Tertia Pars
9. Summa III, Q.2, Arts. 7–8: The Union Is Created, Real Relations vs. Relations of Reason, and Union vs. Assumption
Class of 2008-10-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/009-summa-iii-q-2-arts-7-8-the-union-is-created-real-relations/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, grant enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written, Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:25] Little item here in chapter twenty-four of her life, where she had certain friendships that were not maybe the best friendships, right? And her confessor was kind of urging her to break off these friendships.

[0:44] Um, he told me that I ought to leave nothing undone so as to become entirely pleasing to God. And he treated me with great skill, yet also very gently, for my soul was not at all strong but very sensitive, especially as regards abandoning certain friendships, which were not actually leading me to offend God. There was a great deal of affection beneath these, and it seemed to me that if I abandoned them, I should be sinning through ingratitude.

[1:13] So I asked him why it was necessary for me to be ungrateful if I was not offending God. He told me to commend the matter to God for a few days, and to recite the hymn Veni Creator, and I should be enlightened as to which was the better thing to do. So I spent the greater part of one whole day in prayer, and then beseeching the Lord that He would help me to please Him in everything.

[1:39] I began the hymn. While I was reciting it, there came to me a transport so sudden that it almost carried me away. I could make no mistake about this; so clear was it. This was the first time that the Lord had granted me the favor of any kind of rapture. I heard these words. Oh, this is words. I will have thee converse now, not with men, but with angels.

[2:04] Wow. But words of our Lord, right? I would have thee converse now, not with men, but with angels. So my old teacher Kasurik used to say, you should make an act of will, opening up your mind to your guardian angel, right? So that he will be more able to direct you in your thoughts and in your life.

[2:28] Another little thing here from Saint Teresa of Avila's thing. It's a little bit about the glorified body, right? Which is nothing compared to the glorified soul, but got to be led into things gradually, huh? Okay.

[2:47] It's very interesting what our Lord does. One day when I was at prayer, the Lord was pleased to reveal to me nothing but His hands. Talk about Monléon being led by the hands.

[3:05] The beauty of which was so great as to be indescribable. This made me very fearful, as does every new experience that I have when the Lord is beginning to grant me some supernatural favor. A few days later, I also saw that divine face, which seemed to leave me completely absorbed. I could not understand why the Lord revealed Himself gradually like this, since He was later to grant me the favor of seeing Him wholly.

[3:38] Until at length I realized that His Majesty was leading me according to my natural weakness. One year on Saint Paul's Day, when I was at Mass, I saw a complete representation of this most sacred humanity, just as in a picture of His resurrection body, in very great beauty and majesty.

[4:13] I will only say that if there were nothing else in heaven to delight the eyes, but the extreme beauty of the glorified bodies there, that alone would be the greatest bliss.

[4:26] A most especial bliss, then, would be to us when we see the humanity of Jesus Christ. For if it is so even on earth, where His Majesty reveals Himself according to what our wretchedness can bear, what will it be where the fruition of that joy is complete?

[4:48] Although this vision is imaginary, I never saw any other vision with the eyes of the body, but only with the eyes of the soul. So that that's appropriate for us to hear him and study the humanity there a little bit of Christ. We're going to

[5:11] have copies of this to go around, isn't it? This little side here about Thomas as a teacher, sacred doctor. Pass this one down to somebody. Just made

[5:24] a few copies. Oh, enough copies to go around. Okay. Why'd you bring this back? You just made a few copies. I was going to make more copies. Time to gather. All copies sold.

[5:44] So let us proceed now to Article Seven here, Question Two. This is a very difficult reading. Will the union of the divine and human nature is something what created or something yeah? To the seventh one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the divine and human nature is not something created.

[6:24] First objection says: for nothing in God is able to be created, because everything that is in God is God. But the union is in God, because God Himself is united to human what nature. Therefore, it seems that the union is not something what created. Huh. Did Patrick do that thing to see

[7:00] him now? Moreover, the end is always the most potent thing in each thing. But the end of the union is the divine hypostasis, huh, or the divine person, to which the union what is terminated, huh? Therefore, it seems that a union of this kind ought to be most of all judged according the condition of the divine what hypostasis, which is not something created. Therefore, neither is that union something what created, huh?

[7:44] Moreover, this is a great principle in philosophy: propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis, on account of what that more the united principle, right?

[7:59] But man is said to be the creator on account of the what union. And Christ is God, He's creator, right? Therefore, much more is union something not created, but the creator Himself.

[8:21] Now, in the said contra, everything that begins to be in time, huh, extempore, right, is something what created, because God is what outside of time, huh? God is eternal, right?

[8:43] But that union was not from eternity, but began to be what from time. We'd say in English that in time, excuse me, in preposition, right? In the fullness of time, right? Okay. So if this union is something that began in time, can't be something uncreated.

[9:09] Must be something created, right? Therefore, the union is something created, right? Now, and if you had a chance here to study the body of the article here, it goes back to some very subtle things that

[9:30] Aristotle and Averroes and so on first saw, right? Aristotle first saw it, and Thomas what learned from them, right? And this is a truth about what relations, huh? Okay. Now, relations have hardly any being. These relations that are creatures, right? And

[10:04] there's a distinction here between relations that are real, the real things, right, and relations that are just of what reason, right? Okay. Now these relations of reason come under the larger category of beings of reason. Sometimes the Latin ends, which is being rationes, right? Rationes. And there's two kinds of beings of reason. One are these some kinds of relations, right? And even real relations have a little being.

[10:52] Some people thought they're all something of reason, but there are real relations and there are relations that are just what are reason, right? The other kinds of beings of reason are negations, right? Okay. So

[11:10] we can talk here about nothing, for example, right? In fact, I can make a true statement about nothing. Nothing is what? Nothing. Yeah. That's a true affirmative statement about nothing. Or I could say nothing is not something. It's a true negative statement, right? Okay. I mean, talking about something or I'm talking about nothing here. Hmm? Is nothing anything? How can I make two statements about nothing? I'm not making statements about anything.

[11:49] Huh? Something in reason. Yeah. Nothing has no being except in the mind, right? But the mind takes nothing as if it were what something, yeah. Okay. So my old teacher Kasurik used to joke, you know, philosophy is the only subject he says we can get paid for talking about nothing.

[12:15] That's true, huh? Huh? Okay. Now take take something that's not quite as negative as nothing, but take what they call privation or lack. Take blindness, right? Is blindness something in the world?

[12:39] Aren't aren't there blind men out there in the world? And isn't it true to say about some people that he or she is blind? Sometimes a dog is blind or a cat, right?

[12:56] So is blindness something out there in the world? Something in the reason. Is blindness really something, or is is the non-being of something? It's a lack of something, right? And yet we can truly what affirm, right, of this man, right, or this woman, that he or she is blind, right? Okay.

[13:32] But notice the word blindness, like the word science or something, right? Grammatically, they could function, right, just like any other noun, right? So just by science, I'm a scientist. So by blindness, I'm what blind, right? Okay. So this man is a scientist by science, right? And this man is blind by blindness, right? Okay. So this is odd thing, you know. Odd things is beings of reason, right?

[14:08] Now, there are many kinds of relations of of reason, and there's one kind of relation of reason that you find in logic. Take for example what we call genus and species in logic.

[14:44] Well, you could you could porfy define the genus and species as relation to each other, right? Okay. And we can speak of the relation of animal to dog, cat, horse, and elephant, right? And the relation of dog and cat and horse and elephant to what animal, right? And that's like the relation of number to odd and even number, right? And vice versa, odd and even number to number, right?

[15:13] Okay. But to those relations of genus and species, do they exist in the world around us? This is something that follows upon our what understanding and separating out what's common to dog and cat and horse, right? And even dog, cat, and horse don't exist out here, do they? There's just this dog or this cat, right? Okay. So I compared the cats and I separated out what they have in common, right?

[15:46] It happened when I was early with some of these things, huh? Your mother or someone said that's a dog, or not a dog. I little kid after having a number of dogs pointed out will what say, mommy, there's a dog in the in the thing, right? On his own, right? So he somehow separate out what they have in common, right? Okay. But in separating out what they have in common, that's only in the reason, unless you're taking this right.

[16:13] But Aristotle's pretty well refuted that in the seventh book of wisdom, among other places, in the last books of wisdom. So relation of animal to dog, and even relation of dog to what the ones running around out here. That's a relation that exists what only in the reason, right? That's one kind of group of relations of reason, huh? Okay. Now,

[16:51] what if I say Socrates is Socrates and see is that a real relation? He would have a real relation to himself. I think. To have a real relation, you have to have two things there, right? Yeah. But really, you have only one thing there, right? But because the mind can come back upon itself, right? Then I can what multiply right Socrates in my mind twice and then say Socrates is Socrates in the same, right?

[17:42] This is another example, but a different kind, right, of a relation of what reason, right? Okay. You have to state that the Socrates is Socrates is very true, right? Aristotle says that if you say the same thing to certain the predicate, you don't get any reason for something being itself.

[18:06] He says that's a that's a brevity, huh? It's a brief one, brief thing. It's it's obvious. Is today before tomorrow? Now, is that relation of being before? Is that a real relation?

[18:33] Tomorrow doesn't exist, so I guess you got a problem there. Yeah, yeah. Now, I might be taller or shorter than you guys, right? But those are real relations, my being taller or shorter than you, is based upon my size and your size, right? Okay. So these are real relations and things, huh? Okay. But today and tomorrow, does today and tomorrow both exist?

[19:06] Today is the. Yeah, that's the problem. Yeah. And yet you say it's true to say that today is before tomorrow, right? Or today is after yesterday, right?

[19:21] But to have a relation, the things that are related have to both exist. So today and tomorrow don't both exist. Something of today exists, but nothing of tomorrow exists yet. I don't think so. And nothing of yesterday exists, right? So you don't have a real relation between today and tomorrow, even though you'd say that it's true to say today is before tomorrow. But reason what takes together today and tomorrow and compares them and says. One is before, and the other is after, right?

[20:04] Is the mind false saying that? But it's relation of what? He's in. You get the army or something like that. You got another right foot from your left foot, right? But now, right and left are they real relations in me?

[20:30] I'm right-handed. This arm is stronger than the left hand, right? Maybe some of you it's reversed, right? So, it's real basis in me for saying this is my left hand, this is my right hand, right now. But now, if I say

[20:50] the example Thomas uses, the left side of the column and the right side of the column, right? This is the column to the right of me, and this is the column to the what? Left of me. If I'm standing there and Rome there, all those pillars there, between two pillars, huh? The left and the right is left and right really in the columns? There's no real basis in them for left and right.

[21:15] It's in my my body for left and right now. So, there's many kinds of what relations of reason, right now. But now, the one is going to come up here in the chapter here is one that Aristotle first pointed out,

[21:40] and he says that the relation of seeing and the seen, the relation of seeing to the seen is real, but the relation of the seen to the what? The seen. Not really. But our reason, when it tries to understand the relation of this to that, right? It has to what? Understand that as reciprocally related back to the first thing, right? Okay.

[22:20] So, if I see you, you must be seen by me, right? But is your being seen by me anything in you at all? I see this glass. Was the real relation of me in my seeing to the glass there, right?

[22:44] But is the glass being seen a real relation in the glass? Well, seeing is really kind of a immaterial activity, kind of a spiritual activity in a way, but the glass is something quite material. Doesn't partake at all in that, no, right?

[23:13] If someone loves you, they're really related to you by loving you, right? But if you don't know that you're being loved, is there anything in you being loved?

[23:36] Nothing. So this is a very strange situation where you have two relations, because you always said relations come in couples, right? But the one is a real relation, the relation of the knower to the known, right? And the other, the relation of the known to the knower, is just a relation of what?

[24:12] Well, it's kind of a general point about the relations that are said of God from time, right? Like he begins to be what the creator, right? Was something changed in God so he's now he's gone from not being a creator to being a creator? Has there been a real change in God? So he takes on now a new relation to the world.

[24:45] Or he keeps it going. Yeah, but but Saint James says there's no change at all in God. I'm not even a shadow of a change, right?

[24:57] So there's no change in God whereby he changes from being not a creator to being creator, right? The whole change is in you and me.

[25:09] He created your soul or my soul, right? Huh? So we have a real relation to God, huh? But does God have a real relation to us?

[25:23] No. It's hard to understand, right? But it comes up, huh? It came up earlier in the prima pars, huh? Well, now the same distinction is necessary here when you talk about this union. Has God been changed, having something united to him?

[25:52] Well, Thomas recalls a teaching in the prima pars. I answered should be said, he says in the body article, that the union about which we speak is a certain relation, right, which is considered. Between the divine nature and the human nature, right?

[26:14] According as they come together in the one person of the Son of what? God, the one person who is the Son of God, right? Now Thomas recalls the teaching from the first part. Just as in the first part has been said, every relation which is considered between God and the creature really is in the creature. By whose change, right? Such a relation, what comes to be, is born, right?

[26:51] But it is not really in God. But according to reason, what only? Because it is not born by the change of what. God. Notice how different that is from my kicking you, right?

[27:25] I'm your kicker, and you're being kicked, right? Now, but we're both, in a way, changed by this, right? And the activity that results in your being kicked is changing the shape of your body a bit, right? And but I'm involved in this motion too, right? My leg is moving, and you know, coming in there and getting it. See, is that the way God changes us? Huh? Is he really involved in his activities so that he's changed too.

[27:55] No. Thus, therefore, he says it should be said, huh? That this union about which we speak is not in God, what really, but according to reason only. Now that doesn't mean you can't truly say that the divine nature is what united with the human nature, right?

[28:27] But in the human nature, which is a certain creature, this union, this relation, is really there. And therefore, it is necessary to say that this union is something what created, huh? Okay. Now, sometimes I think, you know, that Aristotle and Thomas and maybe Averroes too. I mean, Avicenna meant to say they have a sentiment. Only guys who understood this, right? This business about relations and reason. Thomas, you know, in the Disputed questions on power.

[29:07] He takes up these relations, and then he distinguishes all these different kinds of relations of reason. Very complete text. Where is it? In the De Potentia, Questions Disputatae De Potentia, and develops these thoughts some more. But these he usually distinguishes, you know, in that text, five different kinds of gradations of reason, and one kind that's kind of separated from the other four is the what uh, gradations of logic is about.

[29:43] But then he distinguishes four other kinds, two kinds of which he gets directly from the text of Aristotle, and two from what Avicenna. So he puts them together, right? Four kinds Okay That's. the most complete text, but shows the extreme subtlety of these guys.

[30:17] But go back a bit to some of the things we studied in the first part there. When we take up the divine understanding, the divine will, we take them up in a certain order. We talk about the divine understanding first, and then we talk about the divine will, right? And in creatures like you and me, our reason or our understanding and our will are two different abilities or powers that we have.

[30:54] And the reason or the understanding moves the what will proposes its object to it, right? The object of the will is the good as understood in some way. And so, when we try to know God through creatures, we speak, you know, of what he understands himself and his own goodness, and therefore he what loves himself, right? And so we have a certain relation of mover and move there, the divine understanding to the divine will.

[31:24] That's the way we understand it, right? But is there a real relation between the divine understanding, the divine will? Why not? The divine understanding. The same thing. Yeah. Just like there's no real relation of Socrates to Socrates, right? It's only in our mind that there's two Socrates, right?

[31:51] So it's only in our imperfect thoughts that represent God in a very imperfect way, right? And we have one thought of his understanding, one of his will, right? But these two thoughts correspond to what? The same thing. Yeah.

[32:12] So it's not a real relation there, right? Of the divine understanding to the divine what will, right? When we try to understand what God primarily understands, he say, "Well, the form by which God understands is himself,

[32:38] and therefore he primarily understands himself." So he kind of reasoned from the form by which he understands, right? So we're seeing to what he understands, right? So we're seeing the form by which God understands is like the beginning or source of his understanding. Well, again, is that a real relation, God?

[33:07] Is God really the beginning of His own understanding? If that were so, then God His understanding would not be the same thing as He learned. So again, that's a relation of what? Yeah, yeah.

[33:24] But now, when you get to the Trinity, right? The relation of the Father to the Son and of the Son to the Father, right? These are real relations, huh?

[33:42] So this distinction between real relations and relations of reason, right, is absolutely essential to understanding God, huh? And understanding the Trinity, huh? So it comes up again here, too, right? It will come up again when you study creation, if you study the prima pars and creation, right? Is creation something in God or in us? What's our kind of our relation to God, right? Right, depends upon God, right?

[34:17] And that's a real relation in us. And when we try to understand our relation to God, we understand God' relation to us. It's our Creator, right? But then that's not a real what? Relation.

[34:38] That's hard to understand, right? But get a little bit into it, right? Okay. This text, when we get any more copies, we'll we'll look at it. But when the Second Vatican Council was talking about reading St. Thomas, right?

[35:00] He says, "Then to illustrating the mysteries of salvation, integre, huh, as a whole, quantum fieri potest, as much as is able or as possible, right? They should proceed by looking at it with St. Thomas as a teacher.

[35:25] So, so much as they can, we're trying to understand, right, these mysteries. So something that you'll come come across many times in theology, right? This distinction between relations that are real and relations that are what? Of reason, yeah. There is

[35:55] another distinction that Aristotle brings out in the Categories. And you'll see this. It's kind of it's always confusing the other distinction. Relations in the same Latin, secundum dici and secundum esse, right? And some people say, well, that means reason. This means real. No, that's misunderstanding what the words mean. This other distinction is the one that Aristotle makes in the chapter on relation and categories.

[36:38] See, Plato had defined relation as what is said to be of another or towards another in any way whatsoever, right? And that means that not only is double and half relations, because one is always double of something, right? But also knowledge is a relation, because knowledge is knowledge always of something, right?

[37:05] Yet knowledge is fundamentally not a relation at all, but a what? Quality, right? So though it is said to be of another, right? It's fundamentally a quality, but a quality that has its relation following upon it, right? So knowledge is something absolute, right?

[37:26] But double is not anything absolutely, but its whole being, its whole nature is to be what of another, right? Nothing is double in itself, is it?

[37:50] Double is nothing in itself. It's only something of another, right? And so double will be put in the category of relation, right? While knowledge will be fundamentally in the category of quality.

[38:12] So you have this distinction, and then this distinction, and sometimes Thomas will crisscross them. You get four members, right? So it's really quite a quite a study. Relations, I wouldn't recommend it until you've got

[38:34] a very quiet room to padded room. It's very very difficult, right? I'm always reminded of what the great Aristotle says in the second book of wisdom, where he's talking about the difficulty of knowing the truth. And he spends more time saying why it's difficult to know the truth, right? And he sees a very important distinction. He says the cause, of the difficulty of knowing something, can either be in the thing you're trying to know, or it can be the weakness of our mind.

[39:24] Now, natural philosophy and wisdom are both more difficult than geometry. But the reason why natural philosophy is more difficult than geometry is in the thing you're trying to know.

[39:42] Because time, as you were saying earlier, hardly what hardly exists, Hardly exists, right? How much time is ever here now? In strict sense, no time at all. There's no time in the now. That's all that's real. So time hardly exists,

[40:05] so it's hard to know. But the cause of wisdom or theology being more difficult than geometry is because the weakness of our mind. And Aristotle says that as the eyes of the bat are at the light of day, so is our mind to knowing about God. Aristotle thought that the bat flew at nighttime because the sunlight was too bright for him.

[40:35] But yet, it's light that makes things visible and knowable. So, the daylight things should be more knowable, but not to us because the weakness of our eyes, are meant to be the eye of our soul. And so, Plato in the Republic he compares us to those who are born in a cave, right? And they live in the cave and they can't what get out. And but if they get out of the cave, they would be kind of blinded, right?

[41:08] Well, I mention that because on the one hand, you have these relations, even the real relations in the world around us, they have hardly any being, right? My being taller or shorter than you, you know, but it's hardly anything, right? So those kinds of relations are hard to know because they're hardly what knowable, right? There, the difficulty

[41:42] is in them, right? The cause, the difficulty we have in knowing them is in them because they hardly, hardly there. On the other hand, you get to study the Trinity. You got relations again, and actually, these things are the most knowable all, but not to us, right? So Aristotle says that what's more knowable is less knowable to us, and what is less knowable is more knowable to us.

[42:20] it. Was a great discovery for Aristotle. A very unusual situation, though. So I mention that because seems to me if you take as a whole the study of relation, it involves both causes of difficulty, different relations, and people are constantly getting to what trouble because of this. Very difficult thing.

[43:01] So as they say, it comes up in the study of God and the Trinity, and it comes up in the study of creation, and now it comes up here in the study of what, Incarnation, right?

[43:22] So he says in answer to the first objection, this union is not in God really, but only according to what, reason, right? For God is said to be united to the creature from the fact that the creature is united to Him, without any what, change taking place in God, huh?

[43:49] So it's that kind of situation that Aristotle talked about in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? Where Aristotle's example was that of the knower and the known, right? Where the relation on the one side is a real relation, right? The knower is really related to the known, but the known not to the what? Knower. Knower, yeah.

[44:19] And the second objection is saying, well, doesn't this relation terminate in God, right? Okay. He says to the second, it should be said that the ratio, the thought, the definition of relation, just as also that emotion, depends upon its end or its term, right?

[44:47] But its being depends on its what? Subject, right? So fatherhood is something in me towards my son, right? Okay. So fatherhood is a real relation based on something in me, right? Okay.

[45:19] So it's real because there's a real foundation in me, huh? Or am I being a teacher, right? Okay. Thomas says if I teach you logic, I have one relation to you. If I teach you geometry, I have another relation to you. Okay. So though the the teacher is related to the student as his term, right? The reality of his being a teacher goes back to a foundation in him, in his possessing the science that he's teaching, right?

[45:59] So Thomas points out that distinction, and because such a union, such a relation, does not have esse reale, real being, except in created nature, consequently, it follows that it has only what created being.

[46:31] Okay, the third objection. To third, it should be said that man is said and is God an account of the union, in so far as it terminates at the what divine hypostasis. It does not, however, follow that that union is the creator himself or God,

[46:59] because when something is said to be created, this more regards its what being than the what relation. So that would suffice for first little look at that subject.

[47:32] So let's look down the eighth article, where the union is the same thing as what assumption. What does the word assumption mean, by the way? Does it mean to take on one Yeah, to take to oneself as well, right? Okay. What do we speak? When we speak of the assumption of the Virgin Mary, what does that mean? Takes on the glorified body of Christ. What? Takes on the glorified body of Christ.

[48:06] Mary, assumption of Mary. Oh, she's assumed body and soul, so she's glorified. Yeah. Like resurrection. Yeah. But I mean, is her body taken to her soul? No, it is. Isn't it? She's taken to God. I mean, she's assumed into heaven.

[48:26] I guess there's some controversy about that, but assuming it, you know, which I, you know, the greatest church fathers think, you know, but she did die, right? Okay, so her her body and soul were separated. But then the body was what taken to the soul, right? Most most of the Eastern ones say that they call the dormition that she was yeah that she was preserved from death because she was freed from original sin, so therefore she went to like.

[48:58] Like well, so it was sleep, yeah, and then it was assumed that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Let me say, Paul speaks of it as you know, as sleep, you know, because of the facility of resurrection for God's power, right?

[49:25] Okay, and this again, very subtle here, the distinction he's going to be pointing out. Thank you. You said that the idea, you said the assumption is with the rejoining.

[49:38] It's. Yeah, yeah. I looked at some of the church documents, and one of of of Pius the twelfth, right? Pius twelfth is one who defined the assumption. And there, it seemed to me that that she had died, right? You know, it didn't speak of her as being assumed body and soul together. You know, and That she never died, but again, it's not made as clear. Yeah. Yeah.

[50:05] But It seemed to me, more in accord with the words of the text, were you know. Okay. And so, if you said she did die, then assumption would mean that her body was being taken to her what soul, yeah. Okay. Otherwise, you'd speak of the ascension of Mary, right? But yeah I always thought you? See, I don't know. I always thought the distinction was our Lord ascended because he went up by his own power, but our Lady was assumed because she didn't do it by her own power.

[50:37] Well, I suppose you could take if you take it as not having died, yeah. But I've never heard the explanation. The assumption has the body being taken to the soul. I don't. I don't think there is an official teaching whether she died or not, because it's like a big theological point between East and West. So yeah, it may may not be defined. Yeah.

[51:03] So those doing mass rosary ladies, they can't say assumed body and soul anymore. Okay. Relations, just as motions are specified by their term or limit, but the same is the term of assumption and of the union, to wit, the divine what person, divine hypostasis, and therefore it seems that the union and the assumption do not what differ, right?

[51:50] Moreover, in the mystery of the incarnation, the same would seem to be the one uniting and the one assuming, and the one united and the one what

[52:04] assumed, huh? But union and assumption would seem to follow the action and passion of the one uniting and the one united, huh? At least grammatically, one's active, one's passive, there, or the one assuming and the one assumed.

[52:28] Therefore, it seems that union is the same thing as assumption. Moreover, Damascene says in the third book, "Other is the union, other the what incarnation. For union only shows the joining, huh? To which, however, it is made, it does not what show. But notice those words of Damascene in the Latin here: Incarnatio ultimate, humanatio.

[53:06] You know, I often see that word humanatio, but incarnation is kind of a figure of speech. We said right, which is what? What's figure of speech called?

[53:22] No. Yes, synecdoche Yeah. See, antonomasia and synecdoche are alike, and you've got a whole and part, right? But in Synecdoche, you've got the integral or composed whole and its part, and in the antonomasia, you have the universal whole and its part, right? So

[53:54] when you say he, the word was made flesh, right? The word was made a man, right? Then you're taking a part of man, right, for the whole man, right? But a composing part, right? So that's called synecdoche, right?

[54:11] So those are kind of awful words there from the from the Greek, but we don't have any English of the word for them, right? And they're quite common in the in Augustine and Thomas and so on. So it's good to know those words.

[54:34] To what, however, it was made, not yet. But incarnation and humanatio determine to what the union was made, right? But likewise, assumption does determine to which the union was made. Therefore, they seem to be the what same, right?

[54:59] But against this is that the divine nature is said to be united, but not assumed. So they don't seem to be exactly the same, right? These two, huh?

[55:13] The answer should be said. That has has has been said. Union implies the relation of the divine nature and the human, according as they come together in one what person.

[55:33] We can say the divine nature, human nature united in the one person, of the word, right? Now, every change, every relation, rather, which begins to be in time, right, or from times, as I like to say, is caused by some what change, huh? And change consists in acting upon and what undergoing acting upon being acted upon.

[56:12] Thus, therefore, it should be said that the first and chief difference between union and assumption is that union implies the relation itself, but assumption, the acting upon, right, by which someone is said to be what assuming, or the undergoing or being acted upon, according as something is said to be what assumed.

[56:48] That's the first difference he sees, right? Assuming and being assumed, like action, passion, some change, right? He took from the Blessed Virgin something, right? And something was taken from the Blessed Virgin. We can say, right? That's assumption is referring to, right? While union is what this relation, the human nature and the divine nature are united in the person of the Word.

[57:29] Now, from this difference is taken another difference. For assumption is taken as in what coming to be, right, in fieri. But union is something that has been what made.

[57:49] And therefore, the one uniting is said to be united, but the one assuming is not said to be assumed. Now, the human nature is signified as in the term of the assumption to the divine hypostasis, which it is said to be a man. Whence we say truly that the Son of God, who is uniting to Himself human nature, is a man. But human nature, considered in itself, as signified in the abstract, is signified as the assumed.

[58:36] But we do not say that the Son of God is what human nature. But he took human nature, right? From the same, there follows a third difference.

[58:58] That relation, especially one of what equality, does not have itself more to one extreme than to the other. But acting upon and undergoing, or acting upon and being acted upon, have themselves in diverse ways to the one acting upon and the one undergoing, in two diverse terms. And therefore, assumption determines both the limit from which and to which, right? For assumption is saying, as it were, and they didn't use the Latin there, ab alio from another, right, to oneself, sumptio taking, right?

[59:47] But union determines none of these things. Whence, indifferently, one can say that human nature is united to the divine and the reverse, right? The divine nature is joined to the human in this one person,

[1:00:09] but one would not say that the divine nature was assumed by the human, but the reverse that the human nature was assumed by the divine, because the human nature was joined to the personhood of God, divine personhood, so that the divine person might subsist in what human nature. Are you thoroughly convinced now that these don't mean exactly it's not synonyms?

[1:00:48] So he points out he replied then to the first objection that union and assumption do not have themselves in the same way to the what term, but diversely. That's been brought out in the body of the article.

[1:01:06] To the second, it should be said that the one uniting and the one assuming are not entirely the same. Why? Because every person assuming is uniting, but not the reverse. For the person of the Father united human nature to the Son, but not to Himself, and therefore He is said to be uniting, but not what assuming.

[1:01:39] And likewise, they are not the same. The united and the assumed. Why? Because the divine nature is said to be united, but not what assumed.

[1:01:56] So what does Hilary say? From words put forth disorderly, heresy arises. So you don't want to say that human nature assumed the divine nature, right? No. Human nature took on the divine nature, so to speak. You don't want to say that. No. From words put forth disorderly, huh? Heresy arises Ex verbis inordinate prolatis Or as Charles Dickens says, we're not always masters of our of our words, right?

[1:02:39] Sometimes they they get out of control. They master us. To the third, it should be said that assumption determines to whom is made the copulation on the part of the what one assuming. Insofar as assumption is etymologically almost ad se sumptio, taking to oneself, right?

[1:03:06] But incarnation and humanatio, right? Thomas is now repeating the words of Damascene in the Latin translation, anyway. On the part of the assumed, which is flesh, right, or human nature, right, and he's just following the the um, words incarnatio humanatio, right? When we say he was made flesh. he was made a man. Mhm.

[1:03:34] And therefore, assumption differs in definition both from union and from incarnation or humanizing. A humanized God, huh? God was humanized. Made more human. You gotta be careful about that. The word is misused. It's not a good deal for him. Let's maybe take a little break now. After those two horrendous articles.