Tertia Pars
10. Thomas as Teacher of Things and Words; Q.2, Art. 9: The Greatest of Unions, and Things That Differ Only in Thought
Class of 2008-10-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/010-thomas-as-teacher-of-things-and-words-q-2-art-9-the-greatest/

[0:00] Little bit on Thomas as a teacher of sacred doctrine. In his exposition of Psalm 48, Thomas says, "It's kind of simple way he does it here. Whoever teaches,

[0:14] either he teaches things or he teaches what words. Now, it's an awful simple way of stating it, but it's kind of profound in a way. Now, obviously, a man who teaches things is going to use words to teach them, right? He might stop and talk about what's up front. You might say it's the things, right? He's going to talk about. Or he teaches words. We're obviously going to talk about the things that the words signify, right?

[0:42] But what's up front is the words that you have to explain, right? The words of Saint John or Saint Matthew or Saint Paul or something, right?

[0:53] When we preach faith and morals, what we sometimes call dogmatic and moral theology, we teach things, right? And that's what he's doing in the Summa Theologiae. He's teaching things. What's the thing he's teaching? Mainly God, Incarnation, other things, right? When we

[1:15] expound upon Scripture, we teach what words. That's an interesting distinction, I think, that he's made there. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, if I'm writing a commentary or exposition of the Gospel of Saint John, right? I'm going to explain the words of Saint John, right? But you're going to want to explain the realities of the words. Yeah, yeah, obviously, yeah. But what's up front there is the words of John.

[1:47] I have to explain what those words signify, right? And not get into the things, right? Okay. Now, if you take Dionysius or Areopagite or pseudo Areopagite what he is, he's kind of in between these two, right? But his works are about names, and the one that Thomas commented on is called what in Latin, De Divinis Dominibus, right? It didn't say De Deo, about God, but it's about the divine names.

[2:24] Why Thomas would say the Summa is about God, not about the names of God. Okay, so there's a little distinction there, right? Now, what happens? I think I gave you people copy of the Pseudo-Areopagite, didn't I? That's in the library. Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Books, yeah. Well, anyway, you'll find when you expound on the words of Scripture, right? Like, for example, God will be said to be good, right?

[2:52] But many, many places in the Scripture are said to be good, right? Or God would be said metaphorically to be fire. Many places in Scripture, right? Now, every time the word "good" comes up, you are going to say all that you want to say about why God is said to be good. You'll be repeating yourself again and again, right? So let's, in a separate book, talk about the word "good" said of God, and then in another book we'll talk about the metaphors, right?

[3:22] Which are words, right? The word "fire," right? Okay. And so, Cornelius a Lapide he I've seen somebody talking about the word "fire" said of God in one passage. He says, but more fully, maybe in in Acts the apostles' name, when the Holy Spirit comes down, fire and so on. I've explained more fully, right? You see me? So in a way, Dionysius is kind of in between, right?

[3:50] But the fact that he tells his books and his books are distinguished by proper names of God, metaphorical names, etc. He's closer to what verba, right? Okay. So this is a distinction you could say between the work of Thomas, like the the Summa Theologiae, the Summa Contra Gentiles, or the Compendium of Theology, even the Catechetical Instructions, right? And then the exposition of the Gospel of Matthew, John, Saint Paul, and so on, right?

[4:21] Okay. Thomas, of course, teaches both, right? And in teaching either, Thomas is what praised, right? Okay. Now, in the rest of his first page, I go to him as a teacher of res, and then in the second page, as a teacher of what verba. Okay. Now, the Second Vatican Council states this about Thomas as a teacher of things when the dogmas of our faith are taught. In the teaching of dogmatic theology, the Council proposed this order of learning, and this is from the decree the Institutione Sacerdotali, about instruction of priests and so on, and about studiis ecclesiasticis record, right?

[5:11] Okay. And it says three things here. Dogmatic theology should be so ordered or disposed that first these biblical themes are proposed first, right? Okay. Then, what the fathers of the Orient, the Eastern right church, and the Western right, ad singulas revelationis veritatis. Notice the word "singulas, right? It's kind of an ad hoc character to the what fathers of the church because a heretic has denied this article of the faith, so now we're going to defend this article of the faith, singulas So it's important use the word "singulas" there.

[6:05] What they you know brought in to what faithfully transmitting right and unraveling right in the pianiis right that's the second thing you should do and the further history of dogma related to the general history of the church right the different councils and so on then the third thing it says huh this is the one that we're interested in as far as Thomas then he says to the mysteries of salvation right integre meaning as what as a whole right huh as opposed to what ad singulas revelationis veritatis right in the middle

[6:56] quantum fieri potest as much as possible right illustrando making them what bring them into the light right that work of what looking at these things as speculation right with Thomas as a teacher right

[7:19] to more intimately what penetrate these mysteries and also to learn their what connection yeah okay so he's saying in a sense to illumine as much as possible when should what take Thomas as a teacher huh and to penetrate more fully these mysteries and to see the order connection among them

[7:49] huh so I say according to English here three reasons are given here for looking at the mysteries of salvation with Thomas as a teacher first so the students might learn to cast light upon them as a whole as much as is what possible right secondly so they may learn to penetrate them more inwardly huh and third so that they may learn to see their what connection

[8:25] now in his encyclical on Sacred Scripture this is going to Thomas is one who docet verba right this is words in his encyclical on Sacred Scripture Pope Leo the Thirteenth praises Thomas in particular as a teacher of words when he discusses the contribution of the Scholastics to the study of the what Bible

[8:50] with the age of the Scholastics came fresh and welcome progress in the study of the Bible if you go back to this providentissimus Deus, it's kind of the first encyclical on scripture there that you have on the Vatican website, and there he speaks of the contribution of church fathers and the contribution of his scholastics and the contribution of the modern scholars and so on, right? And it gives you a kind of view of the whole that you don't have in the later ones.

[9:17] They want to deal more with contemporary problems and so on. So he says, with the age of the scholastics in the Middle Ages, there High Middle Ages came fresh and welcome progress in the study of the Bible. To them we owe, and the first thing he points out is the accurate and clear distinction, such as had not been given before, the various senses of the sacred words.

[9:41] So he distinguished between the sense of the letter, which shouldn't be translated what, literal sense. Why? I see Latin senses literalis, but some people translate that the literal sense. But then they would exclude from that the metaphors, right? By metaphors pertain to the sense of the letter. You say, the Lord is a rock, right? The sense is not that he is really a rock, but the sense is what the sacred author means by calling him a rock, right?

[10:13] He's strong support, stable support, and so on. Then you have the spiritual sense, right? Which, as you may recall from the beginning of question one, there the Summa distinguished into three senses. And

[10:30] then the assignment of the value of each sense in theology. The division of books into parts, so you know how Thomas has always divided these things up and showing the order, and the summaries of the various parts. I mentioned before how he divides the Gospel of Matthew into what three parts? Because Matthew says emphasizes humanity of Christ, and so he's represented by the man and the four figures.

[10:56] And as man, he came into this world. He proceeded through this world, and then he left this world. So he divided into those three parts. He subdivides and subdivides down.

[11:09] And the investigation of the objects of the writers, what what we call in Greek there the skopos, the demonstration of the connection of sentence with sentence and clause with clause, all of which is calculated to throw much light upon the more obscure passages of sacred value. So his illumination here, as well as in the healing. And he says the valuable work of the scholastics of Holy Scripture is seen in their theological treatises and in their scripture what commentaries.

[11:44] And in this respect, the greatest name among them all is Saint Thomas Aquinas. So I rest my case. The case of Thomas. We won't throw him out.

[12:14] I was reading Thomas on the on the virtue of hope. You know, very very interestingly, he says. And I got thinking about it a little bit. He says, "Hope has two objects,

[12:30] and one is eternal life. " Because by hope you're seeking eternal life to see God as He is, face to face, and you're seeking to do so by the help of God, right? Primarily.

[12:50] So those are the two objects, right, of hope. Well, you know, when we study theology, we say we talk about God in Himself, and God is the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end, right? But notice how faith, which is defended by theology, this kind of theology here, this is the science by which faith is engendered, nourished, strengthened, defended. How that prepares the way for hope, right?

[13:24] Because one of the objects of hope pertains to God as He's the what, the end of all things, but in a special way, the end of the rational creature. And the other object of hope that by His help pertains to Christ as He's the, I mean, to God as He's the what, beginning, right? And of course, He singles out later on His omnipotence and His mercy, especially in terms of His being the beginning, right?

[13:54] That He has the power. Notice how those things tie together, right? The connection between them is kind of marvelous to see. That by faith, you know, He's the Alpha and the Omega, and you see that as the Alpha and Omega, He's the object of hope, right? Which is the next theological virtue that comes out of that.

[14:24] But there, that's a text where he speaks of omnipotence and mercy. There, you see the. I always think of the connection between mercy and hope, right? You can see that in the hail, Holy Queen, too, right? Mother of Mercy, our life, first sweetness, and our hope, right? But the Mother of Mercy and hope—they go together those two very much so. I suppose Sister Faustina has something to say about that too, but I don't claim to be an expert on her.

[14:51] Okay, so up to the ninth one, right? Where the union of the two natures is the what? Greatest of unions, right? The ninth one proceeds thus. It seems that the union of the two natures is not the what? Greatest. Yeah. The most of all of all unions, right?

[15:21] For united, falls short in the notion of what unity from that which is one, right? For united is said by participation, one is said essentially.

[15:39] But in created things, something is said to be simply one, as is especially clear about the unity which is the beginning of number. Therefore, this union about which we speak is not the greatest what unity. What about the one that's beginning of the number? right? I've been in the science of numbers now, you know. What's the one at the beginning of numbers? Isn't that more one than this union here?

[16:08] Oh. Can get more one than one. Yeah. Yeah. Moreover, as regards those things, the more those things that are united are more distant, the less would seem to be their what union. But those things which are united according to this union, most of all are distant from each other, namely what divine nature, human nature, because they are what infinitely distant from each other. Therefore, this is the least of unions, right?

[16:47] Minima union. How can you unite things that are infinitely apart? I mean, if they're united, they must be barely united, right? String. Huh? By a string. Yeah. Definitely long string. Moreover, by union something becomes what one. But from the union of the soul and body in us, there comes about something one, both in person and nature. But from the union of the divine human nature, there comes something one only in what person, not not one nature there.

[17:29] Therefore, more is the union of the soul to the body than of the divine nature, human nature. The body and soul make up one nature, right? The divine nature, human nature. You mean two distinct natures. And thus the union about which we speak does not imply the greatest unity, right?

[18:00] Now, the fourth sed contra, there is a little strange. Thomas, will you reply to the sed contra But again, this is what Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity. That man is more in the son than the son in the what father. But the son is in the father by the unity of essence. Man is in the son by the union of incarnation. Therefore, more is the union of incarnation than the unity of the divine essence.

[18:32] Which nevertheless is the greatest of what unions. And as consequently, the union of the incarnation implies the greatest unity. I always went to the extreme a little bit, huh? Okay, go pause it back just a minute. Thomas's response: I answer it should be said that union implies the joining of some some things out of which one is formed in something one. Therefore, the union of incarnation can be taken in two ways: in one way on the side of those things which are joined, and another way on the side of that in which they are joined.

[19:28] And from this side, this union has a preeminence among other unions because the unity of the divine person, in which are united two natures, is what maxima

[19:46] but does not have preeminence from the side of those things which are what joined. So the human nature and the divine. nature remain distinct and infinitely apart, right? And someone says to Christ one day, "You know, you're good." he Says, "Why call me good? God alone is good, right? He's aware of the difference between himself as God and himself as what man. So they remained distinct; those two natures, and they even remained, you might say, infinitely what distinct, yeah, distance, right?

[20:31] But if you consider what united in in the one person, the Word, then this is the greatest of unions, huh? Is what union is more than the union of a what the unity of a divine what person, right?

[20:50] Yeah. Now this goes back somewhat to our understanding to what one is in regard to the first objection, right? Of course, Plato and and uh Avicenna got a little mixed up, right? They they mixed up the one that is the beginning of number with the one that is convertible with what being, huh? And that was the great distinction that Aristotle was the first to see in history.

[21:17] Most people since him have not been able to see that distinction, but Thomas was able to understand it with the help of Aristotle. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the unity of a divine person I'm not saying human person now the, unity of a divine person is greater than the what numerical unity, which is the beginning of what number. So, divine person is his unity is oneness is greater than that of the one, is the beginning of number, the unit, as we call it.

[22:01] For the unity of the divine person is a unity subsisting by itself, right? Not received in anything by partaking, for it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the notion of unity. And therefore, there does not belong to it the notion of a part, as to the numerical unity, which is a part of a what number, yeah, and which is partaken of in things what number, huh?

[22:39] And therefore, as regards the union incarnation, it proceeds on the numerical unity by reason of the unity of person, not, however, by reason of the what human nature. Which is not the unity of the divine person, but is united to what to it, huh?

[23:13] So he's saying that that one is not a number, right? Following on, saying one is a unit a part of a number? No, he's saying that the the one which is the beginning of number is not as much one as the divine person is one. huh?

[23:30] And the which you have to go back to the Prima Pars there and say that read the article again of the question on God being what one, right? Okay.

[23:49] And. But what does he mean then when he says the unit is a part of a number? Well, if you take one, it is convertible with being. One means what? Undivided being, right? Huh? Yeah. So to be most one, he says in the prima Pars, he had to be most being as well as most undivided. And so he points out that the divine person here is per se subsisting, right?

[24:18] He has more being than the what one that's the beginning of what number. In fact, a number, you know, is something that the number that the arithmetician at least considers is something that in a way exists fully only in the mind.

[24:48] But number is also an accident. of the same thing. Yeah. so that's B, right? Purse subsistence, as he says here. I say I can understand that more fully if you go back to the distinction that Aristotle first saw between the one that is the beginning of number and the one that's convertible with being.

[25:17] So being and one go together. So what is first in being is first in what unity? Thomas is talking about accidental being there. And how much being does

[25:47] White Geometry have? How much being does White Geometry have? Now, sometimes we try to say that white geometry hardly exists, right? Aristotle praises Plato for saying that sophistry is about non-being, right? It's about the accidental, right? And it hardly is, right? Now, am I a white geometry? Or am I someone who is white and is a geometer?

[26:34] There's something by which I am white, namely, certain color that my skin has. There's something by which I am a geometer, right? Namely, a certain science, or knowledge that I have. Is there anything by which I'm a white geometer?

[26:54] Is there anything called white geometry? Or color geometry, right? Is there such a thing? I'm using now. You probably get a special studies black geometry at Harvard.

[27:18] So, or can you say if I was not born a white geometer, right? Is there a way of becoming a white geometer? There's a way of becoming white, and there's a way of becoming a geometer, but there's no way of becoming a white geometer.

[27:39] So it hardly has any being, right? But if you look at it now from the point of view of oneness, of unity, right now, does the color white and the science of geometry somehow come together to make white geometry or to make a white geometer? Do we become one? Well, again, we say they're one only per accidens, because to be white and to be a geometer belong to the same man.

[28:17] That's why we say, right, a white geometer. But they don't really come together, my color and my geometry, to make anything, do they? So you can see, as a thing is in being, so is it in unity, right?

[28:38] So the first example of accidental being is when two things belong to the same thing, right? And they are said to be because they belong to the same thing. But that's also the first example, maybe, of accidental unity, right?

[29:03] Why my body and soul are more one than my color and geometry are, but the being that I have, in the union of my body and soul by being a man, is more being than the being I have as a white geometer. I am very much a man, but not much a white geometer. It could use anything. White geometer, is it? To be white is something. To be a geometer is something.

[29:40] But to be a white geometer, is that something? don't really come together, do they? So as the thing is in being, so is it in what unity, right? So the fact that the divine person is per se subsistence, right? Shows that it has being, right? In the way that the one which is the beginning of number does not have being.

[30:08] In fact, the one that is the beginning of number is kind of elusive. and you come right down to it. But the one that is beginning of number is found really in the category of quantity.

[30:26] Goes back to the division of the continuous, right? One straight line is one, right? It's not divided. And a point is very much one, but a point doesn't exist by itself.

[30:53] Sometimes I have a student in class who would question whether points exist, right? And the way you try to show that points exist in some way is that bodies don't go on forever. Therefore, there is a surface to a body, right?

[31:12] And surface doesn't go on forever. Therefore, there is an end to surface of line. That line doesn't go on forever. So there is an end, and it's end is a point. So in some way they exist, right? But the end of a line, can you cut it off?

[31:31] Can you cut a point off from a line? Can't. Any more? Can you cut off a line from this table or piece of paper? Can you cut off a line? If I try to cut, you know, down, you know, I can make it very, very, you know, depending upon my instrument, I can make it very thin, you know. But can I make cut off a line? Something has length but no width.

[31:57] Doesn't really exist by itself, right? So this one, in the sense of a point, which is like the one that's being of number, doesn't really subsist by itself, right? Doesn't have that being.

[32:18] Now the second objection Thomas sees some truth in it, right? That reason proceeds on the side of the things joined, right? Not on the side of the person whom is made the union.

[32:35] We call this union sometimes the hypostatic union. That means the union is in the hypostasis, in the person of the Word, right? So if you consider it on that side, then it's the greatest of unions, huh? Because the union of a divine person is that great, huh? But if you consider on the side of the things being joined, huh? Well, the human nature and the divine nature don't come together to to form what one nature or one thing, right?

[33:06] So, in that sense, it's not the greatest unions, right? But if you consider that in which they are united, that's the greatest unions. The third objection there about the what about the body and the soul? To the third, it should be said that the unity of a divine person is a greater unity than the unity of person and nature in us, and therefore the union of the incarnation is greater than the union of the soul and the body in us, huh?

[33:54] Because that which is objected, on the contrary, supposes something false. That greater is the what union of the incarnation than the unity of the divine person in the essence. It should be said to the authority of Augustine that human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much what less.

[34:27] But this man, in some way, is more in the Son than the Son of the Father, in so far as the same thing is what supposed in this that I say man is taken for Christ, and in this that I say the Son of God. This is the same what person, right? But there's not the same what suppositum of the Father and the Son. They're different what persons, right?

[35:01] Huh? So, in in incarnate word, there's only one person. In Father and Son, there's two persons. So, in one respect, there is what more union if you consider just that, right? Okay.

[35:32] But since the the Son is the same thing as the divine nature, and the divine nature is in the Father, right? Then the Son and the Father are more what one, right? Okay, even though there's two persons there.

[35:51] These objections make you you know talk about saying you're in this thing you're seeing their conviction, right? Because you got to think about the incarnation and the Trinity here, right? And the and the Unity in both, right? And which is greater, right? So is

[36:13] is he? I'm not clear on whether he's correcting Augustine or simply giving Augustine a benevolent interpretation. Well, he's saying you can say that in the incarnation there's more unity of person than there is in the Trinity. Because in the Trinity you got two persons or three persons. I mean, if you take the father and the son, you get three persons. But in the incarnation, only one person.

[36:40] If you look at it that way, then there's one is more than more one than two. Is that what Augustine was saying? That's the way Thomas understands it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, somebody as great as Augustine, you understand him in a way that makes sense. When I when I read that said comment this morning, I said that doesn't sound right. Yeah, yeah. But that's what Thomas is is in in a way that does expect, you know.

[37:10] You know, seeing Thomas's explanation of teaching on the part of the will, you know, is his willingness to read carefully, frequently, and with reverence or respect, right? The words of wiser than us And so he tries to read Augustine with great respect, right? He does the same thing with Aristotle. With Aristotle, right? When Aristotle is talking about God's knowledge, right? Some people misunderstand what he says, right?

[37:45] What Aristotle brings out is that God's knowledge must be a knowledge of God. It must be God that he knows, right? And some say, well, then Aristotle is saying that God knows only God, doesn't know us. Well, that's ridiculous, Aristotle would think that, right? And of course, there are at least two places, you know, where Aristotle criticizes Empedocles' position about knowing, right? Because Empedocles' position about knowing would make us know something God doesn't know.

[38:15] And Aristotle thinks that that's absurd. You know, that falls in Empedocles' position, right? And I mean, Empedocles is saying we know hate because we have hate in us, right? And then, because there's no hate in God, then God wouldn't know hate, and therefore we'd know something God didn't know. Aristotle thought that's absurd. So there's something wrong with his position, right? So Thomas, since Aristotle is talking about God knows chiefly and primarily, right?

[38:45] And so that's Aristotle trying to determine there, right? Not everything that God knows, what God knows, you know, chiefly fundamentally. And so he interprets Aristotle as meaning that, not meaning this is all that God knows, right? And I say that does fit in with the other texts of Aristotle, where he he. he uh. Says this about God, right? It would be absurd to say we know something God doesn't know.

[39:16] Saint Thomas isn't going to say, as Augustine in his retraction. So you'd say the union of the incarnation is a hypostatic union, a union of one person, right? Why the union of the Father and the Son is not the union of what one person. In that sense, the union is what more, right now. But Thomas says that it would be false to say that the father and the son are less one in the divine nature, right?

[40:07] Then the what two natures are the one person of the son, right? Doesn't make any sense, huh? Again, it goes back to the fact that the father and the son, compared to the divine nature, there's no real distinction. There's merely a distinction of what

[40:30] of reason between the father and the divine nature, right? We saw that in that comparative study, remember? Because God is altogether simple. So, but there's a real distinction between the father and the son, but between the father and the divine nature, there's only a distinction of reason.

[40:58] That's what got to be careful, you know, with the syllogism, right? In the second figure, we use the second figure syllogism a lot in theology, and all the second figures have negative conclusions, huh? And the way you get a negative conclusion is by affirming something of one thing that you deny of the other, right? And

[41:20] remember the the objection to saying that there's no distinction, real distinction between the father and the divine nature, the son and the divine nature, because something can be said of the divine nature that cannot be said of the Son, or vice versa. For. Example: You can say that the Son is generated, right? The divine nature is not generated. Therefore, the divine nature and the Son are not the same thing, right?

[41:54] Okay. Now, of course, Thomas says, well, if what is affirmed of one thing is denied of another, right? There must be a distinction between them, right? But it may be either a real distinction that they're two different things, or it may be that they are distinct in what reason, yeah. Okay, that's a very subtle thing, right? I got thinking, you know, being kind of crafty fellow here.

[42:28] I was going back to things I know in philosophy, but carrying back this distinction that Thomas makes there, right? And let me give an example, right? Is it good here? When you talk about the most universal things, huh?

[42:46] And one of the most universal things is being, right? Because being is said of Anything that is, can there be something that isn't a being? That would be contradiction in terms, right? Okay. But then you find out later on that good is also said of all, right? Okay. You say, well, how can that be? Because aren't there good things and bad things? Okay. So how can good be said of everything, right?

[43:21] See. But when you study these things more deeply, you find out that the bad is first of all a what? It's a privation. Yeah, it's a privation, or to use English word, lack, right? Now, what is a privation or a lack?

[43:44] Well, it's the non-being of something you're able to have and should have, right? So Augustine, you know, kind of exaggerates that and says, sin is nothing, and the man who sins becomes nothing. Okay, but it's not really nothing,

[44:08] but it's the non-being of something in a subject able to have. See, once you start to understand what the bad really is, then you realize how being and good are really what convertible, right? Now, when you study being, one of the the two main divisions of being are division of being according to the figure of predication, substance, quantity, quality, relation, and so on, and then being into act and what ability.

[44:45] And ability is, of course, for the sake of act. So act is better than ability, right? But ability is good because it's an ability for act.

[45:00] And so you begin to see how being, as such, is good. Act most of all but ability because it's relation to acting. While the lack of predation is something bad. Okay. Now, once you have this truth that being as such is good,

[45:33] now I'm going to syllogize that they're not the same, right? Okay. Because I'm going to find something that is said of one that would be denied of the other. Okay.

[45:49] What's the opposite of bad? So good is the opposite of bad. So being is not the opposite of bad, but being is the opposite of what? Yeah. So being is not the opposite of what? Bad. right? So therefore, being is not what Good. Well,

[46:31] I've never seen Thomas do this, but I'm kind of crafty here. And I'd say, well, the fact that something is affirmed of good that would be denied of being, right, shows that there is a distinction between being and good, right?

[46:54] Okay. But it doesn't tell you is a distinct, a real distinction, or a distinction of what reason, right? See. So in Thomas, you know, in the beginning of the day, De Veritate the question is disputata de veritate Thomas, following incidentally,

[47:22] he shows you how these most universal names, although they're what convertible, right? Um. Nevertheless, they're not synonyms, right? Have a different meaning, right? Okay. And the first meaning of good is the good is what all want, right? Okay. And when Thomas explains it, he goes back to what Aristotle points out in the De Anima that the soul, in some way is, all things, and because all things are in some way what Knowable, right, and desirable and so on, and you get the idea of true and good because of that.

[48:10] So good and being are not the same, but have exactly the same meaning, right? Being means what is, and the good means what is what desirable, right? Okay. So they differ in meaning, but they're not two different what things.

[48:32] And so the reason why you can affirm something of one and not of the other is because they differ in what meaning. Their meaning is not the same, but you're not bringing out a distinction in things. Up here, you find out that they mean the same thing, right? But Defined differently, right? Okay. I'm going to take something even more simple than that. Something something much more simple, right?

[49:02] Euclid, there when he talks about numbers, he calls by the likeness to geometry. He calls, or we call, I suppose, the factors two numbers that multiply each other, right? Make the number. We call those like take number twelve, let's say. Three and four would be what? The factors. Yeah, yeah. Well, Euclid calls them the sides of twelve. Yeah. That much nicer is. Okay. Okay. Now. So we

[49:40] say the number whose sides are three and four. Okay. It's the number whose product are 3 and 4 right? The number whose sides are three and four, and the number whose sides are two and six.

[50:17] So, is the number whose sides are three and four the number whose sides are two and six? Are they two different numbers? No. The same thing. The same number.

[50:31] But is there a difference between three and four and two and six? Yes. Yeah. Three and four are not two and six. Therefore, the number whose sides are three and four is not the number whose sides are two and six, right?

[50:49] In a way, yes. Because these ones here, the sides are even. These two sides even. Numbers. No. So they can't be the same number, right? Well, no, no. But what you have here,

[51:18] you have like a different definition almost, right? Or a different meaning, right? Three and four and two and six are not synonyms, are they? Okay. So two different definitions of the word of the same number, right?

[51:37] So something could be affirmed and denied of these two, right? This is a number whose sides are an odd and even number, and this is a number whose sides are not an odd and even number, but two even numbers. Or this is a number whose sides are two even numbers, and this is not a number whose sides are. Okay. So something can be affirmed one of these, but denied of the other, because there is a distinction in the definition, you might say, of these of these two, right?

[52:23] But there's no distinction of what. But these two numbers are being the same number, right? But defined or known differently, right? Yeah. Or, as like you said, you know, twelve inches and one foot or something, right? Same length, right? But known somewhat differently, right?

[53:00] And sometimes if I want to call it 12 inches. I'm going to, you know, want to cut it into the inch, inch things, you know.

[53:09] But it's easier to see right now than than good and what being right, or good and true, right? You might you might find out that being

[53:29] as such is what knowable, right? And Aristotle points out in the ninth book of wisdom that ability is knowable through act. Ability is knowable through the act, which is an ability. But act is knowable to itself. So if this is the most universal division of being into act and ability, so all being is what knowable.

[54:03] Now is being and knowable convertible? Well, we're saying every being is knowable. Is everything knowable being? Say, well, can I know nothing? Like we're talking about nothing before, right? I know something about nothing. Nothing is nothing. Nothing is not something.

[54:25] But I have to give nothing some being, make it a being a reason, right? In order to what make statements about it, right? So being and being and knowable are really convertible.

[54:44] Can't know much about nothing. That's because it's not much being, right? It's being only a reason, right? Isn't it? It's sometimes strange, you know, but you go back to the early Greeks, and they all had this idea: can't get something from nothing, right? And they all mean something by the word "some" by the word "nothing" when they say that, don't they? But not in the same that's not a contradiction.

[55:12] You mean something by the word nothing? Well, nothing is something, a reason, but not something outside the reason, right? Reason takes as if it were something, right?

[55:26] Okay, so being as such is knowable. Being and knowable are convertible, right? Can just said to be convertible when you can say every A is B and every B is A, right? That's a bit of the magic. Okay, now but now I'm going to syllogize that being and knowable are not the same, right? I say, well, knowable is the opposite of what unknowable, right? Is being the opposite of unknowable So something they said, therefore, of the unknowable that is denied of being; therefore, they're not the same.

[56:10] There's some distinction, yeah. But is there a distinction of in things? Say, or is there a distinction of what? Reason. Well, we've shown before that you know being as such is knowable. they're not really different in reality.

[56:37] The same as being an knowable. but they are different in what? In in thought, huh? That's a very subtle thing, right? And it's easier to see, right? Not as easy to see as as a sphere, right? The number whose sides are three and four, and the number whose sides are two and six; those numbers are not different in reality, numbers, but they're different in thought, right? The thought is a little bit different, right?

[57:15] One case is known by three and four, and the other case is known by two and six. That's that's that's really great discovery, but it's a Aristotle and Thomas see the more difficult things, right? He realized that being and good are the same thing.

[57:35] Of course, you get to God, that's very important to you. God says, "I am who am," right? That's what he said, you know. But then Christ comes on and says, "Well, He alone is good," you know. Yeah, it's really the same thing you're talking about, but you have a little different thought about that, right? Huh? I'm

[57:57] really, you know, I'm very much a logician, you know. I know about the second figure of syllogism, and I'm constantly, you know, when we argue that God is unchanging, so on, we're affirming something of God that we deny of the changing or vice versa, right? And I'm so used to doing that, and then all of a sudden you see the guy trying to do the same thing with

[58:28] a person and the divine nature, you say, "Oh my gosh! We've shown that what? That the divine nature is not the person is not the divine nature, right? Because this person, the son is is generated, and the divine nature is not generated. But you know, think twice. Maybe it's possible that something can be affirmed and denied when there's only a distinction of what reason, huh? Say.

[59:01] Then you go back and say, "Hey, wouldn't I talked about even you know something less difficult, if you can say that? You're talking about God by Himself, you know, before you get to the Trinity, right? That's more difficult to understand. Say, well, is the divine mind and the divine will really two things?

[59:29] But can something be affirmed of one that's denied of the other? Is the divine mind free, really? Does the divine mind choose, or just the divine will chooses? Huh? So the divine will chooses, the divine mind does not choose. Therefore, the divine mind and the divine will are not the same. But. We show before that they must be the same, right?

[1:00:01] Well, how can something be affirmed to one and denied of the other if they're really the same thing? Yeah, distinction in thought, right? Why is there a distinction in thought? Well, because we start from creatures where they're really distinct things, right? And then you get a thought about a word, a thought about mind, and realize that mind and thought must somehow already be in God, right? But in God, they're one in a way we don't really understand, right?

[1:00:35] Well we understand that there must be one thing in God. So we have two thoughts about one thing. Actually, one and two thoughts. You know, that's kind of an amazing thing, though, right? To see that, right?

[1:00:50] You say, well, is it possible that our mind could have two thoughts with only one thing? Yeah, you can go back to syllogism right? You have two thoughts about twelve.

[1:01:04] Same thing. It's a little, it's easier to see, right? That you have two thoughts of the same number. The number whose sides are three and four, and whose sides are two and six. You know, Euclid has a a way of showing that sometimes a square number is a square number is a cube number. Okay. And it takes sixty-four, right? Sixty-four is what eight times eight. So it's a square number.

[1:01:34] It's also four times four times four. It's a cube number, right? Okay. While the number eight, let's say, is a cube number but not a square number. Number nine is a square number but not a cube number. So, but here sixty-four is both a square number and a cube number, right? But you got a different thought, right? It's kind of interesting to see that the same number can be both, right?

[1:01:57] But see, I have a different thought of sixty-four. I can look at sixty-four as a square number. I also look at it as a cube number. Which is it? Well, it's one and the same number.

[1:02:16] But to me, you know, you know, when we first define square number and cube number, right? They don't have the same definition, do they?

[1:02:32] See. And then you say, well, okay, now what is four? Well, it's a square number. And you take numbers something like that, right? And later on, you find out that the same number could be both. What? That's kind of amazing, right? See. But you know, I probably start with something simple. It's like you know, take four, which is two times two. Two is the first number, right?

[1:02:54] So four is the first what square number? What's the first cube number? Two times two times two. Yeah, eight. Eight. See, nine would be the second square number. What's the the the next cube number? Twenty-seven. Twenty-seven. Yeah. Okay. Um.

[1:03:19] And Euclid has a beautiful theorem, you know, that between any two square numbers, there's one mean proportional. He has another theorem that between any two cube numbers, there's two mean proportionals. Okay.

[1:03:35] Um. So between, like, say, eight and twenty-seven, you've got say, twelve, right? And eighteen. So eight is to twelve as twelve is to eighteen as eighteen is to twenty-seven on the ratio two to three. You say, well, gee whiz, if there's a number that is both what?

[1:03:57] Yeah. Or you had if you had two numbers, they were both square and cube, they'd have both one mean proportional and two mean proportionals. Amazing, right? You know, wonderful things. So, but first you think of these things as separately, right? The separate theorem that says, you know, the separate definition of cube and see. Now,

[1:04:24] when Euclid begins to talk about numbers, he defines odd number and even number, right? And he defines prime number and composite number, right? Do you think that an odd number ever even number? See. So the definition of odd and even numbers seems to be always in different numbers. And will prime number ever be composite? What's a composite number? Well, it's a number that's measured by some other number, right?

[1:05:00] See, one not being a number, right? Why the prime is measured only by one, right? It's not measured by any other number. So will prime number ever be a composite number? See. Okay. But then you you meet somewhere along here, you know, definition of a square number and definition of a cube number, right? Then you find out later on

[1:05:24] that it's possible that the same number would be both a square number and a cube number, right? See. But in the beginning, you have two definitions, and you see, but you know later on you realize that it's possible, you know. See why why four and and let's say eight. Four is just a square number. Eight is just a what, cube number. That's the way the creatures are, right?

[1:05:56] They're just kind of a comparison, right? Why God is like the what? He's both a square and a cube, you know. I mean, I mean, you see what I mean? And and you say, well, this is it. Lumps like every comparison. I mean, it's a little bit like that, right? You see, you know, we we take up man, the human soul, and this is the gateway to studying God and the angels, right?

[1:06:25] But in man, the understanding, the will, each has their definition, and they're two different things to define each other, right? See, and then later on we realize that there's mind and will in God. that must be, but then, or maybe it's the same thing, right? Kind of hard to understand, but kind of prepares for if you study these numbers like I've done, you see.

[1:06:59] Yeah. No, but you got to be kind of broken into these things, right? The thing thing that struck me when us when Euclid ends up the first book there, you know, Pythagorean theorem, right? But then after he studies proportions in in book five, and it goes back to the things, then he shows that any you know regular rectilineal figure, like a pentagon, you have a pentagon, right?

[1:07:31] On on the hypotenuse of the right angle, right? And the pentagon's another two, so those two will be equal to the pentagon on the side opposite the right angle, and the same thing, you have a hexagon. It's a regular figure, right? And it's like the squares, regular figure, you know, the sides are all equal, right? You realize the power he's got in there, you know, you see.

[1:07:58] But when you get into dialectic and you get into philosophy, you see these proportions. You know, we dominate understanding things. Appreciate it. I'm going to take off here anyway. I usually try to stick my windows when I come on Thursday this this week, though, so I get a rush.