Just as the charity of the road is not what taken away, evacuated, huh?

[38:29] But is perfected in what? heaven. So also about the what it should be said about the light of grace. huh? I know he's got the word lumen in there, huh? Every perfect gift coming down from the Father of Lights, huh?

[38:49] Because neither in its notion implies some what imperfection. Well, you can chew these things, huh? I don't mean you have to really chew that in the first sense of the word, chew. Because I don't think you should be chewing your book up. I don't want that won't help you to understand it any better. I don't think. Okay.

[39:11] Moreover, grace is known through its effects. But infinite are the effects of grace, of which one comes before another. Therefore, if according to this grace ought to be divided into going before and subsequently, it seems that there are infinite species of grace. But every art avoids the infinite, right? Infinite are left behind by any art, right?

[39:44] Therefore, grace is not suitably divided into going before and going after. My goodness. To the third, it should be said that though the effects of grace can be infinite in number, just as infinite are the acts of man, right, possible ones. Nevertheless, all reduced to some determinate number, right, in species. And moreover, all come together in this that one of them precedes another. Sounds like the old idea of motion, right?

[40:20] Motion is divisible forever. Yeah, yeah. That's one sense of before and after, right? The sense in which today comes before tomorrow, or this hour comes before this hour, or you know, sense in which Wednesday comes before Thursday, and Thursday comes before Friday, And Friday you know, different species of what before and after are they?

[40:50] In the same way that Wednesday comes before Thursday, Thursday comes before Friday. My father came before me, and his grand—my grandfather came before him, and I came before my son, and my son comes before my grandchildren. Okay.

[41:11] But against this is that the grace of God comes from His mercy. That was from His love. Okay, it's from His mercy, I guess. You could say both, right? Huh.

[41:30] But but both in Psalm and the Psalm fifty-eight, I guess it is. Must be the correct numbering, huh? It's read, My by his mercy. comes before me. Yeah. And again in Psalm twenty-two, His mercy what? Following. Yeah. I never noticed that. Yeah. Therefore, grace is suitably divided into coming before, prevenientum, and prevenientum, coming before. How do they translate English there? Prevenientum.

[42:16] Yeah, yeah. Okay. I answer. It should be said that just as grace is divided into operating and cooperating according to diverse effects, right, of the same grace, huh? So also in running before, right, coming before and following, in whichever sense grace is what taken, huh? Now there are five effects of grace in us. My goodness. Five effects.

[42:57] Of which the first is that the soul be what healed. Okay. Second is that it wills the what good. Third, that the good that it wills it efficaciously, huh? Operates, huh? The fourth that it perseveres in the good. And ah, fifth that it arrives at glory, huh? That's it. That's it. No other thing after that, I don't think.

[43:38] And therefore, grace, according as it causes in us the first effect, is called prevenient, coming before, with respect to the second what effect, huh? And in so far as it causes in us the second, it is called what. Subsequent with respect to the first effect, and just as one effect is after one effect and before another, right? So grace can be called coming before and subsequent according to the same effect, with respect to what?

[44:20] Yeah, just like Thursday is after Wednesday or before Friday, so is Thursday before or after? Both. Yeah. Now, who is its authority for this Absurd statement? And this is what Augustine says, right, in the book on Nature and Grace. It goes before that we be healed. It follows that as healed we are vivified. It goes before that we are called. It follows that we are glorified. That's beautiful.

[45:05] That's beautiful. So we better stop now.