Tertia Pars
43. Summa III q.16 a.1: Is It True That 'God Is a Man'? Predication, Supposition and the Incarnation
Class of 2009-05-07
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/043-summa-iii-q-16-a-1-is-it-true-that-god-is-a-man-predication/

[0:00] The Father and Son, Holy Spirit, amen. Deo grazias Thank you, Guardian Angels, thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, drink from the lights of our minds, ordain and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand what is written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:33] So, what are those words that Thomas quoted earlier in the Summa? There is it from Hilary or Jerome? Ex verbis in ordinate polatis heresis, heresis incuritor. So you can see why this question is here, right? Huh? How can you speak now about Christ because of what he's taken on here? The word he's taken on. So let's look at the proemium again. Then we're not to consider about those things which follow upon union.

[1:06] And Thomas divides this into hey three, yeah, okay. And first, as regards those things which belong to Christ by himself, right? Secondly, about those things which belong to Christ

[1:24] in comparison to God the Father. And third, about those things which belong to Christ as regards what us, right? Now, about the first, a twofold consideration occurs. First, those things which about those things which belong to Christ according to his being and his coming to be, huh? And secondly, those things that belong to Christ by reason of his what unity, and that will be the next couple, next three, I guess, questions, huh?

[2:04] But sufficient for the days, the evil thereof, right? Now I was looking at the Catena Aurea right, huh? And looking at the text a little bit of the Gospel of Saint John, the thirteenth chapter is the one where. He washes their feet and so on, and and Christ mentions, you know, and usually the text will say, "You call me what? Yeah, or actually, teacher, I think, and it's teacher and and master.

[2:36] And and I am so right, and so goes on to explain this. I was looking at the text there, and actually has the article for both teacher and Lord. You know, because never get to the translation, And so, you call me the teacher, but it's almost like you know he says only one teacher, Christ. He's the teacher by antonomasia, right? But the article is there in the in the Greek, huh?

[3:05] So I don't mean it's another example of antonomasia there, you know, but it's not using the translation, so you know, see that. Now here, of course, you don't have what in Latin you don't have the articles, so Latin is missing a part of speech. But you do have the article in Greek. Shows superiority of Greek to Latin, huh? So about the first, he says twelve things are asked.

[3:36] First, whether this is true that God is, I suppose in English you'd say, a man. huh? So is that true? God is a man. Secondly, whether this is true that man or a man, is what God.

[4:00] Third, whether Christ is able to be called the lordly man. Fourth, whether those things which belong to the Son of Man are able to be said of the Son of God, and the reverse, huh?

[4:24] And then whether those things that belong to the Son of Man are able to be said of the divine nature, and of the human, those things which belong to the what Son of God.

[4:44] A lot of things here about predication. Had somebody at the house last night, and we were going through the Peri Hermeneias, the book on the statement there, and and the talking about the verb being a sign of something said of something, right? Now, as remarking how this runs through logic, right, the way in which something is said of something, so you have the in Latin, you know, you have the first work in logic is the De Praedicabilibus huh?

[5:15] That comes from the Latin word for said of, huh? So genus, difference, property, species, property, accident could be taken as what a complete division of names said univocally of many things, huh? Then you have the categories, but in Latin they call it the predicamenta, and then you have in the logic of the third act, you have all kinds of things about the the four predicates in dialectic, huh?

[5:44] And so on. And a lot of times when Thomas is is commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics, there he'll say that here he's borrowing from logic, or here he's borrowing from natural philosophy, because here he's proceeding per via motus by way of motion, so it's like a borrowing from natural philosophy. And then per viam praedicandi, you know, that's borrowing from logic, right? Well, a lot of this here is about can you say this or that, right?

[6:13] And how can you say this or that? When can you not say it? You better be careful what you say and what. How would you say of me so much, but but you say this one, you know, They've been studying here, huh? Sixth whether question whether this is true, the Son of God was made a what? Man, yeah. Didn't say made flesh, right? Made a man.

[6:45] Seven whether this is true that man was made what? God. Think about that. I am a little more, you know, a little more cautious about that. Whether this is true, Christ is a creature. Yeah, be careful about that one. I think we're gonna be careful about all of them. Nine whether this is true, that this man, pointing at Christ, right, began to be, or was what? Always, huh?

[7:30] Ten whether this is true, Christ as man is a what? Creature. Eleven whether this is true, Christ as man is God. Be careful about that one. Twelve whether this is true, Christ, according as he is a man, is a hypostasis, or a what?

[8:00] Thomas wants to get involved in these things. I don't know, but it makes us stop and be careful here. So to the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that this is false. God is a man.

[8:18] For every statement, affirmative statement in matter, remote is false. So if you say that man is a stone, I say, well, they're so far apart, man and stone. How can man be a stone? But this proposition, this statement,

[8:41] God is a man, is in remote matter, because the form signified by the subject, God, and the predicate, man, are maxime most distant, huh? In further part than man and stone, right? So you can't say man is a stone. How can you say God is a man? I mean, this this is this.

[9:10] Since, therefore, the forecited statement is affirmative, it seems that it is false, right? Incidentally, this is a little side, but propositio, right, is originally the name for the premise of a syllogism, and then by custom, propositio began to stand for statement. So I still like to translate as statement, but rather than proposition, but it's customary to translate it by proposition, right? That's that's the way that's what is you know the word.

[9:45] But propositio means placed before, placed for, right? Yeah. And so it's really the name of statement, not by itself, but insofar as it's a premise in a syllogism. But Thomas is following the custom here. I don't know why he does that, but he does that. Okay.

[10:11] Moreover, the three persons, right, more come together to each other than human nature and the divine nature, right? But in the mystery of the Trinity, one person is not said of another.

[10:36] That would be radical to say the Father God the Father is God the Son, wouldn't it? But yet they have more in common than human nature and divine nature, right?

[10:50] For we do not say that the Father is a Son or the reverse. Therefore, it seems that neither can human nature be said of God,

[11:01] as when it is said that God is a what man? Moreover, our great friend here Athanasius says that just as the soul and the flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ. One Christ is

[11:22] This is false. that the soul is the body. Therefore, this is false that God is what man. Yeah. Notice that second argument. It seems to be arguing that what from the Fortiori, right? That you can't say the Father is a Son even though they have more in common than human nature and divine nature. Well, how can you say that the other right? Can't even say about them.

[11:54] Though Christ does say the Father and I are one. There's a hidden third thing there. Yeah. Moreover, as in the first part is bad. and we're talking about predication there. What is said of God not relatively, right, But absolutely, right? Notice the word absolute is often just taken as the what opposite of relative, right? So relative is what pros ti ad aliquid towards another, right? And then they sometimes say the absolute is in itself, but understood negatively, right?

[12:42] Not towards another, right? I'd say to oneself, right? But mean that to another. So what is said of God not relatively, like Father and Son are, but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each what person. But this name man is not relative, but what absolute. If therefore it were truly said of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each person is man, which is clearly what false.

[13:21] So you all convinced now? If I drop dead at this moment, you all. I think you all straight. I have to explain it to upstairs.

[13:34] Or downstairs, where they send me. But against this, this one of the most beautiful texts for for the incarnation, Thomas often refers to it. But against this is what is said in Philippians chapter two, verses six and seven, who, when he was in the form of God,

[14:01] emptied himself, right, taking on the form of a servant, made in the likeness of men, in essential likeness of men, and habit to inhabit, right, found as a man, right,

[14:20] and thus the one who was in the form of God or God, in other words, right, is man. But he was in the form of God as God. Therefore, God is a man. That's pretty convincing. Excellent. Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that this proposition, this statement, 'God is a man, ' is conceded by all what Christians, huh? " But not by Roger Haight, apparently.

[14:55] Okay. He's not a Christian. He's a Jesuit. But incidentally, you know, which is worse, to lose charity or to lose faith? To lose faith. Yeah. Because if you lose faith, you lose hope and charity. Yeah. So it's worse to lose faith than to lose charity. Yeah. I made that point before. You know that I stay asking students in class. You know, which is better to breathe or to philosophize?

[15:30] Right. Of course, I know it's all answered to breathe, right? And so he asks them, "Well, why is it better to breathe than to philosophize?" And they'll, they get some reason. They'll say, "Well, if you're not breathing, you won't be doing anything else, right?" And I'd always point out that you're arguing here by the fallacy of equivocation, huh? Because you're saying that you can breathe without philosophizing, but you can't philosophize without what breathing, right?

[16:07] And that shows that breathing is before philosophizing in the second sense of before in the categories. Second sense is in being, right? If this can be without that, but not vice versa, right? Aristotle's example was one is before two. And

[16:28] why we're not asking about that sense of before? We're asking about the fourth sense, which is better. So I first point out that they have this philosophy. Okay, then I say, okay, now I'm going to help you, though. " you know, I'm going to help you, say. And I said, "Which is worse, to kill a man or to kill a dog? " Say. Well, it's worse to kill the man, right?

[16:49] And which is worse, to be blind or to be deaf? And most people say to be blind, right? So it seems that the opposite of the worst is the better, right? But there is an exception to that rule, right? Which is what?

[17:12] Well, when the lesser good is before the greater good, not in goodness obviously, but in being, right? Then the loss of the lesser good is worse than the loss of the greater good, because it involves the loss of the greater good as well. Where the loss of the greater good doesn't what? Involve the loss of the lesser good, right? So which is greater, charity or faith? Well, charity is greater than faith, right?

[17:43] As St. Paul teaches us. And therefore, if there was no order of being there between these, right? If you could have charity without belief,

[17:56] then the loss of charity would be worse than the loss of what? Faith. But if faith is before charity, in the sense that you can have faith without charity, it's a kind of dead faith. Do you have faith without charity? But you can't charity without faith. Then the loss of faith, right, is going to be worse because then you lose what? Charity, right. And in that sense, despair, which is even opposed to hope, right, would be worse, right, than to lack charity.

[18:39] Because if you despair, like like poor Judas did, right, then you would lose charity too, right? Okay. So you don't incur heresy here, right? Because you might lose. Even greater goods, losing faith, which is bad in itself.

[19:10] So he says. Okay, but it's not, however, conceded by all, according to the same what reason, right? For some concede this statement, not according to the what proper taking of these what terms, God and man. For the Manichaeans, uh, say that the Word of God is a man, not a true man, but a what fictitious a likeness, huh Insofar as they say the Son of God took on an imaginary body. Yeah,

[20:03] as if we say that God is a man is a what? Yeah, it's called a man, right? Bronze, Copper, Probably not. Because it has the likeness of man, right?

[20:26] Like I say, who's that on the wall? Maybe just you know, if he's a particular person, no, that's George Washington or that's Sharbel or somebody, right? Okay, but he's not only similar to Leonardo, right? It's the likeness of him.

[20:49] Likewise, he says, those who lay down that in Christ the soul and the body were not what united. Remember that? Probably people had about they're afraid if the body and soul united, you'd have a human person there, then you have two persons, right? Okay, and we answered that problems about that earlier, right? But those who lay down in Christ, the soul and the body were not united.

[21:17] They would not say that God is a true man, right? Huh? But he'd be said to be a man figuratively by reason of his what parts? Huh?

[21:29] But both of these opinions was disproven above, right? Others, conversely, lay down truth on the side of man. So you got a real man there, and deny the truth on the side of God.

[21:54] So many ways to be mistaken about these things. For they say that Christ, who is the God-Man, to be God not naturally, but by partaking of this, to wit, through grace, right? Grace is sometimes said to be partaking of the divine nature, but it's not to have the divine nature; it's your nature. Just as all holy men are said to be what gods? Text that Christ puts sometimes, right?

[22:32] And people kind of misunderstand that text because they say they're attacking him for saying he's the son of God, right? Then he quotes the text, you know, that you'll be gods from the Psalms, so on. It's almost like Christ is equivocating, you know. But he's saying, you know, he's really arguing a fortiori right. If those who only partake of the divine nature are called gods, what about the one who has the divine nature?

[22:56] A fortiori he's not what. Unreasonably called the Son of God, right? You know, but but plenty might you know misunderstand the text and say, well, he just means I just, you know, God in the way these saints are said to be God, right? Huh?

[23:16] In some of my editions, there, Albert and all say the divus or divi, you know, in the genitive. Yeah, looks like almost the divine honor, the great, right?

[23:28] Um. But Christ was, according to these people, more excellently so before others on account of a more abundant what grace. And thus, according to this, when it is said that God is man, God does not stand for the true and natural God, and this is the heresy of Photinus, which also was disproven above, right? Huh?

[23:56] Others concede this statement with the truth of what both terms, laying down Christ and what both a true God and a true man, but they do not what save or keep the truth of what predication.

[24:19] For they say that man is said of God through a certain conjunction, right? A certain joining either of dignity or authority or of affection, right? Or of indwelling, right? And thus Nestorius said, "God is a man, and to this he signified nothing other than that God is joined to man by such a junction that man is inhabited, you might say, right? Indwelling by God. God dwells in him like a special temple or something, right?

[24:58] And united to him according to affection, they will the same thing, right? And according to a certain partaking of authority and of the divine honor.

[25:10] And in a like error fall those who lay down what two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, huh? Because it is not possible to be understood that of two who are what distinct in hypostasis or suppositum, one is properly what said of the other, right?

[25:42] So my wife might be my better half, but it's never me. But only according to a certain figurative what speech, right? Insofar as they are joined in something. If we say that Peter is John because they have somewhat union to each other, and these opinions also above have been what disproven, right?

[26:16] Whence, supposing, according to the truth of the Catholic faith, that the true divine nature, right, is united with a what true human nature, right? Not only in person, but also in supposito, right, or hypostasis. If you recall, you know, we supposito or hypostasis is what more general than person, right? So a person is by definition a hypostasis of a reasonable nature, right, intellectual nature.

[26:56] So Thomas, you know, is alluding to the fact that you don't distinguish those, right? Some are saying, well, they're united in one, but not the other. We say that this is a true statement and said properly, right? That God is a man, right?

[27:18] Not only on account of the truth of the terms, because Christ is a true God and a true man, right? But also on account of the truth of what predication, as one could be said of the other, truly, huh?

[27:40] Now Thomas is going to explain a little bit how this is possible, right? Because is the human nature and the divine nature the same? Can you say that the human nature of Christ is his divine nature? No, no. So if you take those in the abstract, you can't say one of the other, right? But now we come back to the idea of how, in the concrete, it can stand for the one who has the nature, right?

[28:07] Okay. So he says a name signifying a common nature in the concrete is able to, and I think the best way to translate supponere is to stand for, right? For any one of those contained in that common nature, right? Okay. Just as this name man can stand for any singular man, right? The example I take is very simple, as I say. Duane Berquist is the son of a man.

[28:46] Well, a man there stands for my father, right? See, doesn't stand for what universal man? Strange sense that I'm the son of universal man, right? So even though a man is universal, right? When they say I'm the son of a man, a man there is standing for my father, right? Okay.

[29:13] Or I'm the father of a woman, well, a woman there is standing for my daughter Maria, right? Okay. I won't say how many I'm a grandfather of, but.

[29:38] And thus, this name God, from its way of signifying, that's very important, right? This concrete rather than the abstract, right? Is able to stand for the person of the Son of God, right? But we were talking about how in the beginning of John's Gospel, right? In the Beginning was the word, and the word was what towards God. Well, what does God stand for there? The Father, yeah, yeah.

[30:15] Well, in this case, it's standing though for the what Son, because he also has the same nature. For of every suppositum, huh? That's the Latin word corresponding to hypostasis, huh? Supposit of any nature. Truly and properly is able to be what said of it a name signifying that nature, if that name signifies it in the what concrete. Just as a Socrates and Plato properly and truly can be said man.

[31:01] Because therefore the person of the Son of God, for whom what stands this name God, right? Is also the suppositum of human nature. Truly and properly, this name man is able to be said of this name God, according as it what stands for the person of the Son of God. Like

[31:35] you say, a man is a man is my father. Is that true? Yeah. Not just a man, but a man can stand for my father, right? Because he has human nature, right? Okay.

[32:05] Okay, so now come back to the objections here. First one was saying, "And this remote matter, right? " Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that when diverse forms are not able to come together in one what individual substance in one suppositum, then it

[32:35] is necessary that a statement be in remote matter, right? Whose subject signifies one of those forms, and the predicate what signifies another. But when two forms able to come together in one individual substance, there is not remote matter, but Natural or contingent, as when I say that the white one is what? Yeah.

[33:06] So, human divine nature and human nature, although they are most distant, right? Those two natures. Nevertheless, they come together through the mystery of the incarnation in one individual what? Substance in one person.

[33:26] To which neither of them is in it peraccidens, right? But secundum se, right? What substantial. And therefore, this statement, God as a man, is not either in what remote matter, right? Nor in contingent matter, but in what natural matter?

[33:56] And man is said of what? God. Not peraccidens, but per se, as its what? Hypostasis. Not by reason of the form signified to this name God, but by reason of the individual substance, which is the hypostasis of what human nature.

[34:24] So satisfactory. Okay. What about the second objection here from the Trinity? Don't they have more in common? So shouldn't we say the Father is the Son? To the second, it should be said that the three divine persons come together in the nature, but they are distinguished in the what? Suppositum. And therefore, they are not said of each other, right? But in the mystery of the incarnation, the natures, because they are distinct, are not said of what each other when they are signified in the abstract.

[35:10] For the divine nature is not the human nature, right? But because they come together in the suppositum, they are said of each other in what? Concreta.

[35:30] So the concrete in a sense is, saying God signifies as what has the divine nature, right? Even though the have and the had are not really distinct, right? But it signifies as having the divine nature, and man signifies as having the human nature, right? Well, this divine person, the Word of God, has both of these natures, right? So you can say that the one who has this nature is also the one who has that nature.

[36:01] You can predicate, therefore, the concrete names one or the other, right? But you couldn't predicate the divine nature of the what, human nature, right? Can

[36:18] you say that this Christian is a geometer? Or can you say that, this healthy one is a geometer? I assume a healthy, animal. But is geometry health? No, but the one who has health, is also one who has some geometry, right? So you can say, the geometry is healthy. But you can't say geometry is healthy. Someone, alright? Mm-hmm.

[36:59] Okay. Now the third objection, taken from Athanasius. To the third, it should be said that soul and flesh, are signifying what, as in the abstract, right?

[37:14] Just as divinity, meaning the human divine nature, and humanity, the what, Nature. In the concrete, though, they are called what, animated, and fleshly or corporeal, right? Just as in other case, in the concrete, you say God and what, man.

[37:44] So you can say what has a soul is, has flesh, right? And what has flesh, has a soul, right? So the soulful is corporeal, the corporeal is soulful. But the soul is not the body, and the body is not the what, soul, right? I was looking at a book there, a bookstore there, about scientists and religion and so on, and a big section there, you know, from from Einstein over Einstein, right?

[38:17] You know, and he was praising Spinoza, you know, for saying that the body and soul are the same thing. Einstein's view of God, in a sense, is what, pantheistic, right? I taught the the philosophy of nature, and we read the fragments of the great Anaxagoras. Anaxagoras is the first Greek philosopher really to, among those who know about him, I heard fragments from, to speak explicitly of a greater mind that's responsible for the distinction and order in the natural world.

[38:54] And so, but he comes to it, you know, not as a believer or a fowler or the religion of the time, As you know, Anaxagoras got in trouble for saying the sun is a stone on fire, and they say he was influenced by what meteors. Sometimes a meteor, when it hits the atmosphere, it bursts into flames. It's consumed usually before it hits the earth. Thank God, but occasionally, right?

[39:24] It it it hits the earth as a burning rock still. There's one down the southwest United States. The Indians talked about, and and now they can locate that where it was. You know, and they can see the terrain the way it was. So that's maybe Franklin thing, right? And then they knew that there was one that landed over and Anaxagoras as part of the world, right? So you know, it's like the falling star, you know, falling.

[39:46] It's stone on fire, right? Aristotle himself rejected that because he said it would have burned up on the way down But anyway, but this was impious because you're saying that the god. The sun was a god, obviously. Is a hot stone, right? So they're troubled the Athenian authorities there, and so they're getting at him, Pericles, right? Because he was befriended him, Pericles. But Anaxagoras then said that this greater mind must be all kind of distinct from things, because if it was mixed up with things, it could not what rule them, right?

[40:27] So when you tried to explain, you know, thinking there of Anaxagoras, you have to bring out the more general statement that the ruler must be what distinct or separated from the what ruled, right? Now Einstein comes to the idea of a greater mind too, but it's what mixed up with the universe, so he doesn't get as far in his thinking as Anaxagoras,

[40:58] right? So sometimes even Einstein will say his thinking is pantheistic, which kind of is a big danger of democratic thinking, according to De Tocqueville. huh? This is yeah, De Tocqueville, the democracy in America, right? There's a chapter on that, right? Short chapter, but he says we see, you know, this pantheism in the French thinkers and the German thinkers. If you go through, you know, the Enchiridion Symbolorum or we get the official pronouncements of the church during the 19th century, especially, you'll see this German theologian being corrected for his pantheistic ideas.

[41:33] That guy, and who is it? The cardinal there, the Siri was it? Who's the cardinal? Oh, just happy Siri, yeah. Yeah, yeah, who wrote the book there? Yeah, I'm talking about how you know Hans Con and some other people, Bronner. Bronner, Yeah, you know, they have some pantheistic statements from time to time, so it's a tendency. But Anaxagoras rises above that, right? So you have to admire the the great Anaxagoras.

[42:08] When Thomas is in the Summa Contra Gentiles he's been showing how God is responsible ultimately for the distinction order of things, you know, they often bring in the great Anaxagoras.

[42:25] Okay. Okay. Now, in the fourth objection there, the one that says things that are said absolutely, right? Are commented with the Trinity. He says that this name "man" is said of God not by reason of what the nature of God, right? But by reason of the union in the person, right? Which union implies a what relation, and therefore it doesn't follow that rule of those names which are said absolutely and not relatively of God from eternity, which is said of each person.

[43:20] So I always was worried about that idea of supposition, you know. I think probably the best way to translate English is to say standing for, right?

[43:30] I can say I'm married to a woman, not just any woman. Suddenly, say I'm married to a woman. A woman stands for Rosalie, my wife.

[43:46] So you can do that with woman. You can do with man. My father is, you know, I'm the son of a man, right? I'm the father of a man.

[44:01] I think what's got to be careful there is to realize when you say, when I say I'm the son of a man, a man or man, the word man has not taken on a new meaning. Namely, we know Victor Burquist is my father.

[44:22] It keeps the name it has, right? So this is something a little different than what the meaning of the name, right? See. And so when you say, you know, that God is what a man, right, or God became a man, right? Say God there stands for the Son of God, the Word of God, right? When you say in the beginning was the Word and the Word was towards God, then God stands for the what Father, right?

[44:59] When you say God from God, well, in one case God is standing for the Son, in other case for the Father, right? It wouldn't be correct, you see, but somebody might, you know, get confused, right, and say, well, when we say God is a man, the meaning of God is the Son of God. No.

[45:25] When we say and the beginning was the Word and the Word was towards God, the meaning of the word God is the Father. No, see, ex verbis sonoris nati polatis I'm putting forth those words in a disordered way, right? See, no, in both of those cases, right? The word God has the same what meaning, right?

[45:52] But in one case it's standing for this one who has the human, the divine nature, in other case for that one who has human nature, right? Okay. When I say I'm the son of a man and the father of a man, it's not the same man, but it's not two different meanings of the word man, right?

[46:18] When I say I'm the son of a man, I'm the father of a man. Say, well, in one case a man means my father, in the case my son. But somebody said in that kind of careless way, but that would be really what wrong. False

[46:41] I guess You're one meaning the word man, and you're another meaning man. You know. Obviously, I'm just. It's like it's like with the prologue, because when it says the word was towards God and the word was God, they had the same meaning. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Father and child one. It's interesting,

[47:07] say, to standing for, but it's it's not that the word is taken on a new meaning. But now, when you say that God became man, so man might become God. If you're talking about us in the second part of that statement, right? Or maybe then, you know, you are gods, like it says in the psalms, right? Then, then that's a different meaning of the word God, right?

[47:39] You know, because you're partaking of that, right? Just like in the ethics, there reasonable can mean essentially reasonable or partaking of reason, right? There's such a thing as a reasonable love. There's, such a thing as a reasonable fear, such a thing as a reasonable anger, right? But these are reasonable in a different sense than my reason is reasonable. They're reasonable in the sense of partaking of reason, right?

[48:21] And so they're said by reason of a ratio to what is essentially reasonable, right? In the same way, we are said to be gods because we, in some way, partake of the divine nature, right? Without having the divine nature as our nature, though.

[48:47] And now you have a different meaning of the word. I know I'm not God in the same. I mean, I'm even God in the second sense, but I'm not God in the in the fundamental sense of God, right?

[49:10] Thomas says, "Already, there we even speak of how the idols are called gods too, right? But they're false gods." Heraclitus, the Greek philosopher, says, "You know, talking to these statues, he says, like does a commandant talk to his house or something." It's a good way of putting it.

[49:34] But isn't the Acts of the Apostles there where they run out and they want to take Paul as being, you know, a god? Yeah, yeah. You

[49:45] can't believe who really thought that, but they did. What's amazing is as soon as they wanted to do that, and then the Jews came along and told them, that then they wanted to kill them Yeah, So one minute they want to worship the next minute they want to kill them What would the distinction between the meaning of

[50:05] Or something treated in logic? Well, I suppose it'd be logic more, you know, more logic. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Grammar? He has to be too subtle for the grammarian.

[50:18] Just a noun to him. That's all it is. You know how I make fun of the grammarian? There, always comparison to logic, right? Equilateral triangle, green triangle, exactly the same. Grammatical analysis of those two. A noun being modified adjective. Professorician. No, no. Equilateral

[50:45] is a species making difference, and green is an accident, right? No difference to the grammarian. I'll skin off his skin. Yeah. Now, as your professor, it's bad for grammarians like you. I am a stone. Fine. Did

[51:14] you know anywhere that Aristotle touched that distinction? Not as explicit as in Thomas, you know, but Aristotle, I think, understands it. I mean, it's involved right away in the categories, right? When Aristotle, you know, first distinguishes the categories, he uses the concrete names because they're all distinguished in comparison to what substance. But then, when he gets into that category, he may use the abstract name. Because,

[51:58] you know, if you say the relation of say virtue to courage and temperance, right? And the relation of virtuous to courageous and temperate is really the same, right? Doesn't make any difference, right? But if you want to point out that these qualities are really something of substance, then you want to use the concrete word, right, where it can be said substance. So you can't say the man is courage or the man is temperance properly, but you can say he's courageous or he's temperate, huh?

[52:37] Or just or something else. So now, ready for the second article.