Tertia Pars
47. Aquinas on Christ's Unity: Whether Christ as Man Is a Person, and Whether Christ Is One or Two (Summa III, q.16–17)
Class of 2009-09-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/047-aquinas-on-christs-unity-whether-christ-as-man-is-a-person/

[0:00] Visible, they say, in Latin, right? He's capable of laughter. Well, if you understand the nature of man as an animal that has what reason, right? Because he's an animal, he can make the the sounds of laughter, but more primarily because he has reason, he can see the what absurdity of something, huh? And I was laughing earlier about the the czar there of Obama, who uh thinks that animals should have a right to be represented in court, you know, by a lawyer, huh?

[0:35] So if I'm getting rid of my dog or throwing my dog away, or I'm going to, you know, cut up the cow and eat him, the cow's got a right to sue me in court.

[0:52] There's something funny about this, right? So if you understand that I'm a rational animal, you can see why why capable of laughter about some of these sort of things. So that reminds you that they they say make those things funny, and everybody else takes that seriously. Yeah. That's the funny thing. Yeah, yeah. Well, that's funny too. Yeah, they take it seriously. But by understanding that, then you can answer the objection.

[1:14] It's just because you know the right definition. Yeah, you know, it solved all the difficulties right? Okay. And so I say the discovery of a good definition of a thing like place or or a person, right, is a major work of the mind, right?

[1:39] When something has been most beautifully defined, that's when it does all these things that Aristotle says in the fourth book, and Thomas repeats in the sentences there. This is a major accomplishment of reason, and so I admire Boethius not only for his definition of person, but the definition we saw earlier of eternity, right, in the prima pars, and the there's other definitions, you know, that are attributed to Boethius that come from Boethius.

[2:14] Say this is a major mind, Boethius. I know myself, you know, when I when I first started out in philosophy, I got interested in the poetics of Aristotle, and the poetics of Aristotle is announced to be about tragedy and comedy, right, primarily. And we have the part on tragedy, but the part on comedy has been lost, right? So, in imitation of Aristotle, I was setting out to try to define comedy, right?

[2:45] And it took me a long time to do, right? It was a major work, you know, huh? And and so it's a major accomplishment. If you go to Aristotle's book in logic, there called they call in English the Topics, but that doesn't get that's a transliteration, not a translation. It means really about places, right? Huh? Where you look for dialectic arguments, huh? And there's eight books of the Topics, books about places.

[3:16] And as Aristotle explains in the first book, all of this is ordered in a way to definition. Is your all of this, you know? And and there's a whole book there, you know, about seeing whether something belongs to something or not, right? And then another book about whether if it belongs to it, does it belong to it? What? Essentially, right? Or is it outside? Yes, right. And another book, you know, does it belong to it, but belong only to it?

[3:48] And all goes into the definition. The definition has to belong to the thing, right? It has to belong to it essentially in its very nature. It has to be what belong only to the thing being defined. And even that's not enough. And Aristotle has another book, you know, where he says, now we require some other things in definition besides all this. And we get another book about how to, you know, you see, my goodness, this this is a what a major work, huh?

[4:16] Is it? And you know, and I admire Shakespeare's definition of reason. Um, it's only gradually I begin to realize how good his definition of reason was. But the more I understood it, the more I realized that this was a what? This was a great accomplishment, right? This is you know.

[4:37] Most people are just you know using the word definition in a very loose sense, you know, for some explanation of what they mean by their words, and maybe not too good an explanation of what they mean by their words, and so on, right? I don't realize what it really would be to define these things. I'd come into class and I'd say, what is love? And the students a lot in the friendship class, and we're staying, well, it's a feeling.

[5:02] I said there may be a love that is a feeling. I said, but anger is a feeling too, isn't it? You know. So is anger love? You know, that's about where they are, right? It's a feeling, right? And that's only you know one kind of love, and maybe not the fullest sense of love. But even that is not you know, not that every feeling is love, right?

[5:28] And so it takes a lot to. In logic, I'm doing logic with a student in the house there Wednesday nights, and and you know, get the definition of statement and the definition of syllogism, right? Now these are really you know major accomplishments, huh?

[5:52] Most philosophers can't define these things. If you ask them, you know, out of the blue. Why, if you ask them what a genus is, what a you know, they can't define it. They don't have a distinct knowledge of what it is, and the whole rest of philosophy depends upon having a distinct knowledge of what a genus is. Even theology does, right? You know, we have an article there as God in the genus, and what a genus is, right?

[6:21] Or you're told, you know, when you carry over the word wisdom, say to God, you drop the genus and keep the difference. What the hell does that mean? You know, you know, but you know, Father Boulet there at Laval, they really, you know, drum this into us, and you see it over and over again in Thomas, and so you got to know, and that's the first thing the Isagoge, right?

[6:45] I asked my colleagues one day, you know, how many of you read the Isagoge? None of them had, and some of them didn't even know. You know, what it was Yeah, it's like that in the Acts of Apostles, the Holy Spirit. We haven't even heard of them, you know. Are you in the Holy Spirit? Who's that? You know, this is this, but this is the equivalent of that in in philosophy, right?

[7:08] You know, you haven't read the Isagoge, you know. First course I had at Laval really was first semester there was the Isagoge there with Albert the Great's 200-page commentary, you know, paraphrase of it, you know, so you got a certain foundation,

[7:25] you know. So here we have the definition of person, right? He's saying, well, if Christ, according as is a man, is a individua substantia, right? He's not a universal substance, right? And he's one of a rational nature, right? Human nature. Then he's a person, right? Isn't that the way? You know.

[7:55] But notice, and we've talked just take one example there, Shakespeare's definition of reason, ah, the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, right? Well, what does the word discourse mean, right? In order to understand that definition, you have to spend a long time understanding what you mean by discourse, and then what does it mean to call discourse large, right? And a whole series of things involves, right?

[8:24] So even if you have the words the definition, it doesn't mean you understand the definition. And I just love Thomas's article said on the definition of eternity, right? And there's four or five parts of the definition, and maybe objection one will attack this part, objection two that part, objection three that part, and each one that will be answered, right? But notice how he's focusing your mind on each part.

[8:57] He's very what stingy there, right? Won't let any word in the definition go out there. So the sometimes people misunderstand the definition. That's a strong argument, though, for some of the very definition, right?

[9:34] Moreover, Christ, according as He is man, is a thing of a human nature, and a suppositum and hypostasis. One is the Latin word; one is the Greek-derived word of the same nature. But every hypostasis or suppositum and thing of a human nature is a person.

[10:00] No. It's true even of him, but it's not the same. person Therefore, Christ, according as he is man, is a person. But against all this, Christ, according as he is man, is not an eternal what? Person. If, therefore, according as he is man, he were a person, it would follow that in Christ there are what? Two persons, one in time and one eternal, which is what sounds like the same right, which is erroneous.

[10:35] this has been said above, so, let's, see what the master does here. I should really leave you for another day, you see. In your cell, locked up and saying nothing else.

[10:58] It's only way they clear a man's mind, you know. you can't let them. read the daily newspaper or some other thing that follows our mind up. The answer should be said that it has been said above. This term man, huh?

[11:19] Incidentally, you say this term man, right? That really comes from the logic of the third act, because the syllogism has what? Two premises and three terms, three always in Greek, right? Three limits, huh? But because those limits might be expressed by one word, then

[11:51] the word "limit" started to be used for a name, right? So we still use in English. You say, "Define your terms." Why do we say "terms"? We say "define your names" or "define your words," which would be more accurate, right? And so even even Thomas here kind of follows the what custom, right?

[12:13] Just like when you teach the logic of the second act, what is the logic of the second act about? I say it's about statement, huh? A lot of people will say that it's about the proposition, right? But originally, proposition meant a what? Premise in syllogism. propositio was a Latin word for premise, and propositio, place before, right? Because you're going to draw a conclusion, right? So, propositio is not naming statement by itself, but it is, but the statement insofar as it's being used to what?

[12:56] Yeah, yeah. Just like say, well, I'm I'm a man and I'm a father, right? I'm a father because I give rise to somebody, right? Okay.

[13:10] So I prefer to use the word statement, right? As I say, it's common to use the word proposition now for statement, and likewise, they tend to use the word term for what? Yeah, yeah. Of course, probably part of the reason for that is that the the act that seems to be most characteristic of reason is called reasoning, and you can see that in the word itself, right?

[13:35] Reasoning would seem to be the act of reason, right? And so it kind of stands out reasoning, and therefore we borrow the word proposition for statement and term, right? For what the names that make up the proposition.

[13:55] Stephen Thomas always does that, huh? Okay. It shows it shows the force of what custom, right? You heard my little complaint there, you know. You know, you sit down to eat, you know, people say, "Let's say grace," and they say, "Bless us, oh Lord." These, I guess, that's not really grace. That's not the Thanksgiving for what you're going to eat. That's the blessing, right? And then there's another prayer, which is the Thanksgiving, which should be said after the meal, you know.

[14:27] But usually after the meal, you're not in the very religious state. People forget it. Yeah, yeah. But I mean, they're accustomed to call what the blessing grace. They're accustomed to call the the blessing the Thanksgiving, which is not what it is, right? But even I, you know, tend to follow the custom because you know what else I'm going to say. You know, but it shows you the force of custom, right?

[14:56] Because Aristotle says, you know, when he starts with the force of custom, he says even something we know is unreasonable will continue to follow that.

[15:07] So even the scientists will say the sun rose at six, you know, even though he he knows that's not the way it is. So he says this term, this word, this name, man, placed in what? Reduplication. Duplication, right? Huh? Can be taken, and this is essentially, saw I guess in the previous body, right? Either by reason of the suppositum, right, or by reason of the what nature, right?

[15:40] Yeah. Now, so you can see that even the word God, right? You say the word was toward God, you're taking it by reason of what one of its supposita. When you say that God is. Eternal or something like that, right? Or a God is all knowing or something like that, that is taken by reason of the nature, right?

[16:06] When therefore it is said that Christ, according as he is man, is a person, if it is taken by reason of the suppositum, it is manifest that Christ, according as man, is a person, because the suppositum of the human nature is nothing other than the person of the Son of God.

[16:34] If, however, it be taken by reason of the nature, thus it is able to be understood in two ways. That reminds me what Aristotle says. He says most men are not good at seeing a distinction. And Thomas is always seeing a distinction. I know this one Dominican there. I've been a Dominican, and he said he had this one teaching. He always said, "Never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish."

[17:05] That's a bit of exaggeration, but there is some truth to that, right? He said that Thomas is not going to simply affirm or deny a lot of these things, but he's going to see a distinction and then eventually may affirm or deny something in regard to the parts of that distinction. But the version that is don't say yes, don't say no, say distinguish. Yeah, yeah, yeah, same thing.

[17:30] If, however, it be taken by reason of the nature, thus it is able to be understood in two ways. In one way, that be understood that it belongs to human nature to be in some person. You are not going to have human nature there without a person there, right?

[17:50] Yeah, you are not going to have human nature there without there being a person who is who is a man, right? Okay. And in this way, it is true, for everything that subsists in human nature is a person.

[18:08] In another way, it can be understood that to what the human nature in Christ there is owed or belongs its own what personhood that is caused from the principles of what human nature, like your personhood or mine is, right? And thus Christ, according as he is a man, is not a person,

[18:36] because the human nature is not what existing by itself apart from human nature, which is required for the right to a person. Okay. Now just to go back and give you my my magisterial explanation of this, right?

[18:58] Here a line with an end point, right? Now, if another line is drawn apart from that, right? It has its own what? End point, right? But if this other line is drawn to that point, then that point, which is a divine person, subsists both in the divine nature and in the what? Human nature, right?

[19:29] So you might say that it belongs to the line, a reason of being a line, to have an endpoint. But to have its own endpoint? Well, if it's drawn separately, right? But if it's drawn as a human nature of Christ is drawn to his divine person, then it has an end point, but the end point is the end point of the original line, which is the divine what?

[19:57] Person. I always tell the joke, you know, about meeting the Catholic Philosophical Association, where some nun, you know, got up to give her paper, and the title of paper was "Audiovisual Aids to Metaphysics."

[20:18] Well, when the paper was announced, people were like you know, just kind of spontaneously, you know, not being mean, just burst out laughing, you know. laughter It's like Obama's speech last night, at one point, you know, they spoke out of laughter when the Congress could write Oh really? Yeah.

[20:38] So, see, this is the point that Thomas is making here, right? So, if if it was separate, it would cause its own what? Endpoint, right? Okay.

[21:03] But it's not in this case here because human nature is not by itself apart from existing the divine nature, right? Now he says to every man who plant the first objection, every what? Man has got a person, right? It is that man, and Thomas says it should be said that to every man it belongs to be a person, according as everyone subsists in human nature is a person.

[21:38] But this is private, huh? A lot of times people don't know how to translate proprium, right? But I don't think in a lot of cases, you know, it should be translated as proper, but private, right? But this is private. It belongs to this man alone, right? But is private to the man Christ that the person subsisting in human nature is not caused from the principles of human nature, but it is eternal, right?

[22:10] Just like in the line over here, right? The endpoint is not caused in that line, but it's caused from the other. line. And therefore, in one way, he is a person according as his man, since it belongs to every man to be a person. But another way, not. In that way, he's not like us, huh? Otherwise, he's not like us. He's what?

[22:38] Great man. Okay. Now the second objection was the one that was drawn from the definition of what? Person, right, huh? To the second, it should be said that. Individual substance, which is placed in the definition of person, in the definition that Boethius worked out, right, implies a complete substance subsisting by itself, separated from others, right. Otherwise, the hand of man could be said to be a person, right, since it is something substantial and it is individual, right.

[23:27] But because it is a individual substance existing in another, it cannot be said to be a what person. And for the same reason, neither can the human nature in Christ be said to be its own what person, because it exists in the what divine person. But it can nevertheless be said to be individual, a singular thing, right? But not the individual, singular in the sense of the definition of person.

[23:58] Okay, Thomas is explaining there the definition. Okay, now the third objection. Moreover, Christ, according as he is man, is a thing of human nature, and a suppositum and hypostasis are the same nature. But every hypostasis suppositum and res naturae of human nature is a person. Therefore, Christ, according as he is man, is a person.

[24:26] Thomas says to the third, it should be said that just as person signifies something complete and subsisting by itself in a rational nature, so hypostasis, suppositum, and res naturae signify in the genus of substance something subsisting by itself. Whence, just as human nature is not by itself alone, right, apart from the person of the Son, so also is not by itself in hypostasis or suppositum or res naturae.

[25:05] And therefore, in the sense in which this is negated, Christ, according as he is man, as a person, is necessary to negate all the others.

[25:16] Okay, Thomas. So, shall we go on or take a little break or take a little? Oh, okay. We can look at the premium, huh? Not not introduction. Proemium You know. I mentioned yesterday and give a little course on what a premium is, right? Philosophy and so on. But I always mention how I like the premium to the Verbum Dei there in Vatican II, the one on divine thing.

[25:48] But if you have the official Latin text, it's very short. But it says premium, right? But the first English edition I had of the documents, it says introduction. Introduction means what? Leading into. So, as an old college professor, there's a lot of courses in not only my own department but other departments called introduction to economics or introduction to this or introduction to that, and you're being led into that subject, right?

[26:21] I don't say very far, but you're being led into it, right? And why a premium is what? It means pave the way, right? You see, but you're not leading the person into it, right? The most important thing, the premium, is what you're aiming at, right? But then you start to pursue that, you're leading the person into it. That work I mentioned by by the great Boethius, huh?

[26:49] It's called in Greek the Isagoge, right, to the categories of Aristotle. A lot of times it's just you know abbreviated to Isagoge, but that's etymologically the same as introduction. So he's leading you into what logic with that treatise, huh? But that introduction to logic, and especially the logic of the first act, has its own premium, right? And and Porphyry has a magnificent premium, right? He says, you know, he's talking about the necessity of what he's going to talk about, right?

[27:21] And he says he says to know what genus is, what difference is, what species is, what property is, what accident is, is necessary, Chrysaorius, he says, not only to understand the categories of Aristotle, which is the reason why the question arose, but for definition, for division, and for demonstration, right? So it's a magnificent, you know, you realize how important the teaching of the Isagoge is, right? And it passed down among you know the Arabic, I mean the Muslim commentators and and the Christian ones.

[27:56] I mentioned, you know, first thing I did was always read this 200 page thing by Albert the Great. And Cajetan has got a commentary on it, you know, Cardinal Cajetan wrote the you know in the Summa. It's printed in the Leonine. Cardinal Kajetan has got a beautiful commentary on the isogogae of porphyry, right? I had a copy, but I don't know what happened to it. It was very good.

[28:23] So this is a magnificent work, right? That the great Greek. Philosophers, there's commentaries on it by the later Greek philosophers, and then by the Muslim, Christians, and so on. And tremendous work, right? Now, if you look at the definition, say, of genus, and the explanation of genus in there, it's in the five of Aristotle's Physics, right? And things about species are another part of Aristotle. But what Porphyry has done is bring together, right, the teaching of Aristotle about these that's somewhat scattered in the books we have, and then you have a kind of what you see a whole picture of something that you wouldn't see otherwise, right?

[29:06] And he gets all this respect from all these other commentators writing about the Isagoge. So we're going to look at a proemium here now, not an introduction Okay. Then we're not to consider about those things which belong to the unity in Christ in what in general, right, huh?

[29:37] Now those things which pertain to the unity or plurality in particular are determined in their places, just as above has been determined that in Christ there is not one what science, right? There are many kinds of knowledge in Christ. There's the beatific vision. There is infused knowledge. There was what experiential knowledge, and so on.

[30:11] And further later on, there will be determined that in Christ there is not only one what birth, yeah. We had the Nativity of Mary there. Do you people? Yeah, that's our foundation day. Yeah, each year what? Foundation day. Oh, thirty-one years ago. Oh, yeah. Of course, they they brought the kids in the grade school there, right? You know, they had the whole part of it. So the pastor comes down and says, "What does the word Nativity mean?"

[30:41] Let's go on explaining this, right? If anyone gets his birthday, okay. So it ought to consider, therefore, first about the unity of Christ according to his what being, his existence. Secondly, as regards his willing, right,

[31:11] and that's the next question, right? So seventeen, eighteen. Third, as regards his what doing, huh? And that's question what nineteen, huh? Christ had one will. I don't know what they call those guys. Yeah, yeah, one will. You're careful about that. It's a harmony there, Wilson. Okay. Now, in this first question,

[31:48] two things are going to be asked, huh? Whether Christ is one or two. Who tells me that? Okay. And whether in Christ there is only one what? Being, right? Huh? Okay. So that's a short question, huh? We'll take a little break now, and then we'll start. Whether Christ is unum, they'll duo.

[32:27] The first one proceeds thus: it seems that Christ is not one, but two. For Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity that because the form of God took on the form of a what servant, right? God is what both, right? On account of the God taking on these things, and both is man on account of the man what taken. But utrumque cannot be said whether or not what two.

[33:10] Therefore, Christ is two. I don't know in English how would you say it. If you said that Christ is both God and man, right?

[33:21] Yeah, both God and man. Now, if someone is both, he's what one or two? Two, I'm thinking. Two. Yeah, yeah. So he's two. That's an argument in a sense, huh? Is Augustine here referring to because the form of God took the form of a servant? Is he referring to the Philippians of kenosis? That part of scripture. Yeah,

[33:48] yeah, yeah. How does self-emptying, yeah, empty yourself out? How does that involve becoming two? Well, he says when he was in the form of God, he emptied himself and took on the form of a man. So he took on two forms, right? And he took on both forms. And another way of saying it more simply is he was then both God and man, right? So one became two.

[34:09] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Moreover, whoever there is other and other, there are two. But Christ is other and other, as Augustine says in Enchiridion. Now using that same text in a sense, since he was in the form of God, right? When he's in the form of God, he took on the form of a servant, a slave. Ah,

[34:43] both is it one that is both, right? But other on account of the word, other on account of the what man. Therefore, Christ is two. Yeah, unusual number of objections here, doesn't he? Yeah. Moreover, Christ is not only man, because if he were a pure man, right, he would not be what God.

[35:12] Therefore, is something other than man, and thus in Christ there is other another. Therefore, Christ is what two. Those two two Ali and Ali arguments.

[35:30] Moreover, Christ is something that is the Father and something that is not the Father. He is God and the Father is God. Okay, he's man and the Father is not man. So he's something that is the Father and something that is not the Father. Therefore, Christ is something and something. Therefore, Christ is two.

[35:55] Moreover, just as in the mystery of the Trinity, there are three persons in one nature. So, in the mystery of the incarnation, there are two natures in one person. So these two mysteries are in a way contrary. In the one, you have unity of nature and a multiplying of what persons. In other case, you have the reverse, right? Unity of person. So then you have you know the the heresies are in the case of the Trinity always taking what because there's one nature there must be one person or because there are three persons there must be three natures in the same way because

[36:38] there's one person two natures in the incarnation there's two natures there must be two persons like Nestorius says or if there's only one person then there must be what one nature right so they're very similar those arguments right but you can see how how truth is in between two what Extremes. extremes huh all my reports go with the modest truth Shakespeare says huh nor more nor clipped but so right they say more or less than the truth they are villains and the sons of darknesses as Falstaff says King Lear himself

[37:18] well when you say that there are three natures in God because there's three persons are you saying more or less than the truth yeah and when you say there's only one person because there's only one nature you're saying less than the truth right now in the case of the incarnate Word if you say there are two persons because there's two natures you are saying more or less than the truth if you say there is one nature because there's one person you are saying less than the truth so going back then to words there in King Lear all my reports go with the modest truth right the truth is in the middle between two extremes we've talked before about how in the courtroom you know.

[38:14] We're talking about those two ways of departing from the truth by saying more or less than the truth. I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, which is again saying less than the truth and nothing but the truth. I neither add nor subtract from the from the truth, right?

[38:36] So sometimes you know the assimilate or see a likeness there between the virtue of reason and the moral virtues, huh? Because in the moral virtues, as Aristotle defines in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics, it's a habit with choice existing in the middle, he says, huh? Towards us as determined by right reason, huh? So courage is in between foolhardiness and cowardice, huh? It's not equidistant from both, closer to one than the other, but still it's in between two vices, huh?

[39:10] And truth is in a sense in between two mistakes or two errors, right? One of which adds the truth, and the other subtracts the truth, right?

[39:25] Aristotle gets the eighth book of natural hearing there. He's saying, well, is everything at rest as Parmenides and Leucippus say, or is everything in motion as Heraclitus says, or is the truth lying between these two, you know, positions, huh? But the thing about the extreme positions is they can't explain, right? I mean, if everything is at rest, why would anybody think everything's in motion? If everything's in motion, why would anybody think that everything's at rest?

[39:58] But if some things are in motion, some are at rest, and there's some part of the truth in both of these extreme positions, but not the whole truth, right? But on account of the unity of the nature, this isn't

[40:26] the case of the Trinity, right? This is the fifth objection, now. Notwithstanding the distinction of person, right? We can say the Father and the Son are one, according to that of John chapter ten. I and the Father are one.

[40:45] Therefore, not withstanding the unity of person, on account of the duality of natures. Christ, Christ is two. It's kind of neat to that objection, huh? And it does touch upon that that kind of contrariety of the two mysteries, huh?

[41:11] Moreover, the philosopher says in the third book of the physics that one and two are said denominatively. But Christ has a duality of natures; therefore, Christ is two. Aristotle speaks of what denominative means there in the beginning of the categories, huh? First chapter.

[41:43] So I don't say you are justice; I say you are what? Just right. I don't say you are health, but you are healthy. So one and two are said denominatively, but Christ has duality of natures; therefore, he's two.

[42:04] Moreover, just as an accidental form makes one to be other, it's still but more precise in the Latin and the Greek there. So the substantial form. Makes something to be what other kind, as Porphyry says, huh? Okay. So you don't have exactly in English two words to correspond to that, right?

[42:32] But in one case you're talking about other in quality, other in other in kind, let's say, right? You have to use. Okay, what do you know? It's the

[42:46] I say, go give it. But in the Isagoge right But in my text, there Christ referred to as predicabilibus, right? That's what you have. Yeah. So it's a treatise of Albert on the kind of paraphrase of Porphyry It's called the predicabilibus, right? And the work of the categories is de predicamentis, right? But it has that work in there set up. So you speak of the predicables. You're talking about the way something is said of something, right?

[43:18] Genus is one name said of many things, other than kind, signifying what it is, right? But in Christ there are two what substantial natures, right? Two different kinds of things, the human and the divine. Therefore, Christ is other in other, right? He's other in kind. Are

[43:44] they calling it psychology? Split personality? No, not split personality. there's only one person there. Split nature. You know, when they talk about how in the Gospel of Saint John Christ is saying there that it's he's preparing there his departure, you know, in the Last Supper, he's arguing or pointing out that unless I go, the Holy Spirit will not be sent, and so on. But Thomas and the church fathers seem to be saying that if Christ remained on this earth, we'd have a hard time, right, kind of accepting his divinity, right?

[44:30] We sit here across the table from you, you know. No, or anything. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And but also the apostles were kind of attached to his what his very humanness, his very kind of a familiar way, right?

[44:48] And they had to and be separated in a sense for him to have maybe the proper attitude, for them to have the proper attitude towards Christ. Kind of shows you the the human nature there and weakness of our nature and so on. It's

[45:12] not clear, you know, that. All the apostles firmly believe that he's God. You know, even up at the Last Supper, right? No, show us to the Father, and it's enough. You know, and he's been with you all this time. You know, and but you know, the Father and I are one. And so, you know me, you know the Father. But against this is what the great Boethius says in the book about the two natures.

[45:46] Huh? It's a book about the what? Yeah, that's where you get the definition of person. I think. But in everything that is, in so far as it is, is one. But we confess Christ to be; therefore, Christ is one. Beautiful, Probably seven objections, huh?

[46:15] You do that, you know, in the Middle Ages, because people have respect for Boethius, right? Boethius says the opposite, though. But think twice. You know, why would the great Boethius have said this? If this was the whole truth, you know.

[46:34] I answer: It should be said that nature, considered what by itself, in so far as it is signified in the abstract, is not what able truly to be said of the suppositum or the person, with the exception of what in God, right? Because in God, there is no difference between the person and the what nature, right? But am I human nature? No. You might say I have human nature, right?

[47:24] So I'm a human, I guess. Some people might deny that, but am I human nature? See, just like am am I uh logic? No, Maybe I'm a logician, in. Some sense, I'm not logic. So you want to consider the nature by itself and what belongs to it. You might speak of human nature, right? Huh? But human nature be said of a man? No, no. Say he he has human nature, right?

[48:08] He is human. He says, "Nature considered by itself, as it signified in the abstract, is not truly able to be said of the suppositum or the person, except in God, right? In the kind of simplicity

[48:28] in which does not differ what is and that by which it is. So, I am a logician, and logic is that by which I am a logician, right? But what I am and that by which I am what I am, not the same thing. I am not logic. See, or if I am healthy, am I health? I am health. I am strength.

[49:02] No, that may a figurative way of speaking. You know, I'm really that. Speak of woman as being a beauty, right? But is she really beauty? No, she might be beautiful, but beauty is that, quote, that by which she is beautiful, right? Okay, health is that by which I am healthy, right? But you can't really truly say of me that I am health. Now, in this unusual person, in Christ, huh, however, Since there are two natures, the divine to it and the human, right?

[49:47] One of these, to wit, the divine, can be said of him both in the abstract and in the what? Concrete. For we say that the Son of God, who stands under in this name Christ, is the divine nature, and he is what? God. You know, saw Christ in the Gospel Saint John says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Right? Huh? He used the abstract word there.

[50:23] But human nature cannot be said of Christ by itself in the abstract. Is Christ human nature? No, but only in the concrete, in so far as it signifies in the what? Underlying, right? So he said to be a man, but not to be manhood, right? Human nature. For one cannot truly say that Christ is human nature, because human nature is not apt to be said of its what?

[50:58] Underlying suppositum, right? Um, it is said, however, that Christ is man, just as that Christ is what? God. Now, God signifies having deity, right? Okay. And Inter Thomas explained that back when he talked about the names of God, right?

[51:23] That, as Aristotle pointed out, the proper object of our reason is that what it is is something sensed or imagined, and in these things that we sense or imagine, what they are and the thing are not the same. So the thing has that nature, right? But the nature cannot be strictly speaking predicated of it or said of it.

[51:52] Okay. Now, in the case of God, though, you see, Deitas, you want to use the Latin word, Deitas, God, the Godhood, right, the divine nature, and Deus are really, in reality, the same thing. But they differ in the way they signify, right? Because God signifies as what has the divine nature, and the divine nature signifies as that by which he is God. So someone says, "By what is God God?

[52:38] Well, it's by his divine nature that he's God." And so we have to speak that way, right? Even though we realize that either to call him God or to call him the divine nature has a defect in it, because divine nature signifies more that by which he is than his actual being, and God signifies that which has the divine nature, and therefore, like it was something composed, like in us.

[53:12] And so we have a real problem, right? And and in some sense, no name is what adequate, right? Although maybe its fundamental meaning could be applied to God. So he's touching upon that again here. For God signifies habentem, having deity, right? But as we say, you know, in talking about the way the thing really is, we say, "God is whatever he has." Okay, but that ain't true about me.

[53:48] I have some logic, but I'm not logic. I have some help. Ah, I have human nature, but I'm not what I have. Not what I have. It's strange, huh? But I do truly have it. But I have whatever it is. I have.

[54:14] Ah. But in God is whatever he is said to have have right? Okay. We can't avoid using that way of speaking, huh? Because our mind is what it's natural for our mind to turn towards what sensible and imaginable things, and therefore, where what they are and what they have, not what has exactly the same. Okay.

[54:45] So God, the word Deus signifies having deity, right? Having the divine nature, and man signifies what has what humanity, huh? Now you can see another distinction here.

[55:10] But in another way, having human nature is signified by this name man, and in another way by this name what? Jesus, or even this name Peter. For this name man implies right, having humanity, but indistinctly, right. Just as this name God, indistinctly, implies having deity, right.

[55:46] That's why you can have God stand for what, the Father or the Son, right, or the Holy Spirit. But how does this name Peter or this name Jesus signify? Huh. Imply. Well, distinctly having humanity, right? That is under the what? Limited, determined individual properties.

[56:16] Just as this name, the Son of God, implies one having the divine nature, but under a what? Definite personal property, huh? Wow, what a man! Okay.

[56:38] Sometimes I read, you know, one of these things to Thomas. I'll say, I kind of understood that. I said, but maybe I'll look at it later on this morning, or maybe I look at it again tomorrow. And sometimes, you know, I see something I didn't see in there before, right? I'm a little more sure that I've seen what I thought I saw the other day. It's

[57:05] the way my mind works. I was reading about the angelic times. I said at six a. m. this morning, but I read about the day before, and I said, "I think I'll leave that in there," you know. And then I'll look at it again next morning. My mind is clear again, you know. And yeah, I see it much better, you know.

[57:30] I said, "Okay." I mentioned how De Koninck said, you know. Now, if you think you understood everything you read here, he says, that's a sign you've understood nothing. Because if you had understood something, you would see that you have not understood everything. Yeah.

[57:49] It's like you know the supreme example here. You know, he say, "I understand God completely, or I understand the Trinity completely." That's really a sign I've understood nothing of the Trinity. If I think that, right? With Augustine or Thomas, I said, or Hilary, you know, or any of the other great minds, I have understood completely now the Trinity, huh? No.

[58:23] When Thomas, you know, love that part, and he's giving the reasons for the incarnation, right? And he says, here are some reasons, but he says the more you consider it, the more wonderful this thing appears, and the more you see profound reasons and more reasons why he became man, right?

[58:52] Now, in a much lesser scale, there, you know, C. S. Lewis, you know, talking about great works, you know, says, "What do you do with the guy?" says, "Oh, yeah, I read Homer, yeah, or I read him Somewhere, somewhere, he he gave a cursory reading, you know, of Hamlet or King Lear, you know, but you can go back to these things again and again, right? Even you know, great work of art like that.

[59:21] I mean, after all, Western civilization begins with the Iliad, right? I mean, if you had to pick out something, where does Western civilization begin? You know, which is a thing you can't get too precise an answer to, but probably the best answer: would be, well,

[59:37] it began with Iliad. Why else would it begin anywhere else. Okay, so he's explaining this distinction, right, between the way in which the common name "man" implies having humanity, right, and the way in which a name like what Jesus or what do we call some grammar names like Jesus and Peter? What do we call them? Proper names, yeah. Private names. I

[1:00:13] says the number of what duality in Christ is placed about the what the natures, right? And therefore, if both natures in the abstract could be said of Christ, huh? It would follow that Christ was what. two on his part, huh? But only the divine nature can be said of him, right? But not the human nature.

[1:00:47] But because the two natures are not said of Christ, except in so far as they are signified in the what underlying suppositum, is necessary according to the notion of the what suppositum to predicate of Christ one or what two. Now some lay down in Christ, and this is these subtle heresies, right? Duo supposita, right? But one person.

[1:01:25] Which seems to have itself, according to their opinion, as a what complete suppositum by the ultimate completion, and therefore because they lay down in Christ two supposita or two hypostases, right? They say Christ to be two in the neuter genera, right? But because they lay down one person, they say he's one masculine, the grammatically speaking. For neither genus designates something in neutrum, the neutral genus designates something unformed and what imperfect, right?

[1:02:06] At least they have a fun there. Our debate, you know, picks up the Zetamologist, I'm aware, but the explanation of the word neutral is. ne uterus Not from the uterus

[1:02:21] That's the etymology. I don't know. if that's Isidore's etymology, but some of them are kind of, you know, interesting. So the neutral neuter genus designates something unformed and imperfect, right? But the masculine genus designates something formed and perfect, right?

[1:02:48] But the Nestorians, the heretics, laying down in Christ two persons, say that Christ is not only two neutrally but also two what? Masculine, right?

[1:03:05] But because we place in Christ one person, right, and one suppositum, right, as we say person and suppositum just differ as what suppositum is more general, right? And person is a suppositum of a rational nature, as is clear from the things before. It follows that we say that not only is Christ one masculine, but also one what? Neuterly. So he's one and not two, huh? I'm sure he's glad to know that.

[1:03:47] These people, these these theologians or these scriptural scholars, have Christ doubting whether he's what? God. God, and you know, not quite sure. He's gradually realized maybe I'm God. Imagine how what a feeling he had when he finally realized. That wasn't a

[1:04:11] great. Okay. How about the word of Augustine there in the first of the Trinity, right? He's both, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that word of Augustine should not thus be understood, that utrumque

[1:05:00] holds itself on the side of the what? Predicate. As if to say that Christ, right, is both, but it holds itself on the side of the subject.

[1:05:18] And then the word utrumque, both, is placed not as it were for two supposita right, but for two names signifying two natures in the concrete. For we are able, I'm able to say that both, to wit, God and man, is God on account of God taking both natures, and both, to wit, God and man, is man on account of the, except man. I think I'll think about that another day.

[1:05:56] That's that's a little bit dense even for this guy. Okay. To the second, it should be said that when it is said that Christ is aliud and aliud, right, other and other, the the speaking locution should be laid out, exposed, expounded. That in the sense that he has you know what, other and other nature, and in this way Augustine expounds it in the book against what, Felicianum, right,

[1:06:38] where when he says, in the mediator of God and man, other is the what, Son of God. son of God, other the son of man.

[1:06:57] He says other for the what distinction of substance of the two natures, right, but not what alius, right, for the unity of person. Well, again, that makes no more sense in the Latin, right? Because aliud is what neutral, I guess, right? And so he's aliud aliud, he has two natures, right? But he's one person, so he's not alius et alius. I'm going to share modern scriptural stuff.

[1:07:32] As Vincent of Lérins formulates in creatore he says alius et alius non alius et alius, but in salvatore aliud et aliud non aliud et aliud, it puts it in a dense form. Yeah, but English doesn't come out so good because we don't have that same grammar, you know. We wouldn't try to think. That's one of the reasons people argue, you know, that they should teach Latin, you know, so people get an idea of, you know,

[1:08:01] grammar and precise way. And Gregory Nazianzus, right, in the epistle to. Chaledonium If it's necessary to speak what in a condensed way, compendious way. What's Thomas's work called? Isn't it called Compendium of Theology? And it's written for what his friend.

[1:08:37] Aliud quidem et aliud, right? Those of which the Savior is. If is not the same the invisible to the visible, right? And what is without time to that which is under time. So we're speaking the two natures, right? But is not aliud et aliud, absit. For these are both what one.

[1:09:10] Now, to the third, it should be said. This is another argument from the aliud and aliud. To the third, it should be said that this is false. That Christ is only what man.

[1:09:30] Because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another what nature. In that the terms and the predicate are placed, and they hold themselves as form, right? And notice how in a statement, there sometimes we'll say we divide in three parts. Say, man is an animal, right? Or man is the subject, and animal is the what predicate, huh? Well, why do we call man the subject? Subject being what?

[1:10:07] Yeah, yeah. So that the subject is like matter, and the predicate is like the what form. And notice how when we divide something universal into particulars, we we tend even like on a board, you know, to put the particular under the what. Yeah. The same way that we put matter under what form, right?

[1:10:38] Now, why do we do that? Is that reasonable, right? Well, one time when I was watching my little nephew, before I was married, I'd build up a little tower, right? And he would what knock it over and laugh. But if I got him distracted and I could build the tower taller than him, he'd go oh oh oh with his little finger pointing at it in admiration, right?

[1:11:10] The marvelous work I had done. And he didn't try to knock it over, right? And why? Yeah. In other words, if he tried to mess with that tower, he was going to act upon him. Why, if it was below him. He could easily act upon, right? So we think of the agent as acting upon the what? Subject. Yeah, yeah. And now, as you know, you can you can be hammering something to the roof and say, "Well, now you're you're under, right?

[1:11:48] " But as you know, it's kind of hard to do that. You know, if you can, it's much easier to be pounding it like this, right? So that's we get the idea that the agent acts upon the what? Patient, right? And so I translate, you know, those two categories, which you translate in Latin actio passio, right? I translate them as acting upon and undergoing, right? So you think of the agent as acting upon the matter, right?

[1:12:24] But the result of the agent acting upon the matter is to give the matter ultimately a form, right? So if the form comes the matter from being acted upon by the agent, then the form is what above the matter. That's the way we speak, right? And so

[1:12:48] again, now the universal is like a what form that can be realized in many what matters, right? Like the form of this table might be realized in many tables here of this form of this chair, right? So the universal is like the form, right? And you're more apt to predicate the more universal the less universal, right? You more say animal of man than or dog than the reverse, right?

[1:13:18] Dog and animal. So it holds itself what formally, right? The predicate. So that's that's a common thing from some logic, and there might be more reasons I'm giving there, but that's a little bit of of that.

[1:13:40] So to the third objection, it should be said that this is false. That Christ is only man because it does not exclude what another suppositum, but another what nature. Yeah. Now there is no other suppositum, but there is another what nature in that terms or words in the predicate placed hold themselves as like form, right? The matter formaliter If, however, there be added something to by which it is drawn to the supposio, suppositum, it would be a true speech.

[1:14:27] If we said that Christ is only that which is a man, it would not, however, follow that he is something other than man, because aliud, since it is the relative of diversest substance, properly refers to the supposium, just as all relatives making a presupposition would follow. Therefore, that he has what another nature. Okay, I've got to go to another appointment, so I think I better stop here at 4: 20.

[1:15:06] Okay. And we'll meet again next week, same time, same place. Human time no, not a jolly time. Thank you. Thank you.