Tertia Pars
20. Aquinas on the Incarnation (ST III q.6 a.4–6): Flesh and Soul Assumed Together, the Whole Before the Parts, and the Role of Grace
Class of 2009-01-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/020-aquinas-on-the-incarnation-st-iii-q-6-a-4-6-flesh-and-soul/

[0:00] Now what is this next article? It's a strange one. This is the reverse, huh? Was the flesh united to what? The word before the soul was what united, huh? To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that the flesh of Christ was first assumed by the word, then it was united to the what? Soul.

[0:33] For Augustine says in the book on Faith to Peter, hold most firmly, right, and in no way doubt. That's pretty strong. How does your translation work? That's a lot funny. The English translation. Yeah, I'm sorry. Most firmly hold and no wise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the word.

[1:14] It seems like it's being assumed there, right? In the flesh. But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been first conceived and united to the rational soul, because the material disposition is before in the way of generation than the what form that completes, huh?

[1:36] Therefore, before was the flesh of Christ assumed and it was united to the what? Soul, huh? So in Aristotle's way of looking at it, then the body is first of all kind of like a plant, right? It has like a plant soul, but not a permanent plant soul, right? Upon the way, and then an animal soul, right? And finally, he sees the what rational soul, right?

[2:11] So if this is before in the order of generation, why wouldn't flesh be assumed, right? Moreover, just as the soul is a part of human nature, so the body. But the human soul does not have another beginning of its being in Christ than other men, as is clear as we saw in the previous article from the authority of Leo Papa, huh? Therefore, it seems that neither would the body of Christ have a what another or different way a beginning of being than in us.

[2:49] But in us, flesh is conceived before the rational soul comes. Therefore, also it was in Christ, and thus flesh was what. Assumed by the Word before it is united to the soul. So a lot of times this goes back to the definition of soul, which Aristotle works out in the second book of the about the soul. But the soul is the first act of a natural body composed of tools.

[3:18] So if the body doesn't have this distinction of organs and tools, then it would have this form that we call the soul, right? And so, you know, in the body, when I say there's a fertilized egg or something, this is the seed. What you first see is what cell division and growth, something that we have in common with the plant, right? Huh? Then later on you you see what sensation, right?

[3:46] And then later on, right? Yeah. So, so we just argued in the previous one, right? From your Papa, I guess, or somebody. That wouldn't be different, right? As far as the origin of the soul, so why should the origin of the body be different, right?

[4:07] Moreover, as is said in the book De Causis, the first cause flows more into the caused, and is more and is united to it before the second cause. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a what second cause to the first. Therefore, the Word is united to the flesh before the soul.

[4:37] That's a difficult proposition in the book of Causis, but. We will see. Thomas says about that. But against this is what Damascene says in the third book. That simul, right?

[4:56] The flesh of the Word of God at the same time, the flesh what Animated animated, rational, intellectual, right? Didn't have an animal soul there and a plant soul or something. Therefore, the union of the Word to the flesh did not precede the union to what the soul, right?

[5:19] Thomas, I guess, is going to go back maybe to the arguments that is the flesh really worthy or suitable to be assumed without having the soul, right? I answer it should be said that human flesh is able to be assumed by the Word by the order which it has to the rational soul as to its own form. But this order it does not have before the rational soul comes to it.

[5:54] Because at once or at the same time, when some matter becomes what the proper matter for some form, it receives that form. Whence, in the same instant, alteration which is disposing the body to receive the new form, right, is ended, in which is brought in the substantial form. And hence it is that flesh ought not to be assumed before it was what human flesh,

[6:32] which it is made when the rational soul comes. Just therefore, as the soul is not assumed before the flesh, right, because it would be against the nature of the soul that it be before it be united to the body, that's what is actually the form of the body. So the flesh ought not to be assumed before the soul, because it is not really what human flesh before it has a rational soul.

[7:06] You convinced of that? Well, I all through this, I'm trying to sort of pieces I've heard about the souls of Thomas Aquinas and these ideas of abortion and when the soul, you know, the soul isn't like animation. I've heard that term, and I'm not sure what Thomas says elsewhere about, but I my impression is that he wasn't sure when you know that he thought. He didn't think that humans that the rational soul was there at conception.

[7:43] Yeah, at the very moment of conception, yeah, yeah, and that goes back, as I say, to the definition of what the soul is, right? Yeah. It's the substantial form of a body composed of what tools, right? Organs. So if you don't have the organs there, right, then you wouldn't have the form of that kind of body. See. And so for Thomas, following Aristotle, right, there's a series of generations, right, and it's like you're a plant before you're an animal, an animal before you're a what, a man, right, huh?

[8:20] Okay. In that case, that doesn't say exactly when the change takes place, right? Okay. Um. But you know, I mean, when you work your way back from from, let's say,

[8:44] you talk about the evil abortion, right? See, you could give an argument against abortion even before the rational soul was there, even though you might say it would be, unless you sin, but that's a great sin, right, huh? Okay. Right. And and Thomas, you know, when he takes up the moral question of let's say masturbation, right, huh? That's a very serious sin, right? But that's a less sin than murder, right?

[9:15] Okay. So the closer you are to an actual human being, the more what heinous or more evil is the is the sin, right? Yeah. But it doesn't mean that the sin begins only when it acts a human being. Right. Same. Otherwise, masturbation would not be wrong, right? And and the fertilized egg and whatever stages may go through before it becomes a man, if that's true, would be even closer, right, to an actual man than the seed in masturbation, right?

[9:58] Um. But even if that's wrong, then a priori the Yeah right Okay similar way that Yeah example another example reasoning the same way about say a moral doubt. You'd say, well, because this is even closer to something as you know is common, and that would be if you're out hunting and you know you're out with your buddy hunting a deer. Right. You know he's over there somewhere. You see something move in the bush.

[10:25] You're not sure if it's a deer or your buddy. You shoot at it. Well, you know your buddy's out there. You're not really sure if that's him, but you still commit a sin, even if it wasn't your buddy. You still commit a sin. You were willing to kill somebody. So, so the same way here, I think that's what that one of the priests arguing on the bio ethics.

[10:43] That's one of the arguments he urges for, even if it was true, it isn't really human life yet. But the fact is, not sure. Not sure. Yeah, we're not sure. If there's a moral doubt, you still have no right to act. You never act with a doubtful conscience in that respect. Okay, now in regard to the first objection, there he says, I think sometimes you know, aren't there some of these other Pope Paul people who might argue from Christ to us, right?

[11:27] What takes place in our conception, you know? I think I'd be careful about that, right? Because look at what Thomas says in regard to the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that human flesh gets its being through the soul, right? And therefore, before the coming of the soul is not human flesh, but there's able to be a disposition for human flesh, right? But now, in the conception, nevertheless, of Christ, right, the Holy Spirit, who is an agent of what infinite power, which your daddy was not, a Simo, right?

[12:14] At the same time, right, together, both disposes the matter and brings it to what? Yeah. But maybe your daddy couldn't do that. See, see. So you got to be kind of careful if you if you want to argue and say that there's a rational soul in the fertilized egg. See, that maybe not be certain, right? Even though in Christ there was always what the two together, right?

[12:41] But the agens infinite virtutis here, right, is not your father, but the the Holy Spirit, right? You see what I mean? Yes. You got to be careful, you know, of reasoning and not saying that we know by faith that the rational soul is there from. The beginning, because this is so in Christ. Well, maybe there's a difference there between us and Christ, right? Sure. Okay. Because his daddy, not his daddy.

[13:17] No, yeah, because his, because his. I've just been reading all this generated the genealogy of Matthew's gospel, all these mistakes. Yeah, Okay. now the second objection is directly saying, well, he's got to be the same as us, right? In every respect. To the second, it should be said that the form and act gives the species a specific nature. The matter, however, as far as itself is concerned, is in ability, right, in potency to the species.

[13:56] And therefore, to be against the notion of the form, that it what preexists the nature of the species, which species is perfected by its union to matter. But it is not against the nature of matter that it preexists to the what nature of the species. And therefore, that's the word now dissimilitude, right? The unlikeness, you might say, right? Which is between our origin and the origin of Christ, according as our flesh is before conceived, than it is what animated.

[14:38] Not, however, the flesh of what Christ. And according to that, which what precedes the completion of nature, right? Speaking about us, I guess. Just as we are conceived from the seed of the man, right? Not, however, Christ, but from the what Holy Spirit overshadowed her, right?

[15:07] But the difference which would be, as you in regard to the origin of the soul, if the soul existed before the body, right? That would what? Redound to a diversity of nature, right? Would lead to a diversity of nature. Now,

[15:32] let me take a very crude example here of a different kind of form, right, or known form, right. You see difficulty in wood existing before the chair.

[15:46] But do you see some difficulty in the form of the chair existing before the the wood existed? Ahead. Huh? Yes. Because the form of the chair, something that's going to exist in the wood, right? It doesn't make any sense for the form of the chair to exist before the matter of which the chair is made exists, right? But it's not inappropriate that the matter of which the chair is to be made should, in some sense, exist before the chair actually exists, right?

[16:24] Now, the third objection to that difficult proposition for the book of De Causis. Thomas has a commentary in the book Of course, in the early works of Thomas, he was still following the opinion that the book De Causis was written by Aristotle, right? And then, of course, he realizes that it's not by Aristotle. Oh, wow. What? But he has a commentary on the book De Causis, and you know, occasionally disagrees with some things in there, but he has a great deal of respect for it.

[16:55] Was it some sort of Greek Greek work, or? Yeah, it's a Greek work. It goes back to after Aristotle. Yeah, yeah, when the when the Neoplatonists there trying to think of whose name is now. I know his name, but I can't think of it.

[17:12] But then it was it was kind of modified by the Arabs and so on, you know, taking these things. Yeah. Thomas, getting to figure out what it was.

[17:32] Now, to the third objection, it should be said that the Word of God, right, is understood before to be united to the flesh, then the soul

[17:46] through the common way in which He is what in other creatures, right, through His essence, power, and presence. Before I say, however, not in time, but in what nature? For before is understood flesh to be a certain being which it has in the Word, then it be what animated, right, which it has in the soul.

[18:15] But by the personal union, before in our understanding, is necessary that the flesh be united to the soul, then to the what Word. Because from its union to the soul, it has that it is able to be united to the Word in person, especially because person is not found except in a what rational nature. So don't worry too much about that objection.

[18:48] Take a little break now, or is it? Yeah. So up to article what five here, right? Okay. The fifth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the Son of God would assume the whole of human nature by means of its what parts, huh?

[19:12] For Augustine says in the book on Christian agony that the invisible and unchangeable truth, that's capitalized meaning the, when it says I am truth, through the spirit, the soul, and through the soul the body, and thus he assumed the whole man, right? But spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore, the whole man was assumed. He assumed the whole man by means of the what parts.

[19:48] Moreover, therefore, the Son of God assumed flesh by means of the soul, or by the soul as a middle term, because the soul is more like God than the body.

[20:05] But the parts of human nature, since they are more simple, would seem to be more like God, who is altogether simple, right? Who is most simple than the whole? Therefore, he assumed the whole by means of the parts.

[20:27] That's overlooking the main difference between us and God, right? Huh? Between the material world, where the simple is imperfect, right? While in God the simple is the perfect. Moreover, the whole results in union of parts. But union is understood as the end of the assumption. The parts are understood as before the assumption. Therefore, he assumed the whole through the what parts.

[21:02] But against this is what Damascene says in the third book. In the Lord Jesus Christ, we do not what the parts of the parts, but which are what,

[21:18] but things that are in a proximate way, right? Composed, to wit, the godhood and the what humanity. But humanity is a certain whole that is put together from the soul and the body as from parts. Therefore, the Son of God assumed the parts through the middle of the whole.

[21:43] Now Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that when it is said that something is in the middle in the taking on of the incarnation." Well, there is not designated the order of time, right? Okay, now that's why does he put that forward? Because we tend to fall back upon the earlier and even upon the first meaning of a word, right? Because simo, well, simo is what?

[22:09] Together or at once. Yeah, yeah. In English, usually say together, right? So if you and I came at the same time, right? Together, we came together. We came at the same time. Not one of us before or after the other. Aristotle takes up simo, haman in Greek, right after he takes up before and after, right? Because it's known by its negation, being neither before nor after. But simo is made the assuming of the whole and of all the parts.

[22:48] For it has been shown that together the soul and the body are united to each other, constituting human nature in the word. But there is designated instead there the order of what? Nature. Whence through that which is before by nature is taken on that which is after by nature.

[23:14] Something, however, is before by nature in two ways. One way from the side of the agent, in another from the side of matter, for these two kinds of causes pre-exist to the thing. Now, from the side of the agent, that is simply first, which first falls in his intention.

[23:44] But secundum quid, right? Is first that from which his doing operation begins, right? And this because his intention is before his what? Operation, right?

[24:07] On the side of matter, from the side of matter, that is before, which exists before in the transformation of matter. But now, in the incarnation, is necessary most of all to pay attention to the order which is on the side of the agent. Because, as Augustine says, there he comes in that again. Because as Augustine says in the Epistle to Volusianum, in such things the whole reason of the thing done is the power of the one doing it.

[24:47] Sounds like the resurrection, right? Where Christ says to the Sadducees, right? You know neither the power of God nor the Scriptures. But is manifest that according to the intention of the one making, before always is the complete, then the incomplete, right? So for the house builder, what is before in his intention? The foundation of the house or the whole house. You might, in fact, make the foundation for the rest of the house, as far as my experience of this is.

[25:26] Okay. And consequently, he says, therefore the whole, then the what parts, right? And therefore it should be said that the Word of God took on the parts of human nature by means of the what? Yeah, or by the whole as the middle.

[25:51] Just as He took on the body on account of the order which it has to the reasonable soul, so He took on the body and the soul on account of the order which they have to what human nature as a whole. So he's consistent here, this guy. His thinking is right, I can see.

[26:17] Now, from that text of Augustine, right? To the first, therefore it should be said that from those words of Augustine, nothing is given to be understood except that the Word, in taking on the parts of human nature, took on the what whole human nature. And thus the taking on of the parts is before in the what? In the via, in the road of operation, in our understanding, not in time.

[26:48] But the assumption of the nature is before in the via intentionis, which is to be before, simply as has been said, right? Okay. We've talked about those two orders before, haven't we? Now sometimes Thomas will quote scripture where he'll say, "Do good and avoid evil," right? Other times he'll say, "Now turn away from evil and do good." And Thomas says, "Well, what's the difference in these two orders?"

[27:20] Say, "Well, to do good and avoid evil is the order of intention, but to turn away from evil and do good is the order of what?" execution. Yeah. I've mentioned how, in the order of the Our Father, you have which order?

[27:42] Intention. Yeah, yeah. So the first two petitions of the Our Father are for the end: "Hallowed be Thy name, Thy kingdom come." The next two petitions are for the means: "Thy will be done," right? And give us this day the. Chief end or chief means and the supporting one, and the last is the ones that are dealing with the impediments to the end. Right? Forgive us our sins and don't lead us into, you know, other sins.

[28:16] But in the Psalms, in the way Thomas following Augustine divides them, right? You have the Psalms divided into three fifties, and the first fifty are about turning away from your sin, right? The second fifty are about doing good deeds and going forward, and the last fifty about resting in God, right? So that's more in the order of what? Yeah, and that's kind of appropriate, huh? Because the Psalms are much longer than the, Be our Father, right?

[28:48] So you have those two different orders here. huh. Now the second objection was saying, well, even in the order of suitability of taking on, right? Aren't the parts more like God, right? Well, he said because they're simpler. The second should be said that God is such that he what is in such a way simple that he's also most perfect, and therefore the whole is more like God than the part insofar as it is more what perfect, right?

[29:36] Okay. So Thomas makes a big point of that in the prima pars, if you remember, right? Because he takes up what simplicity of God and then the perfection of God, right? Kind of in contrast with material things, right? Where material things the more composed is more perfect, right? And so it's kind of an opposition between simplicity and perfection, right? Now, do you ever transcend that in material things?

[30:06] Does a simpler ever become? Now, sometimes in our making, you know, they tell me that the first computers were much bigger and they filled a whole room, and they couldn't do anything compared to a little thing to do, right?

[30:21] Yeah, yeah. Now they get you know smaller and do more, right? You know. And Aristotle, you know, when he's comparing tragedy and comedy, right? And he says which is superior, tragedy or comedy? Huh? And he argues that they have you know they're similar because they both have the same effect, pity and fear, right? But tragedy produces this effect with fewer what

[30:46] words, right? Yeah, so it's more perfect, huh? So sometimes the simpler or the shorter is more what? Yeah. And I've talked a lot about you know brevity is the soul of wit, right? But the wise man will say what?

[31:03] Yeah. So sometimes, you have a little kind of what foreshadowing there, right? Of what God will be, right? That he will be most simple, but most perfect, as Teresa of Avila says. You know, God is altogether simple, and the closer you get to God, the simpler you are.

[31:23] Shakespeare has the sonnet there, you know, where he says some you know the simple miscalled simplicity, right? But generally speaking, in material things, you can say an animal is more perfect than a plant, and a man more so than a. And and yet, the more perfect, but more composed, right? More complex, right? Huh? Sort of like that was our prayer in different ways. You can consider prayer with words, prayer without words.

[31:58] Prayer with words is in some way more perfect, but it's not more simple. No, no. The dentist is my name, I'm going to get it crowned again. you know, I said, all this complication of the human life. I say, you know, It seems complicated. you know, all the things the dentist is doing. you know, and root canals and all kinds of stuff. The. Next time you come, we'll sing "Crowning with Many Crowns."

[32:26] Yeah, yeah. The nurses ask me. I was just thinking. Yeah, I know. That's everything about crown. The nurses asked me, or the system, "I was even crowned before." You shouldn't say quite cleverly. You can set a schedule for your coronation. Yes, yes, yes. Three coronations.

[32:59] Okay, so we're a tertiary, I guess. Right? Yeah. The whole results in the union of parts objection says, but union is understood as the end of assumption.

[33:14] Therefore, the parts are pre-understood. To the third, should be said that the personal union to which is terminated the assumption. That the personal union is that to which assumption is what terminated,

[33:37] but not, however, the union of nature which results from the conjunction of the parts. So that's confusing the two unions. I guess that's an objection. It's plain objection, right? Now, whether the Son of God took on human nature by means of what, grace? Huh. Very thorough, Thomas.

[34:18] Aristotle talks about these guys like Thomas there in the second book of wisdom. You know, some people don't want to read these guys. He says because they seem to be kind of, you know, stingy him, and you know, you know, liberal. He says because they want to clarify a real point. and some people think that's like being, you know,

[34:45] I used to go out to dinner with the other bachelor professors when I was a bachelor, you know, and of course, you know, when you get the bill, you know, we just kind of throw our money in, you know, and so on. But this one old professor, we always thought he just paid just his share. Yeah, he used to annoy us that way, you know, this guy.

[35:06] So the guys, you know, that way with money, we don't think that's a good idea to be that picky about money. I mean, so Biden will cost over more than yours, or you know, what? Who cares, you know? So so many people like this, you know, they want to be like that same way. They want to be liberal, you know. Yeah, yeah. Let a few distinctions go by.

[35:24] It's better for humanism. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Forget, yeah, yeah, yeah. Let's pass over these disagreements. here. To the sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that the Son of God took on human nature by means of grace, right? For by grace we are united to God. How can you object to that? But human nature in Christ, most of all, was united to God. Therefore, that union must have been made by grace.

[35:59] And that's convincing. That convinces me. Okay. Moreover, just as the body lives through the soul, which is its perfection, so the soul lives by grace.

[36:17] But human nature is rendered suitable for assumption through the soul. Therefore, the Son of God assumed the soul by means of grace. Again, second thing that convinces me, right?

[36:34] Okay. More of Augustine says in the fifteenth book about the Trinity that the incarnate Word is like our Word in voice, huh? But our Word united to voice by means of the what, Spirit. Therefore, the Word of God is united to the flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and thus by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit. According to that of Saint Paul, one Corinthians, that the divisions of grace there are, but the same Spirit who gives us these.

[37:16] But against this is that grace is a certain accident of the soul, as has been had in the second part. But the union of the Word to human nature is made according to what subsistence in the hypostasis order, and not according to an accident, huh? Therefore, human nature was not assumed by means of grace as a middle.

[37:47] I answer. It should be said that in Christ is laid down the grace of union and what habitual grace, grace therefore cannot be understood. As a what middle in the taking on of human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of what habitual grace.

[38:21] For the grace of union is that what personal being, that gratia. Freely was divinely given to human nature in the person of the what Word. Which is the what limit of the taking on. Habitual grace, however, pertains to the special holiness of that man. And that's an effect following upon his what union. According to that of John one, verse fourteen, we have seen his glory as that of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth.

[39:13] Right. By which is given to be understood, that by the fact that that man is what the only begotten from the Father, which he has through what the hypostatic union, he has this fullness of grace and what truth. So he didn't. You did not know who he was. Some of these contemporary scholars try to say right.

[39:53] If therefore right. If our by grace is understood the will of God, right? Okay. Make doing something gratuitously right or giving, then the union was made by grace, right? But not as a middle, but as the what efficient cause? Now, how the heck do you get God's objections? Because by grace union to God, I can't deny that.

[40:35] Different kinds of being there. Yeah, yeah. And Thomas points out to the first. Therefore, it should be said that our union to God is through our what operation, our doing, in so far as we know Him and what love Him, and therefore such a union is by habitual grace, in so far as perfect operation goes forth from a what habitum, but the union of human nature to the Word of God is not by what operation, but according to the personal being there, which does not depend from some what habitus, but is immediately from the what nature itself.

[41:31] That's interesting when you get out of that difficulty. Tag that knot. He did it through his mother. They describe Thomas's life. He's puzling about something, and he falls down the ground. He starts praying, and then gets up and he says, "Did he?"

[41:57] To second should be said the second objection now that so the body goes to the soul, right, and the soul through what grace, right, and therefore just as he assumed the body through the soul, he should assume the. Do second should be said that the soul is the substantial perfection of the body, huh? The substantial form of the body, but grace is a what accidental. Now, accidental means what?

[42:28] Not not not praisegive. Part of his nature. Part of his nature. Yeah, yeah. Acted constituting subs as an accident, and therefore grace cannot order the soul to the what personal union, which is not an accident.

[42:50] Just. as the soul to the body. Not an accident to the body. Yeah. On the third thing, Our word huh our thought is united to voice huh to the vocal sound by means of spirit, not as a what formal medium, but as the mover, right?

[43:29] For from the word or thought conceived interiorly proceeds the spirit from which is formed the what voice. And similarly, from the eternal word proceeds the Holy Spirit who forms the body of Christ, as is clear below. But from this it does not follow that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the medium in the force at what union, huh? He's the mover

[44:10] Well, that's something. huh Let's go back for a second here about question four here. So let's see where the proemium was. Beginning of question four there. Then one ought to consider about the union on the side of the what assumed right.

[44:49] About which first one ought to consider about those things which are taken on by the word of God right. Secondly, about those things co assumptis taken on together with which are certain perfections and even certain what defects.

[45:13] Now, the first of those two he subdivides then right. Okay, and that corresponds to questions four, five, and six. The Son of God assumed human nature in its parts. When considering the first, a threefold consideration occurs. First, as regards human nature, right. Second, as regards its parts, and then what we just got through. Third, as regards the order of the what assumption, right. Now he's going to talk about the co assumptis, right?

[45:52] Okay. And so at the beginning of question seven, now he's going to subdivide that part. Then one ought to consider about the things assumed with. What he assumed primarily, right, by the Son of God in human nature. And first about those things which pertain to his perfection. Secondly, about those things which pertain to the what defect, right? Now among these defects is not ignorance. But there maybe is a body that can what suffer and so on, right?

[46:35] Now about the first three things should be considered. First, about the grace of Christ, right. Secondly, about his knowledge, huh? It's going to be perfection of him. And third, about his what power.

[47:03] Now about the grace of Christ, there should be considered two things. How could we get two when he said three before? First, about his grace according as he is a what singular man, an individual man. Secondly, about his grace according as he is the what head of the church, right?

[47:33] That these next two questions, right? The question seven, right? And question eight. But about the grace of union, one is already what spoken, right? That referring to the hypostatic union, right? That's called a grace, of union. Oh my God! About the first, he says he asked thirteen things.

[48:03] Maybe we should stop there, huh? Go on. Stop there, yeah.