Secunda Secundae
8. Believing God, Believing by God, Believing in God, and Why Faith Is Needed for Salvation (II-II q.2 aa.2–3)
Class of 2017-10-12
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/12-secunda-secundae/008-believing-god-believing-by-god-believing-in-god-and-why-faith/

[0:00] But there suitably is distinguished the act of faith by this, which is to what believe. Now, credere deo. How would you translate that? To believe by God, maybe the closest thing, right? It's more dative, though. What? Dative as the object of credere. I think that's the thing that sometimes credere can take dative, sometimes accusative, and then sometimes is in construction. Yeah, yeah. It's more like to believe by God is the reason why you believe, right?

[0:38] Okay. Okay. Because the primary object there is the first truth, huh? Okay. And then to believe God—that's more what the the object is concerned, it seems, huh? Okay. And to believe in God, well, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Huh? This is referring to what kind of the moving towards God is the end of your thinking, huh?

[1:09] Kind of interesting that you should have those three, right? It's a little hard to express it properly in English, huh? We don't say in English that I believe. When I say I believe God, we probably use that for credere deo, right? Huh? I believe God, right? And I believe in God. Well, you're probably using it in a different sense again, huh?

[1:37] But it's kind of a material object, right? Like credere deo is kind of the formal object is that distinction, right? Okay. But how would you express in English to say I believe by God, or you know? Okay. We'll see what Thomas goes on to say here.

[2:03] So we're taking apart your act, huh? Of believing, yeah, yeah. But faith is one habit, it says, right? Okay. One habit there is one act. But faith is one habit, since is one virtue. Therefore, suitably are laid down many acts of it, right? Just like you know, to see is the one act of the eye, right? And to hear of the ear, right?

[2:40] Moreover, that which is common to every act of faith, every act of faith ought not to be laid down as a particular act of faith. But credere deo, right, is found commonly in any act of faith, right? Because faith rests upon the first truth, right? That's what it means. That first. Formal object. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Therefore, it seems that unsuitably is it distinguished from some other acts of faith, right?

[3:16] However, that which belongs even to those who do not believe cannot be laid down as an act of faith. But to believe God also belongs to some without faith.

[3:37] Of course, English would be confusing here. We'd say, "I believe in God," you know, but you know, you know, people would say that, right?

[3:54] Number four, right? Moreover, to be moved to the end pertains to the what? Will, because the good is in the end. They're the same thing, right? Whose object is the good in the end? Aristotle points out in fourteen books of wisdom. But to believe is not an act of the will, but of the understanding. Therefore, we're not not to lay down as a difference. Is one difference of what it is to believe in God that implies emotion in the end?

[4:29] That's an act of the will. This we're talking about. Faith is in the reason, right? But again, this troublemaker is Augustine again, right? But against this is that Augustine lays down this distinction. Now, lays down is what sign of what firmness, right? I am going to lay down the law now, right? The idea of firmness, and in the syllogism, you know, speech in which some statements laid down, right?

[5:05] The same word that you use when you talk about giving a law, right? You lay down the the law, what the kids say. Or lay down the you know. Remember reading Washington Irving's life of George Washington, right? He's laying down the law, you know, because the army is pretty disorganized at that time, you know, and anybody who's you know not being brave will be shot. Lay down the law, you know.

[5:39] You obey your officers, and you know, and you know. Hear about the Marines, right? The captain or whatever goes with his gun to make sure you go forward. right? He's supposed to be a dead hero than a dead coward, right?

[6:02] Yeah, yeah. Hey, Carl, he'd been a Green Corps officer, you know. I said, "Why'd you become a marine?" He says, "Well, if you gotta go any state, you might go into the best." He says, "That was your attitude."

[6:22] Okay. So let's go to the body article. Answer should be said that the act of any potency or what ability, right, or habit can be taken, right, according to the order of that ability or habit to its what object, right? But the object of faith can be considered tripliciter, right? I know. See, I know she doesn't go beyond three. Yeah, he made it negative next pretty well.

[7:08] Okay. Okay. For to believe pertains to the understanding, in so far as it is moved by the will to assenting, as has been said. Therefore, the object of faith can be taken either on the side of the what understanding itself, or on the side of the will moving the understanding. If on the side of the what understanding, thus in the object of faith, two things are able to be considered, right, as has been said above.

[8:07] One of which is the material object of faith, and thus is laid down the act of faith as credere deum. Okay. Now you got to realize that to believe God could have the other sense sometimes too, right? But this is what you're you're believing something about God, you might say, right? Okay. To avoid the equivocation, right? See, right to believe God could mean the formal object too, you know.

[8:38] But but yeah, the Latin, you know. Okay. Okay. Because as has been said above, what nothing is proposed to be believed by us except according as it pertains to what God in some way, right? Just like we say that Iran in theology, you know that what's the subject of theology? Well, it's God, right? Okay. And other things only insofar as they relate to God in some way, as their beginning or their end, right?

[9:13] Creatures relate to God as their beginning, right? And then, of course, are in very much relates us to God. Another is the formalis ratio, right? The object, which is the middle under which one ascends to such a thing believable, right? And this is laid down as the act of faith, credere, deo, right? To give the Latinary. How the heck do those English editions translate that? They probably give up, you know, huh?

[9:53] What? So the first one is believe in a god is the first. Yeah. Yeah, that's one way to try to get around that. yes To believe God, To believe God Yeah Like 'cause he said so. Mhm I believe him So you gotta be very careful there about about the equivocation there between the two languages, right?

[10:14] Right. Okay. Because to believe God in English would mean credere Deum in Latin, right? In the way he's understanding it here. Yeah. Okay. I'm sorry to repeat what you just said Well I say you've got to be careful that, um, to believe in English to say to believe God, is God is the reason why you believe, right? The formal reason, right? Yeah. And, but credere Deo, right?

[10:44] Okay. Means to believe things that pertain to God, right? Yeah. And this first one you said is is the Deo one. Yeah. So when you translate, if you just take the words, you know, and translate credere Deum, you translate to believe God, and then that would have a different sense than it has in the Latin, right? Yeah. You know.

[11:14] Yeah, there's something like that also with the word prayers and I like that, you know, again some of the other languages. Um. To pray God, I say, sometimes people. Some languages they say. Yeah. What does that mean? You're praying to him. Yeah! Yeah! Yeah! Oh yeah! Yeah! Yeah! I'm begging you, it's like you say, you know, Shakespeare says prithi, isn't that a form of, I pray, you, I pray you.

[11:40] I'm asking you. I'm debating you. Yeah! Yeah! Yeah! That's a different meaning than what it means in English, right? Just kind of funny English to say. I pray God.

[11:51] But it sounds in daily speech we speak of it though. I, you know, I pray you would, you know, something like that. Yeah. But

[12:05] if man could think without words, it would be nice. He can't. He can't. I used to always ask them the students, "Can you think without words? "

[12:23] And I said, Well, don't we sometimes think without words? " And I said, Yeah, probably. " But do you know what you think if you can't express it in words?

[12:35] What kind of thinking is that when you don't know what you're thinking? You've got to be able to put into words what you think to really know what you think. People are stumbling around, they can't quite say what they think.

[12:54] I mean, it's another step, you know, to know whether what you think is is true or false, right? But if you don't even know what you're thinking, how can you investigate whether it's true or false?

[13:10] Okay. So, the material object and the formal object is the way he distinguishes credere Deum, which is the material object, and credere Deo is the formal object, right?

[13:36] If one considers in a third way the object of faith, according as the understanding is moved by the will, then one lays down the act of faith, credere in Deum, for what? The first truth is referred to the will, according as has the ratio of a what? In, because that's the object of the the will, right? The good in itself.

[14:10] Now, to the first objection, it can be said that to these three are not designated diverse acts of faith, like the objecture is saying, but one and the same act having a diverse relation to the object of faith, right? And to this is also clear the response to the what? Second, right? We're just saying, credere Deum is what's common to all, right? Yeah, we're not denying that, right?

[14:45] Yeah, we're not distinguishing particular acts, right? But three aspects, you might say, of the same same act, huh? Now, what about those faithless people?

[15:01] To the third, should be said that to believe credere deum, right, which is not to be understood in our English way of speaking, right, does not belong to the faithless under that ratio by which it is laid down to be an act of faith, right? For they do not believe God to be under these conditions which faith determines, and therefore neither do they truly what? Believe God, because as the philosopher says in the ninth book of wisdom, in simple things, a defective knowledge is only in not attaining them entirely.

[15:43] If the thing is truly simple, right, you can't know part and and be correct about incorrect about another part, right? You get the whole, you know. or you don't.

[15:57] It's a very interesting thing, Aristotle points out in the ninth book of wisdom. Just look at the ninth book of wisdom again, and the twelfth book. You know, I remember seeing him pick that up.

[16:15] Aristotle, you know, contrasting, you know, the knowledge of God with the knowledge of what the truth about creatures, right? Huh? Where you have a composition, right? Well, God is not really composed, right? It's entirely simple. So you get the whole simple thing, or you completely miss the point. I say it's a hard thing to understand fully, you know. That's the way he's solving that, huh?

[16:57] Now the fourth objection was saying, "Hey, this is an act of reason. What are you bringing the will for? " What's an act of reason? What move by the will? To the fourth, it should be said that as has been said above, the will moves the understanding and the other powers of the soul to the end, right? And according to this, is laid down that the act of faith is to what?

[17:25] Yeah, in some way tending towards God, right? Huh? Let me just review again, because so that's interesting now that we see what the I know they covered it in the last question a little bit, but when we're looking at the creed, the creed uses "in Deum And so, what would be what would be the reason that the creed would use "in Deum as opposed to any of these other two?

[17:53] Yeah, And in what sense is it? You are saying I believe in God, right? Huh? Right. Is it is it taken the sense of I believe in God here? Same as in the Latin. That the Latin text says in Deum, right? Uh huh. You know, it seems you have to take it in that sense, right? So your believing is in some way what tending towards God is the end, right?

[18:29] Yeah. And that makes sense, doesn't it? If the act of reason is being commanded by the will, right? Well, the will can't do something without its own object, right? So that the what act of believing, right, is in some way tending towards what God in himself, because it's commanded the act of belief, right, by the what Will. will. Kind of a subtle thing, but isn't that? Yeah, isn't that the truth?

[19:06] So the main thing, did you say? The main thing with the creed is it's to build build up our will. It's to reinforce our will for the for that thing. Well, you're you're talking about the what moves the. Active reason, right? What what moves reason to ascend? It is the will, right? Yeah. You know, so you got to put that into an account of the what. Active belief, right?

[19:36] Yeah. You know. I mean. That act is not there without the will moving the reason, right? Yeah. So you're not really expressing fully the act of what.

[19:56] Of faith without bringing in the relation. That it has to God to the act of the will, right? Is moving it, huh? Makes sense. But but the other two senses, right?

[20:16] Which in Latin they call what? credere Deum, right, huh? Which is like the material object, he says, credere deo, right, huh? Kind of the formal object. That's more what on the side of the reason, right, huh? Because what is it thinking about, right? And why is it thinking this way about it, right? Okay. Or what is it enlightening it to do this, right, huh? Okay. But you have to bring in the act of the will, right?

[20:52] So it's voluntary, right? You know. So Augustine will say that. and Thomas will often quote Augustine there, you know, that no one believes if he doesn't will, yeah. So I mean, you're really leaving out an essential understanding of the act of belief if you don't bring in the order that it has from the what to will, right? That takes into account the the object of the will in some way, which is is the end, right?

[21:21] What? Amazing thing, huh? Yeah. So a lot here to to chew on, as they say. Well, I'm gonna send it to her. I'm gonna think about it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Kind of amazing thing, huh? You know. Have respect for this act of belief, right, huh? Was I reading the this latest book by Weigel You heard about that? Which one? It's kind of a personal book, you know, there about his his relationship with John Paul II.

[22:07] It's kind of interesting. I just seen. I haven't seen the book itself. I've seen a few a few accounts of it, you know, and so on, and and you know how they were trying to destroy the faith there in Poland, you know, and so on, huh? And I guess when he went back there, you know, to Poland was tough. You know, that was really tough on the communists that way.

[22:32] Yeah. We want God. We want God. They're actually, you know, we're saying that. What we do? What we do? Was it you that told us who was? I mean, we said at the recreation when he first went back to Poland. Yeah. And the general was in charge. Yeah. He was so nervous he actually wet his pants. Yeah, he was so scared. Yeah, yeah. Did he end up converting?

[23:07] No. Jaruzelski? Yeah, he did before he died. I'm pretty sure I don't. I didn't hear that. I I think I heard that because he died just a few years ago. It's a short time ago, yeah. And I thought I heard that he came back to the faith, but I. tried to look it up. No, he was that he was Jewish. Oh. Well, okay, so he came. back.

[23:26] Well, because he, At least one of his parents was Jewish. He was not. I don't know. I thought I saw that one before he died. Well, there's a triumph of John Paul II for you. yeah. Yeah, yeah, I think I remember that too, and I did remember that he was Jewish. yeah. At least one of his parents. At least, yeah. Just saw you find the Cardinal O'Connor too.

[23:45] did you know that? His mother was Jewish. Oh. I just learned that the Sisters for Life. yeah. That's the founders of the Sisters for Life mentioned that She says it's not well known. His mother was Jewish, and I think she wasn't married when he was born. Oh. So that's why he was interested in the Sisters for Life. He was inspired. He was inspired when he went to Auschwitz.

[24:06] Oh. And that's when he was inspired to uh, establish the. community. So, very interesting. That airplane story is really coming in. Right. Okay. Look at Article Three now. Yeah.

[24:28] Okay. To the third one goes forward. Oh, we can see the. We can't finish. Yeah. To the third, huh? One proceeds thus. It seems that to believe is not necessary for salvation. I don't think you could argue that way? How how you could confuse that issue? Well, the thing is, he'll give us reasons that I can't answer. As simple as it seems, I can't answer the objections.

[24:56] For the salvation perfection of each thing would seem to be sufficient the things that belong to it according to its nature. It gives the cat claws and it gives the.

[25:08] But those things which are of faith exceed the natural reason of man, right? Since they are non apparentia, not appearing, right? Therefore, to believe is doesn't seem to be necessary for salvation.

[25:26] Second, moreover, dangerously does man ascend to those things in which he cannot what Judge judge whether what is proposed to him is true or false. According to that of Job twelve, huh? Non ab oris verba judicat. Do not what. Judge, Judge words by the ears. Yeah. Some people substitute words for thoughts, right? That's what you're doing, you know.

[26:02] But such a judgment, man cannot be able to have in those things which are faith, because a man is not able to resolve them into first beginnings, right? Principia prima,

[26:18] which are the axioms and the so-called postulates, right? To which we judge about all things. Therefore, it's dangerous, huh, to give faith to such things, right? To believe, therefore, is not necessary for salvation. Something so dangerous, my goodness. Okay.

[26:49] Moreover, the salvation of man consists in God, according to that of Psalm thirty-six. The salus autem iustorum a Domino the salvation of the justice from the Lord.

[27:01] But the invisible things of God, the things which are made, are understood, right, being looked upon. And his even his what eternal power and divinity, huh? As it says in Romans one twenty, this is the one that he talk about the natural knowledge that we can have of God, right, huh? This is where the church uses this text and. Saying it's possible, there's some natural knowledge of God.

[27:30] But the things that are seen by the understanding are not believed, right? So the things that are seen, we can know some things about God. Why isn't that enough? You know, we got to answer this other stuff. It's nonsense, you know.

[27:47] I think, yeah, yeah, yeah. Therefore, it's not necessary for the salvation that man believes some things. Now, against all this nonsense, here's what is said in Hebrews chapter 11, verse 6. Sine fide, without faith, right? It's impossible to please God.

[28:14] That's a pretty strong statement. Now, Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that in all what nature's ordered is found that for the perfection of the lower nature, two things what come together. One which is according to its own motion, right? Another which is according to the motion of superior nature, right? That's why my little prayer there, you know, I say, 'Move us, God, to know and love you, ' right?

[28:58] Well, which motion is that talking about? The motion of a superior nature, right? But then the second part of my prayer is right. Help us to know and love you, right? Because according to one's own motion, one must what try to know and love God, right? You still need God's help there too, right? Yeah, but that's why the two parts of the prayer, right? Okay, in the

[29:29] trochaic tetrameter. Okay. Part of the unpublished poems of Thomas. Well, you know, Thomas's prayers, one of them is called there in there, the rhythmus, huh That's Thomas, right? The rhythmus Adoro te devote Yeah, meditating Thomas, you know, you know,

[29:54] he seems to use the trochaic, right? 'Cause it's contrary to what's most common to us, the iambic. Aristotle talks about the iambic as being something we kind of fall into almost in daily speech, right?

[30:11] So Shakespeare uses the trochee when he's talking about the witches, right? Fair is foul, and foul is fair. How thro' the fog and filthy air, he likes to make somebody a little different from us, you know, with a different meter, right? So Thomas says, "like in the one of the prayers visus, tactus, gustus, in te fallitur, That's trochaic. It seems to me. Okay. Just as water, according to its own motion, is moved to the center, right?

[30:43] So earth, air, fire, and water—they thought all fell towards the center, right? But according to the motion of the moon, circa centrum, right? It was a different kind of motion, right? Secundum fluxum and refluxum, right? Okay, talking about the

[31:04] tides, maybe. Yeah, come to tide. Yeah, that's due to the moon, right? Okay. And then more complicated example. Similarly, the what orbs of the planets are moved by their own motion from east to west, right? But by the motion, the first orb from the east to the west, okay. So accepted on faith, right? Okay. Now, only the rational nature, only the created, rational nature, has an immediate order to God, right?

[31:42] Because the other creatures do not attain to something what universal, right? Large discourse, right? One sense of the great Shakespeare's words. But only to something particular, partaking of the divine goodness, either in being only, right, as the inanimate things, right, or also in seeing, in living and knowing singulars, right, as the plants and the animals, right. But the what rational nature, in so far as it knows universal nature of good and of being, right, has immediate order to the universal beginning of being, right, the first being.

[32:32] And the cause, first cause. Yeah, but here he just says the first being, right? Chiefly. Okay. But perfection, per principio, didn't mean cause. Yeah, that's your correct there. Perfection, huh? Of the rational creature, not only then consists in that which belongs to him according to his nature, right? But also in that which is attributed to him from a certain what? partaking of the divine what goodness.

[33:06] Whence above it has been said, and this is back in the prima secunda, that the last beatitude of man consists in a certain supernatural vision of God, whereby we see him as he is, right?

[33:23] We see him as he is, as Saint John says. To which vision man is led, not only right, yeah, not even He's not able to be led, except by way of learning from God the teacher, right? According to that of John six verse forty-five, right? Everyone who hears from the Father and learns comes to me. huh? I like to tell you that. he who listens to the Father.

[34:00] That's what I understand. Yeah. Listens to the Father. I I. That's what I would prefer, but I don't know if I can argue a command

[34:18] Yeah, yeah. How they do this You got Latin here okay How. the they translate your English editions Here Here what When that earth earth of the Father Lord come Fides accaditu right?

[34:36] Now, of this learning, a man becomes a partaker not at once, right? But successively, right? and discursively, right? According to the mode of his what nature, right?

[34:55] Now, everyone thus learning, this is necessary that he believe in order that he might come to a perfect what knowledge, as also the philosopher says. Who is this philosopher? He's always calling me. He never gives us his name. It's not me, by the way.

[35:18] Maybe it was Kasurik Well, Kasurik said he had the brains of an angler compared to this guy called the philosopher. Even though he's wiser than anybody else at the College of St. Thomas, and I was a student there.

[35:41] Just as the philosopher says, and this is a reference now down to the famous text in Sophistical Refutations, the necessary for the learner to believe is necessary for the learner to what to believe.

[36:00] Whence, in order that man might arrive at a perfect vision of beatitude, there is presupposed, right, that he believe God as a student, right, believes his master teaching. That's kind of a beautiful way of proceeding, isn't it?

[36:21] E? Even in terms of human learning, right? Yes. You need to believe the what teacher, right? You know. Keep on coming back to me. I mean, De Koninck said one time in class, you know, he used to explain you know, sometimes a word equivocal by reason, you know, saying that every respectable word in philosophy is is equivocal by reason, right? Huh? And

[36:49] I didn't try to prove that at the time, you know, but the more I live, the more what I see the truth of that, right? Huh? And if he hadn't, you know, said that, I would not have thought so much about what words equivocal by reason, right? Huh? I was kind of joking by myself, you know, of how I might lead students along, you know, like actually lead students along, you know, and say, do you think we can define something by?

[37:21] Words equivocal by reason, and it might seem like, how can you use words that have many meanings, right, to define something? You're not going to what? Be more precise. Yeah, you're not going to really pinpoint what you're trying to define, right?

[37:40] And but then I got thinking, you know, I'm saying, well, I got thinking about Shakespeare's definition, for example, of reason, right? And every word in there is equivocal by reason.

[38:01] And well, how can you define it with words not equivocal by reason? Well, ability, right, is a word equivocal by reason. That's the first word you might say in the definition. Reason is the ability, he says, capability, but I take a liberty and shorten it to ability.

[38:24] Well, if you know the ordered senses of the word ability, you can see which one he has in mind, right? Without trying to be too profound, you could say it's the sense of the ability to do something, right? The rest of the definition tells you reason is able to do.

[38:47] Okay. What's the second word? Discourse. Discourse, yeah. Oh, there's two main senses of the word discourse, right? To run from one thing to another, kind of loose sense of this. We're always running from one thing to another, right? It's kind of scatterbrains,

[39:10] but then there's more precise sense of it. Running from what you know to what you don't know in such a way as to come to know what you don't know. Hey, that's something, right? Well, both of these senses, reason is able to what? Discourse, right? And you got the next word is large, right? Again, equivocal by reason, right? Large can mean covers a large area, or it can mean what?

[39:43] Large, as opposed to small, as opposed to small thought. So is reason capable of a discourse about the universal? Yeah. Is it capable of a discourse about great things? Yeah, more so about small things, right? But you can't see the full power of reason until you see it's able to what? Discourse about great things, right?

[40:13] So now you got to use both senses of discourse, right? I mean, of large, rather. Just as use both senses of what discourse, right?

[40:28] Looking. What's got many three senses? Looking at the eyes, looking at the imagination, looking at reason, right? What's that third sense we have in mind, right? Trying to understand, right? Now, what sense of before and after? All of them. You cannot. You can't define reason without using five words or five phrases that are what all equivocal by what reason, right? Now, what about the famous definition of motion?

[41:01] It's the act of what is able to be, in so far as it's able to be. You're defining it by act of ability, and there really you are equivocal by reason, right? So you kind of turn the twist on the student, right? It's not a question. Can you define by words equivocal by reason? Can you define without words equivocal by reason?

[41:26] But all because he says every respectable word in philosophy is a word equivocal by reason. Nobody else ever said that, you know. I've never even read anywhere else, but you know, it's certainly true, right?

[41:42] But I didn't know it was true when he said it. But I remember what he said, right? Remember how De Koninck I mean how, Kasurik you know, insists, you know, that Aristotle doesn't use the abstract word for the categories, isn't called relation, right? He calls it pros ti which Albert translates ad aliquid, right, towards something, right? And then one day I picked up the Gospel of a guy called John, and he says, "In the beginning was the word, and the word was toward God, right?

[42:20] Pros ti right? " Struck by the fact that that's just what Kasurik was saying about the way Aristotle describes the category relation, as we say, right? Not by that abstract word, but pros ti towards something, right? Son of God is toward God. God stands there for the Father, right?

[42:44] I'm just trying to introduce you to the idea that the Trinity is going to be distinguished by relations. Okay. So. We've wrapped the replies already in article three. Article three. My goodness.

[43:16] To the first, it should be said that since, because the nature of man depends upon a what higher nature, right? To his perfection does not suffice natural knowledge, but this requires something supernatural, right? That's because he's made in the image and likeness of God, we would say, right? But he has something godlike, namely reason, right? The dog and the cat doesn't have anything godlike, huh? Not

[43:50] in that way. Not in that way. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Incidentally, Shakespeare's definition of reason tells you how to understand the word equivocal by reason.

[44:12] Yeah, but first you gotta you gotta run from one meaning to another meaning. You gotta separate the meanings, and then as you run from. One to the other, you gotta be looking before and after, right? To See which one comes before, which one comes after. That's the way you eventually work it out, and then you have reason to know You think it out yeah, yeah. Then you have the the understanding of the word equivocal by reason.

[44:37] Now we distinguish its main senses, but it's the order of them, right? Yeah. Then you can stop running. Now this is very important. You applied the second objection here, right? Okay, it's danger, right? yeah. To second should be said that just as man, by the natural light of the understanding, ascends to what beginnings, right? So the virtuous man, through the habit of the virtue, has a right judgment about those things which belong to that virtue.

[45:18] And in this way, right? Also through the light of what faith, divinely infused into man, a man ascends to those things which are of faith, right? And not to their what contraries, huh? And therefore, there is nothing of danger or damnation in those who are in Christ Jesus, illuminated through faith by Him, right? Okay. So you have a certain inclination due to the virtue itself, right? Because it's a habit, right?

[45:51] It's a disposition. Yeah, yeah. And so you you you supernaturally, right? Reject what is contrary to that, right? Except what is in accordance with it. Now to the third, it should be said that invisible things of God, in a higher way, as regards many things like the Trinity, etc. The faith precedes, which then what reason, natural reason, proceeding from creatures and God would know, right? So Aristotle didn't arrive at the what understanding of the Trinity, right?

[46:34] But he was preceding ex creaturis in deum cognitionem right? Sometimes they take the text of our style there, you know, that we use the word three in praising God, right? Oh, he must have known something about it. Thomas kind of puts that in some proper yeah, yeah. Yeah. Once it is said in Ecclesiasticus, plurima supra sensum hominis, many things above the sense of man, his judgment and the words are shown to you, right?

[47:16] So. I'll be gone for two weeks now, so.