Tertia Pars
48. Aquinas on Christ (ST III, q.17 a.1–q.18 a.1): One Being and Two Wills
Class of 2009-09-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/048-aquinas-on-christ-st-iii-q-17-a-1-q-18-a-1-one-being-and/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of, the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, deepen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:31] What's the feast of Saint Robert Bellarmine today? I don't know if you have it in your calendar. Is it today? I thought that was next month. Seventeenth of September. That's today. I thought it was October, but today is the stigmatization of Saint Francis. It's the feast of I think it's Albert of Jerusalem, isn't it? And your your granddaughter's feast day, Saint Sophia, three daughters. I think when they they hope and charity were three daughters or something.

[0:57] Yeah. They're martyrs. So you can wish your granddaughter. The thing on that songs in there, I think, is by Bellarmine, right? The one. Yes. Cornelius a Lapide it's it's it's not by him, but by Bellarmine. So I guess Cornelius must have been a Jesuit too, I think. Cornelius a Lapide Yeah. Yeah. So keeping the family. Let's just look a little bit more at question seventeen, article one, and look at the reply to the last three objections.

[1:24] So. I think it's a little more clear there. Yeah. Some ways. To the fifth, it should be said that in the mystery of the divine Trinity, the divine nature is said in the abstract. Can be said in the abstract of the three persons? And therefore, one can say simply, and that the three persons are what unum in Latin.

[1:56] But in the mystery of the incarnation, both natures are not said in the abstract of Christ. And therefore, it cannot be said simply that Christ is what two. Secundum quid you could say, right? Okay. But you have to say he's what two in in nature, right? You have to qualify it, right? That's he's two.

[2:27] And now in the reply to the sixth objection. To the sixth, it should be said that two is said as it were having what duality. Not that in something else, but in the very one of whom the two are what said.

[2:48] For the predication is said of the what comes about in regard to the suppositum, which is implied or indicated by this name, Christ. Although, therefore, Christ has a duality of what natures, because nevertheless He does not have a duality of supposita; there's not two persons there, supposita. He cannot be said to be two without qualification, right?

[3:20] And to the seventh, it should be said that the Latin word alterum implies a diversity of what accident, and therefore a diversity of action of accident suffices that something be said simply to be alterum. That's more in the Latin, but aliud implies a diversity of what substance. But substance is said not only the nature of the thing, what it is, but also suppositum, as Aristotle says in the fifth book of wisdom there.

[3:56] And therefore, the diversity of nature does not suffice for this that something be said simply what other, unless there be also a diversity according to what suppositum. But the diversity of nature makes something other secundum quid, that is to say, according to nature, if there is no what diversity of the suppositum. So basically, you're saying because Christ is one person, right? He shouldn't say He's two. Okay.

[4:32] So if He appears to you, we shouldn't say you know not the two of you. I don't think He would appreciate that, and He'll say, "Didn't Thomas teach you how to speak to me? " Unless we're in the presence of a carrot, we can sort of clarify.

[4:59] So sometimes it's kind of hard to get that because of the Latin, you know, but you can see it in English now. That the two of you doesn't seem exactly right, does it?

[5:09] Okay. Talk about your two natures. I wouldn't say the two of you, because it's the same person who has the two natures. Okay. Now the next article, another difficult one here, who is. There's one existence in Christ, one, one to be, right? And one of my former students there, she went down and studied with the Dominicans, right? And I remember she was coming up for one of these big final exams or things, and the Dominican was kidding her, he was going to ask her about this.

[5:47] It was kind of the idea that this would be the the meanest thing you could possibly do to somebody in an exam. So, but we'll see a little what Thomas says here.

[5:59] To the second, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in Christ there is not only one to be or one existence, but what two?

[6:12] For Damascene says in the third book that those things which follow upon the nature in Christ are duplicated or doubled, right? But to be follows the nature, for to be is from the what form, right?

[6:33] Therefore, in Christ there are two what beings. Moreover, the to be of the Son of God is the very divine nature itself. That's what we found in our treatise on the substance of God, if you recall those who were there then, and it is eternal. But the being of the man Christ is not the divine nature, but it is temporal being when in the fullness of time, right?

[7:04] Saint Paul says. Therefore, in Christ there is not only one to be, right? Moreover, this is an interesting argument. In the Trinity, although there are three persons, there is nevertheless one to be on account of the unity of the nature. But in Christ there are two natures, although there's one person. Therefore, there are two to be what? Yeah, the two.

[7:39] Moreover, in Christ the soul gives some kind of existence to the body, since it is its what form. But it does not give to it the divine being, since that is uncreated. Therefore, in Christ there is another to be, another existence apart from the divine to be and the divine existence. And thus, in Christ there is not only one to be.

[8:11] See, especially confused by now. You know teacher, Kasurik said, you know, the duty of the teacher is to confuse the issue. I've had great teachers.

[8:29] But against this, each thing, according as it is said to be being, is said to be one, right? And this is the great truth that Aristotle brings out at the beginning of the fourth book of wisdom. because one and being are what convertible, right? And you know the text, the kind of the famous text for the those most universal things that are convertible. What convertible mean? Well, convertible like a thing and its definition are convertible, or a thing and its property and its strict sense are convertible, right?

[9:10] So you can say every square is an equilateral right-angled quadrilateral, and turn it around and say every equilateral right-angled quadrilateral is a square. That's being said convertible, right? Okay. Or if you have a property and its strict sense, every two is half a four, and everything half a four is what two, right? Well, Aristotle discovered that being and one and good and true are all what convertible, right?

[9:45] Okay. Happen to be looking at a text in the in the sentences again about that today, and one of the objections, you know, against saying this was, well, do they add something to definition, right? Do they not take contract? Well, Thomas says, yeah, they add something. in definition. Definition to be, but they add something that falls upon all being, right? So it's convertible, right? Aristotle talks in particular about being and one, at the beginning of the fourth book of Wisdom, where he shows that wisdom is about being as being, and about the one and the many.

[10:18] Then the consideration of being and one, in a way, is consideration the same thing, but they differ in definition, right? One adds negation to the idea of being, undivided being. And Thomas, in the consideration substance of God, he gets down to the unity of God. If you recall, he has an article or two in there about what the one is and how it's convertible with being and so on.

[10:49] So the sed contra is saying each thing, according as it is said to be, being is said to be one, right? And sometimes they add to one; it's undivided in itself, but distinct from everything else, because one and being are what convertible, right?

[11:10] And that's why when Socrates is what getting you to define something, he'll sometimes turn around, right? If he says to you, "What is a dog?" you say, "Well, a dog is a four-footed animal." Socrates says, "Well, every dog is a four-footed animal, What is every four-footed animal a dog?" If you can't turn around, you haven't yet completed your definition of a dog.

[11:43] If, therefore, in Christ there were two what two bees, right? And not only one, God would be two and not one, Contra is what we were saying in the previous article.

[12:06] I answer: It should be said that because in Christ there are two natures, and one hypostasis, right? That's why we speak of the hypostatic union, right? The two natures don't become one nature, but they're united in one hypostasis. It subsists in both of them. It is necessary, because of this, that those things which pertain to the nature in Christ are two, as we'll see in the next one about the will, right?

[12:43] Christ has two wills that pertain to nature, but those things which pertain to the hypostasis in Christ are one what only, right? Now, a little complicated here. To be pertains. To the hypostasis and to the what Nature. nature, but not in the same way. To the hypostasis, as to that which has to be, that which has existence. But to the nature, as to that by which something has existence.

[13:26] For nature is signified by way of form, which is said to be a being from this fact that by it something is. Just as whiteness, just as by whiteness is something white, and by is in the habit, I guess, and by humanity or by human nature is someone a what man, and by health you are what healthy and so on.

[14:02] It should be considered that if some form or nature there is which does not pertain to what the personal existence of a subsisting hypostasis, right?

[14:20] That to be is not said to be the to be of that person, what simply, but what secundum quid? Now, what does that mean? Like as an example to help you understand it, just as to be white is what a to be of Socrates, not in so far as he is Socrates, but in so far as he is what white.

[14:50] And of this sort, nothing prevents that to be multiplied in one hypostasis or person. For other is the to be by which Socrates is white, and by which Socrates is what musical, right? Okay. Other is to be in secundum quid, right? So when I came to be in this room, right, I got a new being, right? Secundum quid. Yeah, yeah, but you wouldn't say simply without qualification that I came to be today, see?

[15:24] And I used to talk to him about that. If you leave this room, you will cease to be. If I don't qualify it, you know, it sounds like a threat, huh? It is.

[15:38] But that to be that belongs to the what hypostasis itself, right, or to the person, huh, which is a hypostasis for rational nature. But that to be that belongs to the hypostasis or person as such, huh, or by itself, huh? It is impossible in one what hypostasis or person to be multiplied. Because it is impossible that a one thing there not be what one to be.

[16:15] If therefore the human nature came to the Son of God, not hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some posit, right? It would be necessary to place in Christ a twofold to be, one according to which He is God, another according to which He is what man.

[16:44] Just as in Socrates, one posits another to be according to which he is white, another according to which he is what man. Because to be white does not pertain to the to be of the person, right? The to be itself of the person of Socrates.

[17:09] Now to be headed, huh? And to be bodily and to be animated, the whole pertains to the one person of Socrates. And therefore, from all of these, there is not come about except one to be in Socrates. And if it were to happen that after the constitution of the person of Socrates, there came to Socrates hand or feet or eyes, as happens to one born blind, huh?

[17:45] From these there had not exceed to Socrates another to be, huh? But only a certain relation to things of this sort. Because he said to be not only according to those things which he had before, but also according to those things which afterwards what came to him. Thus, therefore, since human nature is joined to the Son of God, hypostatically, hypostatic union, or personally, as has been said above, and not accidentally, like maybe some heretics would say, right?

[18:24] It follows that according to human nature, there is not come to him a new what personal being, uh, but only a new relation of the what personal being pre-existing to the human nature.

[18:48] That now the that person is said to subsist not only according to divine nature, but also the what human. So if we read him right, he's saying that there's only one what esse in Christ, huh? Okay.

[19:08] So it reminds a little bit, you know, of what you learned about the human soul, right? That as Aristotle was perhaps one of the first to show, the two-bee of the human soul doesn't depend upon the what body, right? Okay. And Plato kind of saw this too, but then for Plato, the body was kind of what like a clothing for the soul. It wasn't really one thing, you know.

[19:40] And so the Platonists have a hard time explaining the what unity of man, right? That the body and the soul together are one thing, a man.

[19:55] Um But you could. say that the body what partakes of the existence of the what soul, right? It's a little bit like that in Christ huh? that the human nature, in some sense, right, partakes of the existence of what of God, right? I gotta be kind of careful when it's not exactly the same thing, but because it's joined to the what divine person, right? Then it's not giving Christ really what another existence, right?

[20:32] Simply, okay. Maybe his being a man, right? You can say, but it's not the human nature that he gets to be simply. Okay, it's only one being simply that he has as a divine person, right? And then he had before he he pulled human nature to himself, right? The same way that the soul, you know, before the resurrection, of the body, right? The soul will have an existence that the body will be what drawn to, right, and partake of.

[21:08] It's hard to understand, right? But what led Aristotle's conclusion was that the he saw that understanding the universal is not in the body, and therefore the soul has a what a doing that's not in the body, and that shows that its existence is not as we say immersed in the body, huh? It's not if it had existence our soul only in the body, it would have operation or doing only in the body, right?

[21:45] But it understands not in the body. That shows its existence is not just in the body, but the body's sharing in existence that it doesn't equal, right? That's why Aristotle says in the book on the generation of animals that the human soul doesn't come from the mother and father, right?

[22:08] So you thank God, right, for choosing you to be right, but your soul comes from God, but not through your parents, but from God immediately. So I thank God for my soul, which came from Him, and I thank Him for my body, which came from Him, but through my parents, right? But I didn't get my soul from God through my parents, huh? But He infused my soul at the time that they were bringing my body to into existence, huh?

[22:46] It's interesting to think, you know, but about thanking God for choosing you to be because He didn't choose you to be because you were better than all these other persons He could have chosen to be, right? It is really very gratuitous on His part, and very merciful in a sense, aren't it? If he hadn't chosen me to be, I'd be nothing. I wouldn't know that even I have nothing.

[23:13] You have nothing to show for it. Yeah. I suppose you have to thank him for for choosing the universe to be of which you could be, however humble, a part, right? Yeah. You know.

[23:35] If you could ask, you know, why did you choose me to be? Well, free act, free act, you know. It wasn't because of anything, you know, the excellence you had over, or exactly what I could have done, you know. It's kind of a. He didn't have anything better to do.

[23:57] The priest used to say he didn't choose you because you're good looking, because you're not. We say Dr Berquist that just as the soul isn't fully immersed in the body, and the divine nature is not fully immersed in the human nature. Well, now we're not to say that because because the soul and the body, you know, nevertheless form one thing, right? Yes. See why the human nature and the divine nature don't come together and form one nature, monophysite, you know?

[24:33] Heresy. You'd be monophysite if you said there was fully immersed. Well, if you say the one nature of the two, you know. Oh no. Yeah,

[24:45] yeah. You know, I guess it's in the the creed of Saint Athanasius, right, the Athanasian Creed, that this comparison is made between incarnation and the soul and the body and so on. When Thomas explains that in the Summa Contra Gentiles, it's that the human nature of Christ is like a tool of his divinity, right, and like a joined tool, right. So it's not like form and matter so much, but like agent and tool, right?

[25:20] But anyway, it's another topic for discussion. Now the first objection was saying that what follows the nature is twofold in Christ, right? And Thomas goes back to distinctions in the body of the article and he applied to that first objection.

[25:42] To the first, it should be said, he says that to be follows upon the nature, not as having to be, right, but as that by which something is, right. But follows upon the person of the hypostasis as the one having existence. And therefore, it more retains unity according to unity of the hypostasis than does it have duality according to the what Duality of nature. yeah, Like he said, same distinction that he pointed out in the body of the article.

[26:23] Now, second objection here, right? What about temporal being and eternal being, and so on? He says to the second, it should be said that that eternal existence of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the existence of what man, in so far as human nature is taken on by the Son of God in the unity of the what person, man. That's why I was comparing a bit to the body and the soul, right?

[26:52] That the body takes on what or shares in the existence of the what soul, right? The understanding soul, the understanding soul has existence in its own what, right? Which is not true about these other forms in matter, right? Even if they're going to be represented in the court and so.

[27:15] Okay. So this is kind of a profound thing, difficult thing, right? Okay. But it's because you have one really hypostasis there, you have one to be simply, right?

[27:36] Now, the third objection was trying to say, well, if you have one existence in the Father, Son, the Holy Spirit, they have one existence because they have one nature, then children should have two existences because they have two natures, right? To the third, it should be said that, as has been said in the first part, because the divine person is the same with the nature, in the divine persons there is not another to be of the person apart from the to be of the what nature, and therefore the three persons do not have except one to be.

[28:16] But they would have a threefold to be if what in them there was a what a different to be of the person and another the to be of the what nature.

[28:37] Now, what about the soul giving to be to the body? To the fourth, it should be said that the soul in Christ gives to be or existence to the body in so far as it makes it to be what animated and act.

[28:56] But if the what body is understood to be perfected by the soul without the hypostasis having both, right? This whole, composed from the soul and the body, in so far as it signified the name of humanity or human nature, does not signify that which is, but that by which something is. And therefore, the to be itself of the subsisting person, according as it has a what relation to such a nature, whose what, which relation the cause is a soul, right?

[29:39] In so far as the what it perfects human nature by informing the body. Was he saying? And therefore, the to be of the subsisting person, according as it has a relation to such a nature, of which relation the cause is a soul, in so far as it perfects human nature by informing the body. I suppose the body in some way shares in the what divine being too, huh?

[30:12] But to the what soul, yeah. Okay. Again, next question to me easier, right? Okay. And he's going to be wondering here whether Christ has one will or two wills in Christ. There was a heresy, right, about the one will, but I've often thought about the Trinity. You know, it's kind of strange, three persons but only one will. Yeah, yeah.

[30:48] I suppose it means there can be no disagreement up there. No conflict of wills, like we have all the time, Doug. No, and no, no obedience there.

[31:05] I was thinking, you know, I never remember in all my classes there, or in grade school and so on. But the question is asked: Why should we obey God? Right.

[31:24] Probably you'd begin, you know, at the lowest reason, saying, "Well, if you don't, you are going to be in trouble. " This how Adam and Eve got in trouble, right? They didn't obey God, right? And that's kind of the start of all our troubles, right? So that's a reason for obeying God, right? That you are going to be punished if you don't.

[31:48] But maybe a better reason for obeying God is that if you obey God, you'll be rewarded with, yeah, okay. But is that the best reason for obeying God? Maybe the best reason for obeying God is because you love God, right?

[32:10] And Christ says, you know, if you love me, you keep the commandments, right, and so on. And because you love somebody, you do their will, right? Um, but then then you come to the question: Well, why should you love God?

[32:26] Well, there I think the best answer is in Summa Contra Gentiles, and you can go through the five chapters there on the goodness of God. But the first chapter shows that God is good. Well, that's a reason to love God because He's good. The good is what should be loved, right? But then the second chapter in that section shows that God is goodness itself. Now this is not only good, but is goodness itself.

[32:55] Nothing else is good except by partaking some way of God. So the very reason why anything whatsoever could be desirable is because of God, right? Well, that's really a reason to love Him, right? And then Thomas goes on to show that there can be nothing bad in God, right?

[33:21] And therefore, there can't be a reason not to love him right? There's every reason to love him right? Now what is the reason not to love him What are his bad qualities. Yeah.

[33:38] Of course, some people don't love God because he's opposing what they want to do, right? But there's no reason in God not to love them.

[33:49] Well, does he have a nice person to know them is to love them? But in theory, to know him is to love him, right? Okay. And then he goes on to show that God is the what? The good of every good, right?

[34:06] And then he's the summum bonum, the highest good, right? So you got every reason to love God and no reason not to love him. He's goodness itself. He's the good of every good, right? Those two are kind of the three that are the strongest, I believe, leading up to summum bonum. But you know, they say something marvelous about that.

[34:32] But then I think you can add to that these things. But he chose me to be. That's that's a good reason to love him, right? He created my soul, right? He's got good taste.

[34:49] And he gave me my body to my parents, you know. Then he gave me my parents and my brothers and my teachers, and can go on like this, you know. But

[35:00] there's a lot of different reasons that I gave from this. I mean, there's every reason to love them, right? That's the best reason, therefore, why you should obey him, because. Okay. When we're at

[35:27] the scenes of that, when Antipas and why should we love? Why should we obey God? He better. They probably start there with us. Yeah.

[35:42] I say in the act of contrition, I did as a child, I suppose, because I dread the loss of heaven and the pains of hell, right? But most of all, because it offended thee, my God. So you're going from the lesser reasons to the highest reason, you know, for loving God. But I mean, for being concerned about your sins and so on.

[36:03] Okay, let's look at the proemium here to chapter 18 or question 18 rather. Then we ought to consider about the unity as regards the the will, right? And about this, six things are asked. First, within Christ is other the divine will, and other the what human will.

[36:30] Second, whether in human nature of Christ, other is the will of sensuality, and other of what reason. Kind of strange to use the term voluntas sensualitatis, but let's

[36:47] leave that for the time being. And third, whether in Christ on the side of reason, there were what many wills, right? That kind of arises because Father, not my will but thine be done, right? So he's conforming himself to God's will, but there's something in his will opposed to this suffering too. So there's a two some duplicity in Christ there, right? Not in the bad sense, but okay.

[37:24] Fourth, within Christ there was what free judgment, huh? Free will. Five, whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the divine will in what was willed, right?

[37:45] And six, whether in Christ there was some contrariety of what wills, huh? So kind of thorough investigation here of the will of Christ. Let's look at the first article, which is the fundamental one here.

[38:04] To the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in Christ there are not two wills, one divine and one what human, and the other human. For the will is the first mover and commander, right? In each one doing, but in Christ the first mover and the commanding one was the divine will, because all human things in Christ were moved according to the divine will. Therefore, it seems in Christ there was not except one will, namely the divine will, right?

[38:49] Of course, if his human will is completely conformed to his divine will, his divine will can be the what first mover, right? But he still has his what second mover, right? Okay. Anyway, moreover, a instrument or tool is not moved by its own will, but by the will of the mover. But the human nature in Christ was a tool of his what divinity. And in my text, it's got the reference to what Damascene.

[39:31] Incidentally, I noticed in regard to your use of re-introduction there. That in in the footnotes, so they're referring back, you know, to the proemia. These were intro, you know, it was introduction, right? I mentioned how that translation of Vatican II, right, they translated in the Latin proemium introduction, right, in the English text.

[39:54] Look, I left the church anyway, so anyway. It was it was just a sign to confirm his mind was right. Who are you talking about? Yeah. Who are you talking about? Forget his name, but he got in trouble. Yeah, yeah, he got in trouble. with the water Yeah, he did his novitiate at our monastery up in Nova Scotia. Oh. We left there though. Yeah. He had some disorder there.

[40:17] I mean, you know, the church never was exactly, but did he move the church. I don't know if he left the whole church. He I started off the priest. I think he left the church. too Yeah, So it shows you the trouble we get into with the translating.

[40:34] A little mistake at the beginning is a great one in the end. Yeah, yeah. What does it say? Verbis inordinatae prolatis incurrit haereses Right, right, right. Great, great. But kind of a pun in the old. A little mistake in the beginning. The beginning is the preview, right? It's a great one in the end.

[40:54] Now, does that English translation appear everywhere? I wonder if that's the one that we've got here. There's two. English translations that I know of, unless the Vatican has another one. There's Gregory Baum I guess did one, and Abbott is another one. Yeah, Baum was one. I didn't know who he was, but I just happened to pick it up when Fritz came out, and then someone gave me a copy of the official text in Latin, you know.

[41:17] Because I blew the two blue volumes, but yeah, the English that's in there, I think needs to be redone. Yeah, and that's I think Abbott's translation. I can't remember his name. Oh, Flannery. I'm sorry. There's then there's three. I don't know Baum. Abbott, Flannery, whatever. But I think none of the translators has praying. Okay, so he's saying that the human nature was a tool, like I was mentioning before.

[41:46] There, the way Thomas explains the Athanasius. The because when you speak of a minister as being a animated tool, right? It's a different sense of tool, right? Okay.

[42:10] Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ that belongs to nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature, because those things which are natural are of necessity. But what is voluntary is what not necessary. Therefore, the will is one only in what Christ.

[42:42] So they distinguish will and nature as causes, right? Nature is determined to one, and the will is open to what opposites, right? Doing or not doing it, or doing it this way or doing it that way.

[42:59] Moreover, Damascene says in the third book that in some way to will is not of nature, but of our what? Understanding, namely our personal understanding. But every will is.

[43:20] Some kind of will, right? Because that is not in a genus; that is not in one of its what species. And that's reference to Aristotle's book, *The Topics*, there, right? Quote from that. Therefore, every will pertains to a person,

[43:41] but in Christ there is only what in person. Therefore, in Christ there is only one will. How can a person have two wills, right? You know, some might say, right? A will is something personal, very personal. There is only one person here, therefore, there is only one will.

[44:02] There's a fourth one seem to follow on the third. What? In terms of that, the fourth objection seems to follow on the third one. Yeah.

[44:20] I mean, if it doesn't pertain to the nature, it pertains to. But against this is what our Lord says in the twenty-second chapter of the Gospel of Luke. Father, if you wish, transfer this chalice for me, right? Take it away, but truly, not my will, but yours, come about. Be done. Which, bringing in Ambrose, bringing in in the book to the emperor, Paschasian, says. Just as what he took on my will, he took on my what sadness, huh?

[44:59] And upon Luke, he what? He brings back his own will to the man, right? And of the father to the divinity. But the will of man is temporal. The will of the divinity is eternal, right? To will. Now Thomas begins to look at the history of this thing here. I answer: It should be said that some lay down in Christ there to be one will only, right?

[45:36] But to positing this in diverse ways, they seem to have been what moved. Apollinaris, right, does not place a understanding soul in Christ, but says that the Word was in place of the soul, right. Or also in place of the intellect, right? So some people take the words and the Word was made what flesh, flesh. There's no rational soul there; it's just flesh and body, right? And so, you know, the Word is in place of what the human soul, and there's only one will there, right?

[46:16] Right. Okay. Whence, since the will is in reason, meaning in the rational part of the soul, right? As the philosopher says in the third book about the soul, it would follow that in Christ there was not a what human will,

[46:36] and thus in Him there would not be except the one will, which would be the divine will. And likewise, Eutyches and all who place or posit one nature composed in Christ, right, monophysites, because physis is the Greek word for nature, one nature. They are kind of forced to place one will in it, both the divine nature. That those two different things moving, right? The one is saying, hey, he didn't have a human soul, and a human soul was a word, so it's only one will.

[47:14] Others say, well, the two natures came together and made one nature, so the will of that one nature is the only will he has. So different ways of moving them, right?

[47:27] And then the third way he has in Nestorius, right, who placed the union of God and man to be made only according to what affection and will, and of course then Christ would just be a man, right? So he posited one will in what Christ doesn't really have a divine will.

[47:51] So he got one position there. He sort of got the divine will. Other one is the third position that he has just a human will, and in between, you know, some kind of a will of this composed nature, right? Huh? It's kind of interesting the way Thomas says they arrange those three positions.

[48:10] But after this, he says Macarius Antiochian, Patriarchan, and Cyrus the Alexandrian, and Sergius the Constantinopolitan, that's three big cities, right? And some of their followers, right, posited in Christ one will, although they what placed two natures in Christ united according to what the hypostasis,

[48:49] because they opined that the human nature in Christ was never moved by its own motion, but only according as was moved by the what divinity, as is clear in the synodic the epistle the synod of Agathon the what pope. I'm sure you're all thoroughly familiar with that, right? But my text has got a the third council of Constantinople for that particular thing, and therefore, in the sixth synod celebrated at Constantinople,

[49:31] they give the text here. Acte D. It was determined that it is necessary to say that in Christ there are what two wills, where it is read thus:

[49:52] According as of old the prophets about Christ, and He Himself instructed us, right, and the the symbol that the Holy Fathers handed down to us, there are two what Natural natural wills in Him and two natural operations. We we we preach this, or we we. Proclaim this, right? Preach this, I guess you'd say. He's going to go on into the operations in the next

[50:32] question nineteen. Yeah, here you have a text that's saying both of them, right? So, what does Thomas do at this point? He's given the various heresies, right? Maybe four groups there, right? And then the

[50:52] definitive judgment there, the council, right? And now Thomas is going to give a reason why this, right? And this was necessary to have been said, right? And why? Because it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect what human nature, as has been said above. But to the perfection of human nature pertains a will, which is a natural power of it, just as the understanding or intellect, or reason, is a natural power of it.

[51:35] That is clear from those things which in the first part have been said about the human soul and so on. Whence it is necessary to say that the Son of God took on a human will in his what human nature.

[51:53] But through the taking on of human nature, the Son underwent no what lessening or diminution in those things pertaining to his what, divine And become less divine because he became man, to whom it belongs to what have a will, God, as is said in the first part.

[52:19] Whence it is necessary to say that in Christ there are two wills, one to wit, the divine, and the other what human, huh? So I never personally have had any difficulty in accepting the idea of being two wills in Christ, you know. But there is a whole tradition here of errors, right? Mistakes.

[52:52] This is implicit in saying he's true God and true what man. It has two wills, huh? I suppose then this is a consequence of some problem understanding the incarnation itself. Yeah. Since this is part of the nature, yeah. Yeah, if you think it's one nature there, or you think that there's.

[53:18] The word is in place. The human soul, all these these things, you know, lead you to these false conclusions. Now, the first objection is saying, "But first, moves and commands in Christ is the divine will, right? "

[53:39] In a sense, the will moves you and all your parts to some extent, right? At least all your higher parts. To the first, therefore, should be said that whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved by the what motion of the divine will.

[54:04] It does not, however, follow that in Christ there was no what proper motion of the will of his human nature, because also the wills of what the the pious wills, that is to say, of the other saints. are moved according to the what will of God. This is the famous text that Thomas often refers to, who works in us both to will something and to perfect it, right?

[54:37] As is said in Philippians two thirteen, Thomas is always quoting this, right? Huh? Right? Quotes that one from the Old Testament that the the will of the king is in the hand of God; he turns it when he wants to, right? Okay. This gives all kinds of problems about how this, you know, give you go.

[54:59] But he moves the the will, what not violently, right? But to freely will something. Um. Because although this is a very point that Thomas makes, for although the will is not able to be moved inwardly by some creature, right? Even the devils, I mean, he tempts you; can't move your will inwardly. He can persuade you, try to persuade you, seduce you, right? But inwardly, nevertheless, it is moved by what God, as has been said in the first part, Thomas will show that is soul that takes that thing up.

[55:43] He's just referring back to that one. And thus, also, Christ, according to his human will, followed the what divine will, right? That's he says in the gospel, right? That's why he loves me, right? He always do his will.

[56:04] According to that of Psalm thirty nine, that I might do what your will, my God. I will right. When Augustine says against Maximum, where he says. Where the son says to the father, not what I will, but what you will, right?

[56:30] What what I will but what you will you, right? That these words, he what joins them, right? And says, show truly his will subject to the what, Father? the one who generated him, right? As if we deny that the human will ought to be subject to the will of what, God.

[57:12] So God can move your will, so you freely what choose the good. He doesn't go against your what nature, right? So that you, he doesn't move your will by by what certain violence, right? Because the violence is something outside the will, right? It's hard to understand, right? But it's kind of a marvelous thing, huh? As Saint Paul says, not me, but the grace in me, right? Okay.

[57:52] Now, the idea of an instrument or a tool is something that is moved by what another, right? So Thomas is going to say, well,

[58:06] if one is only moved by another, one doesn't have a what a will. Okay, he's going to point out a distinction here. To the second, it should be said that it belongs appropriately to the instrument or tool that it be moved by the what chief agent, the principal or chief agent, but in diverse ways according to the what properties of its nature. Now he makes the distinction here for the instrumentum inanimatum, right?

[58:47] As the what, Axe. axe or the saw is moved by the artist through a motion that is only what Bodily, But the animated instrument, the one that is animated by a what sensing soul, right,

[59:11] is moved by sense desire, as the horse by the what Rider? the rider. But the tool that is animated by an understanding, a reasonable soul, is moved through his will, right?

[59:39] Just as by command of the Lord or Master, the servant is moved to what? Doing something. Which servant is a what? Animated tool, as the philosopher says, Aristotle first made this distinction. Thus, therefore, the human nature in Christ was a tool of the divinity, so that it be moved through its own what? Will, right? Now the third objection was trying to insist upon the difference between nature and will as causes, right?

[1:00:31] Because the one is determined and the other is not. To the third, it should be said that the power of the will is natural, right? And follows the nature from necessity. But the motion or the act of the power, which is also called the what the will, sometimes is what natural and necessary as it regards what happiness. So you don't choose to be happy or to what be miserable.

[1:01:05] What should I choose to be, right? Okay. Yeah. But sometimes, from the free judgment of reason, it comes, right? And it is not necessary nor natural. And this was taught in the second part. It takes up more of the will. Ah, and nevertheless, the very reason itself, which is the beginning of this motion, is natural, right? And therefore, apart from the divine will is necessary in Christ to place a human will, not only in so far as it's a natural power, or in so far as it's a natural motion, but also in so far as it's a motion of what reason.

[1:01:54] Okay. Remember Shakespeare's definition of reason is the ability for a large discourse. looking before and after. Well, sometimes they say this is the definition of reason as reason, right? Because does reason naturally understand or naturally come to understand some things before reasoning?

[1:02:40] Now you see, most of our understanding is arrived at by some kind of reasoning. And the understanding that you arrive at by reasoning, I call reasoned-out understanding.

[1:02:57] And reasoned-out understanding comes after reasoning. After reasoning it out. Um. But it's just some understanding that comes before reasoning. Well, how do you know that? Because I know the whole is greater than the part. Yeah. Yeah. Well you're going to reason

[1:03:21] Uh what terms are you going to use yeah, yeah. If you understood nothing before reasoning, you'd have nothing to reason from. So, although we're kind of aware of trying to reason out things, understand them, and therefore kind of more aware of reasoning out understanding,

[1:03:44] there must be some understanding that is before reasoning. We call it natural understanding, right? But Shakespeare seems to sometimes make a distinction then between reason as a nature, right, insofar as it naturally understands some things, and reason as reason, right? Okay. And some ways, I suppose, reasoning is more known to us. But Shakespeare says, "Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, " and reasoning, as he calls it in the definition, "their discourse," right?

[1:04:22] Comes from the Latin word "running," right? So reason runs from one thing to another, and this motion of reason is more known to us than its standing still and understanding it. And so it gets its name from reason and so on. Okay, now something like that in the case of the will, right? That if you wanted to define the will in a way proportional to the way reason was defined by Shakespeare, you'd say, "Well, reason or will, rather, is the ability to choose, "

[1:04:57] and that's perhaps more known to us as distinguishing the will from other things. But could the will choose something if it didn't will something without choosing?

[1:05:19] That's like the beginning of reason. And you choose something with a view to some end, right? So it must be something as an end that is willed naturally, and then through the liberum arbitrium of the reason, you say, "I'm going to choose this or choose that as a way of getting to my goal," right?

[1:05:50] He's kind of touching upon those distinctions. At the end of the third objection, I apply to it, and therefore, apart from the divine will, is necessary to place in Christ human will, not only insofar as it is a potentia naturalis, right, or insofar as it is a natural motion, right. But insofar as it is a rational motion, right? Like chooses something, right?

[1:06:25] Aristotle speaks of choice there in the in the Nicomachean Ethics. It's like it's an act of will or an act of reason because it involves both, right? So he calls it motus rationalis come back to that when we get to the article on de libero arbitrio and there's free will in Christ.

[1:06:48] So you'd say, nevertheless, that even the ability to choose, though, is something that what man has because of his what nature, right? Now the fourth objection.

[1:07:12] The fourth objection came. The fourth objection. Okay, the argument that the will is something personal, right? You got a modern touch there. To the fourth, it should be said that through this, that one is said to will in some way, is designated a determined way of willing. But a determined mode or way is placed about thing about that thing of which it is the mode. Whence, since the will pertains to nature, this which is to will in some way pertains to the nature.

[1:07:57] Not according as it is considered absolutely, but according as it is in such a what hypostasis. Whence also the human will of Christ had a certain determined mode from this that it was in the what divine hypostasis, huh? That it would be moved always according to the motion of the divine will.

[1:08:30] Could Christ sin? People ask that. You know. I don't think so. Did he choose not to sin? No. Be careful about that. Okay, so take a little break here. before we do