Tertia Pars
51. Summa III q.18 a.5–6: 'Not My Will but Yours' – Christ's Human Will and the Divine Will, With No Conflict Between Them
Class of 2009-10-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/051-summa-iii-q-18-a-5-6-not-my-will-but-yours-christs-human/

[0:00] The break. Okay. Now, whether the human will in Christ wanted or willed something other than what what God willed, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus: It seems that the human will in Christ did not will something other than what God willed. And take the other side. For it is said in Psalm 39, from the person of Christ, that I might do Your will, my God. I will, right?

[0:47] But he who wills to do the will of another wills what that one wills. Therefore, it seems that the human will of Christ will of nothing other than the will than the the will of the divine, the divine will. Seems that it's got to be that way, isn't it? What's he going to maintain here?

[1:16] Moreover, the soul of Christ had the most perfect what charity, perfect love, which also exceeds the comprehension of our what. Yeah. According to that of Ephesians chapter three verse nineteen, the what charity of Christ supereminentem, going above science.

[1:52] But it pertains to charity that man wills the same thing that God does, right? Whence the philosopher himself says in the ninth book of the Ethics, which is one of the two books on what friendship, right? That one of the things about friends or friendly things is to will and choose the same things.

[2:18] Therefore, since he was, when we take up charity, it's a kind of friendship that Thomas argues in the treatise on charity. Therefore, they should will the same thing, right?

[2:36] Therefore, the human will in Christ will of nothing other than what the divine will. Moreover, Christ was a true what comprehensor, right, on the side of his what soul, but not his his body until after at the end. But the saints who are what comprehenders in in the homeland, yeah, fatherland. Will nothing other than what God wills.

[3:12] Otherwise, they would not be blessed, because they would not have whatever they will. For the blessed man is the one who has whatever he wants and wishes nothing. Yeah, as Augustine says in the book of Trinity. Therefore, Christ willed nothing according to human will. That did not. That the divine will did not what will Thomas doesn't go against all that?

[3:53] Against this is what Augustine says against Maximinum. In this, that Christ what said, not what I will, but what you will. Right. He shows himself to what will something other than the Father. Well, he's quoting Christ himself, not Augustine, and Augustine's quoting Christ. Well, but what more could you ask for? For a Sed contra, huh?

[4:39] What except by a what human heart he was not able, right? since our infirmity in his own right, not the divine, but the what human affection transfigured.

[5:00] Well, there's got to be some distinction. There's got to be something. This this is really it's really tight, right? But I think the objections are pretty good, don't you? And that means pretty good set counter is pretty good too. So my mind is tied in a knot, isn't yours? It's going to get untied by explaining what he means by not what I will, but you will. What does he mean by I will?

[5:30] Yeah, yeah, yeah. We saw, you know, a number of evidences of it. I answer. It should be said that as has been said, that in Christ, according to his human nature, there is laid down a what multiple will. Right. Okay. We had a whole bunch of distinctions here in more than one of the articles.

[5:58] And it's kind of a strange way of speaking here. To wit, the will of what? The sense appetite, right? Sensuality, which is called the will by what? Participation.

[6:13] That's kind of interesting, huh? Because in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says reason is one of the parts of the soul, and then there's another part of the soul that can obey reason or be trained to habituated to obey reason, right? To listen to reason, and that's reasonable, not in the sense of having reason, essentially, but by partaking of it, right?

[6:45] That's the reason why Austin Farrer said the music of the 18th century was superior to the music of the Romantic period, huh? Because it represents the emotions in harmony with reason, huh? In a way that the Romantics would not seek, right?

[7:06] So when you listen to the music of the 18th century, Mozart and Handel, and so on, your emotions are moved in a way that

[7:18] if it doesn't make the virtuous, it disposes for what? For virtue, right? Remember when rock and roll was first coming out, and I was reading a report of a riot down there in Newport, there, where they were showing the sailors were listening to rock and roll and they were throwing these chairs, you claps, you know, convention, one of those things flying through the air, right? Because you know it's kind of metal chairs, but that was the effect of this kind of wild music, right?

[7:56] Huh? Aristotle, in the eighth book of the Politics, talks about listening to the right kind of music. Because the right kind of music, your emotions move in harmony with music, and so if it represents the emotions in harmony with reason, then your emotions are being disposed for what? For virtue. It's not enough to make your emotions virtuous. If I go home tonight and listen to to Mozart, I'll be virtuous in the morning, you know.

[8:27] Maybe. Well, not necessarily, but I'm being disposed that way, right? Huh? Okay. If I've listened to the wrong kind of music, you know, most of what's been put out today on the radio and so on, it's.

[8:48] Six o'clock news isn't a surprise. Six o'clock news isn't a surprise. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it distinguishes first of all between the what, the voluntas sensualitatis, right, which is called will by what, participation by partaking of it, and the what, rational will, right, and then we distinguish whether it be considered by way of nature or by way of what, reason.

[9:33] Now it has been said above that from a certain what dispensation of God, right, the Son of God, right, before His passion, right, and therefore before His glorification of His body, there He allowed His what flesh, right, to act and to undergo those things which were, what proper to Him. So He became hungry and thirsty and so on. And likewise, he permitted to all the powers of the soul to do those things which are what proper to them, pertain to them.

[10:12] Now it is manifest that the voluntas sensualitatis, that's the emotions, right? The sense desire refuses or flees naturally sensible pains, right? And the injury of the what body, right?

[10:33] Likewise, the will, as a nature, repudiates them; those things which are contrary to what nature, and which are in themselves or as such bad, as for example death and other things of this sort, right?

[10:57] But these things, sometimes the will, the will per modum rationis, right, is able to choose, right, from their order to the end. Just as also in some purely a man, right, his sensuality, huh, and his will, absolutely considered, refuses right, what is that? Burning, okay. Which the will secundum rationem chooses on account of the end of what? health. But the will of God was that Christ was to undergo the pains or sorrows and the passions and death, right?

[12:03] Not that these were willed by God as such, right? But in order to the end of human what salvation, huh? Whence it is clear that Christ, according to the will of sensuality, according to emotions, the sense, and according to the will of what reason, Reason. which is considered per modum naturae, and then notice the the confusion in the language a little bit, huh? Because the voluntas rationis he was contrasting with the voluntas naturae, right?

[12:41] By saying the the will of reason as opposed to the to the sense desire, right? But the one that's by way of nature could will something other than God, right? Huh? But according to the will, which is per modum rationis, huh? All things considered, as he says, they will. All things considered, he always what will what God wills, so,

[13:08] which is clear from the very thing that he said, not as I will, but as you. So, there is some conformity there that he's talking about, right? But even though there is some will there that is willing something else, right?

[13:27] For he willed according to the will of reason to fulfill the divine will, although he says that he wills something other according to his will Yeah.

[13:49] What you will according to the will of reason, there, um, one's conformity with God, is is his will simply speaking, right? Okay. That's all things considered, right? To choosing to do. That's why we discussed this matter and studying before that what we see in Christ is perfect order. Was natural for him to want a boy. He wanted a boy, but what he chose because it was God's will.

[14:24] It's a great one. That's perfectly worded. There is no no disagreement. So, again, it is nature, right? And the nature of emotions not to refuse this, right? To to to be saddened unto death, as he says. Okay.

[14:45] Now, to the first, it should be said that Christ willed that the will of the Father be fulfilled, as it said in the Psalm. I guess he quoted. Not, however, according to the will of what? Sense. Desire. Yeah. Whose motion does not extend to the will of God? Huh? Just follows the senses. Nor through the will which is considered by way of what nature, which is carried towards some objects absolutely considered, right?

[15:18] And not in order to the what divine will, huh? In the same way, to the second, it should be said that the conformity of the human will to the divine will is noted according to the will of what reason. According to which, even the wills of friends are what in harmony. Insofar as reason considers something to be willed in order to the will of the what friend, huh?

[15:53] You might do something that the grandchildren want to do. They absolutely consider you want to do right. Going again, Grandpa. We went to the to the to the Getty Museum there, you know, you know, and they got paintings, everything. So anyway, there's a courtyard there, and so I bought a green apple, right? So I started eating the green apple, and one little grandchild, she takes a couple bites out of the apple, and I one takes it, takes more bites.

[16:23] Finally gets back to me, and he's almost complete to eat it up. What do they want them to do there or not? Have a kind of trust, you know. I consider just because they they feel free to to eat Grandpa's apple. They haven't learned about Obamacare yet. I saw bumper stickers the other day, first time I saw it, and it just it's a sign, right? And oh, it's got to do with Obama, but but in front of it, so it's really like just one word, Obama, Obama.

[17:08] Pretty clever. Clean Obama. Okay. But the third should be said that Christ's at the same time comprehensor, right? Viator right? Insofar as through his mind he enjoyed God, right? And yet he was a what Viator because he had a able to suffer flesh, right? And therefore, on the side of the able to suffer flesh, something could happen in him that was impugned to what will, and also to the sensus.

[17:54] Take a little break now. Article six, is it? What? In the NAB, we do have hers. I rest my case I think that is a modern translation. Yeah, well, I think there's probably the Latin word for hers. That's my guess, and that the Hebrew actually is closer to hers. Yeah, where you go with that? You got to find out what the Hebrew is Well, the Septuagint is the source of the Vulgate That was done by.

[18:29] Yeah, I think we have both from here, but I think. This next one is related to this idea because if you have one will that is in conformity and one that's not, right? Then is there in Christ a contrariety of wills, right? But Thomas seems to take a different side here. To the sixth one proceeds thus: it seems that in Christ there was a contrariety of wills.

[18:55] huh Why is he going to take the opposite side? We just said before. Well, the contrariety of wills is noted by the contrariety of objects, just as the contrariety of motions is observed according to the contrariety of terms, as is clear to the philosopher in the fifth book of Natural Hearing Physics. But Christ, according to diverse wills, willed contrary things. For according to his divine will, he willed death, which he what fled according to his what human will.

[19:37] Whence Athanasius says in the book against Apollinarius, when Christ said, "Father, if it is possible, let this what chalice pass from me? Nevertheless, not mine, but your will come about." And again we said the spirit is prompt, but the flesh is what weak. That's what Faustus says. You know, I've got more flesh than other men, so take that into account. He shows here two wills, right? The human, which, on account of infirmity of the flesh, refuses the passion, and the divine, which is prompt to undergo the passion.

[20:24] Therefore, in Christ, there was a contrariety of wills. My text says, "Ergo in Christo." You hear that? Did I spell that? What? At the end of the objection. Yeah. Sounds like Spanish or something. Ergo in Christo. Said that. That's just there to clash. Yeah. That's Christos. Yeah. No, no, no H in there. Oh, that's the typo in your book. Yeah, okay. Maybe in Italian they do that too, right?

[21:04] Maybe so. Moreover, in Galatians five seventeen, it is said that the flesh what lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. Right. There is therefore a contrariety of wills when the spirit desires one thing and the flesh a what another. But this was in Christ, for through the will of charity, which the Holy Spirit made in his his mind, or his mente, he wished what the passion, according to that of Isaiah's, he was offered up because he himself willed so.

[21:42] But according to the flesh, he what refused the passion. Therefore, there was in him a contrariety of what wills. Moreover, Luke chapter 22 had said that he was in agony, right, and he prayed in a what prolonged way, right. But agony seems to imply a certain what. fight to the soul tending to what contraries, a little war going on as Shakespeare would say right like like a civil war you like that I'm going to use therefore it seems in Christ there is a contrariety of will

[22:32] against this is what is said in the determination of the sixth synod my book says the what Third Council Constantinople For we preach to what natural wills not what contrary according as what the impious heretics assert but following, what his human will right and not resisting or fighting against it but rather subject to his divine and omnipotent will.

[23:13] Well, what's Tom's going to say here now? You think he takes just the opposite side from what he said in the previous? huh? This guy surprises you, huh? I answer: It should be said that contrariety cannot be unless what opposition be noted in the same and according to the same. If, however, according to diverse, and in diverse things the diversity exists, this does not suffice for the full notion of what contrariety, just as not to the notion of contradiction.

[23:54] As an example of man it is said to be what. A beautiful or healthy, according to his hand, but not according to his foot. Well, that's no contradiction, right?

[24:06] To this, therefore, that there be a contrariety of wills in something, there is required first that, but according to the same thing, there be noted a diversity of wills.

[24:23] If the will of one is of something coming about according to a universal reason, and another the wills of something not coming about according to a certain particular reason, there is not altogether a what contrariety of wills. If, for example, the king wishes to suspend the the thief for the good of the republic, right, and some what one who is relative wishes him not to be suspended on account of his private love, there will not be a contrariety of what wills, unless perhaps to such an extent the will of the private good is extended, right, and that he wishes to impede the what public good, right, so that this private good might be reserved.

[25:25] Yeah, the kind of the kind of best thing to say about that. Okay. Then, according to the same thing, there is noted a repugnance of what wills, right?

[25:38] Secondly, there is required for a contrariety of will that it be about the what same will. For if man wills one thing according to the desire of the understanding, another according to the sense desire, there is not here any contrariety, unless perhaps the sense desire to such an extent prevails that it changes or at least retards, right, the will or the desire rather of the reason. For thus already it arrives at the what will of reason something of the contrary motion of the sense appetite.

[26:27] Thus, therefore, it should be said that although the natural will and the will of sensuality, motions in Christ, something other will than the divine will, and the will of reason of himself, right, there was not nevertheless there any contrariety of wills.

[26:53] First, because neither his natural will nor the will of sensuality repudiated that reason according to which the divine will and the will of human reason, right, in Christ wished the what the passion.

[27:16] For the absolute will in Christ willed the salvation of the human race, but it did not pertain, huh, to him, right, to will this in order to another, right.

[27:41] And the emotion of sensuality was not able to what extend itself to this, huh. Secondly, because neither the divine will nor the will of reason in Christ. Were impeded or retarded through the what, natural, will or through the appetite of sensuality, since there. Likewise, neither, reversely, was the divine will, or the will of reason in Christ, refusing or retarding the natural what. Motion the natural will of man and the motion of the sensuality in Christ.

[28:28] For it was pleasing to Christ, according to what. The will. Divine will, yeah, and according to the will of reason, right. That the natural will in him and the will of sensuality, would be moved according to the order of their nature. You want to observe their natural, yeah. As opposed to the extreme position of the

[29:07] Stoics, right? You know that you should not be moved at all, right? In your emotions there. Once it is clear that in Christ there was no repugnance or contrariety of what, of wills.

[29:39] Now the first objection, right? One seemed to be one one one the other one one one the other. To the first effort should be said, that some human will in Christ willed something other than his divine will, that proceeded from his divine will. Right? Because he wanted them to what. Have their natural motion right.

[30:14] By who is what, being pleased with right. It was pleasing to his his divine will that human nature would be moved by its own motions in Christ, right? And if it, part of the reason why he wanted to do that is because he wanted to attest to his humanity, right? So if we said that Christ wasn't bothered at all by dying the cross and no big deal,

[30:45] we would question his his human nature, right? You have a human nature there. Just like after the resurrection, there he ate with the disciples, and they they refer to that right that they not only were with him but he actually ate with them you know again and not out of necessity but to show his what his humanity

[31:13] and so he he he he was according to his divine will right that the natural will and the emotion should have this what repugnance right huh

[31:32] but they didn't in any way impede the the rational will and the divine will the second should be said this is the one from the spirit and the flesh right the second should be said that in us through the concupiscence of the flesh is impeded or retarded the desire of the spirit huh but this was not so in what Christ and therefore in Christ there was not the same contrariety of flesh and spirit as there is in us huh

[32:23] okay the third objection here about agony right oh we translate agony the other day wouldn't it this struggle was not in Christ as regards the what rational part of the soul according as it implies a what

[32:49] yeah let's read the word concert right you know it's it's kind of a struggle between the two components in the brass yeah yeah yeah they call it concerto grosso right it's kind of a struggle between two groups of instruments

[33:08] right huh who shall win out right kind of beautiful name huh and then they're on the piano concerto right you know most of Spanish concerto is kind of you know in some ways it's great instrumental music but the piano is able to you know put up a better fight against orchestra than the violin can right and so who's going to dominate right and so the orchestra plays the tune and then when the piano plays the tune you know and whose whose melody is this you know my melody or your melody yeah yeah yeah yeah that's kind of interesting that the word that concert concerto I mean should say

[33:51] And that concerto okay? As when someone, according as reason considers one thing, wishes this, right? And according as considers another, it wishes the contrary. That was not going on in Christ. And this happens on account of the what? Weakness of reason, right? Which is not able to judge which is simply what? Better. Better, yeah. Okay. So you've experienced that kind of situation, I think, right? Yeah. We don't know which is really better to do.

[34:29] That was not in Christ, huh? Because through his reason he judged simply to be better that through his passion the divine will would be what? Fulfilled the divine will about the salvation of the human race, huh?

[34:48] But there was in Christ agonia as regards the sensitive part, right? According as it implies a fear of a what unfortunate thing is imminent as Damascene says in the third book.