Tertia Pars
6. The Union in One Person: Cyril, the Athanasian Creed, the Human Nature as God's Joined Tool, and Why Christ Is Not a Human Person (ST III, q.2 a.1–2)
Class of 2008-10-02
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/006-the-union-in-one-person-cyril-the-athanasian-creed-the-human/

[0:00] Now we got to get Cyril off the hook here. To the first, therefore, should be said that that authority Cyril is expounded in the fifth what synod, right?

[0:24] Which is the second council of Constantinople That's what my third one is Yeah, yeah. Canonate. If someone, right, the one incarnate nature, the divine word, right, saying, does not take this as the father's what, tot, because from the divine nature and the human, right,

[0:55] union made according to what Subsistentia, right, And that would refer to what the union and the person, son. But from such words, one nature or substance, right, of the divinity and the flesh of Christ attempts to deduce, right, such a one is accursed, Anathema said, Okay.

[1:29] Therefore, the sense is not that in the incarnation from the two natures should be one nature constituted, right, but because the one nature of God united the flesh, right, in his what person, right. So Thomas quotes the explanation itself of the synod, right? Okay. That's an old digut, right? Thomas will often say, you know, such a way of speaking should not be extended, right, but piously expounded, right?

[2:09] Okay. But essentially, the synod is saying you should understand it in the way that the objections understanding it, right? That's good enough for me.

[2:22] I'm a teachable fellow. Yeah. The second one is from the Athanasian Creed, huh? To the second, it should be said that from the soul and the body in each of us is constituted a twofold nature, a twofold unity rather of nature and a person of nature, according as the souls united to the body. Perfecting it formally as its form, so that from the two there comes about one nature, as from act and ability, or matter and form.

[3:08] And as far as this is concerned, the likeness between the two should not be what observed, right? Because the divine nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proven in the first part. That's a new question on the simplicity of God.

[3:29] But the unity of the person is constituted from them, in so far as it is one someone subsisting in the flesh and the soul. And as far as this is to be noted, a likeness, huh? For the one Christ subsists in divine nature and the what human. Yeah. Incidentally, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he gives a little bit of explanation of the same thing, right? Because in Athanasian Creed, it says that the union of the human and divine nature in Christ is most like the union of what the soul and the body.

[4:07] You make the comparison, right? There's no nothing in the created world, let's say, that is as much like the union of the human and divine nature in God as that of the soul and the body, right? But Thomas says, what does Athanasius mean, right? Okay. And he says, well, this is the way you've got to understand it. As Aristotle explains in the three books on the soul, the soul and the body are joined as what form and matter, huh?

[4:54] But also as what agent and what tool, tool, okay? Now notice Aristotle defines the soul as the first act of a natural body composed

[5:28] of tools, right? The parts of the body are, as it were, tools of the what soul, right? Okay. So you have this twofold comparison of the soul and the body, huh? And so Aristotle is arguing against the position of the Pythagorean is that any soul can go into any body, okay?

[5:52] The argument is not only from matter and form being relative to each other. But he also argues from the fact that not just any art can use a tool of any art. So my wife possessed the art of the tailor, right? Okay. And she might use a needle and thread and a few other tools, but my brother-in-law possesses the art of carpentry, right? He uses a hammer and saw, right?

[6:21] Well, can my wife use the tools of the carpenter? No. And he can't use the tools of the what? Tailor, right? Huh? Okay. So, in what way is the union of the divine nature and the human nature in Christ like the union of soul and body? Well, not like form and matter, right? And that was heretical, right? The Arians and people like that said that the divine nature was in Christ in place of its human soul, so as if like as were the you know matter and form, right?

[7:02] Well, that's heretical, right? Okay. But the human nature, right, of Christ is like a tool of his what? Divinity, right? Okay. And then Thomas goes on further and explains that there's two kinds of tools, huh? And one is a tool that is not joined to you, huh? Like a hammer or a saw or something like that, right? But another is a tool like my hand or my teeth or something, right?

[7:37] Which is a tool what? Joined to me, right? Huh? Okay. And what kind of a tool is a priest? A joined or separate tool? If Christ uses you, a priest, to sanctify somebody or to use the sacrament or something, right? Offer sacrifice and so on, are you like the hammer or are you like the hand? Not the hand, because we're joined by nature.

[8:11] No, the hand. I think we're joined by nature. Or he assumed our nature. Yeah. But he's using you like you use a what? Hammer. Okay. Say. But the divine nature and the human nature of Christ is like my hand. See. So it's joined to God, right? Huh? In the same person. And therefore, it's like a joined tool, right?

[8:39] It's like Thomas says, the tongue is a tool of my reason, and not because the reason is the form of my tongue, right? The reason is immaterial power, but I use my tongue to express my thoughts and so on, right? So that's a tool joined to me, right? Okay. So that's the explanation he gives, right, of the Athanasian Creed here in the Summa Contra Gentiles, my favorite.

[9:04] volume, by the way. This is a beautiful explanation, right? This is a, and that a tool has something from the what? Excellence of the chief agent, right? So the human nature of Christ, you know, has an efficacy that human nature that's not joined to Him in the same person would not have, right? Here he gives

[9:32] a little different explanation, right? The one in the, in the, yeah, interesting, yeah. It goes back as I say, to Aristotle's understanding too of the soul, right? That to the bolt, the body, the body is to the soul not only as the matter, but also as its what? Tool, right?

[10:05] Here he gives a little different explanation of it, huh? It's okay. It's taking as much soul. Most of our kids are just a hammer, huh? Yeah.

[10:20] To third, it should be said, and this is again what going back to what Damascene says, apparently, from Gregory. To the third, it, should be said that as Damascene says, the divine nature is said to be incarnate because it's united to the flesh, what? Personally. Not that it be converted into the nature of what flesh. See, someone can take the words though, and the word was made flesh and say, hey, That's what it seems to be saying, right?

[10:53] Huh? Yeah. But it seems so too when you study, study the history of these things a bit, like even in the Summa Contra Gentiles. You see all these heresies and all these misreading of Scripture, right? You can see how good Vatican II is, right? When said that sacred Scripture, sacred tradition, and the magisterium of the Church, no one can stand without the other two, right? I really need them, right?

[11:24] How you know it can easily misunderstand sacred Scripture, huh? Without the sacred tradition, huh? The councils and so on, and without the magisterium explaining sometimes what the words mean, huh? But vice versa, they at the same time would support the others.

[11:44] I always use an old military thing there, you know, where we'd mark with the M1 rifles, huh? And then you press in a kind of bivouac kind of, you know, and you need how many guys to put your rifles down, right? You need three because they have these little hook hooks, right? And two of them you can hook them together, but they fall, right? Need a third one, you know.

[12:04] And that's the way these three things are. You need all three of them, and no one can stand without the other two of those three rifles, right? In the same way, the divine, sacred scripture, and the church and the magisterium, one cannot stand without the others.

[12:23] See that a lot in in in the coming home program there at EWTN, you know, where a lot of these Protestant ministers that came over to the Catholic Church, they were trying to say, you know, scripture, sola scriptura, and the question is, well, where'd you get these books, you know? Well, you got to bring in the tradition of the church, right? And I kind of convinced them, right?

[12:47] But they're kind of coming to see gradually, right? The truth of that statement of Vatican II. That's a beautiful example, I think. The three is enough, right? Two is not enough, there. No two of those can stand by itself.

[13:06] For the same reason you could say that you can't understand magic two or any other counsel without scripture. and tradition. Likewise, flesh is said to be deified, as himself says, not by being converted into the divine nature, but by its union to the Word, right? With their properties being what saved, right?

[13:49] So it might be understood, caro deificata, because it was made the what flesh to the divine Word, not because it was made what God, huh? Okay.

[14:10] So would you say that Thomas's words were wise? His wisdom was turned into vocal sound. Or is it because these words are being used as a tool, right, by someone who's very wise?

[14:33] So I find the words of Thomas wise. I can find the words of Shakespeare wise, right? I don't know where Shakespeare's wisdom comes from, but I find he says some very wise things, right?

[14:47] But his words are wise because they're the words of a wise man. So we might say that God's actions are what, Even his human actions are divine, because they are the what actions of the divine person. Even though they're human nature.

[15:12] So, we'll take a little break, and in your exam, they'll be asked for the three reasons. The three reasons. The three reasons. But sometimes it's good, you know, when you, if you have a hard time sleeping at night, you lay down in bed, you know, pressures off the body, you know, and you can think about these things and say, now, what are those three reasons? I know the Summa Contra Gentiles used to give, you know, even more reasons sometimes.

[15:39] And I'd come back, and after a while, after I'd read it, and say, now, before I look at the text again, I'm going to see if I can remember all those reasons. And usually I could remember some of them, but not all of them, you know. And then, I kind of think, I say, oh, that's the reason I missed, you know. And you kind of, it's like the coin, the lost sheep, or something, you know.

[15:59] I mean, you've got nine out of ten reasons. What the hell is that tenth reason? And you take more delight in the tenth reason because that's the ones you could remember, right? You know. And so, one of the teachers, awake at night too, you know, find the goddamn go down the hall and get the book and see what the tenth reason was, you know.

[16:19] But you could do that in some ways, and then you know, you don't, you know, then maybe a week later you've forgotten it. But I mean, as you keep on reading and reading these things, the the reasons, you know, start to do more and more, right? Stick with you more and more.

[16:39] So. So now we got the falsehood eliminated, right? Now we can go to assume the truth here, right? It seems that the second one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the incarnate Word was not made in the person, huh? First, because the person of God is not other from His nature. We learned that, right? In the Trinity, he would think of this objection.

[17:17] If, therefore, the union was not made in the nature, it would follow that it is not made in the what? Person. Moreover, human nature is not of less dignity in Christ than in us.

[17:48] But personality, being a person, pertains to dignity, right? As is had in the first book. Therefore, since human nature in us has its own personality, right? Its own personhood, if you want to say. Much more would it have its own personhood in Christ? Thomas is going to answer that by saying it's drawn to a higher personhood than human personhood. So Christ apparently is not a human person.

[18:31] You read this guy. Moreover, as Boethius says in the book on the two natures, the person is an individual substance of a rational what nature. This is the definition of person that Thomas defended in the prima pars. But the Word of God assumed an individual human nature.

[19:04] For universal nature, right, does not what subsist by itself, but only in the what naked contemplation is considered. Naked means what? Without images, right? Without senses, as Damascene says. Therefore, human nature has its own what? Personality. Yeah. Yeah. Therefore, it does not seem that the union was made in person.

[19:41] Why does Thomas always attack the truth in this way? To make you stop and think, I guess. But against this is what is read in the Council of Chalcedon. Not in two persons divided or partitioned, right? But one and the same, only begotten Son, our Lord, we confess Jesus Christ. Therefore, the union of the Word was made in what person?

[20:28] Now, Thomas will say, "I could begin to respond to you. " He says, "in the Summa Contra Gentiles, we have to see what it means to be united in person, what it means to be united in nature, right? " But he's talked more about the first in the first article, and here he's going to talk about the second. It should be said that person signifies something other than what nature.

[20:52] For nature signifies the essence of the species, what it is, right? Which the definition what signifies? It's apparently a quote from Aristotle. Definition of speech signifying what a thing is.

[21:13] And if to those things which pertain to the notion of the species, nothing other was joined or could be found, right, to be joined, there would be no necessity of distinguishing the nature from the what? Underlying nature. From the not the underlying nature, but from the what underlies the nature? Oh. Which is the individual subsisting in that what in nature? Because each individual subsisting in that nature would be altogether the same with that what nature.

[21:53] But there happens in some things, subsisting things, to be found something that does not pertain to the what notion of the species, namely the accidents and the individuating what principles.

[22:12] Just as most of all appears in we things, huh, in those things which are composed of matter and form. And therefore, in such things also, secundum rem, right?

[22:29] In the things themselves differs nature and the suppositum. Not as it were altogether, right? Separated. But because in the suppositum, in the underlying, is included both the nature of the species, and there are added above this some other things that are besides or in addition to the notion of species.

[22:59] Whence the underlying signifies as the whole having the nature just as a formal part which is perfective of it. So am I, Duane Berquist, am I human nature?

[23:19] If I was human nature, I'd be the only man, right? But you can see I have human nature, right, as a formal part of me, right, huh? But I have things that are in addition to human nature, right? I have some knowledge of odd numbers and even numbers and so on, right? Okay, and I have health and I have color and I'm sitting, so on. Okay.

[23:53] An account of this in composed things, in things composed from matter and form, nature is not said of the underlying. So Duane Berquist is not human nature. He's a man, but man means what has human nature. It doesn't say that I am human nature.

[24:14] For we do not say that this man is his own what human nature, huh? His own humanity. If, however, there is some thing in which altogether there is nothing other apart from what the notion of its species or nature, as in God, there they are not other secundum rem, right? That's the phrase he uses in things in reality. The underlying and the what nature, huh? But only according to the thought of which approach we understand them.

[24:57] Because the nature is said according as it is a certain essence, but the same is called the underlying according as it is what subsisting. And what is said of the underlying should be understood of the person in a rational creature or intellectual creature, because a person is nothing other than an individual substance of a rational nature, according to Boethius. So Thomas says, as far as the word self is concerned, hypostasis, which corresponds in Latin to suppositum, right?

[25:34] You can speak of This in regard to any individual substance, right? Why person is an individual substance of rational nature, right? So everything that is in some person, whether it pertains to the nature of it or not, is united to it in the person, right?

[26:06] So in my person is I am what, both a man and I am what a geometer, right? And somewhat healthy. Okay. If therefore human nature is not joined to the Word of God in person, in no way is it what. Yeah. And thus, wholly is taken away the faith of the Incarnation. Which is to under under undermine the whole of the Christian faith. Because he says in another place, the whole Christian faith depends on two things: divinity and humanity.

[26:55] Yeah. Because therefore, the Word has a human nature united to itself, but not what as pertaining to His divine nature. It follows that the union is made in the person of the Word, not in the what nature. Thomas seems to be saying that it's either joined what to the nature or to the person, and it can't be joined to the nature, as we saw in the previous article.

[27:26] Therefore, it must be joined to the person, or else it's not joined at all. And that's obviously contrary to the faith, right? The relationship between person and nature. he seems to indicate it's like a whole to a part. In us, in us creatures, yeah, and especially the creature is composed of matter and form, right? So that is. So human nature isn't the whole of me, so to speak.

[27:57] But your your person includes your nature. Yeah, yeah. In other words, Duane Berquist has human nature, right? But he also has things besides human nature. That I'm a geometer, that I'm white, okay, that I'm healthy, if I am, and so. Okay. So many things can be said of me, right? So the person is the whole, right? It includes everything when you when you say that you include all the others.

[28:29] Things that pertain to nature and things that don't pertain to nature. And you see, human nature and geometry don't come together and form one thing, right?

[28:40] Yeah. So it's because this is because I am a man, and I am a geometer. You can say you've got a well human geometry or something, right? Because they both belong to the same, right?

[28:57] And so, but like that in in the incarnation, right? That God is man, and man is God. Not because the human and divine nature are joined, but well, they are joined in a way, but not to each other, right? They don't come together. One doesn't become the other. They don't become part of one great nature or something like that. But because they both belong to the same what person, right?

[29:23] The same person subsists in these two natures. Now we'll see how Thomas answers the objections, because you might say, "Well, we saw in our study the Trinity, right? " And in the comparative study of the Trinity, remember that the there's no difference between the the Word of God and the Divine Nature, right? There's no difference between the Father and the Divine Nature. No difference between the Holy Spirit and the Divine Nature, right?

[29:54] Okay. Secundum rem they are the same, okay? And secundum rationem there's a difference there, right? Okay. Why does there real difference secundum rem between the Father and the Son, and between Holy Spirit and Father and the Son, right?

[30:14] Now I see how Thomas does this, but you know when he say, I was reading today an article there in the sentences that we say is the will of God the cause of things, right? And one objections is saying, well,

[30:35] isn't the divine knowledge the cause of things, right? And Thomas says, or isn't the divine power? Another objection say that, and Thomas will say, well, God's power is infinite, right? So he wouldn't produce anything in particular unless he will to produce this rather than that, right? And the same way with Aristotle argues, you know, in the ninth book of wisdom, that knowledge can't alone produce something because of the same knowledge of opposites.

[31:07] So my medical knowledge enables me maybe to make you healthy or sick, but I can't do both, and so I got to choose. Make

[31:19] a good choice. And my knowledge of logic enables me to teach you and to deceive you, and I can do both. And I knew when I gave an exam in logic, right? I knew how to make something seem like a good argument that had a fallacy in it, and I knew that would deceive most of the a good number of them, right? But so whether I teach or deceive, right, depends upon my will.

[31:54] The same way a man is a master of rhetoric, you know, he can persuade or dissuade, right? You know, he can go in and show the guy is guilty or show he's not guilty, right? And so

[32:10] there's a little moral problem there, as one might say. I know my client is guilty, I go in there and you know they try to you know kind of say that they they try to the barrister and lawyers try to say you know well we got to get the guy you know here you know anyway you know but I mean if you know the guy is guilty if you go in and show that he's persuade the jury that he's not guilty you know you know is that Is that moral, right?

[32:37] So you might say that God's will determines to what his power shall be applied and to what his knowledge shall be used, right? So that in a sense the main cause there is the divine what will, right? Okay. Now someone comes back and says, yeah, but God is altogether simple. So the divine knowledge and the divine will, or the divine mind and the divine will, are the same thing, right?

[33:05] But yet they differ. What? Secundum rationem right? And it's in so far as God's will that he ultimately what is said to act or to cause something, right? And not in so far as he's what knowledge, right?

[33:27] So you know, you're talking about predestination there, for example. You know, you say God chose us to be right, huh? Or he chose us to be beatified and eventually. But that's the divine will, right? He says this is a free choice in God's part, right?

[34:00] So maybe Thomas is going to say something like that. If you say, well, there's no difference between the divine person and divine nature, right? Huh? But still not the same. But they still differ secundum what rationem, right? Huh? And therefore, there's a difference between saints being united to the nature as nature, and being united to this as a what? As a person, right? Huh? Okay. Just this is not the same thing to say.

[34:26] This comes from the divine will and it comes from the divine knowledge, right? Even though that they are the same what thing, right? Huh? Yeah. So.

[34:41] But I'm I'm chosen to be insofar as he has will, okay, or insofar as his will, okay. Let's see how Thomas answers that first objection because that's that's an interesting one here from our point. So the first, therefore, should be said that although in God there is not other secundum rem right? In the thing, the nature and the person, right? Huh? They differ nevertheless according to the way of what signifying, huh?

[35:14] Because the person signifies by way of something what subsisting, and because human nature is thus united to the word that the word subsists in it, right?

[35:30] Not, however, is something added to it to the reason of its what, or the definition of its nature, or is its nature changed to something? Right. Therefore, the union is made in the person and not in the what nature.

[36:09] Let's say going back to something, probably say it does. Does God know bad things? Yeah. Does God will bad things? But the will and the knowledge are the same, right there.

[36:37] But the bad is the object of God insofar. as he is mind, right? Not insofar as he is what? Well, will, right? Say that again. The bad is an object of God, in so far as he is mind, right? But not in so far as he is will, right? Because the bad is known by God, but not will. You have to see that distinction, right?

[37:09] We don't really understand God, right? But we understand that he's both mind and will, and that these are not different secundum rem, right? But neither one of them fully expresses God, right?

[37:26] What we understand by the one, we say that the bad is an object; it is known. But in so far as it's will, it's not what will, huh?

[38:03] So that's the way he's solving, in a sense, during the first argument here. Thomas goes Thomas goes all the way back to Aristotle in the in the book of Natural Hearing, right? Where Aristotle is saying acting upon undergoing are the same motion. Okay.

[38:29] So by pushing this, is its motion, right? And it's being pushed is its motion, right? So motion and what? I mean, pushing and being pushed is the same thing. Secundum rem, but not secundum what? Rationum, right? Because insofar as its motion is from me into the cup, it's called pushing. In so far as it's in the cup from me, it's called being pushed.

[39:00] I kick you, right? By kicking you and you're being kicked are the same thing. But I'm kicking you and you're being kicked. The difference secundum rationem right?

[39:23] It's kicking in so far as it's from me into you. And it's being kicked in so far as it's in you from me. And two can play at that. Say, why don't we ever get to kick you?

[39:44] The second one is talking about the the importance of human what personality, right? Okay. And seems that you're denying Christ, right? Something that your human nature, my human nature has, right?

[40:07] To the second, it should be said that personality necessarily, to that extent, pertains the dignity of something as perfection. Insofar as it what pertains to the dignity perfection of that thing, that it exists what per se, right? By itself, which is understood in the name of person, right? But it is more more dignity, more worth to something that exists in something what more dignified than itself than it exists what per se.

[40:48] And therefore, from this fact, human nature is more what more dignity in Christ than in us, because in us, as the word per se existing, it has its own what personality. In Christ, our it exists in a higher person, in the person of the Word.

[41:08] Just as to be completive of the species pertains the dignity of form, but nevertheless sensitive is more noble in man on account of the conjunction right to a more noble form that is completive of it Than in the brood animal in which there is the what it is the completing form, right? Okay. So in other words, um, to to be a sensing soul is what completes the nature of a brood.

[41:44] In us, we're completed not by a sensing soul but by an understanding soul. But we have more dignity even in our sensing than the what. Yeah. So we appreciate the beauty of Mozart's music, which I can never get the cat in the house to appreciate, right? Got the kitchen there, and take a little bit of sandwich meat out of the icebox or something like that, and cat be right there next to you, know?

[42:11] But you play that Mozart opera stuff for the animal, and the cat just sleep through it, right? Or you know, you see it in in Aristotle talks about recollection there, you know, how it's kind of a syllogism, right? But in the imagination, the memory, right? Recalling this to that, you know, what were you doing yesterday at ten o'clock? You know, you can kind of reason your way back to it, right?

[42:36] And then, person, you know, all this, you know, poetic imagination. So, and you see how the sense powers have a certain mobility in man, right? But they don't have any of the animals, right? And even you know, old cuisine, you know, and wine, so on. There's a certain dignity, you know, in in our food and the taste of our food that the animals don't have, right?

[42:59] Can't tell what the cat sees in the mouse myself. We always like my steak, you know, like the box, you know. They don't appreciate the white sauce or something, you know. Okay.

[43:17] Now, the third objection was taken from the definition, right? Of person, Thomas begins by saying, "To the third, it should be said that the Word of God did not assume human nature in the universal, but in the in the atomon, in the individual, right? Just that's why I read individual for undivided, as Damascene says. Otherwise, it would belong to each man to be the Word of God that belongs as it belongs to Christ.

[44:00] It should be known, however, that not every individual in the genus of substance, right, even in the rational nature, has the notion of a person, but only that which exists what per se, yeah, Not however that which exists in something more perfect. Whence the hand of Socrates, although it is a certain individual, right, is not nevertheless a person, right, because it doesn't exist by itself, but in something more perfect, namely in its what whole.

[44:34] And this also is able to be signified in this that the person is said to be a substantia individua. That's in the definition of Boethius.

[44:46] For a hand is not a complete substance, but a part of the what substance. So, although human nature is a certain what individual in the genus of substance, because nevertheless it doesn't exist by itself, but in something more perfect, to wit in the person of God. Consequently, it is that does not have its own what personality, and therefore there was made a union in the person. Now, come back to my my limping comparison, right?

[45:24] Okay. We'll call it the end point here, the beginning point, A, right? Okay. Now, if I draw this line over here, it has its end point too, its own end point, right? So now you got two persons here, right? Okay. But now suppose instead of drawing this like that, I draw to that end point, right? Well then, A is beginning of both this line and that line, and it's the same point as beginning of both, right?

[46:17] So what's going to take place in the incarnation is that human nature is going to be drawn from the Blessed Virgin, right, to the same what person that is the second person of the Blessed Trinity, right? Okay. Now if that human nature was not drawn, right, to that point, right? But by itself, it would have its own, what, personality, right?

[46:49] I guess it has a, you know, kind of dislikeness, but you can see the point, huh? In the case of the incarnation, human nature is drawn to subsist in the same what, person. That is the second person of Blessed Trinity, right? In you and I, our nature is not drawn to subsist in that person, but it has now its own, what, personality, right? Okay. But there, in this case this example here, it's one the same point as the beginning of this line and the beginning of that line, right?

[47:35] But it's not drawn to that point, but drawn by itself, right? Then you have two points, right? So here you have one and the same person subsisting in two what, natures, huh? It's like this point here is the beginning, if you want to say, or the end of two lines, right? But it's one and the same point that is the beginning of both of those lines, right?

[48:05] Or in this case here, you have two points, right? I think there's something to be said for that humble comparison right? It just leaves out something, right?

[48:27] So we speak of this one person, the Word of God, subsisting in what, two natures, right? And something like this, you see this one point here is the beginning, one of the same point is the beginning of two different lines, right? Of course, the two lines are not what.

[48:53] Yeah, That's why it's a little, a little different the geometrical thing here, huh? Make it even more interesting in a sense, huh? You know how in a circle there you could draw a diameter, right, huh? Okay. So you could have a curved line and a what, straight line, right? And this point here, the diameter of a circle, is the same point as the beginning of a curved line and a what, A straight line, right?

[49:28] But can a straight line and a curved line ever correspond? Maybe at a point. Yeah, but then that's the point's not a line. Yeah. So a curved line and a straight line will always be what? distinct, right? This is a little bit like the divine nature and the human nature, right? They cannot ever coincide.

[49:59] But one and the same point can be the beginning of a curved line and a straight line, right? And this is something like Incarnation here, or one and the same person, right? Very much an atom, because the point is indivisible right, is in fact in both of these lines. Just as one and the same person subsists in two natures that remain entirely what? distinct, the fire and the bush, right?

[50:36] Bryce, crude, crude minds. He has something to say to that, huh? Yes. You said that. Makes sense. Or extending like this, but I think there's something there, you know. Kind of my little way of picturing. You realize that Christ, and when we read to

[51:25] do so, but he could assume what? He could be two men if he wanted to be. Yeah. Another human nature he could assume there's no limit to. Yeah, Yeah. In the same way, you know, to the same point, I can keep on drawing what many lines, right? What would be the reason for him to do this? The same person, yeah. Have a crowd, yeah. One person. Wow.

[51:47] Don't tell that to the to the people who believe there are alien planets. that visited and he has to repeat the two So yeah, and so he could even use the two. Yeah. I'm simultaneously doing different things. Yeah. Why not? A limit on divine power. Yeah. But it would be it would be. I think Saint Clement said it probably wouldn't be fitting because it would just confuse us.

[52:15] Yeah, yeah, we're confused enough without that. Yeah. Just think all the things you can get done. Isn't that a nice fire location? Just think how many chicken coops you could build. We'd be very broad-minded to uh, different. People.