Tertia Pars
44. Summa III q.16 a.2–4: 'Man Is God', the 'Lordly Man', and Saying Human Things of God
Class of 2009-05-07
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/044-summa-iii-q-16-a-2-4-man-is-god-the-lordly-man-and-saying/

[0:00] Whether, this is true that man is God. Well it's appropriate that he take up these two questions together, right? I don't know if even in English you'd say that man is a God. I don't think you'd say that. Only the Jehovah's Witnesses say that. They do.

[0:29] Okay. That kind of implies maybe one God, right? The second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that this is false that man is what God.

[0:44] Why? Because the name God is incommunicable. But in the Wisdom chapter fourteen, the idolaters are reprehended for the fact that this name God, which is not able to be communicated, they placed it upon what woods and stones. Therefore, for like reason, it seems unsuitable that this name God be said of what man. Okay. A little difference here in those two, but let Thomas spell it out. However,

[1:28] whatever is said of the predicate is said of the what subject. That sounds like the great rule in the book on syllogism, the prior analytics. where Aristotle says, if what A is said of all B, then A is said of whatever B is said of. So, if animal is said of all dogs, then animal is said of whatever dog is said of. Okay. But this is true that God is the what Father, or God is the what Trinity.

[2:00] Trinity. If therefore this is true that man is God, it seems also that this is true that man is the what Father, or man is a Trinity. So man is God. God is a Trinity. Therefore, man is a Trinity. True. Sounds like like a perfectly good syllogism, right? Huh? Shows the danger of syllogism, right? When they first discovered syllogism, they started you know fooling around with these things and got into all kinds of troubles, you know, because of that syllogism.

[2:40] The kind used to say, "No, he's really convinced by the syllogism." But they started getting trouble because of the syllogism. However, in Psalm eighty, it is said, "There shall not be in you what." A recent God, A, God,

[3:05] but man is something what Recent like something new something new, yeah. For Christ was not always what a man, right? Therefore, this is false that man is what God, right?

[3:24] But against this is what is said in Romans nine chapter, chapter nine, Romans, verse five. From whom is Christ, according to the flesh? Right, that's talking about is the man, right? Who is above all the blessed God? Right. Yeah,

[3:48] it solves the question there. right? And see how Augustine says you need the epistles of Saint Paul, right? He he clears up a few things. Yeah. But Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore, this is true. Man is God.

[4:06] Now Thomas is going to be more brief in reply, because the first question has cleared up a lot of these things. I answer: It should be said that supposing the truth of both natures, right,

[4:22] the divine to it and the human, and the union in the person and the hypostasis, this is true and proper. Man is God, just as that other statement, God is what man.

[4:41] For this name, man is able to stand for right in the hypostasis in the individual substance of human nature, and thus it is able to stand even for the person of the Son, which we say is the hypostasis of what human nature is in Christ.

[5:03] But it is manifest, however, that of the person of the Son of God, truly and properly is said this name God, as is had in the first part. He is God. Whence it remains that this is a true and proper predication. Man is God. Good clear mind, this Thomas had. I was reading there in that book on the Doctors of the Church. I guess Urban the Fourth requested both Thomas and Bonaventure to to do a

[5:44] office for the blessed sacrament, right? And for the feast, I guess, and according to the account there, when Bonaventure saw Thomas's one. he tricked up his own. Yeah, I've got to dig you that one.

[6:03] Humility. Okay. So the first there, which should be said, that those idolaters that are attacked there in the book of wisdom, right, attributed the name of God to stones and and pieces of wood, according as they are considered in their own what nature,

[6:41] because they thought in them there is something of the what divine, right? We, however, do not attribute the name of God or the God name of the divine nature to the man according to his human nature, right? We don't think that the human nature of Christ is God, do we? We don't think he is God because of his human nature, right, or because he has human nature, right?

[7:12] But according to the eternal suppositum, the eternal person, which is also by the union the suppositum of the what human nature, this has been said.

[7:29] You remember my little my little geometrical example? What this is, right? You know, You know very just the likeness here, huh? Where this endpoint here is the divine person, right, and this line here presents what the divine nature, okay? And what happened? Well, if you make human nature, you would have it seems its own what endpoint, its own human person here. This line represents human nature, but it has its own person.

[8:14] But what he did was to draw a human nature to his own person, right? So at the same what person is the human nature here subsisting in the same person as the what divine nature, right? Okay.

[8:37] Notice one line is not the other line, right? But they have the same what endpoint, right? Okay. That in many ways falls falls short the way it is, right? But in one way the little likeness there, right? Okay. I think anything makes some some sense there, right? To see that that if if that line is drawn over there, it has its own endpoint, right? But if it's drawn to the end of the first line, then it doesn't have its own endpoint.

[9:14] But there's the same point subsisting in both lines, right? Same point as the beginning or the end of both of those lines. And this is the way that the human nature and the divine nature, you could say. Yeah, but the unlikeness is there too. I may get in trouble with that sometime. But it does illustrate. something. We have it recorded. When my trial comes up. We'll submit to the CDF.

[9:43] When the Inquisition calls me in, yeah. What's this about? God, being a lion. They make a lot of puns in my line, yeah. Okay, so it should be said that the idolaters attribute the name of the divine nature right to the stones and to the wood according as they consider their own nature right because they thought in it there was something of the divine right.

[10:19] We always attribute the name of the deity to man. We do not attribute the name of the deity to man according to his human nature, but according to the eternal what point there, right? The eternal person, which is also by union the supposed to him, right? A human nature has been said. Okay, well that's kind of what I thought, but he says a little better than I could say it.

[10:50] Those beautiful words of Aristotle there in the in the books of wisdom where he says we should try to say what some things better than our predecessors said them, and other things we should try to say as well as they said it.

[11:08] And Thomas is one that you usually say. I can say it as well as he says it. I should be what satisfied, right? Rarely can you say it better than him, huh? Just like in fiction, there you know, I told you how this one guy who had a photographic memory, you know, he challenged anybody to produce any line from any poet, anything in human life, you know, and he topped with a line from Shakespeare, right?

[11:35] So it's impossible, you know, to say it better. It seems, you know, than Shakespeare. huh? At the end of his life, you know, Washington Irving says ridiculous for us to claim any, you know, prize or honor, you know, Shakespeare, you know, said it all, you know, just you can't said so well, right? Even the things that you might want to

[12:01] express your own feelings, your own emotions at times, you know. So I couldn't express my own emotions as well. Shakespeare could express my emotions.

[12:15] That's what people say. You know, they read Shakespeare and say, "Hey, he's saying what I felt better than I could express what I felt." Beautifully said. You know, my favorite example there is when when the father says when Juliet is found apparently dead on her wedding day. You know, death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. How could you say more beautifully?

[12:39] You know, but that is you know, beautiful only daughter, right? On the day of her wedding, being found apparently dead, right? Death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. You can't ruin that, you know. You don't even try.

[13:03] I notice when I read, you know, the English novelists sometimes, though they'll they'll be quoting Shakespeare, right? And I notice that one scene I used to take from Dickens, you know, and of course it's obviously borrowed from the line from Macbeth, you know. You can't just can't prove that's why I call Shakespeare the master of the English language, you know.

[13:25] There's no way to prove about that. What Mozart said about melody, you can't define it, you know. You can just hum it. Yeah. That proves he was married

[13:49] I obviously my my favorite piece by Brahms is his Variations on a Theme by Haydn, you know, beautiful theme by Haydn, you know, and and and he can vary it, you know, but it's it's basically Haydn's theme, huh?

[14:06] Okay, now the second objection there is really, you know, people would stumble over this, you know. If you can say that man is God, and God is the Father, or God is the Trinity, right? Well, then seems you got a syllogism there, right? Okay. To

[14:31] the second, it should be said that this name Father is said of this name God, according as this name God stands for the person of the Father.

[14:45] But thus it is not said of the person of the Son. When you say that the Son or the Word is God, God is not standing for the Father, is it? Okay.

[15:01] For thus it is not said of the person of the Son, because the person of the Son is not the person of the Father.

[15:10] And consequently, it is not necessary that this name Father be said of this name Man, about whom or of whom is said this name God, in so far as Man stands for the person of the Son. So when I say this man is God, God is standing for the what Son of God, right? When I say God is the Father, God is not standing for the Son of Man, for the Father.

[15:43] Therefore, you're not really what following the rule of logic, right? The major term is not being said of the middle term in the way the middle term is being said of the what minor term, like when you say, you know, animal of dog and dog of. That one who discerned the equivocation here. We've got my wife and I got a big kick out of that. Who found that then?

[16:13] Found that. Oh, I didn't even see it. Yeah. He's discerning. Yeah. She was interpreting a certain other gender. Yeah. It wasn't super the community life was chasing the cats and so on. Yeah.

[16:40] Okay. Yeah. So, interesting from a logic point of view to to classify the fallacy here, though, right? Because is it really a fallacy of equivocation? See, or is it a different kind of fallacy, the fallacy of the accident? Because with the equivocation, because you don't have two different meanings. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[17:17] Okay. So you are a man. A man is my father. Therefore, you are my father. See. When I say you are a man and a man is my father, um, does the word words a man have two different meanings there? No. But when I say you are a man and a man is my father, a man is not in the two statements standing for the same person.

[17:52] Yeah. Yeah. So you can't conclude you are my father, right? Well, unless he's a priest. Well, okay. Okay. Now you're equivocating. Now you're equivocating two senses of the word father. Yeah. Father means something different. Now you're going. Now you're going into equivocation. Yeah. Now he's going into that. Yeah. Those are the first two fallacies. You know, the fallacy of equivocation and the fallacy of the accident. The first and the two groups, right?

[18:18] From words and then from things, right? Yeah. It's interesting, though. Go back to logic, you know. But you know, when you read the modern philosophers, they're never really talking about these kinds of fallacies, right? Like Thomas is always identifying somebody's thinking. Actually, they always are. They don't talk about them. They just speak them. Yeah! Yeah! Yeah! Yeah! Yeah! But even

[18:51] if you know these kinds of mistakes, you can still make them yourself, right? You see. But if you don't even know that kind of mistake, or and thinking about that kind of mistake and trying to avoid that mistake, you're you're much more apt to be caught for that kind of mistake. Feuerbach says, you know, the human mind is infinite. The infinite is God, as the theologians say.

[19:17] Therefore, human mind is God. So they say we're not atheists, you know, who don't believe in God. We believe that man's mind is the highest divinity, as Marx says in his preface to his doctoral thesis, right? But he got that from Feuerbach

[19:38] the essence of Christianity, you know. This is an obvious thing, you know. A medieval, you know, any medieval theologian would see right away that there's a fallacy of equivocation there, and they don't consider the possibility that might be an equivocation in the word infinite, right? And it's interesting, you know, in the first. um uh book there of physics there natural hearing, uh he had the same fallacy with the word infinite, not those those two meanings, but two other meanings.

[20:11] You know where what's his name? Melissus you know says that being has what? No beginning right. Meaning no beginning in time right, and therefore it has infinite goes on forever right. Whereas Aristotle points out well, you know something these are two different meanings. There were beginning beginning in time and beginning in your what magnitude right. He mixes up the two right. So he's making the same kind of mistake with the same word and two different other meanings, but.

[20:51] My old teacher Kasurik, I don't know where he got the text, but he maintained that Augustine said somewhere that the only part of logic worth teaching is the part on fallacies. I don't think exactly this is the part where Augustine really said this. you know, but it's kind of interesting. you know. Now we come to the third objection, I guess, right?

[21:31] To the third, it should be said that although the human nature in Christ is something what? Recent, huh? new. Nevertheless, the what? Suppositum of human nature is not something what recent, but eternal. And because this name God is not said of man by reason of the human nature, but by reason of the person the suppositum, it does not follow that we place God as something recent.

[22:11] It would follow, however, if we placed or posited that man stands for a created person, a created suppositum, according as according as it would be necessary to say, for those to say, who in Christ lay down their two what? Suppositum. Okay, so we can say God is man and man is God. Should we take a break? Okay, before we go to home, Demetrios. Article three here: Whether Christ is able to be called homo dominicus?

[22:52] huh? How's your English translations translate that? Homo Dominicus. Lordly man. What? Lordly man. Yeah, dominus means lord, yeah. That's a strange question, but oh, Augustine—he's responsible for it. I see in the first objection here. To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that Christ is able to be what? Called homo dominicus. Dominicus is like an adjective, isn't it? Modifying homo.

[23:30] He's the lordly man. For Augustine says in the book on the eighty-three questions, "One should be what? Consul to one one. That those goods are expected which were in that what? Lordly man.

[23:56] But he's speaking about Christ. Therefore, it seems that Christ is homo dominicus. Kind of an argument from the authority, the great Augustine. Moreover, just as dominion belongs to Christ by reason of his divine nature, so also humanity pertains to what? Human nature. But God is said to be humanatus. Was it made human? As is clear through the Damascene in the third book, where he says, "Humanatio shows that what joining which is to what man.

[24:43] Therefore, for like reason, it can be demonstratively said, I suppose, pointing out, right, that that man is what lordly, right? Moreover, just as lordly is said denominatively from lord, so divine is said denominatively from what God. But Dionysius names Christ that the most divine Jesus. Therefore, for a like reason, it can be said that Christ is a what? Yeah.

[25:25] So I'm really confused, huh? And now in the said contra, it's what Augustine says in his book of retractions, huh? So modern theologians don't do what Augustine has, because it's a marvelous thing. I did not see whether it is rightly said rightly said. That homo dominicus Jesus Christus, right? There, Augustine's having, seen second thoughts, right? Since he is what? Lord. Yeah.

[26:00] I think it's kind of an emphatic sometimes, like when it says somewhere in the Psalms, "But indeed I will offer sacrifice" or something like that. It's kind of an emphatic way. to say. Since he is indeed Lord. He is indeed Lord. I remember Thomas talking about the confession of faith there. Thomas, after he sees the wounds and so on, and he says, "What, my Lord and my God, right?

[26:25] " And I know as a boy, many of us, you know, picked this up as something you say the time of consecration, right after the consecration of the. And but Thomas says he says, "My Lord, my God, " he's professing the human nature as well as the divine nature. He can be said to be Lord, even according to his what human nature, right? So that's, wonder about this, right?

[26:51] I mean, he can be called Lord by human nature. Why not Dominicus, right? Because Lord is even stronger, right? If it's you know, the okay.

[27:04] Well, let's see if Thomas can make any sense out of this. I certainly can't. I answer: It should be said that as has been said above, when it is said homo Christus, Jesus, huh? incidentally, which of those names, Christus and Jesus, which signifies more as human nature? Yeah,

[27:34] because as God, he's not what anointed, huh? But Jesus means Savior, I guess. And sometimes you have the word in the Psalms too, right? And you say, as God, he saves too, right? Even more so, you know.

[27:56] So you know, I compare the the two professions of faith there. The one in the chapter sixteen of Matthew, where Peter says, "Thou art the what, Christ, the Son of Living God. " Well, Saint John, the other gospel, has that same profession of faith, but since Christ is not present there, you know, he says these things are written that you might believe that Jesus, and he says that is the subject, is the Christ, the Son of God, right?

[28:25] So it's the same profession of faith as Peter has. These guys are pretty close, anyway, John and Peter, right? Um, so it's interesting that Jesus there is the subject of the faith, right? You don't say Christ is the Jesus, the Son of God, right? But Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and then you profess both the human nature and the divine nature. I think Thomas's Adoro te devote right?

[28:53] You know, in cruce latebat sola deitas hic latet simul et humanitas ambo tamen credens atque confitens I don't quite produce that Latin. Okay, as if the complete profession of faith has to include both the human and the divine nature. So use the word Christ rather than the word Jesus, and when and when you use the pronoun as Peter does, because he's, you know, who you say, about Christ, the Son of Living God.

[29:23] So Christ is more the name of the figure. So Homo Christus are together here. So when it should be said that it has been said above that when one speaks of Homo Christus Jesus, one designates the eternal what person, suppositum, which is the person of the Son of God, on account of the fact that there is one what suppositum, right? One

[30:04] person of both what natures. Now, of the person of the Son of God, is said God and what Dominus Lord, essentially, and therefore it ought not to be said denominatively,

[30:30] because this would take away from the truth of the what union. Whence, since Dominicus is said denominatively, right, from Lord, right? That definition of denominative is right in the very first chapter, the categories, right? Whence, since Dominicus is said denominatively from Domino, it cannot truly and properly be said that that man is Dominicus, but more that he is the Lord. Saint John says that after the resurrection, yeah, when he's on the shore and they didn't recognize him.

[31:20] As soon as John recognized him, he says, "It's the Lord." Yeah, yeah, it's not the Lord you want. If ever through this that is said, man Homo Christus Jesus, there was designated a what suppositum that was created, right? According to those heretics, right, who place in Christ two supposita persons, that man could be called what, Dominicus, lordly, in so far as he's taken over to partaking of the divine honor, as the Nestorians posit, and in this way, human nature is not said essentially what, to be divine, right, but to be deificata, right, which is yeah, made divine,

[32:24] not by the changing over of it into divine nature, but by its union to the divine nature in one hypostasis, as is clear through Damascene in the what, third book, huh? So

[32:42] the first objection. He says Augustine, those words and like words he draws back, huh? Retracts in his book of retractions. Whence, after the foresaid words of the book of retractions, he adds, huh?

[33:05] Wherever I have said right that Christ Jesus is the Homo Dominicus, right? I do not will myself to have said it. I wish I had said it.

[33:25] I was thinking of the washing the feet there by Christ, you know, and they say, well, as Christ himself says, he's giving them an example, right? But he's giving an example of what virtue? What? Humility. Humility, yeah. That must be a very important virtue that on this special occasion, shall we say, he chooses to give an example of that. What? Of that virtue, as if it's terribly important, right?

[33:54] Huh? And you know, a guy doesn't have the humility that Augustine has or Thomas has, you know. I wouldn't trust them. For postea means afterwards. I see it should be not said, right? Huh? Although it can be defended by some what reason, yeah. What? Oh, by no means. No, no, no. I'm not sure that would. be a good thing No, it can be defended. Yeah. He's saying you could defend saying it, but but that it's really best just not to say it.

[34:45] Yeah. Yeah. Because there's a way you could understand it, correct? Yeah. Yeah. Because someone is able to say that man is said to dominicus by reason of human nature,

[35:02] which this name man signifies not by reason of the suppositum, right? Huh? So watch your p's and q's here. I'm not saying Thomas is saying right, even Augustine is saying that.

[35:26] Okay. Now the second objection. What about God being said humanatus? Huh? The Dominicus. To the second should be said that that one suppositum. Which is of the divine and human nature. First was of the divine nature, right? To wit, from eternity. Afterwards, from time, it was made the what? Suppositum human nature, right? So that line on the left there was always, and so that end of that line was what?

[36:09] Always the end or beginning, you want to say, of that line, right? But then, in the course of time, when that other line is drawn to that point, it becomes the what? Suppositum, right, of the other line, right, the beginning of the other line.

[36:30] And for this reason, it is called humanatum, right? Not because he took on a man, because then we'd have another person there, right? But because he took on what human nature, right? Just as this first line didn't take on an end point, didn't take on another point, right? It's just another line. Okay.

[36:57] But it is not the reverse that the suppositum of human nature took on a divine nature, right? Hence, it cannot be said that the man is what made God, or he is what lordly, right? Okay. They probably don't use as many sermons, probably. Not lately, anyway.

[37:26] We'll wait for Trinity Sunday. Okay. Now the third objection. Dionysius calls Christ names Christ Christ the most divine Jesus, right? That's denominative, right? To the third, it should be said that this name divinum

[38:01] is customarily said of those things of which is said essentially this name what? God, right? For we say that the divine essence, the divine substance, is God, right? By reason of identity, right? And that the essence is of God, or it's what divine on account of the diverse way it signifies. And we say that the we speak of the verbum divinum, right? The divine word, I guess,

[38:47] when nevertheless the word is what God, and similarly we we speak of what the divine person, just as the what person of Plato, on account of a diverse what way signifying. But Dominicus is not said of those things of which Lord is said, for we are not accustomed to say that some man who is Dominus should be what.

[39:24] Yeah. But that which in any way is of the Lord is said to be what lordly as the Dominica voluntas right or the Dominica manus right or Dominica possessio Dominica Oratio. Dominica Oratio. Lord's Prayer. Yeah. Yeah. And therefore that man Christ Himself who is Lord cannot be said to be lordly, but His flesh can be called what the Lord's flesh, right? And His suffering or passion, the Lord's what?

[40:10] Passion, right? What do you call it, president? Presidential? I mean, not for. Okay. Just trying to figure out we can call him American. As a first,

[40:36] yeah. And then we can't call him president. That's that. Yeah. I see. Doing some insane things. I called him insane last night. Okay. We could take one more article, maybe. Okay. To the fourth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that those things which are of human nature are not able to be said of what God.

[41:17] For it is impossible for opposites to be said of the same. But those things which are of human nature, we'll say here, are contrary to those things which are private to God. For God is uncreated, unchangeable, and eternal. But to human nature it belongs: that it be created, that it be temporal, and changeable. Therefore, those things which are of human nature cannot be said of God.

[41:56] Moreover, to attribute to God those things which pertain to defect would seem to derogate onto yeah, derogatory. You say in English to the divine honor, and to pertain to blasphemy. But those things which are of human nature contain some defect, as to die, to what suffer, and others. Therefore, it seems that in no way of those things which are of human nature can be said of God.

[42:32] You say that God died. God suffered and died. Well can't have a reason Moreover, to be taken on, I guess, to be assumed, belongs to human nature, but it does not belong to God.

[42:57] Therefore, those things which are of human nature cannot be said of God. But against all this is what Damascene says. Damascene is having a little life here in this treatise, huh?

[43:15] That God takes on or receives those things which are what private to what? The flesh Yeah, idiomata is a Greek word, right? So an idiom is something private to some language, right? An idiot is a man who lives in his what? His own world. But the Greek word for property, you know, or proper, you know, is idios right? Idios That is proprietates, right? When God is said to be what passibilis, able to suffer, and the God of glory was what?

[44:00] Yeah. I answer. It should be said that about this question, there was diversity between the Nestorian historians and the Catholics, right? For the Nestorians, the vocal sounds which were said of Christ, they wanted to divide in this way, right? That those which pertain to human nature would not be said of God, nor those which pertain to divine nature would not be said of the man. Whence Nestorius says, huh?

[44:44] As reference here to the twelfth anathema of the Council of Ephesus, Nestorius said that if one tries to attribute to the Word of God passions, he is what anathema. If, however, there are some names which are able to belong to both natures, right? Of such, we can predicate those things which are both natures, as this name, what Christ or Lord.

[45:21] Whence they conceded Christ to be born of the Virgin and to have been from what eternity, but did not concede that the what God was born the Virgin or man was from what eternity. So they wouldn't approve of the Theotokos, of course, right? Like Christotokos. Yeah, right. Got a little confusion and tricks there when he says he should be called the Mother of God, the Mother of Christ, but not the Mother of God.

[45:58] Okay, but Catholics, however, truly lay down these things, right? Which are said of Christ, either according to the divine nature or according to the human, right? Are able to be said both of God and of the what man. Whence the great Cyril says, right?

[46:24] Is someone to two persons, right? Or to two what? Now there, there you see the problem that was between the Greek and the Latin, right? Huh? Because substantia right, is taken in the sense of hypostasis, right? But in Latin, you have what can stand for the nature too, right? That's why Jerome was saying there's poison under the word here, because hypostasis in Greek is used for the person and more generally for the general for the individual substance, right?

[46:59] By substantia in Latin, it can be used for the nature of what a thing is. So if one to two persons or to two hypostases, those things which in the Gospels, right, and in the Apostolic writings, right, if he should divide the vocal sounds, right, or those things which about Christ are said by the saints, or those things by Christ himself about himself, right, and some of them from these he applies to the man, others to the Word, only.

[47:37] anathema said be accursed. And the reason for this is because since there is the same hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is supposed, right, by the name of both nature. So whether he be called a man or God, what is supposing there is the hypostasis of the divine human nature, and therefore of the home of the man can be said those things which are of the divine nature, and of what God those things which are of the what human nature.

[48:20] There is not making two more articles out of this, right? Enough of that two articles done. However, Thomas said, It should be known that in a statement in which something is said of something, right, not only is to be noted what is that of which it is what the predicate is said, right, but also by what it is said of it. And therefore, although we did not distinguish those things which are said of Christ, they are distinguished nevertheless as regards that by which both of them are what.

[49:07] Yeah. For those things which are of the divine nature are said of Christ by reason of the divine nature; those things which are of the human nature are said of him by reason of his human nature. Hence Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity, we distinguish in Scriptures what sounds off, right, according to the form of God, in what according to the form of the what The servant.

[49:39] It's interesting that the word form. You know, it's not standing for the nature of the thing, right? As Aristotle would tell you, right? And below, what an account of what, and what according to what is said,

[49:57] prudent, foresightful, and a diligent reading, a loving reading, and a pious reader will understand, right. Okay. This is you, gentlemen. I hope. Okay. Nice. Okay. Now, what about opposites, right? Well, the distinction now is from the last paragraph here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that opposites can be said of the same. It's impossible to be said of the same according to the same, right?

[50:31] But according to diverse things, nothing what prevents it. And in this way, opposites are said of Christ, not according to the same, but according to diverse nature, right? So Christ is immovable according to his what divine nature, but he's movable according to his what human nature, right? As God can he eat? No, but as man, he showed his true humanity by eating with the apostles even after his resurrection, right?

[51:19] See how people get in trouble right away, though. See, well, they can't have opposites being said to the same. But you can say opposites are the same according to what? Different things, yeah.

[51:41] Now, same thing about defect. To second, it should be said: if those things which pertain to defect were attributed to God according to his divine nature, it would be what blasphemy, huh? Which, as were pertaining to the diminution of of his what honor, right? Huh? Not, however, if, huh? But they are not, however, pertain to the injury of God if they are attributed to him according to the nature that he took on.

[52:16] Huh? Whence, in a certain sermon of the Council of Ephesus, huh? It is said, do not. God does not think, right, that something is an injury that is an occasion for the salvation of what? Men, right.

[52:46] For nothing of the abject things that he chose, huh, on account of us, does an injury to that nature which is not able to be subject to injuries, huh?

[53:04] But his own, he makes lower things that he might what save our nature, right? When, therefore, the things that are abject and vile, right, huh?

[53:21] Do not injure, right? The nature of God. God, yeah. but they work the salvation of men, right? In what way can you say that those things which are the cause of our salvation were an occasion of injury to to God, huh? Pretty good, this guy, huh? Theodorus, huh? That's the rest The notes is down there. Yeah. Okay. And

[53:57] he says, "To be assumed is not to be said of God. God was not assumed. Because it belongs to human nature, not by reason of the what? supposit, but by reason of itself, right? The human nature was drawn to that, right? So that point was not drawn, right? But the line was drawn to it.

[54:27] That's going to be a different answer to the next one. Whether the things which are human nature can be said of the divine nature?

[54:44] No. What? Somebody wrote it in pencil. Testy's got the one that every every question is yes, no. Well, I just like what they say, you know, they're putting the answers in a dark, bold print. You know, it's it's cheating, yeah, cheating, yeah. See how they just go through and look at the at the bold print and get the answers, you know, but none of the reasons, you know.