Tertia Pars
8. Summa III, Q.2, Arts. 5–6: Christ's Soul and Body Joined to a Pre-existing Person, and Why the Union Is Not Accidental
Class of 2008-10-09
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/008-summa-iii-q-2-arts-5-6-christs-soul-and-body-joined-to-a/

[0:00] Okay. Okay, we're still going to reply the first objection there, right? And this, he says, because in mere men it happens because the soul and the body are thus joined to them that they might exist per se, right? Just like the way I draw that line, right? It's per se by itself, right? Okay. But in Christ they are joined together that they might be joined to something else more principal, right, more chief,

[0:45] which will subsist in the nature, right, that is composed from them, right. An account of this, of the union of the body and the soul in Christ, is not constituted a new hypostasis or person, but the thing coniunctum, joined together, right, comes to a person or hypostasis pre-existing. Just like my only example here, this other line is what comes to a point, to an end point that already exists.

[1:17] That's kind of an amazing thing, though. I just started thinking about it, right? That this this line has an end point that exists before it existed, right?

[1:32] But it wasn't the end point of this other line, so that line was drawn to it, and so this person, that is the Word, did not subsist to human nature until human nature had been drawn to this person from from Mary.

[1:51] Nor, on account of this, does it follow that the union of body and soul in Christ was of less what. Efficacy, right? Somebody might argue and say, "Well, okay, but then, you know, the union of soul and body and me produces the person of Wayne Berquist In Christ, it doesn't produce a person, so it has less efficacy, right?

[2:15] Because that junction, right, to something more noble, right, does not what take away power or dignity, but instead what increases it. It's an interesting comparison here. Just as the sensing soul in animals constitutes a species, which in the animals in the beasts, that is to say, is considered as its last or ultimate form, but not in men, right? Although in them it is more noble and more what powerful.

[2:52] So, somebody say, well, the sensing soul makes a complete substance there in the dog. The sensing soul that I have doesn't what make me completely, but actually, what it's joined to something more noble, the what understanding soul, right?

[3:19] But not in men, although in men it is more noble and more virtuous. My old teacher, Kasurik used to teach you this right just to compare the plant soul with the animal soul, right?

[3:34] Animal soul, yeah. And he says, and he compared the sap of the tree with the blood of the animal, right? Kind of the same thing, the sap and the blood, but the blood is what more perfect than the sap.

[3:50] And you can say that the the sensing soul in man is more what more perfect, more noble, especially the sense of touch. Oh, because I was going to say, I mean, the sensitive soul of an eagle allows it to see much better than I can see. Yeah. Seeing all kinds of animals have a hearing or, the kind of foundation of the senses is the sense of touch, right?

[4:14] Which is found in all the senses. And you know, it's interesting. I was reading in Aristotle there where he talked about the sense of touch, and he says the man who's got a better sense of touch would have a better understanding, right? And and I said, "Well, how does he know that? " Is is if I felt the skin of Thomas would be finer and softer than my skin, and my skin's kind of rough,

[4:40] but anyway, in the commentary there at the end of the second book on the soul, Thomas gives two reasons why the man who has a better sense of touch will have a better understanding, a better soul. And one reason he says is the sense of touch is the foundation of all the what. Senses, right? So the man has got a better sense of touch, will have a better sensing soul, and that is a disposition for the understanding soul, right?

[5:11] And then he says that the sense of touch, you know, depends upon certain balance of hot and cold and dry and wet and so on, and therefore a better balanced body will receive a better soul, and therefore you're going to understand better. Huh? De Koninck it seems, was talking. In fact, he gave, I guess, a commencement address at Assumption College, but Assumption College is a very small place.

[5:44] But it's kind of applied to Descartes. He says, "I sit therefore I am." But the fact that that We prefer, you know, in the modern world, the sense of sight. I can say an eagle to the sense of touch, you know. But he's pointing out how the basic what thoughts all go back to the sense of touch, you know. And that's how we get the words, the idea of substance and so on from the sense of touch.

[6:15] And even the sense of sympathy for others, right, goes back to the sense of touch. Did you ever see that movie there? The one that Orson Welles plays? Was it the Fifth Man or the Third Man? The one where he's in Vienna after the war. He's making money by diluting medicines, and people are dying from it, and so on. And and Cotton, you know, shows up and finds out what his friend is doing, you know.

[6:41] And eventually gets caught, Orson Welles, you know. But they go up in this kind of a, you know, amusement park. You know, but you're looking way down, and and just little people down there, you know. Yeah. Just, just rip them off like that, you know. You don't feel anything for these people, right? You know, you got no feeling. It's just, it's all visual, right? Just wipe it off and how much money that is.

[7:08] The Third Man. Wasn't that a book first? Yeah. I think the Third Man was it called the Third Man. I remember just the version with Orson Welles and Joseph Cotton, you know, and Orson Welles was the the guy who was doing these bad things. He eventually gets caught, but it's a very, very, very good, well done movie, huh? And it's all over. It's kind of a famous movie.

[7:31] There's something that correlates to that would be too that the man with better sense, he has a better soul, better sense of touch. What also means more sensitive to pain, and that's what all the meditation done in Christ's Passion. He had a more perfect soul, therefore, even a slight thing for him was more painful than us. Not because it was weak, because his soul was noble. And then the hands and the feet had the most nerve for touch, and then he was crucified.

[7:59] So. Shakespeare touches upon that, you know, at the end of Julius Caesar, right, the eulogy of Brutus, right. The elements are so mixed in him that all the world might stand up and say, "This was a man," right? Yeah. So. Now

[8:29] the second objection. This is kind of what Damascene means by those words. The second should be said that the word of Damascene can be understood in two ways.

[8:47] In one way, that refers to human nature, which does not have the notion of a common species, right? That word. According as it is in one individual alone. But only as it is what abstracted from every individual, as it is found naked, contemplation without any images, right? Anything that pertains to singular. Or according as it is in what all individuals, huh? Well, the Son of God did not assume human nature in so far as it only in the consideration of reason, okay?

[9:27] Because thus he would not assume the very thing of human nature. Unless perhaps someone said that human nature was a separated form, as the Platonists laid down man to be without matter, right? But then the Son of of God would not have assumed flesh, against what is said in Luke chapter twenty four thirty nine after the resurrection, right? Spirit does not have flesh and bone as you see me to have, right?

[9:59] Likewise, it cannot be said that the Son of God assumed human nature, as it is in all individuals of the same species, right? Because thus he would have assumed all men.

[10:14] It remains, therefore, as Damascene afterwards says in the same book, that he assumed human nature in atomo, right? Which is the Greek word for individual, okay?

[10:30] But not in another individual that is the suppositum or hypostasis of nature, than in the person of the what Son of God, huh? Another way can be understood the saying of Damascene that does not refer to human nature as from the union of the soul and the body there does not result one common nature which is human, but it refers to the union of two natures, the divine and the human, from which is not composed some third thing, right?

[11:07] Which would be a common nature, right? Because thus that would be what apt to be said of many, huh? And this he intends there, huh? Whence he subjoins, for neither is it what is it generated, nor would there ever be generated another Christ from Godhood and humanity, right? In Godhood humanity, a perfect God, the same a perfect man, huh? That's a little obscure that whole text of Damascene, but Thomas follows it through, right?

[11:44] But it could be, but it probably does mean, huh? So don't worry too much about that. Ah. And third objection is saying, couldn't you have the body there being vivified, you know, so on?

[12:03] And to third should be said that twofold is the beginning of body life. One is effective, that means like an efficient what? Cause, an extrinsic cause. And in this way, the word of God is the beginning of all what? Life. Another way something is beginning of life as a form, right? Since to live is for living things to be, as the philosopher says,

[12:32] just as each thing formally is through its own form, so the body lives through the soul. And in this way, the body cannot live through the word because it is not able to be the form of a body, as we showed in the treatise on the simplicity of God.

[12:54] So the body and the soul were joined. Otherwise, he would not have been a what? Man. So when you see the body and blood of our Lord in the Eucharist, you receive his what?

[13:12] His soul as well, right? Divinity too, but well, and here it's actually the soul, right? You ever say that prayer there? The one, anima Christi. You know, but it's kind of a prayer you say after you receive communion a lot. But the first thing is anima Christi, sanctifica me, corpus Christi, salva me and so on. But the first thing is anima Christi because the anima is there, right?

[13:39] Would the anima be there if the soul and the body were not joined? Because the body is there from the words of consecration, but the soul was there because it's joined to the body. Not from the words of consecration because it joined the body. It wasn't joined to the body. Would that prayer be right? We say lex orandi, lex credendi, yeah.

[14:04] Okay, time for another. Yes. Now, whether human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally, right? I was reading this in the oh, I guess

[14:24] in the other Summa, yeah. And I was teaching, you know, the the categories of Aristotle, right? And you know, there are ten categories. And one of the students there wanted to divide the ten into two. But you can do right, substance and accidents, right? But Thomas divides it into three, right? Okay. So you have substance, and then those that signify something existing in the substance, right? But not it's what it is, right?

[15:09] Quantity, quality, relation, and then you have these last six. Are they really accidents in the same way that the the quantity and quality are? Suddenly, something like my being clothed, my clothing is not really in me like my size is in me, or my health is in me, or my geometries in me, or even my fatherhood or is in me, right? Brotherhood is in me.

[15:41] And Thomas, you know, some people, you know, misunderstand the words there and Paul there that he's found habitus. You know, it's in Latin as a man, like that category of habitus, right, which is being clothed and so on. So God has since clothed himself in the nature, you know, but

[16:02] but he uses the term accidentaliter, id est habens, having itself accidentally towards, right? Well, that's something like an accident because I could lose my health, right? Become sick, I can take off my clothes and so on, right? Ah, so I can be with or without my clothes, right? Like I can be with or without my health at least for a little time.

[16:38] But if you look at the last six, then at least some of them, especially like like to be in this room, you know, to be clothed and so on, it seems less an accident than something that is like an accident, right? You know, and Thomas used that phrase actually didn't tell you to say habitus. So in that sense, maybe the division into three is a little better than division into two.

[17:04] But it brings out something that the other division doesn't bring out the distinction of the. Actually, you could subdivide it too, you know, but this one you see.

[17:18] And this is the text that he gives here. To six, one proceeds thus. It seems that human nature was not united to the word of God, or there was united to the word of God accidentally. He's going to take the wrong side first, right? Reason. As usual. And this, this text I'm referring to. For the Apostle says in the Philippians two, verse seven or eight, about the Son of God, quod, and you got to look at the Latin here, quod habitu inventus est ut homo homo.

[17:50] Okay. Now Aristotle calls that category in Greek "echein," right, which means to have, right, and in in the Latin of Thomas or Albert and so on, this category we call habitus, right, and in that is being clothed, right. Okay. So you get the word habitus there, right? Ah, that kind of suggests this false understanding, right?

[18:22] But habitus accidentally comes to that of which it is, right? Whither one takes habitus as one of the ten genera, right? Well, that's what I was referring to, right? Being clothed. In English, sometimes habitus, I don't know how to translate this. Sometimes habit, you could speak of a monk's habit or something like that, right? But it doesn't come across in English. I used to call it outfit sometimes, right?

[18:51] They're outfitted, right? Because it kind of gives the idea, you know, it's something, you know, extrinsic, right? But still fitted to you. And then it's one of the ten genera. Or insofar as it is a species of quality, the first species of quality is habit or disposition, right? Second one is ability or power, impotency, right? And the third one is the sense qualities, and the fourth is figure or shape, right?

[19:19] Okay. But habit, in the sense of a species of quality, would be something in you, right? huh? As it genus of itself, would be something what outside, right? Okay. It's kind of interesting. Aristotle used the word "echein" now because in English, for example, you hear sometimes people speaking of the has and the have-nots. Well is that talking about virtue? Those who have virtue, those who, don't have virtue?

[19:48] No. It's talking about something extrinsic to you, right? Do they have? They don't have, right? You see, Benedict the Sixteenth talking about money, you know, and how to, you know, unreal thing it is in terms of this, you know, it's kind of international this this financial problem. Yeah. Yeah. But there you see something perhaps the word by Aristotle used the word to have, right? Huh?

[20:18] That have, though it has many meanings, right? What comes to mind first, maybe, is something exterior, right? You know, I have a house, I have a car, I have a book, I have clothes, you know, I have money, you know, you know. But these are all things that are extrinsic to me, right?

[20:38] Yeah, yeah, but that that's more intrinsic, right? You know. You have a problem. So this is arguing from the text of Saint Paul, right? Here's Saint Paul, right? He's in trouble here. So, therefore, human nature accidentaliter unita est Filio Dei, right? There's that term accidentaliter. It's not like there's something existing in him, right? But

[21:13] moreover, everything that comes to something after its complete being, right, comes to it accidentally. Sounds like a good philosophical principle, right? For we call accident. As this goes back now to the Isagoge of Porphyry, Aristotle's treatment of accident in the fifth book of Wisdom. For we call that an accident. What can what be present or absent to something apart from the corruption of the what subject, right?

[21:49] But human nature comes from what in time, right, to the Son of God having what perfect being from eternity. Therefore, it must come to accidentally. Yeah, that sounds like a still just meaning that sounds like a great, great argument. Wonder, wonder, you know, what's his name? Porphyry wrote some, I guess, some nasty attacks upon Christianity, and one of the we've lost them because the Christian emperor is burnt He's a tax, I see.

[22:22] He might have been kind of devastated, you know. Augustine discusses you know Porphyry a bit in the City of God, why he didn't become a Christian, you know, was it pride or what was it, you know? But he's a pretty sharp guy, though you know. I mean so

[22:39] that doesn't save you from pride. Moreover, whatever does not pertain to the nature essence of something is an accident of that thing, right? Because everything which is is either a substance or a what accident.

[23:00] But human nature does not pertain to the essence or nature of the what to the divine nature of the Son of God, because the union was not made in the nature. Therefore, it's necessary that the human nature. Come to the Son of God accidentally.

[23:24] After all, the Son of God has a nature, doesn't he? Yeah. So this human nature came to him after he had his nature. So must come to him what? Accidentally.

[23:39] Moreover, a tool comes to something accidentally. But the human nature in Christ was a tool of his divinity. For Damascene says in the third book, "De Fide Orthodoxa," that the flesh of Christ was an instrument. existed as an instrument of his divinity, right? Therefore, it seems that human nature was not was joined to the. Son of God, accidentally.

[24:15] I'm convinced, aren't you? But against this is that what is said accidentally does not predicate aliquid, but how much or how, or having itself in some way.

[24:37] If therefore human nature came accidentally, when Christ is said to be man, there would not be predicated something, but how or how much or in some way having itself, which is against the decree of Alexander the Pope, saying, "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, who has the temerity dares to say that Christ, according as he is man, is not what? Yeah, aliquid, huh?

[25:12] Okay, now Thomas has got a long reply here, huh? Yeah, I answer it should be said, that to the evidence of this question, it should be known that about the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ, unless he calls it a mysterium, right? Something we can't fully understand. A two-fold heresy rose up, right? One was that of those confounding the natures, huh? Just as Eutyches, huh?

[25:47] The Monophysites, from the Greek word for one in nature, right? And Dioscorus, huh? Who laid down that from the two natures was constituted one nature. Thus, that they confessed Christ was from two natures as distinct before the union, but not in two natures, right? After the union of what natures, the distinction would be what ceasing going away.

[26:23] Other was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodorus Mopsuestia huh, separating the persons, right? So we talked about those two what errors, right? Because there's one nature. Two natures, one person. Yeah, I talked about the Trinity. Because there's one person, there had to be what one nature, right? And others say because there's two natures, it had to be two what persons, yeah.

[26:55] Ah, yeah, for for for Nestorius and Theodorus, who just came before him in time, they laid down. Other is the person of the Son of God and the Son of what man, huh?

[27:13] Which they said they were united to each other first, according to what? In dwelling, yeah, in habitation, right? Okay, and that's more like the last six categories, than like, you know, accident in the sense of quantity or quality, relation.

[27:34] In so far as the word of God dwelt in that man, is in a temple, right? Just like we say, Saint Paul says, "Don't you know you're the temple of the Holy Spirit, right? " What Holy Spirit is if He's dwelling in you, is there a substantial union there? No, more like me being in my house or something, right? Okay. Secondly, by a union of affection, right?

[28:04] In so far as the will of that man was always conformed to the will of God, okay. The same way two men maybe can have a harmony of wills, right? Both the same thing. In a third way, by what? Operation, in so far as they said that that man was a tool of the Word of God, right? But like a hammer is a tool of me, right?

[28:33] Something, it's not substantially joined to me. Fourth, by dignity of honor, in so far as every honor which is shown to the Son of God is shown to that man on account of his conjunction to the Son of God, huh? And fifth, by equivocation, according to the communication of names, in so far as we say that man to be God and the Son of God, right? Okay, that's the question I was asking about Martha.

[29:11] Martha, how's she understanding the Son of God, right? And we're sons of God too, you know. Saint John says so. That's equivocal, right? But it's manifest that all these ways imply some accidental what? Union, huh?

[29:33] Some people coming later, some later teachers, thinking themselves to what? Be declining or going away from heresies, they fell into these through what? Ignorance, huh? For some of them conceded the one person of Christ, but laid down two hypostases, huh? We talked about that before, right? Or two supposita, saying that a certain man composed from body and soul, from the beginning of his conception was. Assumed by the Word of God, huh?

[30:11] And this is the first opinion which the magister, and that's Peter Lombard, lays down in the sixth distinction of the third book of the Sentences, huh?

[30:23] I think the first two books of the Sentences are talking about everything proceeding from God, right? The procession of the divine persons, and then the procession of creatures from God, right? And the last two books are the return of everything to God, right? So that's why he takes up the incarnation in the third book. which Thomas does a little bit in the Summa Contra Gentiles or Summa Theologiae, right, where the incarnation is taken up in the return of all things to God, right?

[30:54] Others wishing to preserve the unity of the person laid down that the soul of Christ was not joined to the body, right? We had another article on that, right? That's all saying these articles might seem to be logic chopping almost, you know why is he getting so precise, but they all correspond to the history of the development of this and trying to avoid the mistakes.

[31:19] But that these two separated from each other were united to the Word, what, accidentally, right? That thus they could what, Could not increase the number of persons in Christ, huh? And this is the third opinion which the magister lays down there, right? That's quite a storehouse of the history of theology. But both of these opinions falls into the heresy of Nestorius, huh? First, because it is the same thing to lay down two hypostases, right, or two supposita in Christ, as to lay down two persons, because a person is nothing other than hypostasis in a rational nature.

[32:12] And if one wants to make strength in the name of person, it should be considered that Nestorius also used what the unity of person on account of the unity of what dignity and honor, right, huh? You got to be kind of careful there with. From there, whence the fifth synod, huh? It's against the Second Council of Constantinople, defined as anathema the one who says there is one person secundum dignitatem, right, huh?

[32:45] Honorum et adorationem, as Theodorus and Nestorius insanely, right, both together, right? The other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius as regards this that it lays down in accidental opinion. For it does not differ to say that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in his temple, as Nestorius says, and to say that he

[33:26] that the Word was united to man according to clothing, as uh yeah it's clothing as the third opinion says, which Ethan says something worse than Nestorius, that the soul and the body are not what,

[33:49] but the Catholic faith medium tenens, right between the foresaid positions. Neither says that the union of God and man was by essence or nature, like Eudicus was saying, right. Nor secundum accidens, right? Nor in an accidental way, but in a middle way, according to subsistence or hypostasis. Whence, in the fifth synod, one reads, since in many ways unity can be understood, right? Who follow the iniquity of Apollinaris and Eutyches, right?

[34:39] Um, worshiping the what? The thing that comes together Yeah, but interruption and the kind of destruction of that, right? Because they are destroying, right, intervenientis both natures, right? Okay, so you end up with something that is neither God nor man, right? This is rather a serious mistake. They speak of union, confused union. Okay, but Theodorus and Nestorius, their followers, rejoicing in division, right? Division agendas introduce a what?

[35:23] An effectual union, a union of wills, right? But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both perfidious, confessed the union of the Word to the flesh, according to composition. There you go. The word composition, right? It gets all Thomas's use, right? That's kind of unusual, right? So I can't be too tough on Thomas. Same way you're not extend his way of speaking, which is secundum what subsistentiam, according to the person, right?

[36:02] The subsistence. Thus, therefore, it is clear that the second and the three opinions, which the Magister, the teacher, lays down, which asserts one hypostasis of God and man, should not be said to be an opinion, but the position of the Catholic faith.

[36:24] Likewise, the first opinion, which lays down two hypostases, and the third, which lays down accidental union, should not be said to be opinions, but heresies condemned in the councils by the Church. Boom.

[36:50] Now, the first objection was taken from this misunderstanding of the text of St. Paul in the Philippians, two verse seven, right? Text from St. Paul. We read St. Paul in the Mass this morning. The one to the Galatians. He's calling them, you know, you stupid. Yeah, insensati. I think the Latin is insensati. You senseless men, right? And see, I used that text in class one time. Yeah.

[37:20] Because the Galatians was supposed to come from some part of France or something, Dumb Frenchman up there. Ancestors, of the Irish. the Celts, yeah. The ancestors, the Irish. Because the Celts lived in the Celts.

[37:44] Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that, as Damascene says in the third book, is not necessary that in every way and with no defect to assimilate what examples or likenesses, right? For what is in every way alike would be the same thing and not a what example, huh? So don't don't assimilate my lines here. In every way, right? Just. I'm trying to say that the second line there, right, doesn't have its own end point, but's drawn to an existing point that's already there, right?

[38:24] But don't don't don't don't extend this too much. Yeah. Um. God is not a point. Yeah. That's the point. And most of all in divine things, right? For it is impossible to find a similar example.

[38:47] Both in theology, right, that is in the deity of persons, and in the dispensation, that is in the mystery of the incarnation. You can't find a perfect likeness. But what poor Saint Patrick had to do there, you know, he was supposed to pick up the shamrock, you know. Well, it's one in three, right? But you want to extend that, you know, in every way it's like eternity, right?

[39:13] That's good enough for the Irish. I'm half Irish, you know. My mother, mother, mother was a Burke. Oh. Yeah. There's one line of Burkes to descend from one of the sons of Charlemagne, so so we like to think that we're descended from one of the sons of Charlemagne, but there's no real scholarship behind that assertion. Neighbors of ours in Ireland, the Burkes. Yeah. Was a kind of common name then because don't know how you spell it too.

[39:49] Yeah. I says human nature, therefore, in Christ is assimilated to habitui idest vestimenta, right? Thomas, there is a similarity. He's saying, right. Not as regards accidental what union, but as regards this that the word is seen right to the human nature, just as a man through his what clothing, yeah,

[40:25] and also as regards this that the what clothing is changed because it is formed according to the figure of the one who what puts it on. Okay, that's why I say outfit, you know, but I mean kind of like when they say you know you got a new shoe, you got to break it in, you know, before you go on a trip or something, you know, and so the fit the shoe what takes on the sense the the man who's wearing the shoe his own size of his foot, right?

[40:56] Okay, who from his form is not changed on account of the vestment, right? And likewise, human nature assumed by this word of God is made better, right? But the word of God is not changed, and this is the way Augustine expounds in the book on the eighty-three what questions, right? Okay, of course Aristotle, both in the actually the Categories, the last chapter of the Categories is about the word to have, and Aristotle distinguishes many different meanings of the word to have, right?

[41:36] So you might also be able to explain the text of St. Paul by saying he's not comparing it to clothing, you know, but to some other sense of having, right? But anyway, that's the way Thomas does here, right? Now the

[42:02] second objection. So well, human nature comes to the Son of God, right, in time, right, something that can be or not be there without it. That seems to be the definition of what accident, right? Okay.

[42:26] And Thomas says, well, to the second, it should be said that that which comes after esse completum, after complete being, comes accidentally, unless it be drawn into the communion of that complete what being, yeah. It could

[42:49] be a very interesting comparison here, just as in the resurrection, right? The body comes to the soul already existing. It does not, however, come what accidentally. Why? Because it is taken to the very same what being, huh?

[43:13] So the body might have vital being through the soul. So it's not joined accidentally to my soul after the at the resurrection, right? But it is not thus about whiteness, huh? Because other is the being of white, another the being of man to which what whiteness belongs, huh?

[43:44] So even now my my body shares in the being existence of my what soul, right? But my soul is a very unusual substantial form because it has existence not only in the body, right? But it shares its existence with the body, right? But the body doesn't completely what. Contain the existence of the soul. Now, how do I know that? Or how did Aristotle know that? Because the soul does something not in the body, namely, understands.

[44:22] And that's you know many arguments that they show in philosophy that this is soul, right? But one argument is that the soul understands the universal. And the universal is separated from what the continuous, right? From body, huh? Because everything in the continuous would be what individual being in the continuous, huh? So the fact that you understand the continuous in an un-continuous way is a sign that reason is what not continuous and therefore not a body.

[44:57] So the operation of understanding, which remains in the reason, is not in a body. But you have to be before you can do something. Even Descartes do that, huh? I think, therefore, I am. Huh? And that's kind of like an axiom, right? You have to be before you can do anything. So if the soul understands not in the body, then its being is not entirely in the body, huh?

[45:26] And the soul, when it leaves the body, the understanding soul, it takes its being with it, huh? And then the body no longer shares in that being, right? But when the body is joined again to the soul, it will again share the very same being that it shares in now. So it's not going to come to the body to the soul what accidentally, right? Why geometry comes to my soul what accidentally, right?

[45:55] So to be a soul or even to be reason, right, is not to be a geometer. But I am a geometer now, right? I have a new being, right? You know, I mean, repetition, repetition too, huh? That's really a great book that that he wrote there on on continued proportion, right? The book of continued proportions. What a book! Wow! New York Times bestseller. The bestseller for two thousand years.

[46:26] What did Einstein say? If if Euclid did not arouse your youthful enthusiasm, you were not born to be a scientist. He's like he said something, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. He speaks, you know, of really likely two wonders, right? One was the wonder about the magnet, right? How could something move something apparently being in contact with it, you know, magnetized far away? And the other one was the the wonder at the order of Euclid, there, right?

[46:59] It could it seemed to be so clearly shown, right? He's pretty good there. He's also pretty good on his appreciation of what Mozart, right? They describe Einstein being in the house there, and someone who's playing some Mozart. He ran upstairs, you know, great as violin, covered it all.

[47:23] But you know, you see his remark, you know, Beethoven made his music, but Mozart found it. Mozart's music seems to have been always a part of the universe. There's going

[47:35] to be music, properly speaking, in heaven, you know. Vocal. Properly speaking. Yeah. Properly speaking. Physical sound. Yeah. Vocal sound. Vocal friends. So brother, Benedict, yourself. Hope springs. you, sir. So if Palestina and Mozart met it, you know, you can imagine what kind of. I'm going to have a concert tonight for Palestrina. You're just dancing, and speaking out

[48:07] like that. That's why I'm so enjoy. Sublime. Sublime. Sublime. He's a nobody. He's a nobody. Course of course, Socrates says in the Phaedo that philosophy is the highest kind of music, right? Kepler had something like that. but

[48:38] Aristotle says that what, with the truth, all things harmonize. Then there's the harmony of reason and desire, right? Philosophy aims that, harmony of action and reason. This is the highest kind of music, highest kind of harmony.

[49:02] So I don't think I'm completely disordered listening to music of Mozart. Not completely. And Benedict XVI, you know, he likes to play especially Mozart. All right, piano. Maybe 35 minutes a day, 37. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And as John Paul II said, the Church could not fail to do homage to Mozart. Oh, so. That was that one, maybe. Yeah. Oh, yeah. You see that? Yeah. Incomparable motet there.

[49:32] Ave verum, his praise of the, the, the great Mozart. Okay. So if you understand this. Is that St Thomas's text too? Ave verum, or did he write that him? It's more ancient, I think. Yeah, more ancient. Yeah. Okay.

[50:02] And in in Mozart too for the Eucharist, you know, for the ordinary Eucharist, now beautiful the way he begins it and ends that, just like the Ave Fermo corpus, and it's got some of that excellence, you know.

[50:16] And sometimes you think Mozart's church music is not as liturgical as it should be, you know. I told you the scandal, you know, knowing knowing a beautiful aria from where did you figure out Dove Sono and then you sing an early Agnus Dei you know, it's he borrowed that, you know, made it just beautiful, you know, perfect operatic aria, I mean.

[50:46] Actually, if I'm my soul getting really disordered, I don't go to Mozart, I go to Corelli, huh? Then I get really rectified, huh? The Archangel.

[51:00] So he says that which comes says beautiful comparison Thomas makes here, right? Just as in the resurrection, the resurrection, the body comes to the pre-existing soul, right? But it doesn't come to it accidentality, right? Like geometry comes to my soul, because it is taken to the same what being, huh? So that the body might have living being to the soul, but it's not thus about whiteness, huh?

[51:30] Because other is the being of white and the being of man to which whiteness belongs, right? But the Word of God from eternity had complete being according to hypostasis or person, right? And from time there comes to it human nature, not as it were assumed to one being in so far as it's something nature, as the body is assumed to the being of the soul. So this is the difference, right?

[52:04] But to one being in so far as this being is of a hypostasis or what, and therefore human nature is not joined actually to the Son of God. That's something to chew, right, huh? What's the nature of our reason, you know? It's the nature of reason to to think about something before you understand it, huh? So you think about this and you understand a little bit, right?

[52:30] And you say, I thought about that another day, sometime. I understand it even a little better, right, huh? But you have to think about this union enough to realize that it's like he said, not accidental, right, huh? And one's kind of helped if if you understand the the being of the soul, the understanding soul and the body, right, huh? But yet there's a difference, right, huh? But it helps you to understand it a bit, right?

[52:59] And not everything that comes to you comes to you accidentally. See, when my body comes to me in the resurrection, right, it's not going to come to me what? Accidentally.

[53:20] Not going to give me a being I don't already have in my separated soul. But it's going to come to me to what? Partake of that being that my separated soul has.

[53:39] And I'll be even more satisfied than I was as a failure to be division at that time. You know, I'll be more perfect. He'd be out of fight, huh? Because I'll be more complete. Now, the third objection says, whatever does not pertain to the nature the essence of something is an accident of it, because everything is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the essence or nature of the Son of God, who is divine because union is not made in the nature.

[54:42] Therefore, it is necessary that the human nature come accidentally to the Son of God. That sounds pretty convincing, right? Thomas says to the third, it should be said that accident is divided against substance. Substances, however, as is clear in the fifth book of wisdom, fifth book after the books of natural philosophy, is said in two ways, as Aristotle says. In one way, the essence or nature, right?

[55:10] So therefore, we speak of the substance of a thing, meaning what it is, right? Another way, for the suppositum or hypostasis. So that's a pretty important book, that fifth book of wisdom, huh? Once it suffices to this that there be not a accidental union, that there be a union secundum what hypostasis, even though it's not made a union according to nature, right? Well, when my body is joined to my soul again, that would be what to form one complete nature, right?

[55:50] I'm thinking, you know, these words, you know, working for a while there, in Shakespeare, you know, where he says, or Friar Lawrence says, wisely and slow they stumble to run fast, right? But you see this over and over again in the fourteen books of wisdom of Aristotle. And I was thinking, you know, that these words of Friar Lawrence if you should go forward wisely and slowly should be followed most of all in wisdom.

[56:20] Where more than in wisdom should you try to go forward wisely and slow? only icy road road, you should do so, right? Go forward wisely and slow. But a fortiori in wisdom itself, nothing should proceed wisely more than wisdom. It's kind of amazing, huh? In the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom, Aristotle finally finds out that wisdom is about being as being and the one of the many.

[56:46] At the same time, he realizes that being is what said equivocally by by reason the word being and the word one, right? And then he spends his whole fifth book distinguishing and ordering the senses of the words used throughout wisdom and used also the axioms, because all those words that are used throughout wisdom or in the axioms. Are words equivocal by reason, right? So, wisely and slowly he goes through each word, distinguishing the meanings of the words in order of the senses.

[57:23] That's amazing that he does that. The whole, the whole fifth book of wisdom is that way. And if you think along with that, you know, wisely and slow, they stumble; they run fast. As Aristotle points out in the book on mistakes and stumbling, the most common mistake is from what mixing up the senses of a word, and it's words equivocal by reason that we tend to mix up the senses.

[57:50] So we can see how in book five he's proceeding what wisely and slow and consequently not stumbling, right? And this prevents him from stumbling throughout the rest of wisdom. But it's again and again you see him doing this, but it's amazing here that Thomas goes back to the fifth book of wisdom he looks like yeah, Yeah, Yeah. As Deconic said, but, Thomas was a humble student of Aristotle, right?

[58:18] And he reads them carefully, frequently, and with reverence. So it means to be teachable as far as the will is concerned. Now, be willing to to hear or to read carefully, frequently, and with reverence the words of these guys.

[58:42] Now, the fourth one I was talking about the way he makes use of this words in the Ambrosian Creed, you know, not Ambrosian, but the Athanasian Creed,

[58:55] that the nothing is more like the incarnation than the what union of soul and body. Thomas says, well, not as far as form and matter, but as far as instrument, right, in being a joined instrument.

[59:10] To the fourth, it should be said that not everything that is taken on as a tool pertains to the what hypostasis of the one taking it up, as is clear about the what.

[59:27] Yeah, and the sword, right? Gladius, right? But nothing prevents that which is taken up to unity of the hypostasis to have itself as an instrument, just as the body of man or his what members. So the distinction Thomas makes there in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he talks about this between a joined instrument, right, and what one that isn't joined. Difference between my hand being an instrument of Duane Burquist and my ballpoint pin or my hammer being an instrument of Duane Burkist, right?

[1:00:12] For Nestorius laid down that human nature was taken up by the word only, only, huh? That's important. Through per modum instrumenti, in the manner of a tool, not, however, to the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore, he did not concede that that man was what? That man was truly the Son of God, but only, you can say again, his instrument, right? Huh? Whence Cyril says in the epistle to the monks of Egypt, "Ah, this Emmanuel, that is Christ,

[1:00:58] not only, right, to take on the what office of instrument? The Scripture says, but God Himself was truly what humanatus speaking properly and not synecdochically. That is, he was made a man. For Damascene, however, lays down human nature in Christ to be a tool pertaining to the unity of the what hypostasis. The same way, my hand, right, is really my joined what tool, right?

[1:01:40] Suddenly gets something to think about, as well as a couple of other things. By becoming man, right? Now next, cobart is going to be dealing with union itself.