Tertia Pars
14. Summa III, Q.3, Arts. 7–8: One Person in Two Human Natures, the Fallacy of the Accident, Marx on Making, and Why the Son Became Incarnate
Class of 2008-10-30
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/014-summa-iii-q-3-arts-7-8-one-person-in-two-human-natures-the/

[0:00] Now the second objection says assumption termination. Here now in Article Seven, whether one divine person can assume two human natures, right? To the seventh, one proceeds thus: It seems that one divine person is not able to assume two what human natures, huh?

[0:25] For the nature assumed in the mystery of the incarnation does not have any other suppositum, any other underlying, apart from that of the divine person. If, therefore, it be laid down to be one divine person assuming two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species, which would seem to imply a contradiction. For the nature of one species, for

[1:00] the nature of one species is now multiplied except by the distinction of the what? Suppositum. yeah. But we are taking account of the divine person. There's something maybe infinite about the divine person, huh?

[1:16] Moreover, this supposition being made, it could not be said that that divine person incarnate was one man, because he would not have one what human nature. Likewise, it could not be said that there were many men, many men, because many men are distinct in what suppositum, and there there would be only one suppositum. Therefore, the fourth addition is altogether impossible.

[1:48] Moreover, in the mystery of the incarnation, the whole divine nature is united to the whole nature assumed, that is, to each part of it. For Christ is perfect God and perfect man, holy God and holy man, as Damascene says in the third book. But the two human natures are not able to be totally what united to each other, because it's necessary that the soul of one of them was united to the body of the other, and also that two bodies would be together, which would induce a confusion of natures.

[2:25] Therefore, it is not possible that the divine person would assume two human natures. But against this is whatever the Father is able to do, the Son can do. But the Father, after the incarnation of the Son, could assume a human nature other number from that which the Son assumed. But in no way, for the incarnation of the Son, is diminished the power of the Father or the Son.

[2:53] Therefore, it seems that the Son, after the incarnation, could assume another human nature besides that which he assumed, huh? Well, what the time is going to say to this now? Got himself into this mess. I don't know where to get himself out. I answer: It should be said that that which is possible in one and not in more has a power limited to that what one. But the power of a divine person is infinite.

[3:29] Nor can it be limited to anything created. Whence it should not be said that a divine person so assumes one human nature that he cannot what assume another.

[3:50] For it would seem from this to follow that the personality of the divine nature was so what comprehended through the one human nature that to his personality another one could not be assumed,

[4:09] which is impossible. That's why it's impossible, he says. For something uncreated cannot be what surrounded by, comprehended by a created. It is clear, therefore, that if whether we consider the divine person according to its power, which is the beginning of the union, right, or according to its personality, which is the term of union, right, it is necessary to say that the divine person, apart from human nature which is assumed, is able to assume a what another human nature, another number, right?

[4:47] Okay. Um, so that both his power is infinite and his personality is infinite, right? So it can't be any limit. We can assume three if you want, two or four, right?

[5:10] Okay. So again, the first objection, man, just trying to maintain that there's a contradiction there, right? Because there would be one suppositum of two natures, right, of the same species. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the created nature is perfected in its definition through its form, which is multiplied according to the division of what matter. Matter is the source of individuation, right, in material things.

[5:51] And therefore, if the composition of form and matter constituted a new suppositum, right, it would follow that the nature is multiplied according to the multiplication of what suppositum. But in the mystery of incarnation. The union of the form and the matter, that is, of the soul and the body, does not constitute a new what, suppositum, as has been said above, right? And it goes back to understanding of what the incarnation was, right?

[6:23] He didn't assume a human person, but he assumed a human, individual human nature into his person. And therefore, there can be a multitude, a number on the side of nature, on account of division, matter, without there being a distinction of what, yeah. Or be assumed by the divine person. If they had their own suppositum, right, then they would have to be, like the objection says, right? There

[7:04] would be one man or many men. This is the objection, right? It can't be one man because because we'd not have one human nature, right? Similarly, it couldn't be many because many men are distinct and suppositary.

[7:34] The second should be said that it can be seen that the foresaid position being done, it would follow that there were two men, right, on account of the two what, individual natures, yeah. Without this, that there would be two supposita.

[7:57] Just as conversely, the three persons would be said to be one man, right? This is the previous article, yes. On account of the one human nature assumed, as has been said above, right?

[8:16] Just like there one God, right? But this does not seem to be what true, because names should be used according as what they are to signifying that they're imposed to be to signify, right? Which is from the consideration of those things which are among us, and therefore it's necessary about the way of signifying and consignifying to consider those things which are among us.

[8:54] In which never right, a name imposed from some form is imposed in a plural way, except on account of plurality or what suppositum. For a man who is clothed in two garments is not said to be what clothed twice, right? But one man clothed by two what vestments, and who has two qualities is said singularly to be thus according to two qualities.

[9:34] Now the nature assumed to some extent, very very carefully because you want to get into the heresy there, right? Has itself in the manner of a what garment, although this is this likeness is not to be taken in regard to all things, otherwise you get heresy, right? And therefore, if the divine person assumed two human natures on account of the unity of the suppositum. it's at the unity of the person, but there's not one person of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit.

[10:09] And Thomas says, to the second, it should be said that that position being made, human nature would be assumed in the unity not of one person, but the unity of what? Singular persons, yeah. So that just as the divine nature has a natural unity with what the individual persons, so the human nature would have unity with the singular persons by assumption.

[10:50] Third question was a problem about what? What could be said of one being said of the other, right? So you can say of Christ that he's born of Mary, he's born of what? The Father, right. And then he's saying, well, then what is said of any one of the members of the Trinity could be said of the man, right? And then, vice versa, back over to the other persons, right?

[11:21] You get these contradictions. To the third, it should be said about the mystery of incarnation that there is a communication of properties pertaining to nature, right? Because whatever things belong to the nature can be said of the person subsisting in that nature

[11:50] by the name of whatever what nature he is signified, God or man. But the foresaid position being made about the person of the Father could be said those things which pertain to human nature, right? And those things which pertain to divine nature, right? And likewise about the person of the Son, the Holy Spirit.

[12:17] But not what pertains to the person of the Father by reason of what? His own proper person, right? Could be attributed to the person of the Son of the Holy Spirit on account of the distinction of the what persons, which would remain, right?

[12:42] Is able therefore to be said that just as the Father is ungenerated, right? So that man would be what ungenerated, according as man stands for the person of the what Father, right? But if one proceeds further and says man is ungenerated. The son is man. Therefore, the son is ungenerated. There would be the fallacy of what? Figure of diction, which is in the six six fallacies in speech, right?

[13:22] Or of the what? Accident, right? Just as now we say God is ungenerated, because the Father is ungenerated, right? Or are we able to conclude that the son is ungenerated, although he be God? That kind of goes back to the business of supposition, right? See, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was toward God, right? We can't be toward yourself, right? So therefore, the what?

[13:52] Word is not God, right? It makes sense. with the hyperbaton? Right, the Word was God, right? So when you say that the son, the Word is toward God, God is standing for what? The Father. Yeah.

[14:13] So he said to be towards God insofar as what? God stands in the Father, not towards the divine nature, because then the divine nature would be something different from the from the son, right?

[14:36] I felt so the accident is one that deceives even the wise. You speak of you say does does the Holy Spirit have the power of breathing the Holy Spirit? What would you say? I'm inclined to say,

[15:05] yes, insofar as he's God, not insofar as he's divine nature. Yeah. Yes. If you say the power of breathing the Holy Spirit is a divine nature, the divine nature is in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, but is that the fallacy of the accident fallacy?

[15:25] Because maybe the power of breathing the Holy Spirit is a divine nature insofar as it's in the Father and the Son. Insofar as it's in the Father and the Son, is distinct from the Holy Spirit, right? So

[15:47] it's accidental, I think, to the divine nature insofar as it's in the Holy Spirit to be the power of breathing the Holy Spirit. I have a healthy respect for that fellow," said the accident. Yeah, part of the same. Yeah, yeah. That comes up in the very first part of natural philosophy. There we speak of of change, right?

[16:24] And you know, Heraclitus says, you know, that hot and cold, and dry and wet, the same thing, because one becomes the other, right? If you become something, then you are what you become, right?

[16:40] So if I become a geometer, then I'm a geometer, right? So if the cold becomes hot, then the cold is hot. If the dry becomes wet, then the dry is wet. What's the difference? I became a geometer so I'm a geometer, right? I became a father, so I'm a father. You became a monk, so you are a monk,

[17:05] right? That's the fallacy of the accident. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I know the fallacy of the accident. Therefore, I am the fallacy. I know the premise.

[17:38] So it's not really the sick as such that become healthy, right? It's the body as such that becomes healthy, right? But because to be sick belongs to the body before it becomes healthy, then we see the sick become healthy, right? It's kind of hard to separate those two because you're always sick before you become healthy, and so it seems to be what essential. So the teacher learning as he teaches is that the same?

[18:13] Yeah, it's accidental. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Every teacher will tell you, just a college, you know, level of college at least, that they always learn the subject better when they teach, right? So the teacher always learns. He's teaching.

[18:31] Yeah, but is that belong to teacher as such to learn what he's teaching? Because he's learning, and so far he doesn't know it, right? And as he teaches, and so far he doesn't know the subject. Is that

[18:52] you know? I told you that about Karl Marx, right? Now, Karl Marx wants to see man's fulfillment in making, right? Okay. Aristotle would say, "Well, making is perfecting the thing made. Making a chair is perfecting of the chair, and therefore it's not perfecting of man."

[19:13] And Marx says, "Well, but when you make something, you change yourself too. It's kind of making yourself, right?" Okay. And well, you know, I heard a carpenter say, "You know, that you like this job because you're learning something, you know, but just doing the same thing over and over again, right?" And you say, "Well, yeah, but does that belong to the maker as such, right?"

[19:50] See, insofar as the maker doesn't know how to make, he's not a maker, right? In sense accidental to the maker, they not know how to make. Essentially he does know how to make. Uh It could be said to be what one man having two what human natures.

[20:14] It happens, however, that many men are said to be one people, on account of the fact that they come together in something one, not over, on account of the unity dispositum. And likewise, if two divine persons assumed one in number human nature, they would be said to be one man, not on account of the dispositum, but in so far as they come together in something something one.

[20:42] No, which is some kind of chimera huh. So Thomas seems to be preferring to say that it's what one man having two human natures. Because there's one person there.

[21:04] One and two human natures. That would be the result. What a monster, huh? Object monster. Yeah. You wouldn't wouldn't want to talk about that in the pulpit. Yeah. Yeah. I hope we're not taking this as a preaching material.

[21:24] Write the next newsletter. But I think the very question itself is scandalized. You know, the the average prisoner. Oh, when they say, "Don't cast your pearls before swine," that they turn on you. A third objection, yeah, and that's about the what the penetrating might say of the human nature by the divine nature, right? And the two human nature cannot be that way. To a third, it should be said that the divine and the human nature do not have themselves in the same order to the one divine person, but per per prius?

[22:18] They are compared to it, the divine nature, which is one with it from what eternity. But the human nature is compared to the divine person per posterius right? Subsequently, afterwards, as assumed from time by the divine person,

[22:41] not to this that the nature be what the person itself, but that the person subsists in that nature. For the Son of God is His own what deity, but is not His own what humanity. And therefore, to this that the human nature be assumed by the divine person, it remains that the divine nature, by the personal union, is united to the whole nature assumed, that is according to all its parts.

[23:19] But if two natures assumed, there would be a what uniform relation to the divine person, nor would one assume the other. Right. Whence it is not necessary that one of them be totally united to the other, that is, that all its parts of one would be united to all the parts of the other. Right.

[23:41] Makes sense, doesn't it? I don't think it's worth it. I don't think it's worth it. Yeah. No, I mean the divine nature is going to flood both human natures, but one of them is not going to flood the other one entirely. Right. Okay. But Marx is, in a sense, trying to make man his what? Man perfects himself by making, and therefore,

[24:12] since man's end is perfection of man, well, then making is how man reaches his perfection. But that's really accidental that a man is in any way perfected by making.

[24:27] By frying egg, frying egg every morning, and and perfecting myself at all. You make the egg the same way all the time every morning, you know. the egg right So, more for me to learn about frying an egg, I guess. Or slicing an orange or something. In Chinese philosophy, there was—I never call which philosopher it was—but he was making a point about a butcher and how, over the years of being a butcher, yeah, he was able to make a lot of cuts without having to sharpen his blade because of with the constant practice, the level of perfection of his technique.

[25:11] Yeah, he wouldn't dull the blade by hitting the bones like a more amateur butcher might. And so, well, to be a maker, you can be a maker and not be very good at making. For example, if you're making a cup out of clay, yeah, if you're a beginner, you're a maker, maybe an amateur maker, but you're you're not so good. Over time, you perfect your ability to make, but that doesn't necessarily have any sort of bearing on perfecting yourself as a as a man.

[25:44] Yeah. In other words, what Aristotle point out is, does it belong to making as such to perfect the maker? No. Yeah, to perfect it. Yeah, see. So you can't make you know man's perfection consists in activity that is essentially you know perfecting something other than man. Is it possible to in some of the martial arts from Asia? There's this notion of through perfection of technique. there, there's a spiritual component to it.

[26:19] That if if you become a Japanese would say a sword saint, somebody who's completely dedicated to mastery of the sword, and supposedly there's a spiritual value which perfects him spiritually, which may or may not be perfecting him supposedly as a man. I'm not sure. Would that apply to anything that? Well, it's like I was mentioning before class here that Aristotle's school philosophy is called the Peripatetic, right?

[26:48] Because they walked around, right? So if I go for a walk, you know, in the woods, and I. Think about nature and you know how nature imitates God and so on, right? But

[27:07] that's something other or addition to my walking, isn't it? So we say, "Is walking a way of thinking about God? What would you say?"

[27:25] But you know, I mean, some people when they see their office or something like that, they walk, right? You know, I can't see Dionne there walking back and forth in his office, you know.

[27:40] And sometimes you'll get restless, you know. I don't know. And they do. So uh uh but still it's kind of accidental, nevertheless, to walking. You know, is walking praying, or he fulfills his canonical obligation by walking. Dedicated to walking, very very dedicated. Yeah.

[28:06] Because also in Asia there are different paths to the same goal. I think which would be instead of devoting yourself to the sword, you could devote yourself to flower arranging, arranging, or calligraphy, and that and people do. I mean, and these are all the paths to this type of enlightenment. Well, sometimes people, you know, will say you know that they they go to bed thinking about right something, and they wake up and they kind of solve it, right?

[28:35] Other people say they get the great idea of shaving in the morning or something like that. And then, you know, it gives your hands something to do, I suppose, and you know, it doesn't require too much attention, right? Huh? So I mean, that's apparently a common thing. For some people, yeah. A friend of mine went down to the University of Chicago there, in some of the old days, you know.

[28:58] But kind of these seminars, you know, and everybody smoked a pipe, so he comes back smoking a pipe too. Well, they say you know, packing in and lighting up, you know, gives you time to think, you know, with the other guy.

[29:15] But it's still kind of accidental, right? Smoking a pipe, you know, to to to think. huh? Bill Gates has all his people rocking while they're thinking. Yeah. He had them around, and he said, okay, rock.

[29:35] Is that right? Yeah. It's comfortable. Sure. It's probably part of his own Asperger's syndrome or whatever he has that he has that, uh, he's like autistic Asperger's or something. Maybe we could tell him to play Minesweeper. You take a little break. Okay, so we, we finish this or not?

[30:05] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So we got article seven then. Now we get to the eighth article here, right? Which is what we went through all the other ones to get to, right?

[30:21] By the way, these questions, like an article eight, where they talk about whether something is convenient or appropriate. Yeah. This is always based on the fact of this is actually how it is. So now we're looking back at the fact and showing the appropriateness of it. Yeah, yeah. As opposed to these other. Yeah, yeah. Given that we believe that the Son became man and not the Father or the Holy Spirit,

[30:50] and it wasn't impossible for the Father or the Holy Spirit to become man, right? So now we say, why was it suitable that the Son become man, even though the others were possible, right? Yeah. See, like it kind of makes this question more relevant, huh? Yeah. I mean, if you say only the Son could become man, you know, the Father and the Holy Spirit could not have become man.

[31:13] Well, then. Yeah, they say, well, that's just that's the way it is. Yeah. You know. So you say, why is two half of four? Why can't three, you know, or four, you know? Why is it more suitable that two be half of four than three or you know, than three or five or something, right? Once you realize. You've come up with a long reason. So it's kind of appropriate that it ends up with this article, right?

[31:39] After after those ones, right? Yeah. To the eighth one proceeds thus. it does not seem that it's more suitable for the Son of of God to be made flesh than the Father of the Holy Spirit, huh? For through the mystery of the incarnation, men are brought to a true knowledge of God, huh? According to that of John chapter eighteen verse thirty-seven, this is talking to Pilate, right?

[32:11] For this was I born, and for this I came into the world that I might give testimony to the truth, right? I mentioned before how Thomas quotes at the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles.

[32:25] But from this that the person of the Son of God is made incarnate, many were impeded from a true knowledge of God. Those things which I said of the Son, according to its human nature, referring to the very what? Person of the Son, just as Arius, right? Who laid down an inequality of persons, on account of what is said in John fourteen, verse twenty-eight: the Father is greater than me, right?

[32:55] Because he's saying that according to his what human nature, right? Um, which error would not have come about if the person of the Father was what? Yeah. But no one would estimate the Father to be less than the Son, right? More therefore, surely does it seem that the person of the Father would become incarnate than the person of the Son. What a possible reasoning! Moreover, the effect of the incarnation would seem to be a recreation, in a way, of human nature, according to that of Galatians chapter six, verse fifteen.

[33:44] In Christ Jesus, neither circumcision nor circumcision right? I guess that's without, huh? Uncircumcised, Yeah uncircumcised, yeah. But a new creature, right? But the power of creating is appropriate to the Father. Therefore, it seems more befitting for the Father to become incarnate than the what? Son, huh? So we see in the creed, I believe in God the Father Almighty Creator, heaven and earth, right? So to recreate us, I belong to the Father.

[34:16] This creation is appropriated to him, right? Good argument. Moreover, incarnation is ordered to the remission of sins, according to that of Matthew one, verse twenty-one. You will call his name Jesus, right? For he will make his people, he will save his people from their sins, huh? I guess that's what the word Jesus means, huh? Savior, in a sense. But the remission of sins is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to that of John chapter twenty.

[34:51] Receive the Holy Spirit, whose sins you shall forgive are forgiven them, and so on. Therefore, is more congruent for the person of the Holy Spirit to be made flesh than the person of the Son.

[35:08] So he has two arguments for the Father and one for the Holy Spirit and one for the Son. So I'm really puzzled by this, aren't you? But against this is what Damascene says in the third book. In the mystery of the incarnation is made known the wisdom and the power of God.

[35:31] The wisdom, because he found a solution of a what? Most difficult, right? Word. And most suitable, right? Solution. We saw a little bit of this on the beginning of the treatise on the incarnation, right? Those reasons we gave, you know, from the two Sumas. Okay, says wisdom shows out there. Is power because he made the victim, right? The victor. Okay, as a enlightener. Kind of in Latin kind of.

[36:10] But the power and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to that of one Corinthians one, Christ, the power and the wisdom of God. Therefore, it is suitable that the Son, person of the Son, become incarnate.

[36:31] Now Thomas says, "I'll take him to this. The answer should be said that it was most suitable for the Son, the person of the Son, to be incarnate, right? "

[36:45] I'm going to give what three reasons here, three parts of the reason. First, on the side of the union itself, right? For it is suitable that those things which are alike be what united.

[37:03] Now, of the person of the Son, who is the Word of God, in one way a common agreement with the whole of creation, right? Why? Because the thought of the artist, right? That is his concept or thought, is a likeness which is the exemplar of those things which are to be made by the artist.

[37:35] So they say that the carpenter or the housebuilder, he first builds a house in his mind, then he makes a house out there, like the house. So there's kind of an agreement between what?

[37:49] Yeah, and what's out there, and so between the the thought of God, right, and these things out here, there's an agreement, right? Okay. Whence the verbo of God, the thought of God, right, which is his eternal what concept, huh? Is a likeness that is what an exemplar of the whole creation. And therefore, just as by partaking of this likeness, creatures are what instituted in their own species, but in a mobile way, right?

[38:33] So by the union of the Word to creatures, not in a what? Yeah, participatory, but a personal one, right? It was suitable to repair creatures in order to the eternal and what unchangeable perfection. For the artist, through the form of his art, by which he constructs the artificial thing, if it collapses, right, he restores it, right? Okay. In another way, it has a what special agreement with human nature.

[39:16] From the fact that the word is the concept of eternal wisdom, from which all human, what all the wisdom of men is derived, right? And therefore, man through this that he what goes forward in wisdom, which is his proper perfection, so far as he is a rational creature, that he partakes what the word of God, just as the disciples instructed through this that he receives the word of the teacher.

[39:50] When this is said, an ecclesiastic one, the fountain of wisdom, the word of God, on high is the fountain of what wisdom, and therefore to the consummate perfection of man, it was suitable that the word of God be personally united to human nature, right? Well, sometimes Thomas will refer to the fact that in Greek the word of God is called what logos, right? Which in Greek is also the word for reason, right?

[40:21] So we get the word logic, right? So what is man? A man is the animal that has reason, right? And it's reason that really separates us from the beast. So that Aristotle can say in the tenth book of the Ethics that reason, more than anything else, is man, right? So in the very word logos itself, it shows a certain affinity between what the second person of the Trinity and what makes man to be man, logos, right?

[40:53] This is another way of saying it here, but it's a similar thought, right? In regard to that first thing, you know, a lot of times you know they'll say that God has both what spiritual or immaterial creatures, the angels and the material world, right? And then man is kind of what, yeah, uniting the two. and so like the Greeks said, he's a little cosmos, right? So it's kind of appropriate that God unite to himself, man, because they're kind of uniting the whole of creation back to him, right?

[41:29] Material as well as the immaterial. This this the way he says it here is a little different than I see him saying it elsewhere, right? Elsewhere he'll just remark upon the fact that logos shows a connection between the man and the what second person, right?

[42:00] Man is man by logos, and that very person is called Logos, right? Okay. Man is most human through his thoughts in a way, right? And this is the thought of God, right? One of the Persian fathers had something like that in his sayings. God thought of man, so in terms of his thought being the exemplar of creation, so he said God thought of man and had man in his mind, and then he created man, and man thought of God, and he had God in his mind, so he was reflecting the divinity by thinking about it.

[42:45] just by thinking about the divinity He sort of. reflecting that. Secondly, one can take the reason of this agreement or congruence from the end or purpose of union, which is the fulfillment of predestination of those who are preordained. To celestial inheritance, which is not owed to anyone except to sons,

[43:20] according to that Romans eight verse seventeen, sons and heirs, right? Okay. And Saint John speaks of it in his epistle. There he's going to talk about the beatific vision, right? I mean, the sons of God, right? And therefore, it was suitable that to the one who is the natural son, right, men partake a likeness to the sonhood by what adoption, being adopted sons of God, as the apostle says, whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his what son?

[43:59] So the second argument is taken more from the incarnate person being called what son. The first one may be called what? Yeah, interesting. I love the two two names.

[44:22] Now the third reason, third, one can take the reason of this congruence from the sin of the first turn. That's interesting. He's going to do this. Through which, by incarnation, a remedy is what? Yeah. Okay.

[44:42] For the first man sinned by desiring knowledge, you will be as gods, knowing good and evil, right? Remember, as they attempted. This is clear from the words of the serpent, promising to the man knowledge of good and what evil. Whence it is suitable that through the word of true wisdom, right, man would be what led back to God, right? Who, through a disordered desire of knowledge, receded from God.

[45:19] That's very very subtle. That that last argument, right? That may be the most principal one. You think of the first two, you know, but

[45:27] it's kind of interesting, you know, when they go through the whole process. So you know, why why does it begin with Mary, right? And Mary's fiat, you know, being done, you know, and they say, well, man fell. It started with the woman, right? And then it was, you know, consummated, you might say, with the man, right? Huh? You know, the the revolt, and so in order to redeem us properly, he starts with the woman and then comes to the man, right?

[45:54] The second Adam, right? And but he starts, but Mary is kind of like you know the place of Eve, right? Well, here he has something like that, right? Because he's saying, how did they sin by, you know, what was it a sin of the flesh? Like, some people misunderstand that, right? Because the body is completely under the reason the will, so long as the soul and the reason the will were subject to God, right?

[46:20] So it had to be really a a a what a spiritual sin. see? First sin is a spiritual sin, not like, for us, where it's kind of the reverse, you know, you know, it used to be kind of a commonplace of this religious life. You know that you have to first overcome your your sins of the flesh, right? And then you can start to be difficult ones, the spiritual sins, you know, the pride and all these other things, right?

[46:50] Huh? But if you haven't overcome your sins of the flesh, you better got a long ways to go. Now you know you haven't got to the main battlefield yet, huh? But here's the reverse again from this disordered desire to know. That's that's a you know I'll just talk about embryos and so on. You know this desire to know, you know, in a disordered way, kind of characterizes modern man.

[47:32] Now, the first objection was saying, "Well, this leads to rise to mistakes, right? " Because the father is more than me, and so on, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that there is nothing which what cannot be abused by human malice, huh? When even the goodness of God Himself, right, the goodness itself of God is abused, huh? According to that Romans two four, whether the what you contemn the riches of His goodness, right?

[48:07] Huh. Whence also, if the person of the Father was incarnate, one could from this a man take an occasion of a of some error, right? Huh. That accidental cause, occasion, by the way, as if the what

[48:29] the son would not suffice for repairing what human nature, so on. Yeah, that's a weak objection, no, to the truth. The second should be said that the first creation of things was made by the power of God the Father through the Word, right? Whence the recreation through the Word ought to be made by the what power of God the Father, so that the recreation would correspond to the what creation.

[49:04] According to that of Second Corinthians five, God was in Christ reconciling the world to Him. So things were made right by God through the Word, right? So, meaning John's Gospel. So that would be.

[49:30] Now, the third objection was taken that was more proper to the Holy Spirit. To the third, it should be said that it's proper to the Holy Spirit that He be the gift of the Father and the Son. So the remission of sins comes about through the Holy Spirit, as through the what gift of God,

[49:56] and therefore it was more suitable for the justification of men that the Son become incarnate, of whom the Holy Spirit is a what gift? In sort of sense, you can say that when He breathes upon the apostles and says, "Whose sins, you shall forgive; they are forgiven, and so on," He's bestowing this what gift upon them, right? Huh? Okay.

[50:37] The Holy Spirit is a gift of the what? Son, maybe the Father too, but of the Son, right? So put that in your pipe and smoke it, huh?

[50:52] Let me say now. You say.