Prima Secundae
280. Justification of the Impious (I-II q.113 aa.6-7): Remission of Guilt and Why Justification Happens in an Instant
Class of 2016-04-14
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[0:00] Okay, we're up to Article Six, right? To Six, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the remission of sins ought not to be numbered among those things which are required for the justification of the impious.

[0:28] For the substance of a thing ought not to be what numbered with those things which are required for the thing, just as a man ought not to be what with his soul and his body. But the justification impious is the remission of sins, as has been said. Therefore, the remission of sins ought not to be computed among those things which are required for the justification of the impious.

[1:10] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the justification of the impious is said to be the what remission of sin, according as every motion takes its species from its term.

[1:26] But nevertheless, to obtaining the term, many other things are required, as is clear from the things said what above. This is kind of like the end there, you know, rather than something presupposed to it, right? Huh?

[1:49] Probably just bring that out in the body of the article. Moreover, the same thing is the infusion of grace and the remission of what guilt. Just as the same thing is illumination and expulsion of darknesses.

[2:10] But the same thing ought not to be numbered with itself, for the one is opposed to what multitude. Therefore, one ought not to number remission of guilt with the infusion of what grace. Huh? Philosophical objection.

[2:37] To second should be said that the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to the very substance of the act, and thus they are the same thing. Thus, they are the same. For by the same act, God both bestows grace and remits guilt.

[3:09] Another way they can be considered on the side of the objects, right? And thus they differ according as the difference of guilt, which is taken away, and of grace, which is what? Yeah. Just also as in actual things, generation corruption differ, although generation of one is the corruption of what? Another. So the same thing, right? But they have different objects, huh?

[3:50] So is is coming to know and losing ignorance the same? Because I read the Summa Contra Gentiles and, I'm coming to know some things.

[4:15] Is this also losing some more ignorance? So to speak. Yeah. But is ignorance the same thing as knowledge? Hm. Fill my wine glass. Getting rid of that emptiness there.

[4:56] So you compare it to generation corruption, right? So in the old science there, when what? Air becomes fire, right? Becoming fire is the corruption of what? Air.

[5:24] When carrots and broccoli become human flesh, right? Corruption of broccoli and carrots. Generation of more flesh. Yeah. Okay. More of the remission of sins follows upon the motion of free will towards God in regards to sin, yeah. Just as an effect to what its cause. Through faith and contrition, sins are what remitted. But the effect ought not to be numbered with its cause, because those things which are numbered together, as it were, divided right against each other, those are things that are same in nature.

[6:20] Therefore, the remission of guilt ought not to be numbered with other things which are required for the justification of the impious. Well, to the third, it should be said that this is not a numbering, right, according to the division of a genus into species, in which necessarily the things numbered together are what same That's maybe one reason why Aristotle talks about before and same there, right? Because the genus is before the species, right?

[6:56] But the species that come under the genus by one division are same right? So play is divided into tragedy and comedy, right? And they're same tragedy and comedy, but play is before, as John knows, before the particular.

[7:22] So not a division of the genus into species, but according to difference of those things which are required for the completion of something, in which enumeration something can be what before and something what after,

[7:43] because of the beginnings and the parts of a thing that is composed, there can be something before another. Okay. Now let's get a little more illumination of the body of the article, right? Huh? But against this is that in the enumeration of those things which are required for a thing, one ought not to omit the end, which is most potent in each thing.

[8:19] But the remission of sins is an end in the justification of the impious, for it is said in Isaiah twenty seven nine, this is all what fruit, huh? That one takes away what sin, huh? It's interesting the word of fruit fructus. I talk about how when I first started reading the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, right, and the English text, of course, you say happiness, right? Aristotle was going to ask me what happiness is.

[8:50] Well, we start reading Thomas, of course, they're talking about felicitas, right? And then in Greek, the you know the Greek word is there, eudaimonia, right? But felicitas comes from what? Fruitful Fruitfulness right? You've got the word fructus here, right? Huh? It's very much like an end, right? Huh? It's the last thing produced, you know, from the fruit tree, right? And it's used here, so it's very much the end, huh?

[9:18] Therefore, the remission of sins ought to be numbered among those things required for justification of the impious, that that is the end, huh? So is knowledge required for the teaching of the ignorant?

[9:43] At least of the teacher. I hope so. But I mean, he's saying there that we're not not to omit the end, right? That's what it's all about, uh So yeah Teaching. If you're ignorant and you need to be instructed, you better hope for it Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Can they be teaching the ignorant with with no knowledge? Resulting.

[10:06] You maybe don't you don't succeed in teaching sometimes if the if the students don't learn right they don't acquire some knowledge they didn't have before but that's the at the end of teaching right to give some knowledge to somebody. huh They fail as dudes Yeah. Although you look at so much of what's called higher education and essentially they're teaching the ignorant as opposed to yeah I always say education but crimes are committed in thy name.

[10:36] That's a good one. They they teach they teach them how to emote they teach them a slogan they don't teach them to think. Yeah. Terrible.

[10:55] Just you know you scratch the surface and you discover horrible things right horrible things going on. Answer it should be said that four things are enumerated which are required for the justification of the impious huh four things huh. Four. Okay. To wit the infusion of grace right

[11:34] the motion of free will to God right through faith right and the motion of free will towards sin right huh against sin I guess huh nobody says incompatibly sounds like he's after after what he wants to say. In regard to

[12:03] you know. I remember Laplace once telling me that when we say credo in deum in one sense in Latin one way to use it means I believe against God that's not the sense of what we're saying he said that's one of the meanings of in it it's used with preposition I mean against something they translated towards I don't know why they translated towards which sounds like you know move towards but no it's not in regards to the rule of two or three right now you know in the middle here you've got two things that pertain to the motion of free will right now by the gratiae infusio that's not really something that I do right.

[12:58] And I don't exactly remit my my guilt. I don't think. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So there's ways to twist this, you know, into shape. The reason for this is because it has been said, is that justification is a certain motion, right? Do you see the word motion there? By which the soul is moved by God, from a state of what guilt, to a state of justice, huh? Now, in every motion by which something is moved by another, three things are required, huh?

[13:46] First, the motion of the what mover, huh? Secondly, the motion of the what movable. And third, the consummation of the motion, or the arrival at the what end. Now, on the side of the motion of God, the divine motion, one takes the infusion of what grace. On the side of the motion of what Free will. free will mood, right? One takes two motions of it. According to the recess from the term from which, and the excess to the term to which.

[14:34] Now, the consummation or the arrival at the term of this motion, is implied by the remission of guilt, in which the justification is what consummated, right?

[14:50] So there he's dividing into three, right? Maybe I'm a fanatic about two and three. I don't know. When he tries to explain the four, he divides into three, right?

[15:23] In every motion by which something is moved by another, three things are required. So he kind of encloses the. It seems to divide the first against the other three.

[15:38] Yeah, or but I mean you know the the other ones are. Pertain to the motion of the movable, right? And then the consummation of motion—that's the third one, right? He divides them into three.

[15:58] That's why he's insisting in the said contra about the end, wasn't he? If you said said contra again, but said contra in the enumeration of those things required for a thing, well, not not to omit and overlook the end, right? Which is potissimum in quoque quoque.

[16:27] So what do we got on this motion of the student there, right? We got on the part of the teacher, the teaching, right? Pouring it in. And the part of the student, the the learning, right? And then the end, which is some knowledge, right? Three things.

[16:47] Now we get article seven. We got time for this, yeah. When the justification of the impious comes about in an instant or successively, what would you answer before you look?

[17:05] What? Yeah, I would think so. Yeah, I just got through reading in the Summa Contra Gentiles this morning. The second book there, he's taking up creation, right? Huh? He's showing that creation is not what there's no succession there, right? It's all.

[17:24] And then I. What? Yeah, yeah, he was no evolutionist. Yeah, yeah. And and you know how he used the term "recreatus"? Did we say that before the word "created" again? Re recreated. So I suspect that maybe it's that creation, right? Recreation is an instant too, right? I know that's what Chrysostom says, comparing the change of transubstantiation to the change of baptism. It says it's divine power; it's instantaneous.

[17:54] Yeah. It has a succession of it. Well, it starts here, and then we say some other prayers, and then start finishing those things. So Thomas has a chapter in there, you know, that that creation is not a motion, right, or a change, right, because they are successive, right? They're not all at once.

[18:14] Okay, so. To the seventh, one proceeds thus. It seems that the justification of the impious is not in an instant, but successively, because as has been said, huh? For the justification of the impious is required the motion of free will,

[18:37] but the act of free will is to choose, huh? Which presupposes the deliberation of counsel, right? This has been said above, huh? That's why we always object to the so-called pro-choice people right now. They don't allow the woman to get counsel. They don't give any counsel, right? Don't let her see what's what the little thing inside is, you know, and so on. Since, therefore, since deliberation implies a certain discursum, right?

[19:12] That's Shakespeare's word, discourse So. That's where he got it right here from. Question article seven. Just dawned upon him when he when he traveled down Italy. There's a theory that Shakespeare went to Italy, you know, because he knows so accurately Italy in the plays like Romeo and Juliet and so on, and

[19:35] he might have met those terrible Catholics, you know, down there. We don't know. Nobody knows exactly. Since, therefore, deliberation is a certain discourse. Which has a certain what succession, right? It seems that justification impious is successive, huh? Well, that convinces this dummy over here.

[19:59] Speak for yourself. Assassination, by association. Yeah. Your teacher's a dummy. Wait. Yeah. There used to be, but Kassirka's kind of warning me. and I went up to Laval, you know, that he and De Koninck are always making little jokes about each other, you know, and that he'll probably say in class like that, and I'll say, "Well, once my teacher said, 'Well, then he can't be good, ' you know, something."

[20:29] He might become embarrassed by by by some, which De Koninck never did, you know. But I mean, Kassirka's kind of warning me that I might get into some of these things.

[20:45] Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the motion of free will, which runs together to the justification of the impious, is consent, right? To the detesting of sin, and to acceding to what God, God, huh? Which can consent, huh? Subito fit, huh? Comes about instantly, right? Now it can happen that what? That there sometimes that there precedes some deliberation, right? Huh? Which is not of the substance of justification, but a what road, huh?

[21:34] To justification, right? Just as locomotion is the road to what illumination, huh? Aristotle and Thomas following him too thought that enlightenment was all at once; didn't take time, right? And so the only reason why it takes time is because the sun's going to come over the horizon, right? But the illumination, right, is all at once, right? So that's why he compares it to that, right, to that thing.

[22:07] Um. So he's saying that justification is what all at once, right? Even though there might be something what that takes time that precedes it, right? Huh? But the consent is once that is that that's something indivisible, right? Okay. And he compares it to something that was very common in their thinking.

[22:37] Kind of ingenious the way they measure speed of light, you know, modern scientists, you know. I've read descriptions of it, John. I still don't. I suddenly couldn't, you know, reproduce that experiment, huh? I know I've heard of things where they do a laser from here to the moon, some mirror, and they left up there, and they can time it, and then they can measure the distance. Amazing.

[23:05] Amazing. I think maybe they left it up the edge, right near my aunt Margaret. My aunt Margaret said when the weather would get weird, she'd oversee. So all that stuff they left on the moon—that's what's causing it. So finally, we're over. Okay, now let's go to the second objection. huh? Moreover, the motion of free will is not without some actual consideration, but it's impossible at the same time to understand many things in act for human being, that is to say.

[23:45] Since, therefore, for the justification impious is required both the motion of free will in diverse things, right? To it towards God, huh, and towards sin, it seems that justification impious cannot be accepted, cannot be in the instant.

[24:06] Well, is there a way that we can sometimes understand two things at the same time? See, if if I know that a dog is not a cat, right? When I think of what a dog is, I can't be thinking about what a cat is. I think about what a cat is, I can't be thinking of what a dog is, right? But when I know that a dog is not a cat, or a square is not a circle, do I know square and circle at the same time?

[24:34] I couldn't know that a square is not a circle unless I was thinking of square and circle at the same time. Now, when I when I square, when I when I define square, right, thinking the definition of square, I'm not thinking the definition of circle, right? But when I say square is not a circle, I'm doing these two together, right? Now,

[25:00] to second, it should be said that as has been said in the in the first book, nothing prevents two things being understood simul, right? In act, according as they are in some way one, right? Just as simul, we understand the subject the predicate in a statement, right? Okay.

[25:23] So in the first act of reason, which is understanding what something is, when that precedes, right, understanding the statement, then there's not together, right? simul. I don't understand what a square is and what a circle is

[25:41] together, but when I get to the second act, and I say a square is not a circle. I must be knowing square and circle together, right? I was actually know that a square is not a circle, right?

[25:57] If I said Michael is not what Peter, huh? Huh? Patrick, I mean, yeah, Patrick, yeah, yeah. See, then, then I would have to know both you in some ways, right? And I suppose the opposite would be if we were to say something that was false. You might know this if you said a square is a circle. In some way, you would be knowing together, but

[26:22] in a false statement, you would. Yeah. Apparently, has some difficulty now, but I think I know that a man is not a woman. You know, has some difficulty now. It depends on who it is. It's a matter of choice now. They say, you know. Depends on who you're talking to. Pro-choice is taking on you know really nasty you know other meanings you know today you know the people who choose their.

[26:42] What are they going to be? Yeah, we're going crazy out there in California. Oh my God! Anyway. Granola steak. That's what they call it Looks fruits flakes Fruits flakes and nuts Yeah yeah yeah

[27:02] So nothing prevents two things from be understood together, according as they are in some way one, right? Or when you make a comparison, right? And you say, well, you know, Mozart is better than Beethoven, or something, right? Okay. They are understood together, right? Simul, subject and predicate, right? In so far as they are united in the order of one what that affirmation.

[27:30] Even you know when you see a syllogism, you find you judge a syllogism to be valid, and you see the conclusion does follow from the premises, then you're knowing the conclusion and the premises. Now this is even more than the second act, right? It's the third act. When you first reasoning, you know you're not at the same time knowing the premises and the conclusion, right? When you finally able to judge this is a good syllogism, right?

[27:53] Then you're seeing that the conclusion follows from those premises, right? And then you're knowing them together, right? That's what it means to resolve in the beginning Yeah yeah Yeah.

[28:11] And in the same way, free will is able to be moved in two things all at once, right? According as one is ordered to the other, right? Okay.

[28:27] So I want money to buy candy. Money and candy are. Both there. Together. All at once. Yeah. Now the motion of free will against sin, we'll say, is ordered to the motion of free will towards God, right? I think Tommy should get a little problem with his his prepositions here. Cleaned up a bit. Yeah. An account of this, a man detests sin because it is against God, to whom he wishes to adhere, right?

[29:06] And therefore, free will, in the justification of the impious, at the same time, huh, simul, is detested sin, and he converts himself to what God. Just as a body at the same time is receding from one place and acceding to the what other, right? Huh?

[29:37] I used to say to the students there, you know, you're going home for Thanksgiving, yeah. Now, what's your mother saying? You shouldn't say you're going home You're coming home. Yeah, yeah. So you and your mother have different language, or what's the problem? I said. Yeah,

[29:59] we're not talking. Yeah. But same way. Yeah. Why do you call it going home, and she calls it coming home? Two limits. Yeah, yeah, but it's the same thing, doesn't it? Yeah. Yeah. So my detesting sin and my tending towards God, right, are really the same. What? Motion. Yeah. They're together, right?

[30:39] So therefore, free will and the justification of the impious, simul, together detests sin and converts itself to God. Just to the body, simul. It's receding from one place, you know, and acceding to another. So the guy who's at the school is what the term from which, right, and the mother's at the term to which. So they describe it differently.

[31:09] Moreover, hey, this guy got five objections, what? Isn't it something like Heraclitus, the way up and down being the same? May not be the same thought, but I mean, it's the motion is the same; it's just the terms are different. Yeah, yeah. You got to be careful there, right? Is for me to go from my house to to the monastery, and to go from the monastery to my house is that the same motion?

[31:32] Same motion. Yeah. Same road. Yeah, same road. Those days didn't have. Those split highways, yeah. Okay. It's funny, huh? Thomas's got five objections here, right? Now usually he just has three objections, huh?

[31:52] Moreover, a form which receives more and less, right? Like heat, right? Successively is received the subject, right? Huh? So when I put the water on the morning and make tea, you know, it's cold and then it's gradually so, right? Huh? And wait, whistles at me, you know. So okay, he whistles, you know. Isn't that it's pretty? Okay. Just as is clear about whiteness and blackness, right? Huh?

[32:24] But grace receives more and less, as has been said above. Therefore, it's not received subito and subject, not at once, huh? The church doesn't canonize somebody subito either, do they? Much as they desire.

[32:43] Since therefore, for the justification of the impious has required the infusion of grace, it seems that justification of the impious cannot be in the what instant? Huh? Instant is the indivisible of time, right? Huh? The now in the strict sense.

[33:08] To the third, it should be said, huh? This is not the reason wherefore a form is not received subito in matter, right? Because it can be more and less, huh? For thus light would not be received subito in error, right? So you have the same example, right? Which can be more or less enlightened, right? Huh? But the reason is taken on the part of the disposition of matter, or the subject, as has been said, huh?

[33:44] Well, that's something that, look for the body, corpus of the thing to. So we'll let Thomas pass, temporary pass here, right? Okay. Not going to get out. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. Whatever.

[34:09] Moreover, the motion of free will, the fourth objection, which concurs, right, runs together for the justification of the impious, is meritorious, right? And thus is necessary that it proceeds from grace, without which nothing is what meritorious. But before is it something that chooses the form, then that acts according to the form.

[34:39] And therefore, before grace is poured in, and afterwards the free will is moved in God and in the detesting of what sin. Therefore, justification is not all at once, right?

[34:57] Okay. To the fourth, it should be said that in the same instant in which the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate according to the form. Just as fire, the minute it what is generated, once when it's generated, it moves what upwards, and its motion would be instantaneous if it were completed in the same what instant. But the motion of free will, which is to will, is not successive but what instantaneous, huh?

[35:35] That's going to be said. It says in the body of the article. And therefore, it's not necessary that the justification of the impious be what successive. Okay, look at that. Reply to the fifth objection. That looks beautiful. It's going to be so so nourishing. Huh? You can see that.

[35:58] Okay. Now, moreover, if grace is poured into the soul, the fifth objection it's necessary that there be some instant be given in which it first is in the soul.

[36:16] Likewise, if guilt is remitted, necessary for there to be a last instant to give. Yeah, this is the one. There is double souls, right? Must be given in which the man is what subject to guilt, right? But it cannot be the same instant because then opposites would be together in the same thing, right? Therefore, it's necessary for the two instances to be succeeding each other. Among which, according to the philosopher, in the sixth. Book of the physics, there must be two a time in between, right?

[36:54] You need two different nows. Therefore, the justification does not come about all at once, but successively, right? Okay. So there's a time in which I'm ignorant before I know, right? And therefore, that time doesn't go on forever. There's a last instant in which Berquist is ignorant of something, right?

[37:20] Okay. And then there's a later time where he he knows the Pythagorean theorem, right? So there must be an instant which is the beginning of that time in which Berquist knows that, right? Now the last the last second in which Berquist is ignorant of the Pythagorean theorem, right, can't be the first instant in which he knows it. Therefore, there must be two different instances, right? Between two instances, there must be some time, just like between two points that are really distinct.

[37:54] There's a line, right? There you go. This reminds me of Aristotle says, right? Because he he solves this, right? Let's see the beautiful text of Thomas. Okay.

[38:23] To the fifth, to the fifth, it should be said that the succession of two opposites in the same subject is different in the consider ought to be considered differently in those things which are subject to time, and otherwise in those things which are what above time, right?

[38:45] Now in those things which are subject to time, there is not a what last instant to be given in which the form, right, the prior form is in the what subject. In my example, there's not a last instant in which I'm ignorant.

[39:09] But there is a last time to be given, right? And a first instant in which the form following is in the matter or the subject.

[39:26] Now the reason for this is because in the in time, one cannot take a what another instant immediately what preceding it, huh? In that instances are not what following each other in time, just as neither what points in a line. Yes, it is proven in the what? Sixth book of the physics.

[39:59] Yeah, so the sixth book of the physics is the book on what the continuous, right, and on the division of it and so on. Now, Thomas will often come back to this, right? It comes up, you know, like they say, you know, when

[40:16] the Eucharist, right? It's it's bread, and then it's the body of our Lord, right? Well, is our last instant in which it is the is bread?

[40:35] According to what he just said no first instant In which it is the body of our Lord, right? Okay, there can be a last time, right? But the end of that time is the first instant in which it is the body of our Lord, right?

[40:56] But if you say, you know, there's no there's no time between. What? If you have if you have two different instances, right? Then there'd be some time in between them, which would be neither bread nor the body of our Lord, right? You get all kinds of problems, right? So Aristotle solves it by saying that there is a what? First instant which.

[41:20] And but there's not a last instant in which it is not. That's a hard thing to see, right? If you say there's no time between the two, right? There's no time between which I am what, neither ignorant nor knowing the Pythagorean theorem, right? Well, then you have to say if you think there's a last instant in which I'm ignorant, and a first instant in which I am what, knowing it, then there's an instant in which I'm both what?

[41:55] Ignorant. Yeah, and this is the way Hegel says that all change is a contradiction, right? That's the start, you know, for Marx, right? I see Marx gets it from Hegel, right? So if the last instant in which I am ignorant is the first instant in which I am what, knowing it, then in that instant of change, I am both ignorant and knowing, which is a contradiction, right?

[42:22] And if it's not, if it's not the same instant, well, then there's some time in between. Yeah, but there can't be any time which I'm neither ignorant nor knowing. See, so there must be this in which I'm both. You see what I mean? Yes.

[42:42] But since you come to know when the the activity of coming to know is completed, you know. So there is a first instant in which you know, but not a last instant in which you're what ignorant, huh? It's a very subtle thing to see, right? But Aristotle, in a sense, saw the the difficulty of Hegel, right? Hegel says all becoming is a contradiction. Was Hegel's erroneous thought?

[43:10] Was there any utility that was built on by Hegel or some of his intellectual sons like Marx? Yeah. Was there any sort of utility to that mistake at all? Well, that's the philosophy of revolution. Yeah. Idea. Conflict. Right. That's how we go forward. The historical dialectic. Yeah. Yeah. But I guess I was thinking of something constructive this far, not destructive. But yeah, that's yeah. That's the illusion and the attractiveness of it.

[43:44] In other words, was there anything positive so that people subsequent philosophers were fooled into thinking that this there was real validity to this, which is really an error? Yeah, yeah. I mean, they're really denying the basic thing that something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right? They're denying that the fundamental thought of the human mind really everything is really based upon something cannot both be and not be at the same time in the same way, right?

[44:24] You can, as with Father Owen Bennett, you should remind us is that and nobody learns that. I mean, you might come to learn how to name that and think it out. You take a toy from a child and you say mine. No, mine. You know, it can't be. both yours and mine. Nobody taught him that. He just knows it. Well, I used to quote Hamlet. everybody's heard the thing: "To be or not to be, that is a question."

[44:48] Right? He's thinking, of you know, suicide, right? But I've got to screw with that so much. I say, "To be or not to be, that is a question." I say it's a question because you can't both be and not be. You know, if you could both be and not be, wouldn't be a question to be or not to be. So when Shakespeare says, "To be or not to be, that is a question," say why is it a question?

[45:09] Because you can't be both. What can you do with Shakespeare and not Hegel? Yeah. No, no, Hegel would have said to be, to be and not to be. That's the solution. Yeah, yeah. I told you, my my teacher, Kastriik. You know, he he got this guy at the philosophical conference there, showed he was in a contradiction, right? Kastriik said, "No, now what are you going to do?"

[45:37] You know, the guy said, "Well, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with." That's what he said to Kastriik. That's one of those things I heard. I heard someone describe

[45:48] it's like having somebody import their ship. And they get in the port, and they're at the dock, and then they jump overboard. That's like,

[45:59] why? Well, William Leaves of Grass is so famous for one quote from it. It's, I contradict myself very well. I contradict myself, for I contain many or regions or something like that, which is kind of a grander description. Yeah, yeah. People rejoice in their in their being, you know, these contradictions, right? I contain multitudes. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[46:28] Says a lot. Bill Clinton, William Leaves of Grass, what? Bill Clinton. Rush Limbaugh is listening on the way up. You know, he's talking about. I guess it's become now the thing there. You know that wives should agree that their husbands, you know, can have a few affairs. You know. And they're talking about. I guess they. read it up in the newspapers now, you know, and and this is this going to strengthen the marriage, right?

[46:57] I mean, it's got a contradiction here, right? You know, what is destroying the marriage in a sense is, you know, and apparently when the I know some famous actress or whatever is, she's she wanted more children, he didn't want any more children, so they agreed that they could have more children, but then he could, you know, you know, have once a month or whatever it was. Absolutely crazy.

[47:22] I mean, I mean Russian Bob says it's crazy, you know, huh? But he said this is what's going on, you know, huh? I mean, he's always, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. People rejoice in you know these contradictions, right, huh? Saint Paul calls it a reciprocal sense. Yeah, yeah. I mean, all these, you know, she loves me, she loves me not, you know, but again, all the other, you know, and if you're enough, which one you enough being when you pull the petals from the flower, you know, but.

[47:48] I came across a number of highly educated people who were saying, "Oh, come on, grow up. Everybody does it. " No adultery, in other words, cheating on your spouse. You know, it's a mature thing. Is what they were implying, and yet it just seems to be quite the opposite. Yes, yes, yes. Yeah. Putting the adult back into adult. Exactly. Progressive thinking. Yeah. Okay, let's go back here now.

[48:33] So, in those things which are subject to time, right, huh? One cannot give a last instant in which the prior form is in the subject, huh? But there can be given a what? Last time. Yeah. And a first instant in which the following form, right, the sequent one, is in the matter or the what subject, huh?

[49:01] The reason for which is because in time one cannot take right before one instant another instant preceding it immediately, right? So, always some time in between, right? In that instances do not follow each other. Consequent there, that's just a technical term there, right? Without something of the same kind, so between any two points, there's always a line and other points possible. Just neither are are there points next to each other in the line.

[49:33] Well, you know, just touch upon a bit there. Um. Can two points touch? They have to touch if there's nothing in between them, right? Can two points touch, Aristotle kind of uses an either-or syllogism, right? Huh? Either part of one touches part of the other, or part of one touches the whole of the other, or the whole one touches the whole of the other. Well, does a point have any parts?

[50:07] That's that's a definition of point, though, which has no parts in Euclid, right? So the only way two points could touch would be for the whole one to touch the whole of the other, which would be to coincide, and you'd have only one point. There's no way for two points to touch, right? So there must always be what? If there are two of them, there's some distance between them, right?

[50:27] There's always a line between them, right? And and then that carries over to to time, right? Huh? Two nows, right? If you take the nows being indivisible in time, right? The now in the in the strict sense, right? I mean Aristotle sometimes says we use the word now, you know, in a loose sense, right? Like now we're having class, right? But part class is gone, part of it has to come.

[50:49] but the now in the strict sense, right? That doesn't include any of the past or the future. How long is that? See, it's it's like a point, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[51:05] And so two nows cannot be what? Together, right? There's always some time between them, right? Huh? And so when there's a change, you know, from you know like dying, right? Huh?

[51:23] Is there a last instant which I'm alive? Yeah, yeah. See, but the first instant that I'm dead, right, pertains now to the subsequent time which I'm dead, right? There's not a last instant in which I'm alive, huh? Okay. That might sound good now. There's no last instant in which I'm alive. I'm never going to die. Well, that's a misunderstanding, right? Huh? That there's no last instant in which you're of your life, but the first instance of you did, yeah.

[52:00] Of course, okay. But time is what terminated at an instant, right? Huh? And therefore, in the whole time preceding in which something is moved to one form, it is under the opposite form, right? Huh? And in the last instant of that time, which is the first instant of the sequent time, it has the form which is the terminus of what? Motion, right?

[52:36] But in those things which are above time, it is in another way, right? For if there is a succession there, right, of affections, right, that refers to the appetite, of, the will, or if there is a succession of what intellectual conceptions, right, as in the angels, right, such a succession is not measured by what continuous time, but by discrete time, right. That's a very hard thing to understand, right, the angels, huh?

[53:12] Just as those things which are measured are not themselves continuous, as has been had in the first, when he talks about the angels. Let me go back to the angels there, right? Whence in such things there is given a what, a last instant, right, in which the first was, and a first instant in which that which follows is. Nor is necessary to be a middle time, right, because there is no what continuity of time there, right, which requires this.

[53:49] Now the human mind, the the spiritual part of man's soul, which is justified in itself is above time, right, but per accidens it is subject to time, huh, because the connection with the senses, in so far as it understands with the continuous and time according to what phantasms. So we don't think without imagining, huh? In which it considers the intelligible species, as has been said in the first, huh?

[54:23] So sometimes I say, you know, the proper object of our mind is the what it is of something sensed or imagined, right? And so we think about what something is, we imagine or We're sensing, right, huh? Something.

[54:40] So I think about the squirrels there, right? What the hell are they eating out there, you know? And therefore it should be what judged secundum hoc, right? About this change according to the condition of what? Yeah. That we say that there is not a last instant in which guilt is present, but a last time, right? But there is a first instant in which grace is in us, right?

[55:15] In the all the time preceding, guilt is in us, right? So it's the first instant which I'm cured, right? Washed away. Well, it's quite a mouthful there, huh? Chew upon that, right? Huh? Let's look at the body here now.

[55:41] But let's look at this in counter first, huh? But against this is that the justification of the impious comes about by the grace of the Holy Spirit justifying us, huh? But the Holy Spirit subito, right, comes to the minds of men, huh? According to that of Acts Factus est repente, there was made suddenly made suddenly, right, from the heaven sound of a spirit what coming as vehement, whence the gloss says, huh?

[56:20] In my text there, in the footnote, you see Ambrose, huh? That what the the holy the grace of the Holy Spirit does not what no little tarda things, huh? It's all at once, huh? Therefore, the justification of the impious is not successive but instantaneous. You looking at molumina there? Yeah, it has first means effort or violence, but it means bulk or weight. So I know. molus is a pile Yeah.

[56:52] Yeah. Yeah. It doesn't. It's like the motion of something heavy, just acquiring. So it's not slow efforts. to increase the Holy Spirit. Okay. But he says, "the answer should be said." by the article, that the whole justification of the impious consists originally in the infusion of grace, through which free will is moved and guilt is what emitted. But the infusion of grace comes about in the indivisible instant, right?

[57:29] Without any succession. Because the reason for which is because some that some form is not subito impressed upon the subject, happens because the subject is not what disposed, huh? And the agent needs time, nor that might dispose the what subject. And therefore, we see that when the matter is disposed through the preceding alteration, that the substantial form is acquired in matter, right?

[58:04] I think I'd be careful there, like you know, when is a fertilized egg a human being, you know, or is it the seed of a human being, huh? Now, does the matter have to be disposed before it's the proper subject of the what soul? Because the soul is the first act of an actual body composed of what tools, right now? So unless the the the body has what some distinction of tools, right?

[58:30] It's not yet the proper subject for the soul right now, but it is the seed of the of a human being, right? The seed of the body of human being, huh? Not the seed of the. It's not the seed of the soul, right? Would be appropriate at all to argue that there aren't any tools looking at the gain of the body, because you're looking at the structures within the cells, the mitochondria, things like that, that are tools working towards the development of the.

[59:00] uh Yeah, well I'm talking about the the first fertilized egg, right now. So it seems to me that it's more a seed than a body composed of tools, right now. That it needs to be disposed that way, right now. Now, apparently, when when when God became a man, right, was all at once, right? But there was there's reason for that, right? It's not appropriate that he assume a body, you know, that was not really human yet, huh?

[59:27] But in us, it seems to me that that the fertilized egg is really the seed of a of a human body, right? And then when the organs are what suitably distinguished enough for the you know to be the proper subject of the rational soul, that's obscure exactly when, you know, huh? When when it is, huh? But suddenly, you know, when you got arms and legs, it seems that you've got the subject, and then the soul was there, right?

[1:00:03] Sometimes the pro-life people, you know, don't realize the difficulty of saying exactly when the soul was there, right? You know, is the soul there in the fertilized egg? You know, or just where we see there? Yeah, yeah, it's it's ready to grow then, right? It's almost growing right away, you know. But yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But I mean, it's not maybe not clear what distinction and disposition of organs is necessary, you know, before the God puts the rational soul in it, you know.

[1:00:51] Okay. And therefore, we see that once that when matter is disposed, huh, by the alteration preceding, substantial form is acquired in matter, right? And the same reason, like for example, I'll take, you know, they say, you know, you're heating up the, the, the, you know, the paper, you know, and then I'll set it first into flame, right, you know, once it's disposed.

[1:01:27] And by the same reason, because the diaphanous, right, is in itself, right, disposed to receiving light, it at once is illuminated by the what? Light given by the actual illumination Now it has been said above that God, in order that He might what pour grace into the soul, does not require some disposition except the one which He Himself makes. Now He makes a disposition of this sort that's sufficient for the reception of what grace.

[1:02:04] Sometimes what suddenly right, sometimes paulatim and what successively right, as has been said above, huh? Now that a natural agent does not suddenly dispose the matter, right? Happens from this that there's some disproportion for form, which in the matter resists, right, the virtue of the agent. And on account of this, we see that when the virtue of the agent becomes more strong, then the matter is more quickly what disposed.

[1:02:43] But since the divine power is infinite, it can what? Dispose, what any created matter, suddenly for form, right? This is what he might do, in in the case of of God becoming man, right? Huh? Okay, and much more can he what?

[1:03:04] All at once, yeah. Dispose the free will of man, right? Whose motion can be instantaneous according to nature. Thus, therefore, the justification impious comes about by God in an instant. Okay, that's the thing. to Shoot, we've got to stop now, I guess, huh?