Tertia Pars
45. Aquinas on the Incarnation (ST III q.16, a.5–6): Can Human Things Be Said of the Divine Nature? Was God Made Man?
Class of 2009-05-14
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/045-aquinas-on-the-incarnation-st-iii-q-16-a-5-6-can-human-things/

[0:01] In the Name of the Father, the Son, and, the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, our guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, Pray for us. And help us to understand all that you are teaching. Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:30] Amen. I think the register had an article on the Hebrew-speaking Catholic. I was looking at the remarks of our Holy Father there when he was in Africa. You know, now he's in the Near East, but this is. But he's talking again about reason and faith, right?

[1:04] He says the following morning. This is in the Catholic World report. The following morning, Pope Benedict met with an nunciature with representatives of Cameroon's Islamic community. And then he quotes the Pope here. I believe a particularly urgent task of religion today is to unveil the vast potential of human reason,

[1:31] which is itself God's gift and which is elevated by revelation and faith. But notice how that vast potential of human reason is in those words of the definition of reason. You say it's the ability for large discourse, right? And discourse is called large because it's about the universal, and the less universal, the more universal, and the least universal, and the most universal. So it extends to all things, the ability of reason.

[2:01] And then also you can say that it's the ability for large discourse because you can discourse about great things like the soul or about human happiness or even about the cosmos and most of all about God Himself. So this is nice confirmation of Shakespeare there, right? Huh.

[2:29] Now this other statement is the more surprising in the Pope's part here. Later on, he says, "Indeed, religion and reason mutually reinforce one another. They reinforce one another. Since religion is purified and structured by reason, that's a rather strong statement.

[2:54] Because usually, would think a reason is being purified by faith, but maybe he means from superstition or some, you know, thing of this sort. He's also speaking of Muslims himself. Yeah. So that yeah, their faith would be purified, yeah, yeah. And now, structured by reason, I think you could say the structure means what ordered, right? Of course, that's in the other part of Shakespeare's definition. That reason is the ability for larger discourses, looking before and after, right?

[3:22] So, in that sense, it does this, huh? And reason's full potential is unleashed by revelation and faith. Okay. I was just reading this morning there. You are reading this my favorite book there, this Summa Contra Gentiles Now it's up to chapter, what is it one twenty nine in book three it one twenty nine in book three there, where Thomas is saying that these laws that God has given us are not just arbitrary, but they're based upon something natural, right?

[3:57] And then he gives seven strong arguments to show that they're they're natural. It's a very good reading for that purpose. But I happen to be reading, re-reading Shakespeare's As You Like It, and of course, in As You Like It, you have two pairs of brothers, and in one case, the older brother is being unjust to the younger brother, in the other case, the younger brother is usurping the throne of the older brother, huh?

[4:24] Like in Hamlet, and but eventually they're reconciled, the brothers, right? So it's a beautiful example, you know, of something unnatural, or brothers being unjust to brother, right? But for they reconcile, but they're reconciled in the forest of Arden right? Of course when you introduce the Forest of Arden. You know, he says, and and and this our life exempt from public haunt, finds tongues in trees, books in running brooks, sermons in stone, and good in everything.

[5:02] So the forest becomes a what kind of symbol of nature's being the measure of what is what good, and the brothers are what in their unnatural state are what. Yeah, yeah. I remember. I remember a friend of mine being in conflict with his his brother, right? And As You Like It happened to be showing at that time, so I said, "Let's go see this play." He came back.

[5:28] I thought looked for mildly disposed towards his brother, you know. But I mean, I'm reminded of that when reading Thomas. Thomas is talking about how it's not arbitrary what God's done, right?

[5:41] Beautiful arguments there, but we're not getting to that. We'll be a different thing. We're up to Article Five here, I guess. Now, whether those things which are of human nature can be said of the what divine nature? So I notice the difference in the way that what. God. The word "God" signifies in the words what divinity or the divine nature signify, right? That's why there's a difference here, right?

[6:11] And you can say things of human nature about God, right? That God died for us and so on, right? But can you say, you know, of the divine nature? See.

[6:27] So, to the fifth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that those things which are of human nature are able to be said of the divine nature. For those things which are of human nature are said of the Son of God, right? And of God, but God is same thing as his own nature. Therefore, those things which are of human nature are able to be said of the what divine nature.

[7:03] I notice, the subjection is what reasoning for what the things are, but overlooking the difference in the way they what signify, right? I just happened to be reading that that part on the first chapter of John there, and Thomas is giving all these explanations, all these that the church fathers have for the first words. In the beginning was the word, right? And you know, one meaning of beginning there is God Himself, because God is the beginning of all things.

[7:43] He's the Alpha and Omega, right? So, if the word is said to be in God, and there's a distinction there in the way they signify, right? But they're really the same thing. There still is a difference in the way they signify. You say what is in the other, right? And likewise, you might say the divine nature is in God, right? Or God has the divine nature. But we have to realize that what He has and said to have, He is.

[8:17] Okay. Moreover, flesh belongs to human nature. But just as Damascene says in the third book, we say that the nature of the Word was incarnate, right? According to the blessed what, Athanasius and Cyril. I don't know. Now he's going to have to say it's not the best way of speaking. What is he going to say to that? I wonder. Therefore, it seems that for a like reason, those things which are of human nature can be said of the what divine nature.

[8:59] Moreover, those things which are of the divine nature belong to the human nature in Christ, as to know the future and to have saving power. Right. Therefore, it seems, for a like reason, those things which are of human nature can be said of the divine nature. It's an interesting objection. Now, I guess he's going to solve that with what can participate, what cannot participate.

[9:30] But against this is what Damascene says in the third book that in speaking about the divine nature, right, we do not name or say those things which are private to human nature. What's the word, idiomata, there, right? Idios in Greek, as we said before, means what private, and so an idiom in language is something that's what private. My French teacher said, "You know, this is a French idiom.

[10:04] Say, 'Don't fight it. ' He says, 'Accept it. ' That's the way they speak. We don't speak that way, but that's the way they speak. That is proprietates huh? Proper, I should say, being private to him. For we do not say that the Deitas, which means the what divine nature, right, is able to undergo, or that it is what created, yeah. But the deity is the divine nature.

[10:36] Therefore, those things which are the human nature cannot be said of the divine nature, right? So, verbi senior nati prolati, son, get in trouble.

[10:53] I answer: It should be said that those things which are properly of one thing cannot be truly said of what another, unless of that of which it is the same to that.

[11:10] Just as to be capable of laughter, right, Visibile, does not belong except to that which is man. Now, in the mystery of incarnation, the divine nature is not the same thing as the human nature, but there is the same hypostasis of both what natures, huh? Going back to my example, right? There's one point there, right? Beginning of two lines, but the two lines are not each other, right?

[11:45] And therefore, those things which are of one nature are not able to be what said of the other, as they are signified in the what abstract, as that by which, right? So, I mean, the divine nature signifies as that by which God is God, right? Um, as a distinct from the name God, right? So, can what pertains to human nature be that by which God is God?

[12:17] That's the sense that you'd be saying, right? If you say that what is proper to human nature belongs to the divine nature, you say that what is proper to man makes God to be what he is. Well, that's laughable, right? Ridiculous, yeah.

[12:41] But concrete names stand under, right, or suppose the hypostasis of the nature, and therefore indifferently they able to be said those things which pertain to what either nature, huh? Can be said of the what concrete names?

[13:10] Whether that name of which they are said gives one to understand both natures, as this name Christ. I know, I said Thomas, from time to time, will say that you know that Christ in a way signifies what both. Other times he'll say, "Well, no, Christ means anointed, and it's the human nature that's anointed, not the divine nature. Therefore, Christ is the name of him as what man."

[13:33] And suddenly, when you explain Peter's confession of faith as being a complete profession of faith, which it has to be, because as Paul the sixth says, the whole church is built on this faith of Peter. The faith is what thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God. Right, so he's both the human nature and the divine nature must be in there.

[13:57] Um, but sometimes I think he takes you know the fact that he's anointed by the Holy Spirit and so on by God, right? That's a reference to the divine nature as well as the human nature in the idea of being anointed by God. But, be careful about that though.

[14:18] Which is understood, what both the divinity anointing right, and the humanity anointed. Okay, we'll let you say that, Thomas. Okay, be careful though. Or only the divine nature as this name God or the Son of God, right? Or only the human nature as this name man or what Jesus? Again, myself, you know, the word Jesus means saving. Say isn't that more apt to be applied to both, right?

[14:54] Because as God, he's saving us too. I mean, even more so in some sense. But anyway, but self-referencing I can't get to I've got to watch myself. Whence Leo Papa, must be the other great, right? In his epistle to the what The Palestinians, huh? Just like the present Pope, there has gone there and spoken to them. It does not matter from which what substance Christ is named, right?

[15:30] Since inseparably remaining the unity of the person, right, the same is what. Yeah. The Son of the whole man, right, on account of flesh, and the whole Son of God, on account of being one with the what divinity and the Father.

[15:59] He's a whole Son of Man on account of the flesh. Not only the flesh, but and the whole. What son of God, on account of one divinity with the Father, right?

[16:19] I mean, the main thing in this body, this article is the distinction between the abstract name, right, and the concrete name, right. So God signifies. he wants to explain the way they signify, right? The word God signifies as that which has the divine nature, right? Even though they have and they had the same thing, right? But signifies as as someone having the divine nature, right? Why deitas, right?

[16:50] One word there, deity. Not sure how deity in English means. Same thing, deitas. But deitas signifies as that, but by which one's God, huh? Or is the divine nature, right? Okay. Now Thomas has talked about that before. You know when he talked about how we name God and so on, right? And how we can say both that God is what

[17:23] good and that He's goodness itself, right? But yet they signify somewhat differently, good and goodness, huh? And we can't really avoid those two ways of signifying because, as the philosopher explains in the third book about the soul, our reason's own object is of what it is as something sensed or imagined, and in these the form and what has the form are not the same thing, right? And so our way of speaking reflects the nature of material things, and so when we come to talk about an immaterial thing like God, we have these two ways of speaking.

[18:05] Neither one of which is adequate to him, right? And so we want to say both that he is what good because he is good, but we want to say he's goodness itself because of the simplicity of God, and there's no real distinction in him between his goodness and himself, huh? But we can't avoid those two ways of what speaking, right? And we, at the same time, realize neither one is is adequate, huh?

[18:40] Okay. Now the first objection is kind of overlooking the fact that even though the divine nature is the same thing as God, they signify right in a different way. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in divine things. Really, the person is the same thing as nature. We saw that in our study of the trinity, right? You compare the persons of the nature, right?

[19:09] And by reason of this identity, the divine nature is said of the son of what God. But however, there is not the same way of signifying, and therefore some things are said of the son of God, which are not said of the divine what nature. Just as we say that the son of God is generated, we do not oversay that the divine nature is what generated, as has been brought out in the first what part.

[19:46] And likewise, in the mystery of incarnation, we say that the son of God has suffered. We do not, however, say that the divine nature suffered. But again, maybe to say to understand that you should realize, as I said before, that the divine nature signifies as that by which God is God, right? And you certainly can't say that He's God by reason of something what human, okay? Why God signifies as not that or by God is God, but that which is God, that which has the divine nature.

[20:39] And because God, the person, can have another nature, right? And did have another nature, then there can be what things said of God by reason of the human nature, right? Because it has that nature as well, right?

[20:57] So the word was made flesh, right? Okay. Now the word incarnation. the second objection here. huh? That text there from Damisen, right, where Damascus seems to be coming to himself.

[21:15] He says to the second, it should be said that the word incarnation more implies a union to flesh than the what properties of flesh.

[21:30] Now both natures in Christ are united to the other in the person, by reason of which union the divine nature can be said to be what incarnation, and human nature to be deified, huh?

[21:48] Okay, Thomas. I didn't realize you were going to be so subtle. That's pretty good. Pretty good, huh? Now the we were impressed with this Greek commentator there among the Neoplatonic ones, Ammonius Hermias, right? And he has this beautiful commentary on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, right? And Thomas, you know, he goes through the Peri Hermeneias. He'll often, you know, a difficult point, quote several authors, right? And he will usually see some defect in him, so on, but he doesn't do this Ammonius Hermias, right?

[22:33] And Thomas's commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, you know, is incomplete, and it breaks off, you know, where one of the medieval Latin translations of Ammonius Hermias breaks off. Oh, that's. But Thomas's examples, you know, he's supposed to have placed them with Ammonius, you know, so so Ammonius Hermias got a lot of you know credit with us because of Thomas, huh? So on. But one place where Thomas seems to not go along with the Ammonius is because his explanation is too subtle.

[23:05] Thomas has a little simple explanation. but I wouldn't dare do this with Thomas. But this the way Thomas is explaining this. This way of thinking is not being incorrect, right? And these are pretty pretty strong guys, Athanasius and Cyril, right? You don't mess around those guys. Cyril, I won't mess mess around them. Another third objection, huh? That was the one. Yet some things that seem to belong to divine nature are said of what human nature, right?

[23:47] Now, to the third, it should be said that those things which belong to the divine nature are said of the human nature not according as they what essentially belong to the what divine nature, as if therefore they essentially belong to human nature of Christ, right? But according as they are what participative, huh? They're partaken of, and their derived human nature is partaking of them in some way.

[24:20] That means to have in a partial way, right? Whence those things which are not able to be what partaken of by human nature, as to be uncreated, right, or to be what omnipotent, in no way are said of human nature, right? But now the divine nature, the reverse is not true because the divine nature can receive nothing in a participatory way from human nature. In fact, the divine nature can in no way what partake of anything, because it's what yeah, and it's purely what perfect, yeah, complete actual, right?

[25:04] And those for those things which are human nature in no way can be said of the divine. You know, in in ethics, you know, when you take up the virtues there, and you say that the will and the emotions can partake of reason, right? And

[25:27] reason partake of the emotions? Don't think so. Not really, huh? It can be impeded in some way by the emotions. So it can be impeded. Impeded, huh? Or shaken. Yeah. I know we might speak of our. Could you speak of angry reasoning or fearful reasoning? I think can more so, right? It seems to me, you know, you can. Reason to kind of partake in some way, right, of the influence of these things.

[26:08] But God in no way can partake of something. That's why one of the arguments there, Thomas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he's taking up the goodness of God, right? And as I mentioned before, t here is five chapters there. He shows that God is good, and then he's goodness itself, And nothing bad can belong to God. Then he's the good of every good, and then he's the highest good.

[26:32] But one of the arguments that he can't be bad. If he was bad, he'd have to be essentially bad. He couldn't partake of badness, no. Have to be badness itself, and that's an impossibility, because then he couldn't even be, because to be is good, right? And badness itself would have nothing good in it. So, beautiful argument here. So God can partake of nothing. Doesn't St. Paul say "we see in part you know, it's parte.

[27:02] It's a way of speaking of the perfectionist. You know, in the second book, in the fifth book of wisdom, when Aristotle gets to the third group of words there in the fifth book, and they revolve around the word "perfect" and the word "whole," right? And Thomas, in the commentary, says, "Well, as he said already in the in physics, the third book, there, whole and part. I mean, whole and perfect mean almost the same, right?

[27:36] So they're different words, but they're almost meaning the same thing. Well, then, imperfect and partial mean almost the same thing, right? And the idea of partaking is the idea perfect. If you partake of something, do you have it fully? Partake means to take apart. Yeah. So we're partaking of the mind of Thomas Aquinas, huh?

[28:08] Who's partaking the mind of God? So we're really a part of a part. For that much. Okay, now we get to some questions here about making so on Article Six, right?

[28:38] To the sixth One goes forward. Thus, it seems that this is false. God was made a what? Man. Man, huh? For since man signifies a substance, huh? Put man in the genus of substance, huh? To become a man is to come to be what? Simply. Now you've made this distinction between simply and secundum quid, right? Um. So when I came to school today, did I come to be?

[29:18] In some way. Now you have to qualify, right? I didn't come to be simply, right? But when my parents generated me, right? Then I came to be, right? Yeah. Okay.

[29:35] So I learned geometry. I didn't come to be. I came to be geometry or something accidental. But when I grew to be five foot ten or whatever, I grew to be. I didn't come to be, but I came to be five foot ten, right? Okay. But man is a substance, huh? But this is false. God was made what? Simply.

[29:58] And therefore, that Thomas was arguing that, huh? And through whom all things were made, right? We must be God then, the Word, huh? If all things are made through Him, because everything else was made, huh? Therefore, this is false. God was made what? Man.

[30:17] Moreover, to become a man is to be changed, huh? Now a lot of times that I'm saying, you know, what is change? Well, if we try to define change, I suppose you say change is becoming other.

[30:38] Staying the same is not changing, right? Becoming other, right? So. Seems to be what saying that God changes, right? If he becomes a man.

[30:52] But God is not able to be the subject of change. And this is a text that Thomas often quotes on when gets through showing by reason that God does not change. According to that of Malachi chapter three verse six, I am the Lord, right? I the Lord, and I do not change. And is one of the what canonical epistles there, right? Not a shadow of change in him.

[31:23] Therefore, it seems that this is false. God was made a man, huh? So you get into a lot of trouble with words, huh? Moreover, man, according as he is said of what, according as it is said of Christ, supposes the person of the Son of God. But this is false. God was made what? Person of the Son of God. Therefore, this is false that God was made what?

[31:58] Man. But against this is what is said in John one, verse fourteen. The Word was made what? Flesh. Flesh. And of course, flesh there is standing for man, right? By what? Synecdoche

[32:26] I know it's Augustine there in the Catena Aurea, say part for the whole, you know. Doesn't give it a name, you know. And Plato, you know, in the symposium, he speaks of giving the name of the part for the whole, time universal whole there. But he doesn't give it a name, right? I think those names like Synecdoche and antonomasia came from the rhetoricians, I think. But a lot of times Thomas does pick up and use those words anyway, you know.

[32:57] But in Augustine and Plato, they just seem to say, "Well, this is a you're speaking figuratively, you know, part for the whole." Okay, but against this is what is said in John one. Verbum caro factum est, and as Athanasius says in the Epistle to Epictetus, the Word was made flesh is like as if one were to say that he was made a man, right? Okay. So the divinity is not in place of the human soul, and all those sort of heresies, right?

[33:46] Thomas says, "Answer: It should be said that each thing is said to be made that which newly begins to be said of it." But to be a man truly is said of God, as has been said, right?

[34:07] But nevertheless, so that it does not belong to God to be man from what? Eternity. But from time, huh? Through the taking on of what human nature, right?

[34:22] And therefore, this is true that God was made man. But in diverse ways is understood by diverse persons, right? Just as this God is man, this has been said above, huh? Now, was he going to talk about these in the reply to the objections, huh? Okay,

[34:50] but that's the basic what he's saying. If it's true, that's the order of the articles here, right? In other words, he showed that it was true to say that God is man in one of the previous articles, right? And now, if he adds to that that he wasn't always man,

[35:08] then to bring out that this begins to be said of him, right, and from time, right, in the fullness of time, ah, then we say that he, what, yeah, yeah, became a man or was made a man.

[35:26] Okay. Now, to the first objection, he says, "What about coming to be simply, right? " Thomas is rightly subtle here, right? Rightly to the point. the first, therefore, it should be said that to become a man is to come to be simply in all those in which human nature begins to be in a suppositum, right? De novo creato. Okay.

[36:04] So my human nature began to be in my person newly created, right? And therefore, I came to be simply. Okay. But did the Son of God come to be? simply? He already was, right? Before he became man. But God is said to be made man from this that human nature began to be in the supposito of the divine what nature, pre-existing from eternity, and therefore God became man.

[36:41] Therefore, for God to become man is not for God to what? Become simple. Yeah. Okay. Again, go back to my theoretical thing here, right? Okay. You've got a line here that always existed, and the end point of the line therefore existed. Okay. Now, if I bring another line into existence with its own end point, you can say the end of this line has begun to be when this line came into existence, right?

[37:17] Okay. But if instead of that way, the end point is coming to be when the line comes to be, right, or begins to be, if that human nature. Is what drawn to the already existing person, right? And then does that point there begin to be

[37:46] simply? No, that point was already there. Okay, so that point did not begin to be simply. You could say it began to be the beginning of this line, right, or the end point of this line, right? So that's to begin to be what? Say, couldn't quit. It didn't begin to be very simply, did it?

[38:17] Just like when I learned geometry, I didn't begin to be. I began to be a geometry right I already was before. I learned geometry, right? Okay. If I begin to be when I learned geometry,

[38:33] then I began to be simply right? When I learned geometry, right I didn't begin to be when I began to learn geometry, right? If I didn't begin to be simply when I learned geometry. I merely began to be a geometer. And so the Son of God didn't begin to be when He became a man, right? But He began to be a man.

[39:04] So that was not beginning to be simply for Him, was it? He's most unusual, huh? You know, when our Lord defines eternal life there in the in the seventeenth chapters of John, it's eternal life to know You, right? And Him whom You have sent. Sometimes Thomas explains that in terms of what

[39:32] heaven or eternal life consists in knowing God, but also the incarnate Word, right? So we're going to we're going to really enjoy. We're going to really begin. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's going to be extremely interesting. That's one way of explaining, you know, going out and coming going out and coming in, right? You find pasture, right? You go into the divine nature and you come out to the incarnate Word.

[39:58] That's really that's really life. Ezekiel refers to the book written inside and outside. Yeah. Christ. Yeah. We're going to do that. so you go from the prima pars to the tertia pars We, found pasture there in the prima pars, right? Now we're finding pasture here in the in the tertia pars, huh?

[40:28] Now the second objection, huh? I'm going to have a little longer reply to this, right? To the second, it should be said that it has been said, becoming, right, implies right that something is what said newly of what. Another. Whence, whenever something is said newly of something with a change in that of which it is said, then becoming is what is really change, yeah. And this belongs to all things which are what.

[41:11] Yeah. For for something is not able to what. For whiteness. Which is the name of a quality, right, or magnitude, quantity, right? Cannot begin to what? Newly come to something. Except to the fact that that thing is newly changed to whiteness or to what magnitude.

[41:48] And that's notice the word "absolute." There is taken as the opposite of what? Relative, right? Huh? Okay. So sometimes Thomas takes "absolute" as opposed to "secundum quid, right? But this here, I think, is more "absolute" as opposed to what? Relative, right? The more common use of the word, what? Absolute, huh? I don't remember the text. I saw a text this morning or yesterday in Super Gentiles where Thomas says "absolute vel simpliciter," right?

[42:21] So in some senses, that's taken. I was looking at the text on on the words necessary there, right? And use the term "absolute necessity." Huh? Like when you say two is half of four. But when you say it's necessary to eat, well, you're going to live, but you don't necessarily eat. Some you might starve to death, right?

[42:51] But two must be right, simply. But but I think absolutely there is a sense of simpliciter there Do you need a college education? unless you have a college education? Well, if you're going to, you know. Want to get a good job? Yeah, that's they say.

[43:18] Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you can avoid it, right? I guess. Yeah. But two can avoid being half a four, eh? That's absolutely necessary, right? Simply without qualification, right? Yeah. See, but some people starve to death, right? So it's necessary if you're going to go on living to eat yeah? But see, here, "absolute" doesn't mean "simpliciter," but it's "absolute" as opposed to what? Yeah.

[43:54] But those things which are said relative are able to be newly said of something without its change, just as a man is newly what? Right side without his change to the motion of that which is. So I could be taller than my son and then become shorter than him, to no change or fault of my own, but to his what? Growth. Yeah. See. So I'm newly. I wasn't always shorter than him.

[44:32] Okay. Whence in such things is not necessary that everything that is said to what come to be is what changed, huh? Because this is able to happen through the change of what another, right? And in this way, we say to God in the Psalms, "Lord, you are made a what refuge for us, right? " Um, but to be a man belongs to God by reason of the what union, which is a certain what relation.

[45:14] And therefore, to be a man is said newly of God, without his change through the change of what human nature, right? Which is taken on by the divine person, right?

[45:30] And therefore, when it is said that God has made man, there is not to be understood any change on the side of God, but only on the side of what human nature.

[45:47] Very good, Thomas. huh. Very good. Your voice will be heard around the world. Your bellow. So it's a double reading, right? Damox is bellowed here and around the world. More

[46:12] of a man, according as the objection again. More of a man, according as it is said of Christ, supposes the person of the Son of God. But this is false that God was made what the person of the Son of God, huh? Therefore, it is false that God was made man. To the third, it should be said that man supposes the person of the Son of God, not nudam naked, huh?

[46:41] But insofar as it subsists in what human nature. And although this is false that God was made the person of what the Son. Nevertheless, this is true that God was made man from this that it was united to what human nature.

[47:04] Very good, Thomas. You pass. Carry you off on our shoulders, huh? Tell a story you know of Cajetan. you know who was making his defense, on, I guess at the end of defense, you know, you would invite anybody around if you pass, you know, to have a beer at your expense or something, right? But he this will be until he picked it on his shoulders and carried them off.

[47:30] in their shoulders. And treated him too, as a beer or something. So we'll carry Thomas on our shoulders. Okay.