Tertia Pars
13. Summa III, Q.3, Arts. 3–6: Assuming a Nature Without Personality, the Son Alone Incarnate, Whether Father or Spirit Could Assume Flesh, and Three Persons in One Human Nature
Class of 2008-10-30
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/013-summa-iii-q-3-arts-3-6-assuming-a-nature-without-personality/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and the Son, and, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightened guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand all truth. The Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So I guess we're up to Article three here. Question 3. The third one proceeds thus: It seems that abstracting personality from God, personality by the understanding, that nature is not able to what?

[0:49] Assume, right? Okay. For it has been said that it belongs to the nature to assume by reason of the what? Person. But what belongs to something by reason of another, the other is removed, cannot belong to it. Just as body, which is visible by reason of color, cannot be seen without color. Therefore, taking away personality by your understanding, the nature is not able to what? Assume, right?

[1:35] Moreover, the word assumption implies the term of the union, huh? Take to oneself, huh? But the union cannot come about in the nature, but only in the person.

[1:51] Therefore, taking away the personality, the divine nature is not able to what? Assume. Okay. Moreover, in the first part, it has been said that in divine things, abstracting the personality, nothing what remains, huh?

[2:13] But assuming is something, and therefore taking away the personality, one is not able. The divine nature is not able to what? Assume. Yeah. Now against this, it is that in divine things, personality is said to be a personal property, which is threefold, huh? These are the ones that constitute persons: fatherhood, procession, which is the one that we use for the Holy Spirit for want of a name, and sonhood, right?

[2:58] As has been said in the first part. But taking these away by understanding, there still remains the what omnipotence of God, through which the incarnation was made. As the angel says, Luke 1. 37, I think it's a text where you are talking about the incarnation. There is not impossible before God in a word, right? I think it doesn't involve a contradiction. Therefore, it seems that even removing the personality, the divine nature is able to assume.

[3:39] Now, Thomas is going to talk about how our mind can be. can consider God without the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and then God would be what still individual, right? And therefore, a person he could be able to what assume, right? So we could talk about this even to Aristotle, who knows nothing about the Trinity, or maybe to a Jewish person who doesn't understand the Trinity either.

[4:05] I answer: It should be said that the understanding has itself in two ways to divine things. In one way, as knowing God as He is,

[4:21] and thus it is impossible that something have a line drawn around it, huh? By the understanding that something else would what remain. Now, if you see God as He is, you can't make any separation, right? Because the whole that is in God is one, save the distinction of persons,

[4:45] of which if one were taken away, the other would be taken away, because they are distinguished only by relations, which is necessary to be hama simo together, right? Aristotle said. In another way, our intellect has itself to divine things, not as it were, knowing God as He is, but knowing God through its own way of knowing,

[5:12] which is to know in a multiple way, in a divided way, that which in God is what one. And in this way, our understanding can understand the goodness and the wisdom, the divine wisdom and the divine goodness, and other things of this sort, which are called what essential attributes. Not understanding what the Fatherhood or the Sonhood, which are said to be what personalities. You saw the sum here, right?

[5:47] because it took up the what unity of God, the divine what goodness among other things, the divine wisdom, before he took up the Trinity, right?

[6:00] So it's not knowing God as He is, but in our way of knowing, we can have that separation. And according to this, or in this way,

[6:19] abstracting personality by one's understanding, we're able still to what understand the nature as what assuming, okay? But we understand the nature as what the way of a person, okay?

[6:39] That's what he says when he applied to the first objection, huh? But the first objection is saying that it belongs to the nature to assume by reason of the what person, right? Huh?

[6:56] To the first, therefore, it should be said because in God the same is that by which something is and what it is, huh? Or another way of putting that, in God the same is what you have, what you are, okay?

[7:18] Therefore, whatever is attributed to God in the abstract, considered by itself, other things being what cut off, will be something what subsisting, huh? And consequently, a person, huh? So, if Aristotle thought about God. knowing nothing of the Trinity, you'd think of God as what subsisting, right? And therefore, as being what person,

[7:46] since he is in what intellectual nature, which is what, yeah. Just therefore, as now laying down the personal properties in God, we see there are three persons, right? So, excluding these by the understanding, excluding these personal properties by the understanding, there remains in our consideration the divine nature as something that subsists and therefore as a what person, huh? So the Jew would think of God if he didn't know anything about the Trinity.

[8:21] He would think of God as a what person, right? Aristotle did the same, the old pagan, there, right? Okay. And in this way, can be understood that he assumes human nature by reason of his subsistence or by reason of his what personality, right? He'd still be drawing him to his what himself as a person rather than what making one nature out of his nature and the human nature, right?

[8:50] He'd be drawing it to himself as a person. The second objection: Assumption implies the term union. He says, but the union cannot be made in the nature, but only in the what? Person. Therefore, abstracting personality, the divine nature is not able to assume. And Thomas says, to the second, it should be said that even what? Cutting off, right? By the understanding, the personalities of the three persons, right?

[9:30] They would remain in the understanding, the one personality of what? God, as the Jews understand, right? You could add as Aristotle understands too. Um, to which, and maybe maybe Averroes right? And the son will understand, right? To which could be terminated the assumption, right? Just as we now say it's terminated to the person of the what? Word, huh? Moreover in the first part, it has been said that in God, abstracting a personality, nothing remains.

[10:12] But assuming is something, and therefore abstracting personality, the divine nature cannot assume. To the third, it should be said that abstracting personality by the understanding, nothing is said to remain by way of resolution, as if something else is what. So, the relation, and that other is a what? Relation itself, huh? Because whatever is considered in God is considered as a what?

[10:52] Yeah, supposito. But something of those things which are said of God can be understood without another, not by way of what resolution, but in the way already said, huh? And that goes back to part of the article.

[11:18] Sometimes Thomas, you know, says that there are there's two kinds of abstraction you can make in God. In our mind, there, huh? And he compares the two kinds of abstraction we make to things. So what can I separate from all you guys here?

[11:39] Yeah, I can say what separate the common, right? Common from the particular right, particular, right? And so when I consider God, leaving aside the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it's like this, right? But now there's another one where I might say, well, let's take away from you something, right, huh? And let's start by taking away your your color, right, huh? Okay. And then let's take away your what?

[12:23] Your your soul, right, huh? Now you just got your your body, your matter left, right? Now let's take away your matter, and then what? Nothing left, right? Okay. So this is kind of taking away the what? The form all the way down to its most fundamental. So in that case, you look at the person as underlying everything else, right? If you take away the personality, then what?

[12:50] Nothing is left, right? So you take away my my personality, and My knowledge of geometry and my humanity; those other things are what are lost, right? Okay. So I think in this case, here you are talking about kind of separating the common, the human, the divine nature, which is common to the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and though it's common to them in a different way than human nature, common to you guys, right?

[13:20] Because you don't have one in number human nature, right? T here is some similarity there, right? And so, to some extent, you can just like understand man without any one of you. So we can understand the divine nature to some extent, right? Without understanding the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, the Aristotle and Averroes and the Jews and so on, right, could understand something about the divine nature, right?

[13:47] And then they would see the divine nature as something subsisting, right, and therefore as a person that could assume, right. Okay Yeah he speaks of the two kinds of abstraction so the first one is common from the particular, and the second. is Yeah, he speaks of taking away what the form from the matter, right? Oh. And then going down to the fundamental subject, right? You take that away, and you have nothing left, right?

[14:25] So we think of God as being three persons subsisting in this one nature, right? You take the persons, and then everything's gone, right, in that way. But in this other kind of separation of the common from the particular, it seems you can consider the divine nature without the what.

[14:42] Yeah, yeah. For some reason, it just seems like the same. What's the distinction between the two, as far as Thomas concerned? Well, if you look at the at the persons as what, as the ultimate subject, right, and

[15:05] which everything else is. Like we sometimes might say, the divine nature is found in each of the three persons. Something, but not exactly like the way human nature is found in each of us. The difference being, of course, that it's one and the same individual divine nature that's in the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. While you and I, it's not one in number, right? But there was a certain similarity there, right?

[15:42] So if I think of human nature as existing in in you in these persons here, right, then if I take away these persons, right, that's underlining everything. Everything's gone, right?

[15:59] But if I separate out what you have in common, I can consider that without your individual differences, and that way something remains in my mind when I leave out your,

[16:13] yeah. If I leave out the rock as black and the Cain as white, still I still have man there, right? Huh? Okay. But if you consider the fact that man can exist only as black man or white man or yellow man, take away black man, white man, yellow man, there's no man left, right? Yeah. So sometimes you'll speak, you know, if you take away the persons, nothing remains, right?

[16:40] And sometimes he'll say oh, common nature remains, huh? So it's kind of a subtle thing that he's doing. Not making the distinction as explicit here, but I think you could.

[16:59] Okay. Now the. Fourth article: Whether one person is able to assume a created nature with another one not assuming, right? To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that one person is not able to assume a created nature without another one assuming it. Unless you really follow-up here. Theology is that, So right. For undivided are the works of the Trinity, as Augustine says.

[17:39] So, just as there is one essence of the three persons, so there is one what? Operation. But to assume is it's an operation. Therefore, it cannot belong to one divine person without belonging to another, right?

[18:01] So, you convinced by that? Mm-hmm. Wonderful. So, what the heck is that Frick was teaching these guys We have it on tape. We have it recorded. Yeah. We can submit it to the Holy See. Moreover, just as we say that the person of the Son was incarnate, right? So also the what?

[18:28] The nature. For as, Damascene says in the third book, huh? The whole divine nature in what? One of its hypostases, huh? Was made incarnate, right?

[18:46] But the common nature, but the nature is common to the three persons, right? Therefore, the assumption. So that's kind of interesting. that Damascene seems to be saying that you can say what? That the whole divine nature was incarnate. What does that mean, right? Didn't we do that before? Yeah.

[19:16] Moreover, as human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so also men by grace are assumed by Him, huh? According to that of Romans fourteen, verse three, God assumed Him, right, huh? But this assumption commonly belongs to what? All the persons. Therefore, the what? First ones, right? So God takes you to Himself. It's all three persons taking you to.

[19:58] But against this is what Dionysius says in the second chapter of the Divine Names that the mystery of the incarnation is said to belong to discrete theology, huh? I was just teaching the these guys come to my house on Wednesday night. There, you know, we have the chapter on quantity there in the categories and the fundamental distinction in quantities called discrete quantity, like number, and then continuous quantity, like a line or a surface or a body, right?

[20:27] Huh? This belongs to discrete theology. huh Yeah, And Louis de Broglie's got a what a book on discrete and continuous in modern physics, right?

[20:43] So it belongs to discrete theology, according to which something distinct is said of the what three persons. Now Thomas is going to solve this by pointing out that there's two things, right? In assumption, I answered should be said that as has been said. Assumption implies two things, right? One is the act of assuming, right? And the other is the what term of assumption, right? Okay.

[21:26] It's like if you say that assuming is what taking something to yourself. Now the act of assuming, the taking, proceeds from the divine power, which is common to the what three persons, huh? But the term of the assumption is what a person. as has been said, and therefore that which is of action in the assumption is common to the three persons, huh? But that which pertains to the notion of the what term belongs to one person that does not belong what to the others, right?

[22:18] For the three persons made it right that the human nature would be united to the one person of the what. son? that solves the problem, right? Simple enough, right? That works.

[22:39] So when it says in Scripture, you know, that the Holy Spirit overshadowed the Blessed Virgin, right? There, you seem to be attributed to Holy Spirit, but that is what? What is the way of speaking? It's appropriation. Yeah, it's appropriation, right? It's not as if the Holy Spirit did this alone, right? Huh?

[23:03] But because it what it's a work of God's love and mercy, and these are appropriated to the Holy Spirit by reason of His way of proceeding, then it's appropriated. We saw that little study of appropriation there in that text of the Trinity, right? And on the creed he said but even God the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.

[23:35] What did the Father alone create, and not the Son and the Holy Spirit? So it's interesting now, even in these very formal things like the Creed, right? It's a profession of our faith. You have what appropriation, right?

[24:03] Okay, so the taking of human nature from the Blessed Virgin, right? Huh? And drawing it then—that's an activity common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, although appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Just like creation is an activity common to the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, but may be appropriated to the Father because of His personal property, right? Okay. But the term, but, but,

[24:34] to whom this nature is taken is just the what one person, huh? So you apply it to the first objection then, where it says undivided are the works of the Trinity.

[24:49] To the first, therefore, should be said that that argument proceeds on the side of what the operation, the activity, and the conclusion that you have in the argument would follow. If what it implied only that operation, right? Without the term, which is the person, right?

[25:22] Now the second one. What about this incarnate nature, right? The nature is said to be incarnate, just as what. It's also said to be. Assuming, by reason of the person to whom the union is what terminated, right? Not over, in so far as it is common to the what the persons.

[25:52] For the whole what divine nature, right, is said to be incarnate, not because it is what. Incarnate in all three persons, in all persons, but because nothing is lacking of the perfection of divine nature to the person who is incarnate, It's the divine nature there in the Eucharist

[26:34] A little bit like this, huh? This way of speaking. Now the third objection was taken from our being drawn to God, right? To the third, it should be said that the assumption, which is by the grace of adoption, right,

[26:55] terminates at a certain partaking of the divine nature by an assimilation or likening to what? His goodness. According to that text we were referring to last week, here Second Peter one four, right? That we might be what partakers, right, of the divine nature,

[27:20] and therefore an assumption of this kind is common to the person, both on the side of the what? principle, the cause of the operation, right, and on the side of the what? Term, right. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the side of the beginning, the maker of it, right, not over on the side of the what? Term.

[27:56] That's a nice little comparison there between. Let's do it. Now, could some other divine person assume human nature besides the person of the Son? We'll find out. You must have asked, yes, because the last one is going to be whether it was more suitable for the Son to become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Spirit, right? But you expect you're going to answer that they could, right?

[28:32] Yeah. To the fifth, one proceeds thus: It seems that no other divine person is able to assume human nature besides the person of the Son.

[28:53] Not you learn some catechism, the question often catechism in Europe. White catechism. See here, you learned well. Not even the Baltimore catechism, which I had in my time.

[29:11] Well, through this the first objection, through this assumption, right? It was brought about that God is the what Son of Man. But it is unsuitable to be a Son that this belonged to the Father or the Holy Spirit, right? For this would turn into a confusion of the divine persons.

[29:35] Therefore, the Father and the Holy Spirit are not able to assume what flesh, huh? Speaking by synecdoche Oh, I mean, assume flesh, yeah. But if they were and were called, therefore the Son of Man would be the Son of Man, not the Son of God.

[30:08] Moreover, by the divine incarnation, men have what reached the adoption of sons, according to that of Romans eight fifteen. You have not received the spirit of slavery again in fear, but the spirit of the adoption of sons, huh? But adoptive sonhood is a partaking, huh, a likeness partaking of the natural sonhood of Christ, huh? Which does not belong either to the Father or to the Holy Spirit.

[30:47] Whence it is said, Romans eight twenty nine, whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his what Son. Therefore, it seems that no other person. Could be made incarnate beside the person of the what, Son. huh It's a very interesting objection.

[31:18] I was just seeing a a uh objection I don't know if I'll go up here or not but another work I think if I saw it was argued against the incarnation of just the Son because we should love the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit equally. And if the Son became man and not the Father and the Holy Spirit, then we have what more reason to love the Son than the Father?

[31:46] Suppose if you love the Son, since he has the fullness of divine nature, then you love the other person as well without necessarily realizing. Yeah, But Thomas says you have another reason to love him, right? Yeah. But not a reason to love him more.

[32:05] Because each of these divine persons is infinitely good, right? Can't be, can't love them more. Thomas can go a long ways with this infinity of God.

[32:20] I was looking pretty far, yeah, pretty far. I was looking at the the compendium of theology there, kind of reading it, It's kind of nice to read. it. And sometimes he gives an argument, you know that you don't have in the Summas but usually they're you know some ones you have there. But he was asking

[32:44] whether God produced the world naturally or by will, right? And he gives three arguments in this one little chapter in the compendium. And the first argument kind of is based on something he's just shown in some of the earlier chapters that God created the angels, he created matter and so on, right? And so there was a diversity in what he's made. but nature is determined to one.

[33:09] So if he's producing this naturally, he produces just one. Okay, here's that argument. And then he has a second argument where he says, "Well, nature acts for an end, and this presupposes a mind that knows an end and the person that thinks of the end. " So those arguments I've seen before, right? The third argument he gives is that God's power is infinite. So he

[33:35] wouldn't have produced anything in particular, right? Unless his will had what determined he's going to use his power for this rather than for what. Yeah, right. It's kind of interesting what he argued from the. Kind of surprised me. I saw it. I remember seeing an argument in the in the sumas. But it's kind of interesting argument. You can savor Thomas's arguments, you know. Like a good piece of candy or something.

[34:00] Oh yeah, all day suckers we used to have in the old days. I remember this guy, a guy, four years older than me, but he's my brother Richard's class, and he kind of come down to give a lecture there, you know. And one day he'd get to talk at the college, and gee, I wish you had a guy kind of get to talk at that every day because then there's enough to think for the rest of the day.

[34:25] He's still talking, you know, enough to think about. That's why we little Thomas can go back and say, "Oh, gee, an hour later, what were those arguments, you know?" And your mind kind of comes back upon them and chews them.

[34:41] Don't they say in the Old Testament there was it? The animals that? Yeah, yeah, Ruminate, yeah. There's some symbolism there, yeah. The Augustine people say that. In Boethius talks about that, huh? You want the ruminating animals, right? That they're more sacred or more edible or something, right? But your mind's supposed to ruminate on these things. huh?

[35:04] Yeah. Or an ox. Yeah, It's like you said of those. those Hindus. He's well named, I guess. Yeah. yeah. In the, In the gospel this morning, there is they were. Was it the Pharisees warning Christ about Herod, right? And and and Christ kind of you know addresses some words to to be taken to Herod, right? But he calls him that fox. Yeah. What was it Machiavelli was up here on lion and the fox, and so on There Christ using that.

[35:50] Using that im image, you know, the king's got to be sometimes a fox and sometimes a lion, right? Sometimes he's got to be, you know, uses power in an open way like a lion. Other times he's got to be more crafty and you know, sneaky like a fox This is kind of a compliment in one way, you know, like you know the the unjust servant, you know, who's praised for for some cleverness, right, in this thing.

[36:23] Sons of this world are more prudent sometimes than the sons of the kingdom. Okay. Moreover, the son is said to be sent, right, and generated by a what? Temporal nativity, born of the Virgin Mary, according to which or by which he's made incarnate. But it doesn't belong to the Father to be sent, right? And one of his notions was innascibilis huh? Unbegotten. Therefore, at least the person of the Father cannot be.

[37:07] I like that, right? You see, okay. Again, you could argue that that his being unbirthable, right? Is taken what in his divine nature, right? Not in the other. But again, you kind of see see more appropriate to the Son to be incarnate than the other guys, other persons. But is that strictly speaking, you say that it's impossible for them? But against this, whatever the Son is able, the Father is able.

[37:36] Otherwise, there would not be the same power of the three. But the Son was able to be incarnate; therefore, likewise the Father and the Holy Spirit. The answer should be said that has been said that assumption implies two things. One is the act of assuming, the act of taking a sense. I guess assumenti assumens, assumption. it comes with the word to take, doesn't it? Sumerian, okay. And then the idea of act, right?

[38:12] So it has these two aspects of this, right? But the beginning of the act, the source of the act, is the divine power, right? And the limit is a what person? But the divine power, commonly and without difference, has itself to all the what persons, huh?

[38:39] And the same way, there's a common notion of what personality in the three persons, huh? One person is not more a person than the other, right? Even though their personal properties are what different, huh? Whenever, however, some power has itself indifferently, without difference towards many, right?

[39:04] It's able to what terminate or limit its action to what each of them, right? Just as in rational powers which have themselves to opposite, both of which they are able to what do. Thus, therefore, the divine power is able to unite a human nature either to the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit, as united it to the person of the Son. And therefore, it should be said that the Father or the Holy Spirit could have assumed flesh, just as the what Son, huh?

[39:45] It's just as much a person as he is, right? So it can be joined to their person. And there's something infant about the personality of these three. You know, they can be the you know have several natures there.

[40:03] Now the first objection is talking about the confusion there'd be in the persons. Well, maybe it would be the words, but the first, therefore, it should be said that temporal sonhood, right, by which Christ is said to be what the Son of Man, does not constitute his what person, as does his eternal sonhood, right? That is what is eternal personality, man. That's what is constant, right? But something following upon his temporal birth in time, right, is being born in the Blessed Virgin.

[40:42] Whence, if through this way the name of sonhood was transferred to the Father or Holy Spirit, there would not follow any what confusion of the divine persons. There might be confusion in our mind, but would not be what confusion of the divine persons because you wouldn't have two what. Suns by in in in the in the divinity, yeah. yeah, okay.

[41:11] Of course, God doesn't want to confuse us, but that's. Now, second one, the most interesting objection, the one here from the doctor. The second, it should be said, that adoptive sonhood, right, is a certain what, Partaking, partaking likeness of the natural son, right?

[41:41] It comes about in us, appropriately, from the father who is the beginning of natural what, sonhood, right? And also by the gift of the Holy Spirit, who is the love of the Father and the Son, right? According to that in Galatians four six, for God sent what, the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying Father.

[42:14] And therefore, just as the Son being made incarnate, we receive adoptive sonhood to the likeness of His what, natural sonhood, right? So, if the Father was incarnate, right, we would receive adoptive sonhood from Him as the beginning of natural sonhood, as the Father, when it gives rise to the Son, right?

[42:40] And from the Holy Spirit, as it were, from the common connection of the Father and the what, Son. So you do appropriate the Holy Spirit, you know, His becoming man, right? Activity, right? The Holy Spirit overshadowed the Blessed Virgin, right? Because it's

[43:07] similar along these lines, anyways, it makes me think of the in Isaiah, the Christ is foretold as being Father, Father forever, because He is the source in a certain way of our being begotten. So it's appropriating Him as Father, even as Isaiah, just as man, Isaiah said that. So in a similar way, I suppose you could understand these. Yeah, get to be a son through your father, right?

[43:42] Yeah, depending on the the person incarnate, you could understand. Yeah. Remember, some woman complaining about this term "illegitimate child," right? So when I was young, the much nicer name, love child.

[44:07] But there is love is being, you know, and then you say, well, that's the Holy Spirit, then, right? Huh? You know. Relucta, relucta. Okay.

[44:29] Now, to the third, third one is from the argument of the when the attributes of the Father is these unborn. To the third, it should be said that it belongs to the Father to be in nascibilem huh? Unbirthable, right? Ah, according to what? Eternal activity, which should not exclude the what temporal activity, huh?

[44:57] The Son is said to be what sent, according to incarnation, in that he is from what another, without which incarnation would not suffice for the notion of mission. Okay, but he's arguing, you know, whether you could say that the Father was sent if he became incarnate, right? But it could be said to be incarnate, and it could not be said to be what sent, right? Okay, because it takes on human nature.

[45:28] Makes sense. You can see how was it Sabellius who said that there's only one person, and he's called the what Son because he became man. Ah, you can

[45:58] see how the heretic might assume these things, right? His next two articles are kind of strange. You can see how Thomas said, it. Where the two Christians could assume one and the same. In number, of nature, right? And then the reverse, where the one person could assume what? More than one. nature? Yeah.

[46:36] It's kind of funny, huh? Because you know how you have this reverse situation in the mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of the Incarnation. The mystery of the Trinity, you have three persons in one nature, and then the mystery of the Incarnation, you have one person in two natures, right? And now we're kind of saying, well, could

[46:56] two of these persons, or even three of these persons, have one, one human nature together? And then could one person have two men? These are questions, you know, whether some of these possible, right? You know, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, sometimes you'll say, you know,

[47:31] you'll argue from Scripture. Did God become man, right? And some heretics deny this, and you'll take up their misuse of Scripture and so on and answer that, right? But then you'll show from Scripture that He did become man, right? But then you'll have another section where it talks about: Is it possible, though, for God to become man? And then there are arguments drawn from, you know, misuse of philosophy that seem to indicate this not possible.

[47:56] And then you'll have to answer those, right? And then, but is it suitable to become man? And that's still another question, right? Okay. So, and they're separate things, but here they're kind of, you know,

[48:13] the same question here, right? A little bit of both, because especially the last article would be on the suitability yeah, of the Son, right? But could the other ones have become? Okay.

[48:31] I can see how how the average guy would think, "What the heck are you asking such crazy questions for?" Right? Why does Thomas ask these questions, sir?

[48:52] Well, you you you learn more about what God is capable. of, but. You know more about, you know, what He can do. Yeah. Amen. Know His love more. Yeah. To the sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that two divine persons, are not able to assume one and the same nature and number, right? Thomas could take it aside.

[49:28] For supposing this, either they would be what one man or what many, but not many, because just as one divine nature in what many persons does not suffer for there to be many gods, right? So one human nature in many persons would not undergo many what? Yeah, many men.

[50:03] Likewise, they could not be one man because one man is what kind of this man, right? Which demonstrates one person, and thus they would be taken away the distinction of the divine persons, which is inconvenient.

[50:27] Therefore, two or three persons are not able to what assume one human nature. Moreover, assumption is terminated at the unity of the persons, as has been said. But there is not one person of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit. Therefore, three persons cannot assume what. Yeah.

[51:05] Moreover, Damascene says in the third book, and Augustine, in the first book about the Trinity, that from the incarnation of the Son of God it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is also said of the Son of Man, and conversely, so. So we can say that God died for us, huh? Okay. We can say this man is God.

[51:34] If therefore three persons assumed one human nature, it follows that what is said of each of these three persons would be said of that man, and conversely, what is said of that one man could be said of each of the what divine persons. Thus, therefore, what is proper to the Father, to wit, to generate the Son from eternity, would be said of that man, and consequently would be said of the Son of what God, which is not fitting, right?

[52:09] That's suitable, yeah. It doesn't come together, right? Doesn't hold up. We'd say in English, yeah, because it turns to inconvenience. Ah, just for the fun of it, it turns to inconvenience.

[52:35] Is not therefore possible that the three divine persons assume one human nature? Okay. I mean I know what Aristotle says in the third book about the soul, where he contrasts reason and the senses, huh? And they both know by undergoing, right? They both know by receiving, huh? But the senses receive in a body, the organ, right? And reason receives without a body, right? A material way, completely material way.

[53:12] And Thomas will point out, you know, how too large a sound will kind of what harm the ear and make it deaf or make it not able to hear for a while, right? And too bright a light will what make the eye not able to see for a while, huh? And you know, too sharp a hot hot Chinese food or something, you know, or hot Indian food or something like that, you can't taste anything afterwards, huh?

[53:43] Okay. Ah, we had some of that Chinese hot mustard in the house there, you know, just kind of nice and got it for a little bit of poo poo or something like that. Never give it enough, but for the fun of it, I was I was putting on a hot dog, you know.

[54:03] See, but Aristotle, when you consider something very understandable, like you know, the angels or gods or like that, one is not less apt to understand other things, huh? But one can understand them what better, right?

[54:19] I know the students out at Thomas Aquinas College, huh? Some things that you study in your freshman year seem very difficult to you, but then when you look back upon them and you get to the more difficult things and more understandable things later on, do they seem kind of what easy, you know? See, so the way in which the mind receives is different from the way the senses receive, huh?

[54:46] Well, in a sense, these articles like this, right, are really making you what understand lesser things better, right? You take your time in these things, right? Your mind's exercising these things. You turn back to things, oh, this thing's easy to understand now. huh? I'm reading the De Potencia again, they're kind of going through the articles there. you know. And something like ethics seems so simple, or you know, Or you could seem so simple, or something, you know.

[55:22] or logic seems so simple, you know. The first time you study those things, they seem very difficult, you know. To go into these more intelligible things, come back, right?

[55:50] Against this, huh? The sed contra I guess, yeah. right. But against this, the incarnate person subsists in two natures: the divine and the human. But three persons are able to subsist in one divine what nature, right? Therefore, they are able to subsist also in one what human nature. To wit, that there be one human nature assumed by the three what. That would be interesting, right? Yeah. The What personality.

[56:18] Well, yeah, it would be kind of an image of what takes place in Trinity, right? You know, three persons subsisting in one nature. You know, it's very hard for us to how there can be three persons but only one God. And the Mohammedans, you know, think we're polytheists. You know, then we slip back into the polytheism. You know, and they can't understand that. You'd have a hard time trying to explain to them.

[56:50] And so here you'd have what three persons in one nature? Why not? Who's going to try and talk at once. I mean, who's going to do the talking? Yeah. Well, you know, I often think, you know, of of God the Father and God the Son and God the Holy Spirit having only one will, right? And that's kind of unusual, right? And even among friends, you know, there's still usually a little bit of disagreement of will, a little bit of clash in us, right?

[57:29] And it's kind of hard to understand they could have one will. Would you want to have one will with another human being? I mean. Some of you always agrees with me.

[57:44] That's the answer. That's the answer. Yeah. But if you and and the other guy had one will, you'd always be in agreement, right? Because there wouldn't be any could be possibly conflict, right? Uh. But um. I could have used the will. I mean, one person could use the will to will one thing, and the other person is not willing. could they? Because if if the three persons didn't assume one human nature, would it be possible that you know the person of the Father says uses the human nature to say something where the Son and the Holy Spirit aren't using the human nature?

[58:30] You see, it's hard to. Because there's one operation. There's one will. Right. So all three persons. Whenever the human nature did anything, you would have to give the three persons Or, I think, you know, just like the divinity. It's kind of amazing to think of God in His divine will, because He is free, you know, in regard to creatures, right? And yet there's not going to be a free act of the Father.

[58:55] There's not a free choosing. Father, you know. It's not going to be like the gods of Olympus there in Homer, you know, where where where Zeus wants one thing and his wife wants something else. You know. One guy wants one guy wants that. You know. We sometimes do that, and we create these imaginations, like God the Father wants to punish, and God the Son is intervening.

[59:23] Of course. Let's see what Thomas does with this in the body of the article. Is the answer? It should be said that it has been said above, from the union of the soul and the body in Christ, right? That has not come to be either a new person or a what? Hypostasis. I'm using the Greek and the Latin names. But there comes about one assumed nature in the person or divine hypostasis,

[1:00:06] which does not come about through the power of human nature, right, or of the human nature, but through the power of the divine what? Person.

[1:00:20] But such is the condition of the divine persons that one of them does not exclude another from communion in the same nature, but only from communion of the same what? Person.

[1:00:45] Because, therefore, in the mystery of the incarnation, the whole reason for what has been done is the power of the one doing it, right? As Augustine says in his epistle to Volusianum, which I'm sure you're acquainted with.

[1:01:02] By the way, I just like to go to these letters on Augustine, and try to understand things in them. More about this should be judged by the condition of the person assuming than by the condition of the human nature assumed, right? Thus, therefore,

[1:01:28] it is not impossible for the divine persons that two or three of them assume what? One human nature. It seems to be arguing from the fact that what they're doing the Trinity, right? Okay.

[1:01:46] It would be never never less impossible that they assume one hypostasis or one human person, right? Huh? But that's that would be heretical anyway. right? You'd have to call it a condition. as Anselm says in the book on the Virginal Conception, that many persons cannot assume one in the same what? Man. Man,

[1:02:12] And by man there he means person. Yeah. It would seem strange to have two persons of the Trinity assumed one human nature. Then it seems to me it be one or three, not two. Why would be two? Yeah, yeah, that's question. But I mean, it would be possible, maybe. No, possible. You know, it's strange.

[1:02:43] But then I suppose you could say two of them are sent. Yeah, yeah. It is the Trinity there, you know, where you say the the power of generating the Son is the divine nature in so far as it's in the Father, right? The power of breathing the Holy Spirit is the same as the divine nature, but divine nature is it's in the Father and the the Son, as if there was beginning, right?

[1:03:11] Yeah, these odd things where they come together, two of them and Albert. Um, to the first, therefore, it should be said that this being positive, right? That the three persons assumed one human nature, right? It would be true to say that the three persons are what one man on account of the one in number, right? Human nature, right? Just as now it is true to say that they are one God and not three gods on account of the one in number, right?

[1:03:58] Divine nature, right? Nor does the one there imply a unity of what person, but the unity in the what human nature, right? One would not be able to argue from the fact that the three persons are one man that they would be one what simpliciter in that distinction, right?

[1:04:33] For nothing prevents one to say that men who are many simply are one as regards something, right? Like one people, right? One family. Okay, as Augustine says in the sixth book of the Trinity,

[1:04:54] diverse by nature, right? The spirit of man and the spirit of God, but by adhering they become one spirit, right? According to that of one Corinthians six verse seventeen, who adheres to God is one spirit with him, right? But that one simply is it.

[1:05:25] So Thomas seems to be arguing from the fact that the three persons can subsist in one divine nature; that they could also, what, one human nature?

[1:05:39] Don't be into personal problems, you might. We'd hope that the harmony that they have in the. What's your favorite ice cream? Oh no. Split personality, yeah, Literally split personality.