Tertia Pars
15. Summa III, Q.4, Arts. 1–3: Why Human Nature Could Be Assumed, and Why Not a Person or a Man (with a Digression on the Two Senses of 'Through')
Class of 2008-11-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/015-summa-iii-q-4-arts-1-3-why-human-nature-could-be-assumed/

[0:00] Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God, enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more quickly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all that you've written. The Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. I was reading about one of Saint Teresa of Avila's confessors, who was a Dominican, who was known for his brilliant lectures on the Summa.

[0:34] So, so let's look at the proemium here to question four. Then we ought to consider about the union on the side of what is assumed,

[0:53] about which first should be considered, about those things which are assumed by the Word of God. Secondly, about those things assumed with, which are both perfections and defects. On defects and illnesses,

[1:13] flesh subject to what? Death, death and suffering and so on. But not sin is not a defect assumed. For the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts, whence about this a threefold consideration occurs. First, as regards human nature itself; secondly, as regards its parts; third, as regards the order of assumption. And we'll see in that article or part which kind of order you're talking about.

[1:56] About the first six things are asked. First, whether human nature was more able to be assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. Secondly, whether he assumed a person. You must know the answer to that already.

[2:15] Third, whether he assumed a man. I gotta be very careful when you say that. Fourth, whether it was what suitable that he assumed a human nature separated from what singulars. I suppose it'd be like universal human nature, the form of man himself.

[2:43] Whether it would be suitable for him to assume human nature in all individuals. And six, whether it was suitable that he assumed human nature in some man. Generated from the what

[3:02] stem of Adam, right? Again, he's very thorough, this guy, huh? Of course, our Lord said to him for the cross, you know, being schismatic, told him, "All right, talk about this, you know, is this worthy of you? You written well, Thomas. That's I'd be impressed with that myself if he said that to me. You've spoken well, Dwight.

[3:27] Saying he's saying to to said Eleanor, she had all these fears which made me deceived, you know. She hears the voice, have no fear it is I.

[3:39] Boy. to the first one proceeds thus. It seems that human nature was not more able to be assumed by the Son of God, or more still be assumed, huh? Than any other what nature, right?

[3:56] For as Augustine says in his Epistle to Volusianum, in things done with wonder, huh, the whole reason for the thing done is the power of the one what doing it. But the power of God making incarnation, which is the work most wonderful, as Thomas says, all the miracles are ordered as miracle. This is the miracle of what? Miracles, yeah.

[4:27] But the power of God making incarnation, which is a work most admirable, was not limited to one nature, since the power of God is what infinite. Therefore, human nature was not more able to be assumed by God, or still be assumed by God, than any other what creature.

[4:50] Moreover, he says, likeness is a reason making for the what congruity. I don't think you agree with this of the incarnation of the divine person. But in the rational creature, there is found the likeness of the what image, and in the irrational creature, there is found the likeness of the footprint.

[5:17] Therefore, the irrational creature was able to be assumed just as human nature. Both cases, there's a likeness there, huh? But now he goes above man in the third objection. Moreover, in the angelic nature, there is found a more express likeness of God than in human nature. They're more like God than we are. But Gregory says in his homily on the hundred sheep there, introducing that of Ezekiel chapter twenty-eight, verse twelve, you are the what sign, the seal of likeness.

[5:59] And is found also in angels' sin as in man, according to that of Job 4: 18. In his very angels, was found depravity. Therefore, the angelic nature was more assumable; was it was as assumable as the what nature of man? You might argue from the argument that even more so, right? It's even more like God, right?

[6:28] Moreover, since to God belongs the highest perfection, to that extent something is more like God as it is more what perfect. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, among which is the human nature. Therefore, the whole universe is more assumable than human nature. huh

[6:58] That'd be an interesting one After reading Thomas, you heard all these objections, how closely difficult they are. But against this is what is said in Proverbs chapter 8, verse 31, from the mouth of Wisdom wisdom, right? My delights are to be with the sons of men,

[7:23] and thus there seems to be a certain congruence of union of the Son of God to human nature. So Thomas says, I answer it should be said that something is is said to be assumable as were apt to be assumed by a what divine person. So assumptibile nothing possible so much as the fact, and more more apt to be assumed.

[8:03] Which aptitude he says cannot be understood according to a what natural passive what potency, huh? Which does not extend itself to that which transcends the natural order,

[8:22] which the union, the personal union of a creature to God transcends. Whence it remains that the assumable is said according to a certain what

[8:37] appropriateness to the foresaid what union, huh? Personal. Yeah. Which congruence is to be noted according to two things in human nature? One, according to his dignity or worth. And the other in the necessity of this,

[9:02] according to his dignity, because human nature, in so far as it is reasonable and understanding, is what apt to touch in some way the word itself through its what operation. So, who made me? God made me. Why did He make me to know and love Him? Right, serve in this world by knowing and what loving Himself. Oh, He's quoting the catechism too. Yeah, that was a pretty good answer in the catechism, huh?

[9:36] But some of us criticized the catechism. They said there's nothing wrong with the answers in the catechism. They're very good. We didn't understand them too well, but the thing was not to thought the answers, but to try to understand them better, but at least seeking understanding.

[9:49] I was looking at the little catechisms of my grandchildren there, you know, Chris. All they do is say is that the mystery of the Trinity. You know, it's a mystery, right? don't intend any explanation of it at all. But. That's where the child begins, huh?

[10:08] So he says, in a way, man is what? Just considering his nature, is ordered to God and to being united with God by his what? Operation by knowing and loving Him, right? So already there's a certain what? Aptness for union there, because we're already by our very nature called to know and love God, and to be joined with Him at least in that way.

[10:36] Although it's less than to be joined in Christ's person person, right? But none of these creatures that don't have understanding and will are apt to know and love God as such.

[10:50] Now, secondly, by necessity, huh? Because he needs preparation, since he was what? Subject to original sin, huh? When Thomas, I've been reading just the compendium of theology there, and he starts to talk about the incarnation. He always begins by talking about original sin, right? Now man contracted this and so on.

[11:18] Now he says the two of these together, huh? Belong to only what? Human nature. For to the irrational creature, to the beast, and so on, there is lacking, right, the congruence of dignity, right? To the angelic nature, there is lacking the what? Congruity of the foresaid necessity.

[11:47] So the angel chooses; he goes forever, huh? And completely in one direction. But man, as long as he's in this life, he's what? He's changing from virtue to vice or vice to virtue, right?

[12:03] If you put those two together, it remains that only human nature is what? Assumed. It has to be assumed, huh? Does that convince you, gentlemen? What

[12:16] the? It's not an argument. Now the first objection is taken from the power of God, right? To the first, therefore, should be said that creatures are denominated such from what belongs to them according to their own what causes, not however from what belongs to them according to the first and universal causes. Just as we say that someone sick is incurable. Not because he's not able to be cured by God, but because the the own principles of that subject he's not able to be cured, huh?

[13:06] He doesn't have recuperative powers in himself. Thus, therefore, some creature is said to be not assumable. Not to subtract something from divine power, but to show the condition of the creature who does not have for this any what aptitude, right?

[13:45] See the answer to the answer to that objection. He's not denying the power of God to assume something else, right? He's saying let's look at what's in the creature, right, and see the reason why this creature is more assumable than that, and man is more assumable because he's both able to attain God by his operation, and therefore already is more fitting to be united with God, right?

[14:12] Even in a higher way than by knowing, loving him, to unite to him as a person, right, as personal personhood, but also because of his what necessity, right? Those two things are in him.

[14:29] If just look at the power of God, you don't see the reason. Now, to the second, talking about likeness here. To the second, it should be said, the likeness of image is to be noted in human nature, according as he is capable of God, to wit, by attaining to him by his own operation of knowing and what love. But the likeness of the footprint is to be noted only according to some representation

[15:12] existing in the creature from the divine what Impression. some likeness, right, to God, much more distant. But what falls short from the lesser does not have suitability to that which is what greater. Just as the body that is not apt to be perfected by a sensing soul, much less is apt to be perfected by a what understanding soul.

[15:48] Now, much greater and more perfect is the union to God according to personal being than that which is according to what. Operation right. Most of all Thomas argued in the reverse way from the incarnation to the beatific vision, arguing from what? This gives us hope in the beatific vision because he unites us human nature to himself in an even greater way than our mind is joined to him in the beatific vision.

[16:24] Okay, but now he's arguing in a sense reverse way in terms of the fact that we can be united to him in himself by operation of knowing and loving means that we're suitable to be united to him in the same person a creature that doesn't have operations that can attain to God in himself. Those horses there in my daughter's place there. They're nice animals. They're nice animals.

[16:55] And therefore, the irrational creature which falls short from the union to God through operation right can neither know God in himself nor love him, does not have suitability to be united to him according to what?

[17:17] The third argument is saying, hey, the angels even more so right. To the third, it should be said that some say the angel is not able to be assumed because from the beginning of his creation he was perfect in his what? Personality, since he does not undergo or is not subject to generation and corruption.

[17:45] Whence he could not be assumed to the unity of the divine person unless his personality be what destroyed, which is neither suitable to the incorruptibility of his nature nor to the goodness of the one assuming, to whom it does not pertain that he corrupts something of perfection in the creature assumed. But this does not seem to wholly exclude suitability of the assumption of the angelic nature, for God is able in producing a new angelic nature right to join it in himself or to himself in unity of his person right, so that there's never what his own personality in the angel.

[18:35] Because he would create at the same time he created this divine this human this angelic nature he would what draw it to his own what person right, and thus nothing pre-existing there would be what corrupted right.

[18:51] But as has been said, there would lack or be lacking congruity on the part of what? Yeah. Because although the angelic nature, in some things, was subject to sin, his sin nevertheless is not able to be remedied, as has been had in the first part, in the part that only take up the angels. You could also say, though, that each angel has got a different what nature, right?

[19:21] So if God assumed one angelic nature, that nature would not be found aside to him, right? Why, in man, there are many what individuals like us of the same nature, right? So if he assumes this nature, he doesn't what deprive the rest of creation, right, from having that same what nature? Thomas doesn't develop that argument here, but just simply argues from the fact that the angels could not be what redeemed, right?

[19:55] Okay. So there goes a. It's kind of frightening to think of that. sudden determination. I was rereading a little bit of the what is it called, the Ratzinger report there, the one still, hardy, you know, and he's talking about all the, you know, flack that came up when Paul VI talked about the devil, And of course he's defending, of course, the church's teaching on the devil, but how much opposition there is to this?

[20:32] It's very interesting things in those interviews there. Yeah. Paul the Sixth even got flack when he said that there are other Judases in the priesthood today. They didn't want anything about that. Yeah, to

[20:56] the fourth objection. Why not assume the whole universe, right? To the fourth, it should be said that the perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or one supposito.

[21:11] But of that which is one under what position or order, of which many parts are not assumable, as has been said, the irrational creatures. Hence it remains that only human nature should be what able to be assumed.

[21:33] Let's look at the second article now. Did he assume a person? You hope so. Probably you better read the question. That sounds like the stories got the stories. Yeah. Yes, the stories. Well, I'm a good verifier. Well, Thomas has played the stories a little

[21:48] while here. You read about Saint Trisul, you know, playing Joan of Arc in the little plays inside the convent there, honoring the saints and so on, huh? Well, Saint Thomas has played the stories now. Well, different.

[22:22] It seems that the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the Son of God assumes a what? Assumes a person. For Saint Damascene says in the third book, the Orthodox Faith, that the Son of God assumed human nature in atomos right? Atomos is a Greek word for what? Yeah. And in this context, for the individual, right? That is an individual. So tomos is the Greek word for cut, and a is the negative.

[23:01] Yeah. But this is what the individual of a rational nature, as a person, is, is clear through Boethius' definition in the book on the two natures. Therefore, the Son of God assumed a what person.

[23:17] Moreover, Damascene says that the Son of God assumed those things in our nature that he what planted, right? But he planted there what personality. Therefore, the Son of God assumed a what person.

[23:36] Moreover, nothing is consumed except what is. But Innocent the Third says in a certain decree that the person of God assumed the person of a what man consumed. That was kind of a funny word. Therefore, it seems that the person of the man was before what. Yeah. They all agree with my Nestorian heresy, and so on. Yeah, so if they think I'm right.

[24:19] But against this is what Augustine says in the book about faith to what Peter that God assumed the nature of man, not the person. That's very good, then, Augustine. Quinto Nobody can make a point, like Augustine or Thomas, you know.

[24:47] I was reading the thirteenth book of wisdom there of Aristotle this morning, in the Greek there, and he's saying, you know, in the very beginning, there, first chapter, we should try to say some things better than our predecessors, and other things no worse than they said them. To say just as well as they said, right? Well, some of these things were okay. He said it, Augustine. They can't say any better than that.

[25:18] The answer should be said that something is said to be assumed from this that it is what taken to what to another. Yeah. Whence that which is assumed is necessarily pre-understood to the what assuming? Just as that which is moved in place is fore-understood to the motion itself.

[25:48] But a person is not understood beforehand in the what Human nature In the human nature to the assumption, right? I don't understand how there's a person out here? Right. Right.

[26:06] But the person more has itself as the term of the assumption, as has been said above, right? Okay. So back to my famous example here now. Focus the mathematician now. This point is the divine person there, right? Okay. And this line is going to be assumed to that person, right? And this line is being assumed to that person. Does it have an endpoint? Yes. Not till it gets there.

[26:42] Not till it gets there, right? So it doesn't have an endpoint till it gets there, right? Okay. So the line that is assumed to that point is not pre-understood, not understood before to have an endpoint, and then, at the same time, you might say that it's drawn to that point. It acquires that point as its endpoint. Doesn't have its own endpoint other than that endpoint that's already there.

[27:16] So the person is not fore-understood, he said, in human nature to the assumption of that. But more has itself as the term, the limit, on the end of the assuming, right? For if it were fore-understood, understood beforehand, it would be necessary either that it be corrupted, right? And thus, in vain, would it be what assumed, or it would remain after the union, right? And thus there would be two persons: one assuming, another assumed, which is erroneous, as has been said above or shown above.

[28:02] Once it remains that in no way does the Son of God assume a human person. So he assumed a human nature that had no personality,

[28:23] right? But gave that human nature's own personality. Sometimes I find when I read about human nature and person, that so often, like human nature passes as person, like they don't make a proper distinction. You know what I mean? Sometimes, like, how would you define person?

[28:46] I follow Boethius, huh? Individual substance of a rational nature. To the first, therefore, it should be said. Going back to the objection here from the text of Damascene, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the Son of God assumed human nature in the indivisible, right, or in the individual, which is not other from the what? Uncreated. Which is the person of the Son of God, right?

[29:37] Once it does not follow that the person is what assumed. Okay, that's one way of answering it, right? Like they assume that line in the indivisible point, right? Okay. You might also say that the human nature he assumed was not universal human nature, right? But individually, but not with its personality. But anyway, that's the way Thomas solves it here. And the second objection, again taken from what Thomas said, that to the second should be said that to the nature assumed there was not lacking its own personality, on account of the defect of something that pertained to perfection of human nature, but on account of the addition of something that was above human nature, which is this union to the what divine persona.

[30:59] So he didn't, as it were, take away something, leaving that human nature that he assumed defective, right? But he what gave it a higher personality than it would have on its own.

[31:15] Now, this third word, third objection, is the word consumption, right? To the third, it should be said that consumption there does not imply the destruction of something that was before, huh?

[31:30] But the impeding of that which otherwise would be able to be. For if that human nature were not assumed by divine person, human nature would have its own personality, right? Just like I said that that line, if you didn't draw it to that point, left it to itself, or if you stopped, it would have what its own endpoint, right?

[32:03] And to that extent, the person is what said to consume the person, right? Although improperly, because the divine person, by its what union, impeded lest human nature have its own what?

[32:23] Yeah. Its own personality, right? Just as by what drawing that line to the pre-existing point, right? We what didn't let the line have its own point? Swallowed up existing point. And that second objection the way it's solved there. It reminds me of the the other definition of person from Richard of Saint Victor, which emphasizes the independence of the individual of rational nature. Yeah. And what what he says is, with the assumption of human nature by the divine word, it doesn't have the independence that the others have because it depends on the divine person.

[33:22] But the nature's able to, depend. But anyways, it it's it's it corresponds with the saying. It added something. It didn't take something away. It added something that's above it, and in that way, it's also like the other definition. It added a dependence on the divine person. The rest of us don't have. Okay. To the article before our break here. Whether the divine person assumed a man, right?

[33:52] No. To the third one proceeds thus: It seems that the divine person assumed a man. For it said in Psalm sixty-four, "Blessed the one whom you chose and what? Assumed." Which the gloss expounds in regard to what Christ Himself. And Augustine says in the book on Christian agony, fight, What? Struggle. Struggle, yeah. The Son of God assumed man, so that in that he might undergo human things.

[34:39] Moreover, this name man signifies human nature. But the Son of Man assumed human nature; therefore, he assumed what? A man. Moreover, the Son of God is man. But he is not the man whom he did not assume,

[35:02] because thus he would be for equal reason Peter or any other man. Therefore, he is the man whom he assumed. See, but was he a man before he assumed it?

[35:22] Against this is the authority, of Felix the Pope and martyr, which is introduced in the Synod of Ephesus. That's one of the four, I guess. Huh. Or the one the Pope says, I honor the four first consuls as much as the four Gospels, huh?

[35:41] We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because he is the eternal Son of God in the Word, and not a man what assumed by God. That he'd be someone other than what? Yeah, right.

[36:06] Nor does the Son of God assume a what man, that he would be other beside him, right? Okay. Now Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that as has been said above, that which is assumed is not the end or limit of the assumption, but is foreunderstood to the assumption. But it has been said that the individual in whom is assumed human nature is nothing other than the defined person.

[36:45] Which is the term of the assumption. But this name man signifies human nature, in so far as it is what apt to be in its what suppositum. Because, as Damascene says, just as this name God Deus signifies He who has the what divine nature, so this name man signifies the one who has human nature. And therefore, it is not propriae, properly said, that the Son of God assumed a man.

[37:29] Right. Supposing, as the truth of the thing has itself, that in Christ there is only one what suppositum and one hypostasis. I guess those two words, suppositum and hypostasis, are etymologically similar, right?

[37:54] But according to those who place in Christ two hypostases or two supposita, suitably and properly it is able to be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Whence the first opinion, which is placed in the sixth distinction of the third book of the Sentences, concedes man to be assumed, but that opinion is erroneous.

[38:22] As has been said above, I'm really going to be back to Nestorius with that. Two different persons, right? Now, what about that first one here? The first, therefore, should be said that speech of this sort, right, should not be extended, right?

[38:47] As it were, proper, but they should piously be what expounded wherever they are posited by the holy what doctors. That we say he assumed man because he assumed his what his nature, and because the assumption is terminated to this that the Son of God be man, right?

[39:17] So you could say through this assumption he became what man, right? That's okay, right? He assumed human nature, but that's the best way of expressing that is like that rather than saying he assumed what. Human making assumed. Yeah.

[39:45] Because if you understand him as already a man, you already have a person there, rather than the person of the word. That's what he says in reply to the second objection, there, right? To the second, it should be said that this name, man, signifies human nature in the concrete, in so far as it is in some what suppositum or hypostasis, and therefore just as we are not able to say that he assumed a what, suppositum Yeah, So when we're not able to say that man was what assumed.

[40:33] And to the third objection, it should be said that the Son of God is not the man whom he assumed, but he's the man whose nature assumed. You

[40:48] got that? It's not too tricky, is it? The words there. Going back, you know, to these two great mysteries of the faith, kind of struck this morning as thinking about the sacraments again. And what are the two chief sacraments? Baptism and Eucharist. Yeah, Baptist and Eucharist. And baptism is kind of the foundation of everything, right? Most necessary, you might say. And the Eucharist is the end and the goal of all the sacraments and so on.

[41:39] And sometimes they talk about baptism and Eucharist being the chief sacraments. They'll point to the blood and the water coming from the side of Christ. Now all the sacraments get their strength from the passion of our Lord, but in the blood and the water flowing from His side, right? You have kind of standing out something that symbolizes baptism and Eucharist.

[42:08] Now it's interesting that in baptism, which of these two mysteries is emphasized there? The Trinity or the Incarnation. Yeah. So you're baptizing the name of the Trinity, right? The name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Why in the Eucharist, huh? You say this is my body, huh? You don't say this is my blood, but this is a cup of my blood, right? So you specifically refer to the human nature of Christ and therefore to the what?

[42:38] Incarnation, so it's kind of interesting, huh? To see that the two chief mysteries of the faith, the incarnation and the Trinity, are also standing out in the two chief sacraments. It's kind of interesting.

[42:56] When I was down there in Kansas, there I was looking at the favorite question the questions disputatae, the De Potentia, and in the last questions there he takes up the Trinity, huh? And so, and was it question eight there? He asks first of all whether there are real relations in God, huh? And then the second article he asks whether the relations are the very substance of God.

[43:22] And he gets to the third article and he says, "Do the relations constitute and distinguish the persons?" Of course, the answer is yes, right? Okay. But then Thomas brings out a very important distinction, huh? If you say that that fatherhood

[43:45] constitutes and dis the father, right, and distinguishes the father from the son, and so on, is that all you have to say? Well, Thomas says that the fatherhood constitutes the father in so far as it is the divine nature.

[44:19] Not simply as a relation, right, but as it is the what divine nature, right? Of course the article, right? Before that, as I mentioned, right, is whether these relations are the divine substance. Now remember that in our treatise here, but there it's kind of they're put together in a very close juxtaposition there in the questio disputata. So once you realize that the holy the fatherhood, right, is the same thing as the divine nature, right, then you can say that it constitutes the father in so far as it is what divine nature.

[45:02] But in so far as it's a relation, it distinguishes the father from the son. It doesn't distinguish the father from the son in so far as it's the same thing as the divine substance, because the divine substance is common to common ray as Thomas says, in things to the father, the son, the Holy Spirit.

[45:27] But you can't have a what person who's an individual substance, right, be constituted in its very personhood by a relation alone, right? So it's only the relation of fatherhood, in so far as it is a divine substance, that constitutes the father. It's very subtle in Thomas's part, right? And I mentioned this beautiful text in the sentences, you know, where Thomas says because the relation and the substance are the same thing, right?

[46:07] Some words signify the divine substance as the divine substance. Some signify relation as relation. You have these mixed things, right? But something can signify both in some way, okay? As reminded by an earlier thing in the the potency of we saw in the Trinity II. That

[46:35] what is this power that the father has to generate the son? What is that power? Now. You want to lead up as Augustine would do, and Aristotle, I suppose, if you know about these things. But Thomas says it. You lead up to this thing with objections on both sides, right?

[46:59] And you could say, well, if the power of generating the son were the divine nature, right? Well, since the divine nature belongs equally to the son and the Holy Spirit, the son and the Holy Spirit would have the power of generating a son, right?

[47:23] So it seems it can't be the divine nature, huh? Okay. But then, if you say that the relation, like fatherhood, right, that's through his fatherhood that he generates the son, right? That his fatherhood is ability, his power to generate the son. Well, then, going back to what we learned in philosophy, that every agent makes what is like itself. Every, per se, agent, huh? So dogs generate dogs, and cats generate cats, right?

[48:00] And even the artist, right? You say, well, okay, the carpenter you see, He doesn't generate a man, no. But he generates a house in conformity with the idea he has of what kind of house this should be. So he makes yet like the form through which he acts, right? As Karl Marx says, right? He first makes the house in his head, in a sense, before he makes it in wood and in brick and so on, right?

[48:28] So he's operating through the form in his mind, the carpenter, and he's making something like the form by which operates. So if the father generated the son, if the power by which he generated the son was his own fatherhood, what would he have made? Another father, and that can't be. You see. So would you say he generated the son by the divine nature? In case then the son and the Holy Spirit had the same power, you get into trouble, right?

[49:06] If you say he generated by being through his fatherhood, then you'd be what? Yeah. So the truth must lie between these two what extremes, huh? And so, what does Thomas finally come down on? Well, the power to generate is the divine nature as it's found in the Father.

[49:37] And then the problems disappear, right? He can generate another one, God from God, light from light, true God from true God. When in substance, huh?

[49:52] And yet, only he has the active power, so to speak, of generating, right? The son has that power maybe, to be generated, but not to generate, right?

[50:05] And something like that in this other article is talking about. Is saying, are the divine persons constituted and distinguished by the relations? And Thomas says yes, but he distinguishes, right? So come back to that. You can say fatherhood, right? In some way constitutes the person of the father, right? And distinguishes that person from the son, and so on. But

[50:44] simply as fatherhood, it distinguishes him from the what son, just as that relation distinguishes him from the correlative. But not simply as what fatherhood doesn't constitute the father, right? But it constitutes the father insofar as it is the divine what substance, yeah. Divine Nature, yeah.

[51:13] That's kind of marvelous to see that, right? I was thinking of how I was understanding this famous distinction Thomas makes, huh? But let me approach it a little bit here.

[51:47] Suppose, huh? Suppose I use A to prove B, okay? And then I use B to prove C, right? I could say that A made known

[52:31] well B, first of all, right B made known what C, okay? Now get to know something else. Did A make known C? Through B. Yeah. Okay.

[52:57] A made known C, but not, you see, through itself, right? But through B. okay? did B make known C through A? I was going to say yes.

[53:36] Yeah. But notice, there's obviously two different senses here, right? Yeah. Okay. When you say A made known C through B, B is kind of a what instrument of A, right? Okay. When you say B made known C through A, what would that mean? Necessary precondition. Yeah. But notice, to make known something else, you have to be known yourself, right? Okay.

[54:12] So A would have to be known to make known B, right? And B would have to be known to make known C. So B has the power to make known C only insofar as B is itself what? No. Well, let's take it step by step. Only insofar as B itself is known, right? But B is known only through A, right? So B has the power to make known C through A.

[54:52] You see that? But it's a different sense here, isn't it? Now, let's talk about my soul and my body here, huh? God made my soul through himself, right? He? Didn't make my soul through any creature. It's an immediate thing. Even Aristotle knew that, as he says in the book of Generation Animals, right? That the human soul doesn't come from parents. Okay. Did God do that with my body?

[55:33] No. God made my body through my what? Parents, huh? Okay. But now could you say the reverse? And say my parents made my body through God.

[55:55] In the second sense. Yeah. In other words, the power that my parents had to produce my body. And got that power through what? God, right? So in that sense, you could say my parents produced my body through God. But in another sense, you could say God made my body through my what? Parents. Yeah. Example Thomas often uses to illustrate this is the the king and the bailiff, right?

[56:32] Okay. And the king acts upon the citizens through the bailiff, right? But the bailiff gets the power to coerce the citizens, yeah. So the bailiff acts through the king, yeah. Okay.

[56:53] Christ forgives my sins through the priest that hears my confession. So which sense is that? Through. Yeah. So you can say Christ forgives my sins through the priest hears my confession. Okay. But the priest who hears my confession forgives my sins through what? Yeah. Meaning through the power of Christ, right? You know, receive the Holy Spirit. He says, "Right, whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven."

[57:30] Right. That's very interesting distinction that Thomas points out. You know, two different senses there of through, right? And of course, you can see it kind of very simply that first example I gave, though, easier than the one from the parents or the priest and so on, right? Take a little break now.