Tertia Pars
16. Summa III, Q.4, Arts. 4–6: Not Abstract Human Nature, Not All Individuals, but from Adam's Stock (with a Digression on Universal Cause vs. Universal Predication)
Class of 2008-11-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/016-summa-iii-q-4-arts-4-6-not-abstract-human-nature-not-all/

[0:00] Um we're up to article what five? No, article four. here. To the fourth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals.

[0:19] For the assumption of human nature was done for the common salvation of all men. Whence it is said, one Timothy chapter four about Christ, that he is the savior of all men, and most of all of all the what faithful. But nature, as it's found in individuals, recedes from its what commonness. Therefore, the Son of God ought to have assumed what human nature as it was abstracted from all individuals.

[0:52] huh? How is that even possible? Okay. Moreover, in all things, what is most noble should be attributed to God. But in each genus, that which is per se is most what potent.

[1:15] Of course, Aristotle in the in the fifth book of wisdom, right? He takes up the word perfect, right? And then afterwards, he takes up certain words that signify some condition of the perfect, and per se is what one of the three.

[1:31] Therefore, the Son of God ought to assume per se hominem huh Man himself through himself, as Plato would say, huh? kath' hauto, which, according to the Platonists, is human nature separated from the what individuals. The Son of Man therefore ought to assume this.

[1:57] Moreover, human nature should not be assumed by the Son of God, as it signifies in the concrete, or as it signified as it is signified in the concrete, through this name man.

[2:12] But thus is signified in so far as it is in singulars, individuals. Therefore, the Son of God ought to assume human nature in so far as it is separated from what individuals.

[2:29] I suppose if a person thinks of him assuming human nature without human what personality, they might think this is human nature that's common to what all of us, right?

[2:42] But against this is what Damascene says in the third book, that the Word of God, the incarnate Word of God, neither what assumed that nature which is considered in naked what contemplation, right? Okay. You see the word naked a lot in Albert the Great too, huh? Meaning the universal is what, not clothed in anything singular, right? It's? Removed from that, right?

[3:15] For this is not incarnation, but deception and the fiction, make believe of incarnation, right? But human nature, in so far as it is separated or abstracted from singulars, is thought in the nude, right? The naked contemplation, because by itself it does not, but subsist, as the same, as Damascene says there. The same Damascene says. Therefore, the Son of God does not assume human nature, according as it is separated from singular.

[3:56] Okay, Now Thomas is, well positioned to talk about this being a student of Aristotle. I answer: It should be said that the nature of man, or of any other sensible thing, apart from the being that it has in singulars, individuals, is able to be understood in two ways. In one way,

[4:27] as it has by itself being apart from matter, as the Platonists laid down. In other way, in so far as it exists in the understanding, either the human understanding or the what, divine understanding, but is not able to subsist by itself, as the philosopher proves in the seventh book of wisdom,

[4:53] because to the nature of the species of sensible things, sensible matter pertains, huh? Which is placed in its definition, just as flesh and bones in the definition of man.

[5:10] Whence it is not possible that human nature be apart from what sensible matter. If, huh, human nature were subsisting in this way, huh, it would not have been suitable that be assumed by the what, Word of God, huh? First, because this assumption terminates or ends in a what, person. But this is against the notion of a common form that be individuated in a person. Secondly, because to the common nature are not able to be attributed anything but common operations and universal ones.

[6:04] By which man neither merits nor demerits. When, however, this assumption was made, that the Son of God in nature assumed might merit what? For us.

[6:20] Third, because a nature thus existing is not sensible, but what? Understandable. As Boethius always says, the thing is singular when sensed, and universal when what? Understood.

[6:37] But the Son of God assumed human nature, that he might appear to men in it in a visible way. According to that of Baruch, after this he was seen on the earth. He conversed with men. Quite a quite prophecy.

[6:58] Likewise, human nature or yeah, human nature could not be assumed by the Son of God according as it is in the divine understanding, because thus is nothing other than the divine nature. And in this way, from eternity, there would be in the Son of God human nature.

[7:24] Likewise, it is not suitable that the Son of God assume human nature in so far as it is in the human mind, because this is nothing other. This would be nothing other

[7:38] than if he were understood to assume a what? Human nature. And thus, if he did not assume it in reality, in verum natura, that's why. if I could say in reality his understanding would be what False say in reality, his understanding would be what? False. And there would not be anything other than a fiction of the incarnation, as Damascene says. I'm surprised that Thomas would say it's impossible.

[8:06] But if it were, there's still many reasons why it couldn't. Now, to the first, it should be said that the Son of God incarnate is the common Saviour of all, not by community of genus or species, which would be attributed to the nature separated from individuals, but by the community of cause, in so far as the Son of God incarnate is universal cause of human what? Salvation.

[8:45] So that's a distinction you'll find a lot in Thomas and so on. And let's just touch upon it again. These two different meanings of common, huh?

[9:09] One, I suppose, would be what? Set of many, right? The other one would be what? A cause of many, okay? This first sense of common is common only in the what? Mind, right? The second one is in things, right? Now, the other senses of common in things, huh? So, if you say, for example, that person is common to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and then you say the divine nature is common. To the three, right?

[10:02] Are they The same sense of the word common. Yeah, yeah. Like Thomas uses expression like common in many common in things, right? Common secundum rem so to speak, and common secundum rationem, right? Okay. So you don't want to confuse those two, right? Like kind of the great confusion there you have with you know Heidegger, I don't know Heidegger, but well, maybe they have two, but So Heidegger, right?

[10:42] And going back to Spinoza, right? But Heidegger takes the being, which is said of all things, right, and makes this the beginning of all things in the sense of the yeah that for which everything proceeds, right? And so Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles has a chapter devoted to refuting this. That God, we say God is I am who am, right? He's not the being which is said of all things, and he gives many arguments against this, right?

[11:18] But Heidegger and his logic, is, not really logic in the ordinary sense, nor is it logical. He identifies the two, right? And that's a tremendous mistake, right? But in a sense, Plato is somewhat in that same mistake when he says that the what forms, right,

[11:43] are kind of universal causes, and all men partake in the form of man himself, or all dogs in the form of dog himself, right? But now Spinoza comes before Hegel. Spinoza says the order in thoughts and the order in things is the same,

[12:04] and therefore our first thought corresponds to the first thing. Of course, our mind goes from the confused to the distinct. So the first thought of man is the most confused thought, this very confused thought of being something it is, right? And so he identifies that at the beginning of all things, and then Hegel builds upon this, huh?

[12:35] Yeah. Does Thomas acknowledge that in God there's something akin to ideas, like in how he creates things? Well, he says there are many things that God understands, but he understands them all by his own nature. So he has only one thought, you might say, right? One thinking, but he understands everything by that. Now, I used to love to quote this statement of Heraclitus.

[13:11] He says, "Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all." And in a way, he's anticipating what Aristotle does in the fourteen books of wisdom Because in the fourteen books of wisdom, Aristotle becomes strong in what is common to all, but in both senses without confusing the two, right? So Aristotle says that wisdom is about what is said of all, right? It's about being in one, right?

[14:05] And so he considers being in one in general, right? But then it's also about the what very first causes, and they're common to all in the sense that their causality, or his causality, extends to what all things. So Aristotle doesn't what confuse those two,

[14:32] and actually, even in the *Proemium to wisdom*, there he, when he works out the six-point description of the wise man, he explicitly argues in the first three, wisdom being about what is said of all, and for the last three, wisdom being about the first causes, he keeps the two quite what distinct. And yet, there is a reason why these are both considered in the same what knowledge, right?

[15:01] And I often use the example there. You know, if there was a science about the king, right, this would also be a science about the citizen,

[15:13] because the causality of the king extends to all what citizens, right? And if there is a science about the general, right, it would also be the science about the soldier, because the causality of the general extends to all those of whom soldier is what said, right? And just as citizen is said of more than soldier, that is to say, every soldier is a citizen, but not every citizen is a soldier.

[15:49] So the causality of the king extends further than the causality of the what general, right? And so, there's certain correspondence, right? That the more

[16:02] universal or common your cause is, is the further its causality extends. The more common, in the other sense, you want to talk about it. They

[16:17] often compare ethics there to medicine or carpentry or something like that, right? Medicine is about health, but health is not the end of all things, even in human things, right? But ethics is about human happiness, which is the end of all human things, the goal of all human things.

[16:46] So ethics will talk about all human goods in general, as well as about happiness, then. And Aristotle, in the seventh book of the Politics, right, he talks about very explicitly about all the goods of man, right. And Socrates in the dialogues often talks about all the goods of man, and so the division of all the goods of man into the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, the exterior goods, and then which of these are better, and so on, right?

[17:27] That belongs to the philosopher, right? It doesn't belong to the medical doctor, as such, So, in some sense, ethics is like wisdom, right? In that it's very universal, and it's about also the end of the whole human life.

[17:56] But happiness is common to all we do in the sense of being what a cause of all we do, right? Why, you know, human doing is common in the sense of being set of everything we do, right?

[18:18] And so, ethics will talk about both, but you don't confuse the one two. So it's interesting what the great Heraclitus said, right? Those who speak with understanding, well, by Antonomasia, those who speak with understanding are the wise.

[18:39] Not only do they understand, but the wise man most of all understands, huh? And does the wise man do? He talks about the first causes, which are common in one sense. He talks about being in one, which are common in another sense. He talks about the axioms, which are common in another way. and he becomes strong. with What is common to all? That's why he speaks with understanding.

[19:12] Others don't. But. It's a very gross instance confusion to mix up the, in Latin they call universale in causando, and the universale in predicando, right?

[19:37] In English, there you have these two things: with the general, right? So the general, of the army, Douglas MacArthur, is an individual, right? He's not a. He's not said to anybody else, but he runs the whole army, right? But soldier is general in a what? In another sense, So, it's. Said of everybody in the army, right? Douglas MacArthur is not said of everybody in the army, right?

[20:08] I was reading a book there, and I was out. My dad is there. They're quoting a remark of President Roosevelt. I guess he's with his buddies there in the White House, and got a call from Huey Long, you know, down Louisiana. And after the call, you know, he was saying, "Huey Long, one of the two most dangerous men in the country." Everybody, who's the other guy? He says Douglas MacArthur.

[20:35] But anyway, so yeah, I mentioned how Shakespeare puns in those two senses of general. Remember that in Troilus and Cressida, because in Cressida comes over to the Greek camp, the general Agamemnon gives her a kiss, right? She's a much just woman, right? And then Nestor wants to get everybody into the act of kissing her, right? She's she's been kissed by the general, but she hasn't been kissed in general.

[21:11] But he's punning, right? So I often say, you know, Shakespeare is wiser, you know, and pun puns on these because he sees the two different senses, and he's wiser than than Hegel, right?

[21:25] That's what General Schwarzkopf said. One of the few times we listened to the news, and we're back towards the beginning when the Gulf First Gulf War was going on. They had a press conference, and some reporters said, "Well, generally speaking, " he has a question. Schwarzkopf said, "You got to understand, generals always speak general. "

[21:54] Okay, so we're down here to the replies and get through them. Look at the first objection. I guess right to the first, therefore ought to be said that the Son of God is incarnate, the incarnate Son of God is the Savior, the common Savior of all men, right? Not by commonness of genus or species, which would be attributed to the nature separated from the individual. So, what is a genus?

[22:24] If you take the name and say genus is a name said with one meaning, right, of many things other in kind, signifying what it is, right? And a species is said if it's lowest species, it's a name said with one meaning of many different ones individually, right? In answer to the question, what it is, but he's not common in that sense, but by the commonness of a cause, right?

[22:52] In so far as the Son of God incarnate, the incarnate Son of God is universal cause of the salvation of what man. Now has this universality and causality because he's God made what man? Okay. Now the per se man of whom Plato spoke, right, is not found in rerum natura. Thus, that it be aside from singulars, as a Platonist laid down.

[23:28] Although some say that Plato did not understand the separate man, except in the divine understanding, right? Okay. And thus it would not be necessary that he be assumed by the word, since from eternity he would be what present, huh?

[23:48] Now sometimes we say Plato arrives at his position by thinking that the way we know must be the way what things are if we know truly. You've heard me talk about that as a central question of philosophy. Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are, right? And at first sight it might seem yes, right, because truth is a conformity of the mind with what things, the agreement of the mind with things.

[24:21] And but Aristotle answers the question no, right? Okay. And you have to approach it as they say by manuduction, right? You know, bit by bit, right? Okay. And when Aristotle and Thomas begin talking about it in the second book of Natural Hearing, they talk about how the distinction in order, right, in which we know things, is not what

[24:53] the same, right? So we can know in distinction things that don't exist in distinction, and we can know things in the reverse order that they come in things. So like Sherlock Holmes says to Watson, we have to reason backwards. And Holmes says, "What do you mean? Well, from the effect to the cause, right? So is our mind false in knowing the effect before the cause when in things the cause is before the effect?

[25:25] Aristotle, in a sense, is saying if you don't distinguish between the order in which we know and the order in which things come, then you're going to end up being mistaken, right? Same. And that happens all the time, right?

[25:44] But the other way you could argue for Plato, you could say that well, before what is through another is what is through itself, right? Are you a man through being Michael?

[26:01] Am I a man through being Dwayne? Is Socrates a man through being Socrates? Well, if it's through being Socrates that one is a man, then Socrates would be the only man. Therefore, it seems like Socrates is not a man to himself, but to another. And therefore, there must be someone or something that is man to itself, and that's the per se homo. But then, as Aristotle shows in the seventh book of Wisdom, it's not possible for a man to be what without matter, right?

[26:42] And the universal has to be without at least individual matter. Just like you have these people who think there must be something that is bad to itself,

[26:56] when you realize that bad is really a lack of something you're able to have and should have, well, then there's got to be something besides the bad in the bad, and therefore there can't be something bad to itself.

[27:14] People get a little mixed up and find that principle, right? Get to the third objection now, right? To the third, it should be said that human nature, although it is not assumed in the concrete, as if a what suppositum or hypostasis is understood before the assumption, is nevertheless assumed in the individual, right? Because it is assumed that might be in the individual person, namely the word, yeah.

[28:00] That's the way he explained it before the word animal, there in Democritus. So he answers the Platonists, but knows how, in that position, that he assumed human nature abstracted from the individuals. They're kind of confusing the what universal cause with the universal predication, right? And kind of mixing up the two, huh? You got a universal cause there, the Word of God, and you've got universal predication. The two are joined together in this false understanding or this misunderstanding of what incarnation is, right? To the fifth article here, right?

[29:06] Whether the Son of God should have assumed human nature in all individuals, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that the Son of God ought to assume human nature in all individuals.

[29:22] For that which is first and per se assumed is human nature. What belongs per se to some nature belongs to all existing in that nature. Therefore, it is suitable that he assume human nature in all.

[29:47] Yeah. It wouldn't be you anymore. I would be you. I got to be. Moreover, the divine incarnation proceeded from the divine charity. Therefore, it is said in John three sixteen, God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son. But charity brings about that one communicates to one's friends as much as possible. But it's possible that the Son of God assumed many what natures of men.

[30:25] We talked about that before, right? And for the same reason, he could assume all if he wanted to. Therefore, it would be suitable to show his charity, right? But the Son of God assumed nature in all. supposita I notice at the bottom of the page here in the parallels they have reference to the third book of the sentences, right? So these opinions must come up, right? Yeah.

[30:58] Moreover, the wise man, the wise operator, perfects his work in the briefest way possible, right? But it's a more brief way if all men were assumed to the natural what sonhood, then that to one natural son many were brought into the adoption of sons. Therefore, human nature ought to be assumed by the Son of God in all what. Supposita. But against this is what Damascene says in the third book that the Son of God did not assume human nature, which is considered the species.

[31:43] Nor did he assume all what. Hypostasis huh Okay, Thomas, let's make some sense out of this. now. I answer: It should be said. It was not suitable that human nature be assumed in all supposita by the word.

[32:05] First, because it would take away the multitude of what supposita of human nature, which would be what connatural to man, right? Because in the assumed nature, one does not consider any other suppositum apart from that of the person assuming.

[32:31] If there were not a human nature except that what assumed, yeah, would follow that there was not except what one suppositum of human nature, which is the person assuming, huh?

[32:50] Second, it would derogate, take away from the dignity of the Son of God the incarnate one, in so far as he is the first one generated in many what brothers, according to human nature, just as he is the first born of every creature, according to his divine nature.

[33:14] For then all men would be of equal dignity. God hates equality. as the old TJ Kasurik used to say. Third, because it would be suitable that, just as one divine suppositum is made incarnate, so one human nature alone, right, would be assumed, so that from both parts there would be found what unity, huh? One to one, right?

[33:59] Marriage, I guess, supposed to be one to one, huh? Okay. Let's look at the first objection there again. The first, therefore, should be said that to be assumed belongs secundum se to human nature, because it does not belong to it by reason of the person, just as it belongs to the divine nature to assume by reason of the what person, not because it belongs to him secundum se as such, as pertaining to his essential principles or as its natural property.

[34:55] Through which mode it would belong to, or what? Supposita What's he saying there, he's basically denying that it belongs to man, or human nature as such, to be what? Yeah, in the way in which you'd say it belongs to the triangle, such to be what? Has interior angles a bit of two right angles, or something of that sort, huh? Or belongs to two as such to be what?

[35:43] Half of four, right? Okay. So when you say it's suitable that human nature be assumed, we don't mean that it what falls in the very essential principles of human nature that it be assumed, huh? Because then it would be common to all men to be assumed, huh?

[36:03] On to the second objection, it should be said. This is the one from the love of God, right? He's not showing enough love here. The second, it should be said that the love of God to men is made known not only in the assumption of human nature, but most of all, right, especially to those things which he what suffered in his human nature for other men. According to that of Romans five verse eight, our Lord commended his love for us because when we were what enemies, Christ died for us,

[36:45] which would not have place if he assumed human nature in what all men, huh? So is Christ's love for us shown more by his what he suffered for us than by his becoming man? Sort of like the coffee and sugar being sweet. If it said,

[37:19] I mean, the fact that he joined human nature to him is a sign of love because that's the first effect of love, to you. Yeah, that's right. But does he show his love for us more by that or by what he suffered? By what he suffered, but otherwise he would show it more by being more, assuming more human. Is that it's sort of like the I guess the A makes no B or something.

[37:42] Hmm. Is that that's sort of part of the resolution of this that he shows the love of the incarnation through what he suffered for us? Yeah, but he says greater love than this hath no man, right? He laid down his life for his friends, right? Maybe his life, his love is shown more by that, right, than by the fact of incarnation. Showed by that too. Yeah, it's shown by that, but also the fact that he suffered shows the love of the incarnation as well.

[38:17] Yeah. He couldn't show that if he had assumed all of us. It would be way too deep. Okay. Now, as far as the brevity of life, the brevity of the way, Brevity is the soul wisdom, right? To the third, it should be said that to the briefness of the way, the wise man, what observes, huh?

[38:50] It pertains that he does not what do through many what he could what. just do through one, And therefore is most suitable that through one man he saved all the rest. Brevity.

[39:12] You can't have less than one. Can you? That's a good question. You say something else you wanted first. No. So in the body of the article, you said the Son of God assumed many human individuals, so then their underlying or the supposed power would be taken away, right? What is natural to them? Yeah, natural to men to have what many persons in the same nature. Okay. So in a sense, you'd be going against human nature.

[39:52] I'd do this. Okay, is that because I was trying to see if if that would be what the distinction would be between that and saying, well, if the Son of God assumed a human person, why that human person wouldn't be taken away as well? Like when you. would have to do that Yeah, there'd be no problem, but there'd be no problem. I mean, since he's addressing that when he says that there wouldn't be any persons in human nature if he assumed human nature and all the individuals.

[40:21] Okay, because I think that's kind of what I was thinking of when he first asked if he assumed a person. I was thinking, well, that person would kind of be annihilated into the divine person, taken away, and all that's left is the divine person. In that sense. Yeah. The only person, yeah. Okay.

[40:39] Kind of goes back to that argument against the angel, because you have a nature without its own person. When a man, of course, you can have what. A person of the same nature. You can have many persons in the same nature, right? But if you destroyed that, but assuming all natures, right, then you've got that same problem you have with just assuming one angelic nature. This nature would not exist with its own personality.

[41:24] Okay. To the sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that it was not suitable that the Son of God assumed human nature from the what?

[41:40] Stop that now. For it says, for the apostle says to, Epistle to the Hebrews chapter seven. It was suitable. It was suitable that the what? There'd be a Pontifex. A priest for us, segregated from sinners, right? But he would be more separated from sinners if he did not assume human nature from the root of Adam, the sinner. Therefore, it seems that he ought not to have what assumed human nature from the.

[42:17] Stock of Adam, yeah. Moreover, in every genus, that is a more noble beginning. Um. Or in every genus, that is a is more noble, beginning than that which is from the beginning.

[42:39] If therefore he wished to what, assume human nature, he ought to more have assumed it in Adam himself, right? Moreover, the Gentiles were more what sinners than the Jews, as the gloss says. in Galatians chapter two. We by nature are Jews, not from what, not sinners from the Gentiles. If therefore from sinners he ought wish to assume human nature, he had to more assume it from Gentiles than from the seed of what.

[43:17] Abraham, right? Who was just. Against this is what is said, Luke three chapter twenty three. The generation of the Lord is reduced or led back to what? Already Adam. The answer should be said that, as Augustine says in the thirteenth book of the Trinity about the Trinity, that the that God would be able to what. Receive men elsewhere, right? And from the genus, of Adam, huh? That's why the other senses of genus.

[43:56] The multitude of men descended from one man. One of the meanings of Aristotle gives in the fifth book of Wisdom. Who by his sin obligated human race? But he judged it better, right?

[44:24] That from the one who was the what victim was it? Overcome, I guess, the conqueror. Oh, okay. Yeah. Yeah, you might assume it from the one who was overcome, right, by the devil, right?

[44:51] To whom he might overcome or conquer the enemy, the human race, right? And this on account of three reasons. First, because it seems to pertain to justice that he satisfy who what sin, and therefore from the nature corrupted through it, he had to assume that to which satisfaction would be fulfilled for the whole human nature. That touches upon one of the reasons why the incarnation, remember? That the one who sins should make reparation, right?

[45:27] Secondly, because this pertains to the greater dignity of man, who from that what genus, the victor over the devil would be born, who was what overcome through the devil, yeah. Those reasons are very close together, right? And third, through this also, the power of God would be shown more, right? Who of a corrupt nature and infirm one would assume that which was promoted, right? Into so great a power in what dignity, right?

[46:06] Now, how about the first objection about being separated from sinners? The first, therefore, should be said that Christ ought to be separated or segregated from sinners as regards guilt, right, which he came to destroy. Not, however, as regards the nature which he came to what save, according to that that he ought to be likened to his brothers in all things, as the apostle says.

[46:40] And in this also, more marvelous is his innocence, right? That from the mass subject to sin, he assumed a what? The nature assumed would have such purity, right?

[47:05] Of course, maybe Mary more than Thomas understood, right? Would be pure. Okay, now the second objection. Why not assume Adam, right? The second should be said that, as has been said, is necessary that he who has come to take away sin to be segregated from sinners as regards what guilt, huh? To which Adam was what subject, and whom Christ led out from his what? Right.

[47:48] Is necessary that the one who came to cleanse all ought not to be what? Cleansed himself, right? Just as in each genus, the first mover is immobile according to that motion. That's the common point that Aristotle made. Just as the first thing altering is inalterable, and thus it would not be suitable that he assumed human nature in Adam himself.

[48:27] Now, what about getting it from the Gentiles? To the third, it should be said that because Christ ought to be most of all segregated from sinners as regards guilt, as were obtaining the what height of innocence. It was suitable that from the first sinner, as far as Christ would arrive, right,

[48:55] through many just in between, right, in which there would shine a little bit certain signs of the future sanctity, right. And a kind of which also the people from whom Christ was to be born, God instituted certain signs of sanctity, which began Abraham, who first received the promise of what Christ. And circumcision, as a sign of the federation, the contract being consummated, as is said in Genesis seventeen eleven.

[49:41] Okay.