Tertia Pars
12. Grace Natural to Christ, the Assuming Person, and 'Simply' vs. 'In Some Way' (ST III, Q.2 a.12 – Q.3 aa.1–2)
Class of 2008-10-23
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/012-grace-natural-to-christ-the-assuming-person-and-simply-vs/

[0:00] The second question here. To the twelfth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the grace of union was not natural to the man Christ.

[0:19] For the union of the incarnation was not made in the nature, but in the what? Person. Hypostatic union, as they call it, right? But each thing is denominated from its limit or end.

[0:40] Therefore, that grace ought to more be called personal than what natural, right? Moreover, grace is divided against nature, as the gratuitous things which are from God are distinguished against the natural things which are from an intrinsic what? Beginning.

[1:14] But of those things which are divided as opposites, one is not denominated from the other, right? Therefore, the grace of Christ is not what natural to him.

[1:33] Moreover, that is said to be natural; that is according to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to Christ according to the divine nature, because in that case it would belong also to the other persons. Nor is it natural also according to him according to the human nature, because then it would belong to all men, right? Who are the same nature with them. Therefore, it seems that in no way is the grace of union natural to Christ.

[2:10] One one can see, it's got to be some distinctions about what nature is and what's considered to be natural. But against this is what the great Augustine says in the Enchiridion of Faith, Hope, and Charity, that in the reception or taking on of human nature, in a way, that grace becomes what natural to that man, right? In whom no sin can can find entrance, can can be admitted.

[2:49] Now Thomas says, "I answer, it should be said that according to the philosopher." he's always dragging in that pagan Aristotle. In the fifth book of Wisdom, there fifth book after the books in natural philosophy. Nature, in one way, is said to be what birth itself, right? In another way, the essence of a thing. Now Thomas Theres, as I mentioned before, is taking the first sense of nature and the last sense of nature that Aristotle gives there, right?

[3:19] Okay. Those ones there, important here. When something can be called natural in two ways, right? In one way, only from the essential principles of the thing, as it is natural to fire to be carried upwards, huh? In another way, that is said to be natural to man that he has from his birth, huh? According to that of Ephesians chapter two verse 3. Let's say reading Church right now.

[3:58] The Ephesians, we were by nature, huh, by birth, that is to say, right, the sons of anger of wrath, huh? Original sin. Okay, in Wisdom chapter twelve verse ten, huh? Bad is the birth of them, right, and natural their what? Malice, huh? Okay.

[4:24] So after that distinction, huh, we're now going to consider this question. The grace, therefore, of Christ, whether of the what union to the divine person or the habitual one, right, cannot be called natural as caused by the principles of human nature in him, right?

[4:51] Although it can be called natural as what coming to be in the human nature of Christ by the divine what being caused by the divine nature, yeah,

[5:08] huh? Ah, but it is called natural both grace in Christ in so far as he has it from what his birth, huh? Because from the beginning of his conception, human nature was joined to the divine person, and his soul was filled with the gift of what grace, huh?

[5:38] So we could say in some way, Christ is naturally holy, right? See, not in the sense that you it follows from what the intrinsic principles of human nature, right? But from his very what birth, whereby he's joined, huh, to the divine person, and therefore he has both the grace of union and the. but habitual grace, right? That would be due to human nature when joined to the divine person.

[6:11] Now, to the first objection, which says that the union of the incarnation was not made in the nature but in the person. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although that's true, Thomas says that the union was not made in the nature. It was nevertheless caused from the power of the divine nature, which is true to the nature of Christ,

[6:38] and it also belongs to Christ from the beginning of his what. Nativity, right? So he's saying it's not natural to Christ, um, in the sense that it that it what follows from the principles of his human nature, right? It is natural in terms of his other nature, because he has two natures, as you know, his divine nature, right, to be filled with grace, and it's natural from his what his birth, right, whereby he's what joined to the divine person.

[7:25] The second objection is saying now we got a contradiction here, right? We got to avoid that. To the second, it should be said that it's not by the same that is it is said to be by grace and to be natural, right? But it is said to be grace in so far as it is not from what merit, huh? But it's natural in so far as it is from the power of the divine nature, in the humanity of Christ from his what birth.

[8:05] Now the third objection. To the third, it should be said that the grace of union is not natural to Christ, according to his human nature, as if it were caused from the what principles of human nature. And therefore, it is not necessary that it belonged to what all men. But it was nevertheless natural to him according to his human nature on account of what was private, huh?

[8:39] In his very nativity, huh? In so far as he was conceived from the Holy Spirit, right? That he might be what the same one, the natural what, son of God and of man, right.

[9:02] According to his divine nature, it was natural to him. Insofar as the divine nature is the active beginning of this grace, and this belongs, of course, to the whole Trinity, to be the active what principle of this grace.

[9:28] So we could chance go on into another article. Yeah, yeah. Okay, sure. So question three, right? Then one ought to consider, he says in the premium here, about the union, from the side of the person what assuming it, and about this eight things are asked.

[9:55] First of all, whether it belongs to a divine person to what. Assume whether it belongs to the divine nature. Whether nature is able to assume if we abstract from it its personality. He's getting really, really. I want to penetrate these things, you know.

[10:30] Father Boulet used to be very good about talking about mental indigestion, right? Or see, put it more grossly, you know, mental constipation, right? Can't digest the thing.

[10:50] Whether one person is able to assume without another, right? That better be so. We're going to be in in some heresy, I think. Whether any person, right,

[11:06] would be able to assume, right, huh? And whether many persons would be able to assume one nature number. That's really almost as bad as how many angels dancing there.

[11:25] Seven. Whether one person would be able to assume two natures and number. Now the most interesting one. We got to go through all those before we get to the eighth one. This is an interesting one. Whether it was more suitable for the person of the Son that he assumed human nature than the.

[11:48] I think Thomas is going to defend that the Father could assume and the Holy Spirit too. So, was there some reason why it was more suitable that the Son assumed this?

[12:00] That should be interesting. We've got to go through these other ones. I'll be off the grandchildren before we get through them. There's lady wisdom, there, right? One of the English translations there has some handwritten notes, and then I'll say for each article, for each question, say yes, no, then some of these, probably this whole one here, it says skip. What was the abbreviated course?

[12:39] See, it should be more like you know. I've understood some things here, and something I don't understand. But next time I go through, I'll understand a little bit more and understand a little bit more. Now I was thinking of that beautiful likeness I was giving you earlier there to Nate from the impotencia, right? Yeah.

[12:59] Now you don't want to press the likeness too much, there, right? But if you take Thomas says the the substance of the power of generating right and the substance of the power of creating they're the same power right the divine the divine essence is this power right

[13:26] but he says if you consider the acts right the generating of the Son and the creation then you can see a certain order among these and you'd say that the generating of the Son is before the what creating right and you kind of see that you know authoritatively at least from Saint John's Gospel because he talks about the what the word and then he says and all things are what made through the word right so in some sense

[14:04] the divine power has to what generate the Son before it creates okay because in some sense it creates through the word right through the divine wisdom and power well it's something like this right if you go back to the encyclical on the Eucharist there of Paul VI, and he says he's explaining at one point why it is that when a council defines some mystery of the faith this definition is good for all time

[14:42] and the reason that Paul VI gives in the encyclical on the Eucharist there is that the mysteries of faith are defined by thoughts that belong to a universal necessary experience what we sometimes call common experience

[15:05] so just take a very simple example if the church says God has no parts well that's going to be good for all time right because everybody's going to understand whole and part

[15:19] so there's a certain priority of what comes from reason naturally before the faith in that the thoughts that we naturally have are used to express the mysteries of the what faith yeah so therefore the order is is proportional to the order of the divine what power to generate and the divine power to create which if you consider the substance he says these power there's no order because it's the same same same same thing but if you consider the order of the acts right then the the giving birth to the word right Is before right creation because nothing was made without the word and so on.

[16:12] And it kind of casts a little bit light upon that letter that Boulay used to bring up from Augustine, you know, where somebody asked him, you know, is any opposition between reason and faith? And Augustine says, "Well, it can't be because we're capable of faith because we have reason. So how can it be opposed? " We can kind of see this, right? You know, in terms of what you naturally understand and faith, there can't be any opposition because faith uses what you naturally what understand to express the the statements of faith.

[16:50] Okay, so now we're back here to the first article, right? For the first one proceeds thus: It seems that it's not suitable to a divine person to assume a what created nature.

[17:08] For a divine person signifies something most what perfect, maxi-me-perfectum. and the perfect is that to which no addition can be what made. I was reading the compendium of theology of Thomas there. I like reading you know between going back to the if I go back to so conjugates and he actually shows that God is infinite before he takes up the perfection of God right and then he takes up perfection of God and so on and then he actually takes up that there's no accidents in God right and you know you and I we need all kinds of accidents like I need the science of geometry to have a little perfection to me right I need the virtue of justice and so on to have another

[18:03] perfection to me and so on so but if God's substance is infinitely perfect you couldn't add any perfection to it so how is there can't be any accidents added to God huh kind of interesting huh that's kind of reminded us by what he's saying here perfect is that to which one can make no addition

[18:25] or somebody as Einstein said about some piece of Mozart so well written you know you couldn't improve on it the reason he gave was that perfection is imperfectable. You know you've heard that conversation between Mozart and the emperor right the emperor you know found Mozart's music a little bit too difficult you know and he says too many notes Mozart he said Mozart said just as many as I need it.

[19:05] Since, therefore, to assume is as were to take to oneself, right? It seems that what is taken up is added to the one taking it up, right?

[19:23] Therefore, it seems that it does not belong to divine person to take on what. Now, of course, his taking on human nature is not in any way perfecting God, is it? But it's doing something for human nature, that's for sure. We'll see how Thomas answers. I don't want to anticipate the the master here, huh?

[19:48] Because no one no one remembers that emperor's name. Just just to add an additional. Moreover, that to which Something is assumed, huh? Is in a way communicated to that, huh?

[20:10] There's assumed to it, right? Just as dignity is communicated to the one who is taken into somewhat dignity, huh? So if the prince marries the Cinderella, right? She takes on certain dignity, right? That she didn't have before, before zero here. But of the notion of a person, that it be incommunicable.

[20:36] That's one of the definitions of person, remember? As is said in the first part. Therefore, it doesn't belong to divine person to take on something, but just to take something to itself, huh? That's Richard's, I think, definition. Yeah, yeah. How does he count, please? Moreover, a person is constituted through its what nature, right?

[21:09] But it is unsuitable that the what one constituting take on the what constituted, huh? Because the effect doesn't act on its what cause. Therefore, it is not suitable for person to assume a nature.

[21:32] Against this is what Augustine says in the book on faith to what Peter, right? That the form that is the nature of the slave, right? God took into himself, right?

[21:49] The only, the only born, right? Person. But the only born God is a person. Therefore, suitable for person to take on a nature, which is to assume.

[22:05] So what's he going to say to this, huh? I answer. It should be said that in the word of assumption, right? Two things are implied. To wit, the beginning of the act, right? And the term for to assume is said as a word to take to oneself what something. Can kind of explain what the word means. Now, of this assumption, the person is both the beginning and the what end.

[22:41] The beginning, because it belongs to the person properly to what act, right? But this taking of flesh, to speak. synecdochically was made or done through the divine action, right?

[23:07] Likewise, also the person is the end or term of this what taking, just as as we said above that the union was made in the person, not in the what nature. And thus it is clear that most properly does belong to the person to assume what the nature, right?

[23:32] Can you go too many? Well, in a sense, Thomas doesn't seem by the article to be so much applying a reason why it's suitable for the person to do this, right? But he's simply saying that what does assumption mean, right? It means to what take to oneself, right? And therefore, there's a certain activity there, taking something, right? And there's a limit to whom that thing is taken, right?

[24:07] And he says, well, since a person is the one who acts, right, then it makes sense to say that a person assumes as far as the beginning. Okay. And because, as we learned before, that the union was made not in the nature, yeah, but in the person, okay, then he's suitably the term of this, right? Yeah, sure. Okay. But doesn't fully get to the idea: was it suitable to do such a thing, right?

[24:39] This may now come up in in in the in some of the objections here, applied to objections, right? But the first objection is saying it's not suitable because you can't perfect is imperfectible. You can't add anything to this, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that since a divine person is infinite, then no addition can be made. What to it, huh? Whence Cyril says in the synodal letter, right, the Council of Ephesus, that's an official letter, right?

[25:18] Um, we do not understand, right, the the mode or the way of union being according to a what addition, right? Made of the conjunction, whatever that means.

[25:40] Just as in the union of man to God, which is through the grace of adoption, there is not added anything to God, but that which is divine is what apponitur, huh?

[25:58] Is applied to what? Probably the best way of translating a poniter would be placed towards man or something. How does your English translation have that right there? Into the first,

[26:15] second last sentence. How do they translate a ponendo? But that which is divine is what to man. That which is divine is united to man here. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. Nice to have like lay two or lay. Yeah, yeah. That word is actually positum, which means placed, right? And placed two, right? It's kind of funny to speak of God being placed to, right? Maybe we would say applied.

[26:38] Whence not God but man is what perfected, right? Yeah, you might say that what something is given to human nature there, namely what subsistence, divine subsistence, right? Subsistence in a what divine person, right? But nothing is really added to what to God.

[27:05] He's not perfected anyway. That other word up there in Cyril's letter, coaposition, that verse, there was some kind of comparison. I looked up on a dictionary.

[27:19] Whatever that means. It's not like marriage there, where where your spouse is supposed to be your better part, right? So each gets something, you know. Each one is being completed by the other. But this is not, you know, that the divine nature or God is in any way being completed by this activity, right? But there is some completion, some perfection being given to human nature because it's been assumed in the divine person, right?

[27:53] Okay. So Thomas is not denying the premise that says nothing can be added to God's perfection, right? But he says in the incarnation, nothing God is being in no way perfected by this, right? But human nature is being perfected.

[28:16] It's being drawn to a subsistence that is a much greater subsistence than that that the ordinary human being has, right? The second objection is saying, "Well, person is something individual, something that cannot be communicated, right? "

[28:35] It says to the second, it should be said that a person is said to be incommunicable in so far as he is not able to be said of many what posita.

[28:49] But nothing prevents many things from being said of the person, right? Look at this person. You can say I'm a geometer, I'm white. Yep, grandfather. Yes.

[29:02] Once, it is not against the notion of a person to be thus what communicated that it subsists in many what natures, because also in a created person many natures can run together accidentally, right? As in the person of this man is found both quantity and quality.

[29:29] But this is private, unique, you might say, to the divine person, which, on account of its what infinity, it can what that can come to be in it a running together of two natures, right? Not in an accidental way, like the stories are saying, but by subsistence, right? So, the same person. Subsists in two what natures, right? The divine, the human nature. Something infinite about this divine person.

[30:09] Go on assuming as many natures as you want it to. It may not be simple to go on assuming this? When you say a person is constituted by nature. Well, you have to see a distinction there, huh? In Christ, huh? Because the person of Christ is constituted only by the divine nature, right? Simply, if it's constituted by the human nature, it's only as a human being, but not simply.

[30:43] To the third, it should be said that the human nature does not constitute the divine person simply. But it constitutes it only according as it is what denominated by such a nature. For the Son of God does not have in human nature that he be simply right, since he was a existence right being from eternity, but only that he be what a man. But according to the divine nature, the divine person is constituted simply.

[31:22] Whence the divine person is not said to assume divine nature, but only what human. So there is that distinction again: as simply and what not simply. Simply, Sometimes Latin they'll say some feature there and say "cum quid," but that's a very important distinction in philosophy.

[31:45] You know the fundamental distinctions of being, which is rather universal. Being according to the figures of predication: substance, quantity, quality, and the other accidents, and then being according to act and ability. Right, that is a distinction of simply and what not simply. So,

[32:09] am I in this room? Am I in my house? No. So simply, you'd say I'm in this room, but not in my house. But I'm able to be in my house. See, so in some qualified sense, I'm in my house. But that's ability, right? Huh?

[32:34] You're in your wife's in your wife's heart. That's not merely an ability. See. This is "not the question Is the cum quid or not simply? Is that the same as accidentally or not? It sounds like it's not. No, no, it's a different distinction, right? But they're somewhat similar, right? But they're different distinctions. Okay, so.

[33:07] So, so being an act is being simply, being an ability is what, not simply, but qualified, right? Okay. You know, are there chairs in this room? Okay. Are there chairs in the trees out there? Potentially. Yeah. You wouldn't say simply though, without qualification. You'd say there are chairs in ability, right? We have to qualify, right? So the distinction between being an act and being an ability is also a distinction of that kind to be called simply and not what simply, right?

[33:49] Okay. Now, same when you take substantial being and accidental being, right? When I came here today, did I come to be? Yeah. You came to be here. Yeah, I came to be in this room, right? I didn't come to be, period, right? So, but when I was generated or conceived, then I came to be. See. And you know, I used to always take the example in class.

[34:20] They said, you know, if I say to the student, "Now, if you leave this room, you will cease to be." That sounds like a threat, doesn't it?

[34:36] Now, if they take me to court and I say to the judge, "Now, all I meant when I said that if you leave, you'll cease to be, I meant you'll cease to be in the room." So I know it understands that, like you say, right? So it's only, as far as I know, in a qualified sense, secundum quid, that I'll cease to be if I leave this room.

[35:02] Otherwise, I wouldn't be. You'll be here next week. Yeah. So, so those, those are very fundamental distinctions between being in a sense of substance and being in a sense of accident, right? And then this other division of being an act and being an ability, but both of them are a distinction of what what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some qualified way, right?

[35:33] I mentioned how in the ninth book of Wisdom, Aristotle asks the question after he's gone through act and ability, which is before, right, in time and so on. And he says, "Well, the thing that goes from ability to act, it's an ability before it's an act. But something goes from ability to act by reason of something already in act." So simply act is before ability, and that's why the first cause, the first being, is going to be pure act.

[36:10] As you find out in the twelfth book, three books later. But you know the early Greeks and the modern scientists, they all think that matter is the beginning of all things, and so they're thinking that what is in some way before is before simply. So they're making the fundamental mistake about the first cause, and it's the second kind of mistake outside of speech, but the mistake for mixing up what is so simply and what is so not simply.

[36:44] Now this beautiful dialogue of Plato I mentioned that comes up that kind of mistake, and in the Meno, right? And but the Meno is really an introduction to logic, though, and Meno makes an objection, sophistical objection. That it's impossible to investigate what you don't know. How can you direct your thinking to what you don't know? You're directed to. If that objection was good, there'd be no logic, and there'd be no reason to pay anybody to do research or any sort.

[37:19] Somebody's trying to find the find the cause of cancer or something, right? Because he doesn't know he's looking for. That's why you pay someone you don't know he's looking for.

[37:31] And and Socrates tries to reply to this objection, right? And he makes the same kind of mistake. I don't know if that's intentional Plato's part, or he's really something is Plato. But Aristotle, you know, refers back to the Meno in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, right? And it's a mistake of simply and not simply,

[38:00] because what you don't know, you can know in some way. And so, by knowing what you don't know in some way, you can direct yourself to what you don't know.

[38:17] But then Socrates, you know, he makes a different mistake, because he says that the slave boy knows how to double a square. Because in his conversation with the slave boy, the way to double a square comes out of the slave boy's answers. What does that mean that the slave boy? No, I'm doing this Euclid, and I come to a theorem and I say, "I wonder how he's going to prove that?

[38:42] " You know? And it can be proved by things I know already, but I just too stupid to put these together, right? Yeah. And then my master, my teacher there, Euclid puts them together and say, "Oh yeah, see. " So did I know that theorem when I first looked at it? You know. I was I was able to know it. I was able to know it from the things I knew already, right?

[39:06] But I didn't really know it. I said, "Let's not really know it simply, right?" So Socrates is saying that the slave boy is just recalling something he already knew. Well, no. See, in fact, when he first asked him how you double a square, and he said you double the side, well, that'll give you a square four times as big. So not only does he not know how to double a square in the beginning of the conversation, but he's actually mistaken as to how to do this, right?

[39:35] But he he was able to know it from the things he knows, right? But Socrates, you know, by asking the right questions, helps him to put together things he knows. So Socrates is really teaching him, although he denies he's teaching, right? And I'm not really teaching you something if if my words just make you recall something you already know. So there, at the beginning of philosophy and logic, and then at the end here, when you are trying to find the first cause, you have the same kind of mistake being made, right?

[40:12] But but it runs to the whole philosophy. You know, I used to always tell the students, and talking about ethics and so on, that all day long we're making this mistake, right? Because you are doing something bad because, in some ways, good. Or we're not doing something good because, in some way, it's bad, right? So if you are tired on Sunday morning, we got to go to mass.

[40:37] You know, he's going to prevent you from sleeping longer, right? So in some way, going to mass is bad, right? And you know, if you annoy me, I kill you. You know, well, in some ways, good to kill you because it gets rid of an annoyance in my life. You know, so in a sense, you are making this mistake all day long. And

[41:06] so it runs through all of our thinking. This kind of mistake. But but again, you know, corresponding mistake is this kind of distinction, and that underlies these these things here.

[41:21] He's making that distinction, wasn't he? There at the end. huh? In the third reply to the objection that human nature, human nature of Christ, does not constitute the divine person simply, right?

[41:38] But it does constitute it secundum quid quad, right? According as is denominated such a nature, right? So so the second person of the Blessed Trinity cannot be said to be through his human nature. But you can say through his human nature he can be a man, right? He can be in some way. Okay.

[42:14] You know, in the beginning of of of wisdom, there you know Aristotle when he's describing the wise man and wisdom, he says the wise man knows all things in some way.

[42:28] And you know, because later on he says that wisdom is the knowledge of God, right? The knowledge which God alone would have, or God most of all, right? Well, what's the difference between man knowing all things and God knowing all things? We know them intentionally I mean in some way Yeah. In a sense we know what is said of all things, right? So everything is something. So knowing something in a way, I know what.

[43:02] All things, right? But in a very perfect way. And that's to know all things. secundum quid not simply. But God knows all things? What? Simply. I always used to pick on some young lady there in class, and I'd say, "Now, I'm going to have her. She's going to contradict herself. You know, watch and she'll contradict herself. " And I say to her, "Now, do you know my brother Mark?

[43:29] " And she always answers, "No. " So I asked her what she said. She doesn't know my brother Mark. I said, "Now, you know what a brother is, yeah? You know what a man is, yeah? Okay. " That's what my brother Mark is. So you didn't know my brother Mark? You said you didn't know him. Well, she really contradicted herself. No, just simply, we'd say she doesn't know my brother Mark.

[43:50] But knowing what a man is or what a brother is, in some way she knows my brother Mark. She knows every man in the world, every brother, right? In some way. But that's an imperfect way, obviously, of knowing every man and every brother in the world, right? But in some way you do know them, right? So that's important to see in what way the wise man knows all things, right?

[44:16] Not simply, but perfectly, but in some way he knows them, right? I always have some wise guy in my class say, "I don't go home to my father. I know everything, you know. " First and foremost, he just convinced me I know everything. Yeah, that professor. That professor, yeah. But you know, but in a sense, you know, in the joke, you know, and maybe the father and the son, they're not seeing the distinction I'm trying to get across, huh?

[44:50] You got this horrible thing going on out there called abortion, right? Okay. But if somebody chooses abortion it's because they're in a, they want to continue their job and want to continue their schooling or they want to, you know, have pleasure without responsibility and so on, right? But something that is is simply bad is in some way what good, yeah. So

[45:19] just like my killing the guy who annoys me, right? Or you stand in the way for my promotion, right? If you're out of the way, I'll get your position, right? So eliminating you in some way is what. It's a good thing. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I was reading a story there by Washington Irving, and this one guy got involved with the Indian there and gave arsenic, right? And the Indian used it, you know, to assert his authority over the tribe because if someone challenged him, he says, "Okay, you'll be probably dead in a few days, " and sure enough, the guy died.

[45:56] He must have an appointment, you know. So, yeah. That's the quote from Chester. And I was like, if a man could shoot his mother-in-law at forty paces between the eyes, I'd say he was a good shot. but I wouldn't say he was a good man Good someone. Get paid for one more article here, or what? Yeah, yes. Article for two here. The second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that it does not belong to divine nature to assume, right?

[46:38] Because as has been said, to assume is said as a word to take to oneself, right? But the divine nature did not take to itself human nature, because the union was not made in the nature, right? But in the person. Therefore, it does not belong to the divine nature to assume human nature. That seems to be correct and orthodox. right? So the town's going to take the other side.

[47:06] What's wrong with this guy? Okay. Moreover, the divine nature is common to the three persons. If, therefore, it belonged to nature to assume, it would follow that it belongs to the what? Three persons. And thus, the Father would assume human nature just as Son, which is erroneous, to say the least. Moreover, to assume is to act, but to act belongs to a person, not to the nature.

[47:38] The nature might be that by which you act, right? But the person acts, which is more signified as a principle by which the agent acts. Therefore, to assume does not belong to the nature, right?

[47:53] But against this is Augustine. That's what Augustine says in the book on Faith to Peter. That nature which always, right, remains what begotten from the Father. That is which is taken from the Father through eternal generation. That received or took on, right? Our nature without sin. Dick is Augustine's case. What the heck is it just in these guys. They're really in trouble. I think they're never going to get out of it.

[48:27] Never going to get out this time. I says answer. It should be said that as has been said in the word of assumption to things it signified, to wit, the beginning of the action, huh? What is acting? He might say, right? And the term or end of it to which something is assumed.

[48:56] Now, to be the beginning of assumption belongs to the divine nature secundum seipsum, right? According to itself, in the sense that what? Because by its power the assumption was what made, huh? But to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the divine nature, right? According to itself, but by reason of the person in which it is what considered, and therefore first and most properly,

[49:36] a person is said to assume right, but some secondary way it can be said that what the nature assumes a nature to its what person right. That's kind of

[49:55] can be careful carefulness with speaking it seems to me. And according to this also, the nature is said to be what. Incarnation. Yeah. Not as it were conversed or changed into flesh, right? But because it assumes the what nature of flesh, whence Damascene says, "We say that the nature of God was made incarnate according to the blessed what Athanasius and Cyril." So there's some some tradition here of this way of speaking, huh?

[50:42] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the pronouns say right is reciprocal, right, and refers back to the same one, right? It refers to the same what suppositum, huh? Now the divine nature does not differ in supposito from the person of the Word, and therefore, in so far as the divine nature takes human nature to the person of the Word, it is said to take it to itself, right?

[51:18] Because it but person and nature are the same. But although the Father assumes human nature to the person of the Word, not on account of this does it take it to Himself, because there's not the same what suppositum of the Father and the Word, and therefore it cannot be said properly that the Father assumes what human nature, right?

[51:59] So he's saying in some way the the divine nature, insofar as it's the same as the what person of the Son, right, takes the what human nature to itself, right? Okay, be careful that though what you're saying there.

[52:20] Because taking it to itself, insofar as it's the person of the Son, not as nature. To the second, second objection is saying, "Well, the divine nature is common to the three persons. If therefore it belongs to the nature to assume, it will belong to the three persons, right? To the second, it should be said that what belongs to the divine nature secundum se, by itself or in itself, belongs to the three persons as such things as goodness and wisdom and other things of this sort.

[53:03] But to assume, right, belongs to it by reason of the person of the what word, and therefore it belongs only to that what person. Now, this looks like the distinction we were talking about earlier. There, that what is the the power of generating the Son, right?

[53:25] Is that the divine substance, or is that the relation that constitutes the Father? Well, you see, every agent makes what is like itself, right? So, if the power of generating was the relation that constitutes the Father, then we'd be making another Father. Yeah, that's not so, right? Interesting. So, what what he's generating is is someone who's God, right? Oh, yeah. Okay. But He's generating the same God that he is himself, right?

[54:00] Okay. So, but nevertheless, you can't say because the Son didn't generate, he's just the power of generating. So, when Thomas finally says, "What is the power of generating? " It's the divine nature, insofar as it's in the Father. So it's not.

[54:23] It is not. Yeah, it involves both, right? Yeah. Okay. And I told you about that one text that Thomas. it's in this. It's in the sentences I can find. I pull it out a special place I can find the whole. But you know, because the persons and the divine nature are the same thing, right? You can signify the divine nature

[54:51] by itself, or the person by itself, or you can what combine the two in some way, right? Okay. And it seems you're doing something like that here, right?

[55:10] You say the divine nature takes to itself the human nature, but the divine nature, insofar as it's in the what. Person of the what? Of the Son.

[55:25] Okay, so he's making a distinction. To the second, it should be said that that which belongs the divine nature secundum se belongs to all three persons, right? As goodness, wisdom, and things of this sort. But with the potentia generandi, get that in my mind. So when you read that, is the power of generating, the power of giving birth, does that belong to divine nature secundum se? No No.

[55:52] And now, Thomas is saying something similar here, right? But to assume belongs to divine nature by reason of the person of the what word, right? And therefore, it belongs only to that what person, right? Of course, he's speaking here of the fact of the incarnation, not in terms of the possibility that the Father could, yes, the Holy Spirit could, yeah, But in terms of what it was actually done.

[56:18] Now, the third objection is saying, "Well, to act belongs to a person, right? Not to nature. Nature is more that by which you act, right? To the third, therefore, it should be said that just as in God the same is what is and that by which it is, right? Does that mean say you know that God is what the good is also goodness, right? Okay. So also in Him is the same both what acts and that by which it acts, because each thing acts insofar as it is a being.

[56:53] Hence, the divine nature is both that by which God acts and is also God Himself acting. Phil, just be careful. Thank you. Thank you. Even that.