Secunda Secundae
4. Aquinas on Faith, Part 2: The Light of Faith, Whether Faith Can Be Scientific Knowledge (A.5), and the Articles of Faith (A.6)
Class of 2017-09-28
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/12-secunda-secundae/004-aquinas-on-faith-part-2-the-light-of-faith-whether-faith/

[0:00] Okay. Now, the second and third argument you're going to start to see that in some way the man believes sees him. To the second, it should be said that those things which are under faith are able to be considered in two ways, right?

[0:37] In one way, in what particular, right? And thus they are not able to be at the same time seen and believed, as has been said, right? Another way, in general, under the common notion of what something believable,

[0:57] and thus they are seen by the one who believes, for he would not believe unless he saw that they were to be believed. So he is seeing in some way, right?

[1:11] Either on account of the evidence of the signs, right, like in the case of what Wounds. Of of of Thomas there, right? Humanity. Yeah. Or on account of something of this sort, right? Okay. So that one sees that this will be believed, and the virtue of faith is something actually what poured into us, right? Huh? So we're disposed to what see something to be believable, right?

[1:45] And that's why he replies to the third objection that says what well, faith is a certain spiritual light, huh? So isn't there some kind of seeing because of it, huh? Okay. When else he says a tercera, to the third, it should be said that the light of faith makes one see those things which are what believed, right? Huh? For just as through other habits of the virtues, right, man sees that that which is what suitable to the virtue, or which is according to the habit itself, right?

[2:21] Huh? Okay, so also through the habitum fidei, right, the mind of man is inclined to assenting to those things which befit what right faith and others, right. Okay, so one has certain what inclination through the virtue of faith, whereby what is proposed to believe is seen to be what worthy of being believed, right? Okay,

[2:50] there is a kind of seeing, yeah. It's a little bit like you know the way someone who has a moral virtue, right, sees something as appropriate to his what virtue, right?

[3:17] Somebody has modesty in speech. Yeah. Won't say goofy things on the wrong occasion. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or the man has the virtue of courage, right? Now he should he should go forward, right? He sees that, right? Now.

[3:47] So he doesn't see it in spiritual, but in general, right? He sees some these things should be believed, right? Because in accordance with the inclination of this virtue, he has received.

[4:08] Now, what about hearing things, right? Now, to the fourth, it should be said that aditus is a word signifying those things which are faith, but not of those things about which is faith. And therefore, it's not necessary that these things themselves be seen, right?

[4:39] He sees that they should be believed, but he doesn't see them in themselves, right? Okay, that would be the other way in which the understanding is moved, right?

[5:15] So the virtue of faith then gives him what inclination, right, to see these things should be believed, right? He doesn't see them as being true in themselves, right? Particularly, right? Is it that sort of the influence of the the object, the first truths, in some way enlightens them to see these other things, and so insofar as they are believable.

[5:42] Well, the things that should be believed, he sees them that they should be believed, right? He doesn't see them in themselves that they are true, right?

[5:57] So it's kind of a subtle point, right? But there's a kind of what seeing, right? He's able to. I'm trying to grasp the subtlety. Is it is it that he's able to see in some way

[6:17] the the evidence of the credibility? He's able to judge about. their being believable Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or if they should be believed, right? So, there's sufficient reason to believe. Yeah, yeah. That they should believe, but that's part of the influence of this habit of faith. Yeah, yeah. So he sees that they should be believed, huh? He doesn't see them as being true in themselves, huh? They should be believed by him, right?

[6:49] That's kind of a subtle point that Thomas is making, you know. That's what when we studied epistemology years ago. That's one of the points that the teacher made, impress at least made an impression on me was the evidence of credibility is what moves you to believe something because you see there's reason to believe either on the part of the truth that's being proposed and the good will of the witness.

[7:26] Yeah, yeah. yeah. I remember, De Koninck talking one time about his faith, right? You know? and why does he think he has the the virtue of faith, right? Now,

[7:51] well, he sees the strength of his adherence to these things, right? But he doesn't see them in themselves, so it must be by faith that he believes, right? Rather than by sight that he that he assents, right?

[8:12] Once I read a comment from the old Cardinal Ratzinger before he became pope, and he was answering some question about something I don't remember what the particular was, and somebody remarked, "Well, you're awfully confident about that." He says, "The faith makes us confident." Yeah, yeah, that's what it is. Yeah, yeah.

[8:44] So the light of faith is not sufficient to see these things in themselves, right? But the light of faith is enough to see that these things should be believed by you, right?

[9:24] They talk about the light of glory, right? Huh? It's kind of a different kind of light, huh? And the light of glory doesn't make God understandable, right? Huh? But the light of glory disposes your reason to receive God as that by which you see God as He is. It's a very subtle thing, right? Huh? It's not a light in the same sense, right? Huh? Is that what the Orthodox refer to as the uncreated energies of God?

[9:59] Who knows That was the light—the light that showed the light that they see in Christ as He was at Mount Tabor on Transfiguration. They're saying you can't see Him as He—I think you can't see Him as He is. What they saw was uncreated energies, and I think the scholastic answer to that was that you're saying that God has parts, and that's against, his you know, his simplicity something like that.

[10:24] Yeah, well, no, I mean is that the that the inner what excellence of Christ, right? Shines forth through the body, right? Huh? It's kind of an effect in the body of the elevation of the soul, right? Huh? And of course you saw it in Moses, right? Huh? When he when he went up in the mountain, right? Came down, of course, is what you know. People were, yeah.

[10:54] What's the matter? You know, I'm the one, the one one. You know, if everybody if you walked in there, everybody was closing like that, you think something's wrong with you, you know? Maybe a little self-conscious. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[11:14] Even in the in the we see the beatific vision, right? Now, you know, then there will be this glory shining through our our body, right? Yeah. It's a light in a different sense, right? Huh? Speaking

[11:31] of glorified body, huh? But the but the lumen gloriae, the light of glory, right? It is not a light that makes something visible that was not visible before, but saying what it prepares your soul to receive God as a form by which you see God as He is.

[12:09] I mean, Saint Saint John says in the epistle there, right? Huh? We know when He appears, we shall be like Him, huh? Because we shall see Him as He is, huh? But how can we see God as He is? By what do we see God as He is? By God Himself being joined to our mind, but our our mind has to be raised up by the light of glory, so that God can be received as that by which He is seen.

[12:41] It's a different kind of light, huh? It's not a light that enlightens something, right? But it's disposing the soul and the reason itself to receive God as the form by which He will be seen.

[13:01] Because no created form could what enable you to see God as He is Himself. And how does God see see Himself? Through Himself, right? So how are we going to see God as He is, right? If not through God Himself, right? But then, how can our reason be joined in, right? We have to be raised up by the light of of what glory, right?

[13:39] The light of faith now what doesn't do that, right? Huh? But the light of faith enables you to see that these things are to be believed.

[14:06] It's a little bit like you know the necessity of what Aristotle talks about of the moral virtues, right? For prudence, right? Unless you have your desiring powers properly disposed, right? By moral virtue, you can't see that this is what should be done in this case.

[14:39] The coward thinks he should run away. That's good for him. That's that's that's a man would do in the circumstances, run away, because you're facing what quite possibly death, right? Huh? So unless you have the virtue of courage, you can't see that you should stay here now.

[15:05] Try and stop these guys that are coming up the hill or something. I heard there was a shooting at a church was in Tennessee or something the other day. Did you hear about this? Which one was this?

[15:16] I don't know. I just saw a little blurb about it, and it's. Some church, some nut came in and started shooting people. And I guess when he came in, one of the ushers was there, and he bashed the usher in the head or something with his gun or whatever. Yeah. And the usher ran out to his car. He had a concealed weapon in his glove compartment, and he came in and he pointed the gun at the guy and he said, he'd already shot two or three people, killed them.

[15:40] And he said, you stop now or I'm going to shoot you dead. He stopped. Uh huh. That was the end of it. Yeah. So they said this guy was he was the hero of the day. I think it was on a Sunday. It must have been maybe last Sunday or something. Was it in a Catholic church? I don't think so. It was a Protestant church. But but they said the the guy had a license for concealed carry.

[15:59] He didn't have it on. He actually ran out to the parking lot, got in his car, dropped the gun in, and stopped him. But he didn't shoot him. He just threatened him, and the guy got scared and he stopped. I don't know anything else about the story. Okay. So he was he did the courageous thing. Yeah. He knows. Yeah. Face him down. So a man who doesn't have the virtue of courage, right, it will not seem to his reason, right.

[16:28] He just doesn't have the have the beginning for seeing what he should do, you know. For a man doesn't have the virtue of justice, he's not going to find by prudence what is a just thing to do in this case, right?

[16:45] Doesn't have the virtue of what of temperance, right? Huh? He's not going to see that he should stop drinking now, you know, or he should not pursue this woman, right? Who's not his wife or whatever it is, something, you know.

[17:08] But by the inclination that he has and his moral virtues, that he sees what should be done in particular here and now, right? I've never seen, you know, these people like Bacchic or Dion or something drunk, you know. You know, I mean, they have this virtue of temperance, right?

[17:39] So by the virtue of what faith, right? Huh? You don't see the truth of these things in themselves, but you see that they should be what be believed, right?

[17:54] Huh? Because of the inclination that your reason has through the virtue of what faith, right? Because faith is a a virtue, right? Habit? Habit, right?

[18:12] And every virtue gives this what inclination, right? Harmony with it. Okay, so that's kind of a subtle thing, right? Lumen fidei facit videre ea quae creduntur right? The things you should believe. For just as man, let me reply to the third objection again, again here. For just as through the other hap habits of what virtues, right, a man sees that which is what suitable to him according to that what habit, right?

[19:02] Huh? So also through the habit of faith, the mind of man is inclined to assent to those things which what fit right faith and not to others, right? Okay Some truths, some truths and not others. Yeah, yeah, yeah. What is what is in accordance with? With true faith, yeah, To those things, yeah, it gives you a certain ease or inclination, right, to ascend to those things that are in accordance with your virtue of faith, right?

[19:35] It's to always see that, you know, a man doesn't have respect for the Blessed Virgin, right? And I wouldn't trust him at all. in the matters of faith, right?

[19:52] It? Just seems natural to me to to what to think that, right? Huh? Begin with something you know, not very well established, right? Is proposed to be believed, right?

[20:14] When it's time to reject it, by what? By faith, right? Is Mary the fourth person of the Blessed Trinity? Not yet. I heard an old monk kind of lost his mind. Somebody said something like that. Just, oh no, that's not possible. Because I'm the fourth person of the Trinity. Okay, let's go on to the next article now. Article five.

[21:04] The fifth one proceeds thus: It seems that those things which are of faith are able to be what? Yeah, shita means what? Known, reasoned out, right? Through something else.

[21:24] Now those things which are what? Not. Reasoned out, knowledge. Yeah, known in a sense, seem to be ignorant, right? No. Because ignorancia, ignorance, is opposed to knowledge, right?

[21:44] But those things which are faith are not what Unknown. For such ignorance of such things pertains to infidelity. According to the words of Saint Paul, I guess about himself, there, one to Timothy, right? He's excusing himself, right? He was forgiven because he was ignorant, right? And he did these things, you know. He used to attack the church, right? You know, before get knocked off his horse. It's got an expression in daily life.

[22:17] Get knocked off your horse. See, he says ignorance, right? I did this in my incredulity, right? Therefore, those things which are of faith are able to be what? Yeah. Okay, there's a little ambiguity to the word shita there, right? Because it sounds just means known, you know.

[22:45] Moreover, knowledge or scienzia is acquired by reasons, right? Given for things. But for those things which are of faith, reasons are induced even by the sacred authors, right? Inducter. Therefore, those things which are of faith are able to be what? Known.

[23:13] Does Paul tell us to have a reason for the faith that is in us? It's not Saint Paul or Saint Peter? Saint Peter, yeah. Saint Peter,

[23:24] yeah. Saint Peter, yeah. What? He's to give a reason for the hope. that's in you. Yeah, yeah. But then that presupposes that you're giving a reason for the faith. Yeah.

[23:36] So why do you believe? So you're asking, you're looking for a reason, aren't you? Right. If I'm an atheist or a free thinker or whatever, you know, I ask you, you know. Why do you? believe? We're having an ecumenical session here. Why do you believe, right?

[23:58] You're being asked to give a reason. So you should have a reason for what you believe. Yeah. Well, then then it can be known, right? If there can be a reason for it.

[24:11] There's a reason why for the Pythagorean theorem, right? Reason. Yeah. And and other theorems, it's even easier than that, right? Okay. Moreover, those things which are demonstratively proven are what known, right? Okay. That's reason, not knowledge. Because demonstration is logic, right? A syllogism making us to what?

[24:51] What is the cause? But some things which are contained in faith are demonstratively proven by philosophers, as God to be, right? And God to be one, right?

[25:09] Things of this sort, huh? Therefore, those things which are faith are able to be what? No, no. There's some subtle tricking going on here. Some subtle trickery. going on here. I mean Aristotle proved that God exists, right? And he proved that God is what's simple, pure act, many things.

[25:37] For more, opinion differs more from knowledge than faith, As we said before, opinion there is what fear of the opposite, right? Okay. So opinion is is a kind of what conjectura, the Latin they say, but a guess, right?

[25:58] So sometimes they divide guess into opinion and suspicion, right? Opinion is a stronger guess than suspicion, right? But in either case, are you what? Not sure. Yeah, there's some fear that the opposite might be so, right?

[26:18] I guess I'll go. Don't be normal. Going to go or not, you know? I guess you're right. Can't defend my position. I guess you. I guess you're right.

[26:45] But opinion and knowledge can be in some way about the same thing, huh? So one man guesses what the other man what knows, right? As is said even in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, right?

[27:05] Therefore, seems it what? Also, knowledge. Because faith is even stronger. I mean, closer to knowledge, right? To scientia. Greek word for scientia is what? Episteme, right? Which is both Plato and Aristotle says has in it the idea of coming to a halt or a stop. So when the mind is reasoning, huh, and it shows it really is so, then it comes to a halt or a stop.

[27:47] Beckley jumped out of the what? The mathematician jumped out of the bathtub, right? And went right around, you know. You know, Eureka! I found it, right? So he stopped thinking, right? He's got excitement now. Knowledge makes you stop thinking. Begins.

[28:19] This is what Gregory says. He's a pretty great authority, huh? Gregory the Great, I guess. That apparentia do not have what faith, but what knowledge, right? Huh?

[28:37] Therefore, those things about which is faith do not have what knowledge, right? Do you know there are three persons in God, or just believe that? You don't know it, though, do you? I am an atheist here. You're a rational believer, right? No that's really Okay. So he says, "I answer. It should be said that every scientia is had through some beginnings, huh? That are known to themselves, right?

[29:34] " Now he said that known to themselves does not mean known to itself in the sense that you prove a statement by itself. You don't mean that. Not proved by what other statements, right? Okay. And if it's said to be known to itself in a affirmative way, rather than. You know, way of signifying what

[30:05] something negative, right? Not through another. You could say, well, it's known through its what parts, right? Something like that. Okay. So, beginning of Euclid's Elements, right? You have the axioms and the postulates, right? Which are known to themselves, and per consequence and consequently, what then they are seen, right?

[30:36] And therefore, it's necessary that whatever things are what shita, right? Known demonstratively in some way are seen, right? But it's not possible that the same thing by the same one be both believed and what seen, as has been said above, right? Whence also it is impossible that by the same one, the same thing is what? Yeah, because it's seen, right?

[31:11] But now it is possible that that which is seen or or what known for another? And I say, I mean, you got to be kind of careful about translating visum known, because it doesn't really give you the full idea of visum right? Visum is something known from other things that are certain, right? Known to be certain. Now it can happen, he says, that that which is seen or known necessarily by one person can be believed by what another, right?

[31:47] For those things which we believe about the Trinity, we hope that we ourselves will what see them someday. According to that of the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen, we see now through a what mirror in an enigma in a kind of dark way, right? But then we will see what face to face.

[32:13] Which vision the angels already what have? Whence what we believe they see, right? Okay, so someone can see something that someone else believes, right?

[32:34] And likewise, it can happen even that what is seen or known by one man, even in the state of the what of the way the road, be by someone else what believed, huh? Who does not know this demonstratively, right?

[32:54] Yeah, yeah. That can be known by natural reason too. See, see, in Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles it's very explicitly divided, right? Into two parts, right? In the first three books about those things can be known both by faith and by what natural reason, right? And then the fourth book is about those things can be known only by faith, right? Not by by natural reason. In summary,

[33:32] it can happen that that which is seen or known by one man, even in the state of the road, right, of the of the via this life, can be known can be what believed by another who does not know this thing demonstratively, right?

[33:50] But that which is commonly proposed to all men, right, as believing, right, as to be believed, should be believed, is commonly not what known, right, like the Trinity and things of that sort. And these are what simpliciter, simply subject to faith, right? I'm getting back the old distinction of simply and somewhat.

[34:21] So, do you know that God exists, or do you believe that God exists? I'd like to say I know it, but I know I believe it too. I don't know it really well. Yeah, even the great Charles De Koninck, I remember him saying one time, because he says, "I think I can prove that God exists." He says, "But I would not be so presumptuous as to say so."

[34:55] Sometimes you know they give the proofs, you know, from the sum and so on, you know, to kids in high school, even you know, or something, you know, to show them that they can be, you know, can be reasoned again for these things, you know. But I don't know how much they understand the the proofs.

[35:21] But for most people, they would what? Yeah, it'd be belief, right? But that would be somewhat a matter of belief, right? Because not all men would have to believe it, because some would know, right? If we could have a chance to convert Aristotle, right, he would come already knowing that God exists and knowing some other things about God, right? And so he would not have to be led to believe those things, right?

[35:51] Because he knows them already, right? In strict sense, he knows them. But the Trinity is something that is a matter of faith, simply, right? We made that distinction before. That distinction, we were not here when he talked about it, but the distinction between what?

[36:16] Yeah, yeah, yeah. The simple example to give of that distinction is, you know, the black man is somewhat white because his teeth are white, you know, and they always talk about the the way the black man's teeth, you know, kind of stand out, right, because it's black skin and so on. And I'm somewhat black, right? Because you can see under my eyes, you know, it's black, you know, and.

[36:45] my hair used to be kind of more black, you know. It's kind of white now, but so it's simply speaking white. We talked about that before, right? He seems to be using that distinction here, right? So the Trinity and things of that sort, and the transubstantiation, so on. This is a matter of faith, simply, right? For everybody, right? Even for Thomas Aquinas and so on, right? But the

[37:29] existence of God can be proven by natural reason, right? That's actually a matter of faith, right? It can be known by natural reason, right? But most men maybe will not be up to it, huh? So it can be a matter of belief for what Won't be a matter of belief for most, you know. But

[37:54] it's somewhat right. So he says that which is at the end of the body article, that which is commonly opposed to all men believing, is communiter non visum right? Huh? Okay. These are things which simpliter, huh, are under what faith, and therefore faith and sciencia are not about the same thing, right?

[38:34] Huh? So if you argue that they are the same thing because Aristotle knew this, right, that God exists and so on, right, then you're making the fallacy of what simply and somewhat.

[38:52] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I was being there with what's his name, Joshua, last night. There, you know, the third book there, the and the soul and Thomas has a little thing added there in the text there, where he's showing that Averroes is mistaken, you know, about the possible understanding, right? And it turns out it's the fallacy of what simply not no, it's the fallacy of per se and per accidens right?

[39:34] Okay, which deceives even the wise, as Aristotle says. Averroes is wise, but deceived even him, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the infidels, right,

[40:04] have ignorance of those things which are of faith, right, because they do not see or know. Again, the word "know" doesn't give the exact meaning of "scientia" in Latin, right? It's reasoned-out knowledge, right?

[40:23] They don't see these things or reason them out in themselves, nor do they know them to be believable, right? That's a different thing, right? They don't know that either. But in this way, the faithful have knowledge of these things, right? Not as the word demonstratively by demonstration, right, from statements known through themselves, right? But in so far as through the light of faith they are seen to be what believable. Or they should be believed, right?

[40:56] Okay. So there is a way in which you kind of see as a result of faith, right? You see that something should be believed, right? You don't see the truth of it in itself, okay?

[41:12] Now, what about these reasons that are given by the faithful, right? To the second, should be said that the reasons which are induced by the saints to proving those things which are faith, you might say what? Simply, right? Like the Trinity and so on, are not what? Demonstrative, but they are certain what? Persuasions, right? As it were, to manifest that it is not impossible what is proposed in faith.

[41:45] Or sometimes they proceed from the beginnings of faith, right? That is from the authorities of what? For the authors of sacred scripture, right? As Dionysius said in the second chapter of the Divine Names.

[42:02] For from these beginnings it proves right something among the faithful, just as from principles naturally known, it proves something what? Yeah. Whence theology is a science as in the beginning of the work it has been said, right? You got to be careful there, right? It could be subordinated to the faith of those who see the what articles of faith in themselves now in heaven, right? Okay. Aristotle talks about that kind of science, huh?

[42:35] Science that is subordinate to the science, right, for its principles, and that's what kind of science that theology is. So we sometimes reason from one article of faith to something else. It's a matter of faith, right? Yeah. So it's a kind of scientia there, right? As not reasoning from things naturally known, known to themselves.

[43:13] Now the third one is making very explicit the distinction between simply and somewhat, right? To the third, it should be said that those things which are able to be proven demonstratively, right, like the existence of God, right, demonstration, quia they call it, that something is so from the effect, are able to be numbered among things to be believed, right, by those who don't know the demonstration, right?

[43:40] Not because these things are that faith is about these things simply, right? Among all, but because they are presupposed to those things which are of faith, right? It is necessary, at least by faith, to presuppose them by those who do not have the demonstration of them. Right.

[44:16] Now we down to the fourth objection. Let's recall the fourth objection once again. Let's have it Well. Opinion and science can be in some way about the same thing, right? But faith is even closer to science, so can't be about the same thing, right? Okay.

[44:44] To the fourth, it should be said that, as the philosopher says, there, by diverse men about the same thing, there can be had what?

[44:56] An opinion, just as now there can be knowledge, reason out knowledge, and faith, right? But by one and the same, there is able to be had faith and what? Knowledge about the same things, secundum quid, right? Somewhat? Yeah, in the subject, not according to the same thing, right?

[45:25] For about one the same thing, a person is able to know something and have opinion about something else, right? So the doctor knows some things are wrong with you, and other things he guesses are wrong with you. It's not the same thing that he knows and guesses, all right? But about the same thing, according to the same way, there cannot be at the same time in one man knowledge, neither with opinion nor with what faith, right?

[45:55] For other and other reasons. For science with opinion to be together cannot simply be about the same thing, because of the notion of science is that that which is known is estimated to be impossible to have itself otherwise, right?

[46:17] Yeah, but by reason of the opinion that which someone estimates so, he guesses could possibly be otherwise, right? I guess that so. I think that so. Are they going to be other ways? Yeah, yeah. I think I think they're coming. You know, I'm not sure.

[46:40] But that which is held by faith on account of the certitude of faith is estimated to be impossible to have itself otherwise. But for the same reason, but by that reason, it cannot be the same thing known and believed because the thing known is seen, and the thing believed is not seen. As has been said, right? Okay.

[47:04] Time to stop now, I guess. We're going to go on a little bit. Okay. Now the next group of articles is more about the what the articles themselves, right? Okay.

[47:25] So, Article Six, with the things to be believed. To six, one proceeds thus: it seems the things to be believed should not be distinguished by definite articles.

[47:42] For about all those things which are found in sacred scripture are contained, faith should be had, right? But they cannot be reduced to any certain number and count their multitude. Therefore, it is superfluous to distinguish articles of faith. There's just too many things here to believe.

[48:13] Moreover, material distinction, since it can come about infinitely, right? Should be what Set aside Observed? I mean omitted by art, right. But the formal ratio de object, believable, is one and indivisible. As has been said, namely, the first truth, right? And thus, according to the formal ratio, believable things should not be cannot be distinguished. Therefore, there ought to be omitted the what material distinction of things to be believed.

[48:54] Two articles. However, as has been said by some, there's a whole bunch of people down here: Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Richard the Second, Victorine Okay. An article is a indivisible truth about God, right? Forcing us or finding us or limiting us to believing, but to believe is voluntary, because as Augustine says, no one believes unless he is will. Therefore, it seems unsuitable to distinguish things believable through articles.

[49:50] Against this is what Isidore says: an article is a perception of a divine truth tending towards what? Yeah. Yeah. To him, God, but the perception divine truth belongs to us according to a certain what Distinction. distinction.

[50:11] Which in God are one, but in our intellect are what multiplied. Therefore, the believable things ought to be distinguished by articles. I answer: It should be said that the name of article seems to be derived from what Greek?

[50:37] For an arthron, ah, in Greek, which in Latin is called an articulus, signifies a certain what agreement, you might say, right, of distinct parts, right?

[50:55] And thus the parts of the body are adapted to each other, right? And they're called what? Articles, members. Yeah. We use the word article. Where do we use it in politics? Here, in the constitution? In the constitution, we use it legally. Yeah. Using the newspaper, there's Parts of the newspaper an article about this. There's an article about that. Yeah. Parts of the newspaper Yeah. Are they adapted to each other?

[51:23] I don't know if there are. Then that. Physically. Are we doing it? Visually, there. Yeah. And likewise, in grammar, ah, up the Greeks, they're said to be articles, right? Certain parts of the oration adapted to other what? Saying and expressing their genus, number, or case, right? And similar in rhetoric, articles are said certain adaptations of the parts, right?

[51:59] These things called here are called articles, right? That Thomas has. Aren't they all connected? Yeah, aren't these articles all connected in some way? Yeah. put together on a question Yeah.

[52:15] So Thomas is summa is divided into questions, and the questions into articles, right? There's certain adaptation of these articles one to another, right? These are all about the object of what faith, right? Another one would be about the. There'd be another question about the acts of faith, and another one about the habit of faith, right? So the articles in each question will be coaptata adapted to each other, maybe connected, right?

[52:52] Okay. Terrible quote there from Tullius, right? From Cicero. That's the name for Cicero, right? Articulus dicitur cum singula verba, They're distinguished by intervallis, right?

[53:29] they're distinguished. Whence also the things that are believable by Christian faith are said to be what distinguished particles, in so far as they divide into certain parts having somewhat fitting to each other, right?

[53:55] Now the object of faith is something not seen about divine things, as has been said above, and therefore where there occurs something for a special reason not seen, then there is a special what article.

[54:11] Where many things are what for the same reason unknown, there the article should not be what distinguished. For just as what there is some difficulty had to see that God should what suffer, right, and another that he what rises the dead, and therefore we distinguish the article resurrection from the article of what passion, right?

[54:42] But that he should be what he should suffer, die, and be buried, what kind of goes together, right? They have one and the same difficulty, right? And then one being accepted is not difficult to accept the others, right? In kind of this, we all pertain to one article. So we're going to distinguish the articles by what the difficulties of believing, right?

[55:13] Whatever is not seen about. Yeah, and and there's some difficulty of believing that man can rise from the dead, right? And there's some difficulty about believing that God could die in some way, right? It's a different difficulty, right? And therefore it's a different article, right? So where there's a special difficulty in under in believing, right, there's an article that has to be distinguished. We kind of we kind of get that, Thomas.

[55:45] So we're kind of slow on these, but we're kind of getting there, are we? I'd like to. I would like to understand. But doesn't

[55:58] it make sense, you know, that that that he suffered, died, and was buried? You know, this kind of what. they go together Yeah. Yeah.

[56:10] And it can be one of those three things. It can be the rest, right? He suffered. He could die, and you know, if he died, you know, he could be buried. Yeah let's know If God could die, then he could be buried. Yeah.

[56:27] I was just meeting Washington Irving today. You know, I'd like to meet him there. His visit to Sir Walter Scott's home. You know, and

[56:41] he's giving all the example of his sense of humor, right? Well, I guess somebody that they knew had had died, right? And the wife didn't know that he had died, right? And so she said to her husband, Sir Walter Scott, did did did Sir Walter die? Well, he said if if he didn't, they treated him very badly because they buried him.

[57:08] He's giving us lines so he's kind of a charming man. He says He's completely happy, you know, to get that, you know, because he took him in, you know, and and so I'm. It's the only time I was sad was when I had to leave, you know.

[57:27] Great guy. Okay. So it may not be always easy to tell, but you can kind of see with that example that he gives there.

[57:59] Now, to the first one, that there's a multitude of things in what Scripture rightly ought to be believed, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that some things are believable about which is faith as such, right? Why some are believable about which is not faith as such, but a in order to what? Other, yeah. Just as in other sciences, some things are proposed as per se intended, right?

[58:30] Huh? And some to the manifestation of what other things? Huh? Because, therefore, because faith is chiefly about those things which we hope to see in the fatherland, right? According to that, and this is another part of the definition of faith. Faith is the substance of things what? Yeah. Is kind of a what? Foundation. In the things you're going to what? That you hope to see, right? Huh?

[59:06] And it's kind of a a foundation laid there, right? Huh? Because you believe these things that you will later see, right? So. All these things that contained in Scripture then are not about things that you hope to see, right?

[59:24] And therefore, those per se pertain to faith, which directly order us to what? Eternal life. As if there are three persons, right? Of course, if one of these persons didn't become man, you know, we'd have. It's very much important for getting to heaven, right? So we've got to be told about these things, right? The omnipotence of uh the omnipotence of God, right? The mystery of the incarnation of Christ, is of the sort.

[59:57] Those things who directly order us to eternal life. And according to these are distinguished the articles of faith. Some things are proposed on sacred scripture to be believed, not because they are principally intended, right? But to the manifestation of the things of the foregoing things, as that Abraham had two sons, that the touch of bones

[1:00:33] was raised, from the dead was raised from the dead, right? And other things of this sort, which are narrated in sacred scripture in order to the manifestation of the divine majesty or the incarnation of Christ, and according to such things, why not not to distinguish the articles, right? When Tobias really had a dog he really wagged his tail

[1:01:03] Yeah. Okay. Other things of this sort, which are narrated in sacred scripture in order to the manifestation of what the divine majesty, right, or the incarnation of Christ, right. So in those two things, right. According to such things,

[1:01:54] none say to distinguish the articles. To the second, it should be said that the formal ratio of the object of faith can be taken in two ways.

[1:02:09] In one way, on the part of the what the very thing believed, and thus the formal ratio of all things believed is one, namely the divine, the first truth. And on the part of this article and and this part, the articles are not distinguished, right?

[1:02:32] Another way can be taken: the formal ratio of the things you believed, on our part, And thus the formal ratio of the believable is that it is what Not seen. not seen. And from this part, the articles of faith are distinguished by the things that are not seen. Yeah.

[1:03:00] To the third, it should be said that that definition is given of article more according to a certain what a name, insofar as it has a Latin derivation. Then, according to its true meaning, derive from what? Greek.

[1:03:21] Thomas often points out that the etymology of a word is not its meaning. You can't simply argue from one to the other, right? So, if your name is Johnson, right now, you are not necessarily the son of John. Especially if you're an Earl Yeah. Once is not a great, you know. I am not really a Berquist's name from what?

[1:03:51] Mountain branch. yeah That's not the meaning of the word, is it? My mountain branch. Okay. It can never be said that although right for believing, no one is what forced by the necessity of force, right? Since to believe is voluntary, he is nevertheless what restricted, you might say, by the necessity of the end, because for the one approaching God, it is necessary to believe. That's what the apostle says, right, Saint Paul.

[1:04:41] And without faith, it's impossible to what? Please God, that's a strong thing. Remember, I used to take that example of the word equivocal by reason. Is it necessary to understand the word necessary?

[1:05:14] Because if you maintain it's not necessary to understand the word necessary, you have to understand what necessary means. We mentioned to show why it's not necessary.

[1:05:29] But is the word necessary equivocal? I don't think so. Is two necessarily half of four? Okay. Not by choice. Yeah. It's necessary to eat in this life, isn't it? Is that the same sense of necessary as when I say two is necessarily half of four? I don't think so. No. Because two will always be half of four, right? Do you always eat in this life? No. If you are going to live.

[1:06:09] Then you must eat sometime, somewhere. Like a few times a day. You know, a few times a day, we've got to eat something, right? Somewhere, right?

[1:06:20] There's no time that two isn't half of four. Yeah. Is it necessary to study logic? If you want to think well. Yeah, yeah. So if you want to be a philosopher, you've got to know some logic, right? So in order to be a thinker, right? Okay.

[1:06:47] Is it necessary to go to confession? For most of us. All of us. We're all sinners, right? Um. Didn't didn't. Do you have to go to confession every day or something? I've heard John Paul II did. Yeah.

[1:07:09] It's interesting, right? But notice, huh? It's not necessary to take receive the sacraments, like it is necessary for two to be half of four. Because people can go to life without receiving the sacraments, right? But if you want to achieve this end, then you must what? Yeah, yeah.

[1:07:39] It's necessary for me to have a car to get home tonight. You could even walk. Yeah, yeah. And call a cab. Yeah, yeah. But, you know. But if you want to get there before supper. Yeah, yeah, yeah, and comfortably home, you know. That's right. You know, so I mean, there are different senses of necessary, right?

[1:08:03] So it's necessary to understand, yeah, even to see that's necessary to understand necessary. But it isn't necessary to understand necessary like it's necessary that two be half of four. Because two must be half of four, but not everybody understands the word necessary, do they?

[1:08:37] Must you understand the word necessary? If you want to achieve the knowledge, of something. If you want to understand demonstration, for example, then you must understand the word necessary, right? Right. No,

[1:09:05] to achieve a particular end, right? That's one sense of necessary, right? Okay. Sometimes something cannot, some end cannot be achieved at all without this. What means, right? If You want to live, you got to eat, right? Keeping you guys away from your eating now, right?

[1:09:29] Some people go on a starving thing, likes to kill themselves, right? Yeah. Came up in this talking about the suicide there, you know. they'll stop, you know. Take away their food.

[1:09:48] So the word necessary, you know, it's very. I would say you know that if you don't understand words equivocal by reason, you're going to make a lot of mistakes. You're going to be confused most of the time about the universal, yeah, yeah.