Tertia Pars
52. Truth Crowned, the Wine of Wisdom, and Whether God Creates by Nature or Will; Christ's Two Operations (ST III q.19 a.1)
Class of 2009-10-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/13-tertia-pars/052-truth-crowned-the-wine-of-wisdom-and-whether-god-creates/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, our God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. A little passage here from Shakespeare.

[0:36] I was re-reading the Mercy and Forgiveness romances of Shakespeare. Right, there are six plays, right? And Shakespeare's plays, if you set aside the ten history plays, which are involved in special problems of classification, he has five comedies, three good natured comedies and two satires. Then he has ten tragedies, right? And then in the middle between them, he has the Mercy and Forgiveness plays, in which there are six.

[1:11] And then between the Mercy and Forgiveness plays and the comedies, he has the love and friendship comedies, or romances rather, comedies, which there's also six, right? Well, as we're reading the six plays there, the Mercy and Forgiveness plays, and I ran across this line here, are these lines from Pericles, right? One of the those six plays. And it's a beautiful scene there, where Pericles has apparently lost his wife, right, who's died giving birth to a daughter on the ocean, and she had been sent over the side, right, so he's apparently lost her.

[1:56] And then he had to leave his daughter with people because of her health and so on, and she grew to womanhood, but apparently died, right? And so he's a man who's very depressed, you know, his thing. Well, then he finally lands with his boat at the place where his daughter has ended up, still alive. He doesn't know it's his daughter, but she strikes him as being a lifeless, his wife, you know.

[2:27] This this, and he begins to talk to her, and then she says, "Maybe I've had, you know, as bad a life as you've had, you know, and so on." And he starts to become, you know, convinced into something to her. And so he says here, "Falseness cannot come from thee," he says, "for thou lookest modest as justice, and thou seemest a palace for the crown of truth to dwell in."

[2:57] Beautiful, beautiful lines. Shakespeare says it. I got thinking about a number of things here that are applicable, of course, to to theology. Why does he couple these two or juxtapose these two things, justice and truth? Right?

[3:19] Well, there's a certain likeness between justice and truth. If you take the adjective here, "modest justice," that justice is modest. You've heard me quote from King Lear when Kent says, "All my reports go with the modest truth." He says, "Nor more, nor clipped, but so." Right? And that's why the word justice is sometimes spoken with gaining, even right? And even the adjective, you know, in size and so on, we say it just fits.

[3:56] We mean it's either bigger or smaller, but just that way. So there's a likeness between justice and what truth, and then both are what modest, right?

[4:09] And also the idea of equality. In another play of Shakespeare, I was just reading *Measure for Measure*. Shakespeare calls justice injustice rather inequality. And sometimes the medievalists, when they talk about truth, they say it's the equality of the mind with what things, right? It's either saying more than what's out there, what is not is. They're saying less than what's out there. Saying that what is is not.

[4:41] So they're both modest, and they're both has something to do with equality and so on. That's kind of interesting. Then I got thinking about this thing we met in the treatise in the *Prima Pars on the will of God, where you talk about the mercy and the justice of God. And there's an article, if you may recall, in that particular part that in all the works of the Lord there is mercy and what justice.

[5:19] But the authoritative quote that Thomas says in the *Sed contra* there is from the 24th Psalm, where it says that all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Instead of saying mercy and justice, as in the title of the article in which we're talking about, right? He calls uses the word truth for justice, right? So, and when I looked at our commentary, Thomas's commentary here on the Psalms, and looked at the 24th Psalm again.

[5:56] And of course, he has in there a quote from I think it's Tobias, which also speaks of mercy and truth. So at least two places, maybe three places in Scripture that he has there, where truth is used for justice, right? And I expected to find an explanation, Thomas, as to why the word truth should be used for justice, right? And he did it. too. I don't know, that was too obvious to him, right?

[6:24] I don't think he really explains there, see. But same thing with Shakespeare, right? He sees that what likeness between the two, right? And it's kind of striking that there's so much a likeness that the word truth will be used in the key texts for that truth in theology, that all the ways of the Lord are truth and justice, right? They should use the word mercy and what truth.

[6:53] But now the other thing that struck me was that he should call the truth crowned, right? That's a beautiful expression, right? It's like saying that truth is the king, right? Truth is crowned, and as an Aristotelian, I got thinking about what Aristotle says about wisdom in the second book of wisdom, and what he says about wisdom in the Proemium, the wisdom. In the second book of wisdom, Aristotle says that wisdom is the episteme, right?

[7:36] The reasoned-out knowledge, the reasoned-out understanding of truth, huh? But he says of the truth, right? As if he's using the word truth there by antonomasia, right? And the reason he gives why wisdom is the knowledge of the truth, in a way that no other reasoned-out knowledge is, is based upon that principle we've given before, which Thomas usually refers to by saying that because of moreso, by which I explain more fully as what when the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause.

[8:25] You've heard my simple examples, where sweet is said of the sugar in the coffee, but the coffee because of the sugar, so which is more sweet, and so on. So if true is said of the cause and the effect, but the effect is true because of the cause, which is more true. Yeah. And therefore, the first causes would be most true of all, right? I think Christ said, "I am truth itself," right?

[8:53] And so, if wisdom is the knowledge of the first causes, as he showed in the proemium. Then it is most of all the knowledge of the what truth.

[9:06] That shows a connection between wisdom and truth. But now, how about wisdom and being king, right? Well, in the Proemium, when Aristotle works out the six-part description of the wise man, the culmination is that belongs to the wise man to direct and to order all others, and not to be ordered or directed by anybody else. There's a need for him to be wise, right? So, if the wise man directs and orders the others, he has a likeness to the what The king of the king.

[9:45] And why is that so? Because his wisdom is the knowledge of the truth by antonomasia. And then, of course, I I thought of the uh 19th chapter, no, 18th chapter. Of John, when Christ is talking with Pilate, Pilate says, "Well, then you are a king," he says. And Christ says, "now I said it," and as if he's agreeing, I am a king, right? But then an explanation of how he's a king.

[10:16] He said, "For this I was born, and this I came into the world, that I might give testimony unto the truth. His kingdom is a kingdom of what? Truth, huh? And

[10:32] I was thinking, you know, how when Thomas explains the names of the Son, sometimes the Son is called the what? Splendor of the Father, right? And so in the 92nd Psalm, it is in the correct numbering. The first lines are, "The Lord is King in splendor robe So you're tying up the kingship of the Lord with what the splendor of the one who was born to give testimony unto the truth, huh?

[11:05] And then this other Psalm, this famous one, I think it's 109, huh? The Lord said to my Lord, "Sit at my right hand, for the enemy is your footstool, and so on." He's talking about kind of kingly role, and he says, going on, "Yours is princely power; in the day of your birth in holy splendor before the days before the days till I have begotten you do have begotten you."

[11:27] So it's beautiful that Shakespeare calls the truth what crown, right? Because there is a likeness between truth and what being the king, right? Now sometimes it mentions another thing in Shakespeare too. Sometimes Shakespeare used the word crown for the end, and the end crowns everything else. He says, right? Well, as Augustine says, our end is gaudium de veritate, right? Joy over the truth, right? So it's a crown in that sense too.

[12:00] But I was thinking when I first got thinking about this, it reminded me of his kingship, right? There are various ways in which he's going to be understood, of course. But in that same Psalm, I was mentioning 109, it talks about the kingship of Christ and his what priesthood, huh? Or priest, forever, according to the order of Kizedeck, and so on. And sometimes you have only those two mentioned, right?

[12:37] Other times you have king, priest, and prophet, right? And when I grew up as a little boy in the old catechisms, right, they would teach you know the commandments under Christ the King and the truths of the faith under his prophetic or teaching role. And then his sacraments and so on under his being the priest, right? But if you drop out the prophet and just take two, then you got to put the teacher somewhere in the truth.

[13:12] And I was thinking, well, if I put someplace, I probably put it with the kingship of Christ, right? Just like Christ, you know, is said to be what I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? Well, he might kind of appropriate life to his priesthood, right? Although it's taken his divinity there and truth to his being what the king. You are gonna just have those two.

[13:46] I was thinking a little bit about the the wine of wisdom, you know, the old principle there. And in the second chapter there of John, where Christ turns the water into wine, we have these

[14:07] vases or jars of water, and the scripture mentions of two or three measures. I say now, why can't they say what it is? Because you know later on in the in the

[14:26] last chapter, I guess it is they catch one hundred fifty three fish. They don't give more or less, you know, one hundred fifty or so. It's very exact, one fifty three. They can be that exact about the number of fish caught. Why can't they be exact as to whether the measure right should be two or what? Three. Well they'd already been drinking the water They or sugar

[14:54] So, now you know, Christ, I, I, the the teacher of the rule of two or three, right? Yeah, but I usually say it more completely as you should divide into two or three or both. Okay. So when Thomas is explaining the request of Mary and so on, right, in the occasion for the request of Mary, they have no wine, she says, right? They're running out of wine, right?

[15:30] The wine is what failing, right? I think I brought in that text one day, you know, and Thomas says, "Well, there is three wines that are running short here." And he says, "One is the wine of charity, right? One is the wine of what wisdom, and one is the wine of what justice, right? " Now, of course, this is being said metaphorically, right? And what is there in wine that indicates these two different things?

[16:02] Well, if you put wine on a sore, you would burn, right? Okay. And so this is justice, and so the good Samaritan uses oil and wine, right? He uses mercy and justice, right? All the ways of order that. So it's that aspect of wine that allows you to call it justice, right? What allows you to call it charity? Well, because it inebriates you, right? Okay. Makes you amorous, right?

[16:35] And you know, in the famous prayer there, the great prayer, the Anima Christi, right? Anima Christi inebria me right. It means with what charity, right? So that aspect of wine is metaphor for the the effect of charity, right? But then, Vinum laetificat cor hominis, huh? Or as the French say, "Good wine rejoices the heart of man." in their improvement upon scripture. in the real sense of the Hebrew

[17:07] Um. And then he quotes you know the same text that he uses at the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles, you know that there's there's no bitterness in wisdom, just what delight and joy, huh? In these things. And so that's the way in which wine is like wisdom, huh? Rejoices the heart of man, huh? Now I was talking about the I'm reading the Disputed Questions on power again, right?

[17:32] Just absolutely delightful things there. They're not bitter at all. Just just one delicious thing after another, and but then when Thomas gets to the to the jars in the two or three, right? He has some other explanation of it, right? And I said, well, he could give another explanation here in terms of the wine and wisdom, right? Because wisdom is it about two or three? Well, sometimes we say that wisdom is about the humanity and the divinity of Christ, right?

[18:08] So that's two, right? But sometimes we say it's about the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, huh? Like we do in the Nicene Creed and so on. Sometimes we say that or theology as Thomas says in the Summa is about God in Himself, and then God is the beginning of things, and God is the end. So sometimes we say two, and sometimes we say what three, right?

[18:35] So John is following the rule of two or three two or three. The devil can quote scripture after all. Just give one delicious thing here from the Disputed Questions on power, huh?

[18:59] Did God produce creatures? Did God create? Naturally or voluntarily. Yeah, but some of the greatest minds have said the reverse, right? And the one mind that Thomas happens to mention there, of course, is the great Avicenna, right? And if you read through the you know the sentences which is an earlier work of Thomas, you see a lot of what he got from Avicenna. And when you read Albert the Great, you can see Albert quoting very wonderful things from Avicenna.

[19:36] So you have to have a great deal respect for Avicenna, but at the same time he made some you know important mistakes. So in in

[19:49] Avicenna seeing that or thinking it proceeds naturally, nature is determined to what one, like Shakespeare says in Coriolanus, right? Nature not being able to be more than one. So for Avicenna, from God there proceeds one creature. That's all. And then from that creature, there is some multiplicity in it, right? You get one thing insofar as he contemplates the God, one insofar he contemplates himself, and one contemplates his own potency, so on.

[20:25] You get three more things, and they keep multiplying, right? So the universe as a whole is not really being what distinguished and ordered by God, right? So it's kind of. So this is this is a serious mistake, right? So Thomas has a beautiful article there where he gives four different arguments, right, to show that God produced the universe by reason and will, intellect and will, rather than produced it what naturally.

[21:01] The first reason he gives goes back to what we saw in natural philosophy: that nature acts for an end, but nature doesn't know the end, and nature can't adapt things to the end. So if something acts for an end by nature. It presupposes something that acts for an end by mind and will that can know the end and can adapt things to the end. So if God made the natural world where things act for an end by nature, He must have had understanding and will.

[21:35] It's a beautiful argument, huh? And well, then he has another argument, which is based upon the idea that nature produces what just one thing. Okay. Now, from God,

[22:06] if if nature tries to produce one thing, it's going to produce something that is equal to itself, unless the matter that is receiving the form is not suitable fully for the form, or if the power of the maker is not up to the task, right? Okay.

[22:33] So Shakespeare says, "Thou art thy mother's glass, your mother's mirror, and she in thee calls back the lovely epoch of her prime, right? But if the daughter is not as beautiful as the mother, either the matter in which the mother's form was received was not adequate, or the the maker was not quite up to the task, right, Of making it. But neither of these can be said about God, God, because He doesn't create presupposing some matter, right?

[23:03] He creates the matter as well, right? And His power is infinite, so. So if He made something, if something proceeds from Him naturally, would have to be what? Equal to Him. Of course, equality is based upon what? Unity, huh? And of course, that's what He did with the Son, God the Son, right? He proceeds naturally from the Father, right? And of course, Thomas warns you says, and that's in the context we said before, that nature what?

[23:35] Can't act for an end without something before it. Because the generation of the Son is not for the sake of some end. The Son proceeds from the Father not for some end or purpose, but the Son proceeds from the Father as the end of all things. It's beautifully said, huh? Beautifully said, and it's just delicious, you know. It's just no question about. it. Okay. Then the third argument is that what?

[24:11] God understands the same as His nature, right? Huh? So creatures exist in God in understandable way, and therefore they have to proceed from God through will, That's how things come from understanding. And then his last argument is very interesting. He's got four of these arguments. The last argument is very interesting. And again, you should have to know natural philosophy, right? When Aristotle in the Categories talks about acting upon undergoing.

[24:44] And in the natural philosophy in the third book of Natural Hearing, third book of the Physics. He says that acting upon and undergoing are really the same thing. But in so far as it's from the mover or maker, right, it's called acting upon. And in so far as it's in the patient, the one undergoing, from another, it's called undergoing. So really, where is my kicking when I kick you?

[25:19] Is my kicking you and you're being kicked really two different realities? Now then, that's be double punishment, double double indemnity, right? Huh? So my kicking you is really the same thing as you're being kicked, right? But it's called kicking in so far as it's from me to you. And it's called being kicked in so far as it's in you from me. So really, my kicking is in you, right?

[25:46] Okay. And that's one of the reasons why the creature has can't create. He's got to have something that he can act upon that can receive his acting, right? But God's activity is His very what substance. Therefore, it can't be essentially an act that is what transitive, like my kicking you. Therefore, it must be what activity of understanding and willing, because that's the activity that remains within the what the doer, right?

[26:17] So you must produce the creatures, right, by an activity of understanding and willing. That's a delicious, delightful, savory thing You know it's a wise, ah, wisdom.

[26:41] One more thing from this beautiful thing. There's an objection, right? In another article, there, when the question is raised, is the ability or power of the Father to generate the Son, and the ability or power of God to create, are they two different powers? Do they really differ? A second realm, shall we say, right?

[27:20] No, if there are two different powers, you'd have some composition, God, and so on. Well, one of the objections to this is that the generating something is what proceeding naturally, right? The creation is proceeding, as we said, by will. Well, nature and will are two different what kinds of beginnings? As Aristotle points out in the ninth book of wisdom, he talks about power there. The natural ability is determined to one, or as Shakespeare says, in Coriolanus, nature cannot be more than not being able to be more than one thing.

[28:04] Why the will is open to opposites, right? To do something or not to do it, to do it this way or to do it that way, right? So how can the same power, right, give rise to one thing naturally, another thing, what? Yeah, yeah, see. And Thomas says, "well, it's not impossible," he says, "for the same power to be moved by nature and by the will." Now, at this point, you know the big, the big thing of my teacher Monsignor Dionne one of the big things was question one seventeen, article one there in the prima pars, the article on the teacher, and the teacher leads us from the known to the unknown in two ways, and the second way is proposing the order of principles

[28:53] to conclusions, which is more or less enough in maybe geometry, right? But other sciences, you need this other way of manuductio And Thomas explains. He by the hand by proposing things less universal that we can judge, right? Or by giving us sensible examples, he said, or similia, likenesses, right? Or posita, right? Okay. What does Thomas do at this point? He's explain this, huh? It's a beautiful manuductio, right?

[29:28] You know, he takes as a manuductio for what he just said that the same power can be moved by nature and by what Will. He takes our own what reason, and he says your reason naturally assents to the axioms like the whole is more than a part.

[29:51] But to the articles of faith, you don't assent unless your reason is moved by your will. No one believes unless he chooses to believe, as Augustine says, right? So one in the same ability, it's the same reason in me that ascends to the statement that the whole is more than a part, and that ascends to the the theorem or statement that there are three persons in God. Let's say, right?

[30:21] Right, God became man, but in the one it's moved naturally to ascend to it, right? The other it's moved by the will, which is you know helped by grace and so on. But nevertheless, is being moved by the will. But it's a beautiful, beautiful similitude, similitude, likeness there to say something about God, right? Really, his power to generate and his power to create is the same, but the one is raised to something naturally, and the other by what will, as is shown the other for our good selves, touching upon.

[31:00] So beautiful, beautiful. Let's go then back to our texture. Incidentally, in the what? Is that quote from Pericles? No, no, from Pericles. It's from

[31:17] Act Five, Scene One of Pericles. Pericles was a play that was added in the third folio. It was in the original folio. The. Original folio had just what thirty six plays, right? And then the third folio they added Pericles, right? There's some question, you know, whether Shakespeare did it all, you know, but of course the later acts they think are clearly by Shakespeare, you know. I think the whole thing's by him anyway.

[31:44] And and this is this tremendous these words, huh? As I was saying before, you know, class began. I read all these Shakespeare plays many times, so I never, you know, keep stay up late at night when it's going to happen. You know, keep on reading. I know it's going to happen in all these plays, so I just read, you know, maybe two or three scenes or sometimes even the whole act, and I kind of savour the words, you know, and and say what a wonderful play this is, you know.

[32:09] But I don't have to, you know, stay up till one a. m. or two a. m. to to see what what happens in the play, whether the hero survives or dies or what happens to him, you know. But

[32:24] yeah, so then I notice things in these words I didn't notice before. Keep on seeing more, You know, like DeConnick said that he'd been teaching the eight books of natural hearing, the physics, since the 1930s, you know. because I had him in what 58, 59, first of all, 59. And he says you still see something more in the words when each time he teaches it. I still remember DeConnick had come down the hall, you know, before class, you know, and one day talking to me says.

[32:59] It just was filled with wonder, you know. Isn't this wonderful, you know? He's taught this how many times, right? You know, they're just struck by the by the by the

[33:10] wonderfulness, right? As he said, if you think you understood everything, it means you understood nothing. Okay, very important question. Nineteen. Then one ought to consider about the unity of the operation of Christ, huh? And about this four things are asked: whether there is one operation of both the divinity and the humanity, or whether there are what many, right?

[33:43] Secondly, whether in Christ there are many operations according to human nature. Third, whether Christ, according to his human operation, merited something for himself. He said he merited something for us, but did he merit something for us? Something for himself? And forth, whether through it he merited something for us, huh? So these are interesting questions. In the in the questions disputatae de potentia, he says that the incarnation is the miracle of miracles.

[34:28] In another work, I forget which one now it is, he says that all other miracles are in some way ordered to the miracle of the incarnation.

[34:40] To the first one goes forward thus: it seems that in Christ there is only one doing, one operation of the divinity and humanity. For Dionysius says in the second chapter of the Divine Names, Discreta, discreta, and most what benignant operation about us of God, huh? Through this that according to us from us,

[35:20] as a whole, truly the Word became what human, right? Which is above substance, and he did and underwent those things which were suitable to what his human divine operation. Where one operation he names human and divine, which in Greek is called theandrike, right? That is the virile God, right? He has something of the strength of God. It seems, therefore, that there is one operation composed in Christ, huh?

[35:59] Christ doing, might say, operation is both divine and human, right? It's kind of composed of both, right? It's Theandric. The Apostle Andrew's name is supposed to mean virile, right? Moreover, of the chief agent and the tool instrument, there is only one doing, right?

[36:29] So we'd say that another Pietas out there, right? Pietas was the doing of Michelangelo in the doing of the chisel and hammer—two different operations.

[36:49] It seems like it's one, but the human nature in Christ was the tool of his what? Divine nature, as has been said above, right? Therefore, there is the same doing of the divine and the human nature in what Christ.

[37:11] Moreover, since in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis and or person, it is necessary that that be one and the same that belongs to the hypostasis or person. But doing or operation belongs to the hypostasis or person, for nothing operates except a suppositum subsisting. Hence,

[37:40] according to the philosopher, acts are of the singulars, right? So it's a person who's doing something, right? So it's one person, must be one doing. Seems to be so. Therefore, in Christ there is one and the same operation of the divinity and humanity.

[38:02] Moreover, just as to be existence is of the subsisting hypostasis, so also doing is the is of the the hypostasis subsisting. But on account of the unity of the hypostasis in Christ, there is one what to be one existence.

[38:30] Therefore, also on account of the same unity, there is in Christ one what operation. I would say you got to be before you can do something, right? If there's one being, there must be one doing.

[38:50] Moreover, where there is one thing done, there is one doing. But the same done, but there's the same thing done of the divinity and humanity as the healing of the leper, or the raising of the dead, right? Or even the changing there of water into what wine? Thomas tries to explain why he he calls her woman there, right? Why in the cross he calls her mother, right?

[39:20] Well, he suffers in his human nature that he got from his mother, so he calls her mother there, right? But he performs a miracle due to his divinity, which he didn't get from his what mother.

[39:39] Therefore, it seems that in Christ there is only one doing of his divinity and his what humanity. But against this, it's what Ambrose, and he's one of the what four or five supreme doctors of the Western Church, and of course a great influence upon custom, right? Wanted to hear his words, ended up getting his thoughts, huh? But the words given the thoughts, huh? Words are dangerous, right?

[40:17] But against this is what Ambrose, in the second book to Gratian the Emperor, says: How and what way is there the same doing of what diverse power, right?

[40:43] Can the lesser do what the greater does, huh? Kind of freely translating here, or can there be one doing where there is a diverse what substance, substance, not in the sense of what nature, huh? In the sense of hypostasis. We'll get back into that problem.

[41:03] Thomas usually says in Aristotle gives two main reasons, or, meanings rather of substance, right? One is the hypostasis, certainly opposed to him, and the other the nature, right?

[41:18] I answer, Thomas says, it should be said that as has been said above, the heretics who place in Christ one will place also in him one doing, and that their erroneous opinion might be better understood, right? It should be considered that wherever there are many doers that are ordered, right, the lower is moved by the higher, just as in man the body is moved by the soul, and the lower powers by the reason.

[41:59] Thus, therefore, the acts and motion of the lower beginning are more what done than than are they doing, right? But that which belongs to the highest beginning is properly operation or doing. If, for example, we say that in man that to walk, which is of the feet, right, and to touch, I guess, which is of the hands, are some doings of are things done by man, right?

[42:41] Of which the one, the soul, does through the feet, the other through the hand, and because there is the same soul doing through both, right? From the side of the one doing, which is the first beginning that is the mover, there is one and undifferentiated doing. But on the side of the what things

[43:12] done, there is found a difference, right? Just as in a pure man. The body is moved by the soul, and the sense desire by their rational desire. So in the Lord Jesus Christ, the human nature is moved and ruled by the divine. And therefore they say that there is the same what doing, huh? And it's indifferent from the side of the divinity operating.

[43:51] But from the side of the divinity operating, there are nevertheless diverse things done, right? In so far as the divinity of Christ does something other through itself, as that He carries all things by the word of His power. Other through the human nature, as that He walks bodily, right? Whence in the sixth synod, huh, synod, are brought in the words of Severus the heretic, thus saying. And those things which are done

[44:28] by the one Christ, huh, much differ, right? For some things are what attributable to God, some human, as for example, for him bodily to go upon the earth is truly human, huh?

[44:53] But to what? To give health, I guess you'd say. Yeah. to broken lands or whatever. And to walk upon the earth. Oh, he's walking on the water. Oh, okay, okay. Give hail steps to sickly limbs, wholly unable

[45:13] to walk on the ground. Okay. I don't know what hail is. H A L E. It's a hail and hearty, you know. Isn't that maybe another form of health or something? But one thing, namely the incarnate Word, this and that did, right? And never this of this and that of that nature, right? Who he's saying seems kind of orthodox, trying to take it down to this point, huh?

[45:47] Nor in this that diverse are the things what done, right? Therefore, two operating natures and forms do we justly what define, huh? But in this they were deceived, Thomas says.

[46:08] It's really weird to f to follow these heretics through all their formulations, you know, and and they have some words that sound orthodox, and then other ones they snuck in there and so on. Just.

[46:24] Actually, read some of these heretics. Even today, you know, you find you know one page. It sounds pretty orthodox, and then kind of sits on the other page. Yeah, the other page.

[46:37] But in this day, they were deceived, because the action of that which is moved by another is what twofold, right? One that it has according to its own form, another which it has according as it is moved by what another. Just as the operation of the sun. saw is that what axe? Okay, according to its own form is cutting, right? But according as it is moved by the artist, its operations to make a

[47:16] bench, bench, bench. Okay. So the doing which is a something according to its own form is its own, right? No, as it pertained to the mover, huh? Except insofar as it uses a thing of this sort for its own doing, just as the heat is fire's own doing, right? And not of the what? Metal worker, yeah, blacksmith, whatever. My grandfather is a blacksmith, by the way. Yeah, father's father.

[47:58] A strict disciplinarian too. You can imagine. You didn't. You didn't. If he said come in, you come in. You know. He only hit the anvil once.

[48:21] Is not of the of the blacksmith, except insofar as uses fire for heating what the metal, right? But that doing which is of a thing only according as is moved by another is not other besides the doing of the mover self. Just as to make the what we say was the bench is not by itself a doing of the axe that's other from the doing of the what?

[48:57] Yeah, I assume that's that's true about my example there, Michelangelo, right? And therefore, wherever the mover and the moved have diverse forms, right, or diverse operating powers, huh? There is necessary that to be another proper operation of the mover and another. That of the mood, so I always kind of hesitate, you know, translate this properly, its own really.

[49:40] Although the motion partakes, yeah, partakes of the operation of the mover, right? And the mover uses the operation of the moved, and thus both acts with what communion of the other, right? Thus, therefore, in Christ, the human nature has its own form and power through which it operates, and likewise the divine, right?

[50:17] Whence also the human nature has its own doing distinct from the doing of the divine, and a converse of the same is true that the divine has its own operation. But nevertheless, the divine nature uses the operation of the human nature as a what doing of its instrument, and likewise the human nature partakes of the operation of the divine nature as the instrument partakes of the operation of the chief agent, um.

[50:50] And this is what Leo Papa, as soon as he said to be the fifth great doctor of the of the Western Church, um. This is what Leo Papa says in the Epistle to Flavian, that both what forms act, right? To wit, both the divine nature and the human Christ, um. Now notice the word form, you know, it's used for nature there, like in the Philippians, is it?

[51:21] You know, form of God, you know, didn't think it wrong to be equal to God, right? But then it took on the form of a slave, right? So their form is used in the sense of of nature, right? So not just that pagan Aristotle sometimes uses form in that way, but you find it right in in the Epistles of Saint Paul.

[51:48] To wit, the divine nature and the what human in Christ Thomas is saying that form means that there, with the what communion of the other, right?

[52:02] Which is its own, but the word doing was of the word and the flesh doing what is of the what of flesh, um. If there were only one doing of the divinity and humanity in Christ. It would be necessary to say either that the human nature does not have its own what form and power, because this cannot be said about the divine, right? From which it would follow that in Christ there is only the divine operation, or it has to be said that from the divine power and the human there was blown together in Christ, right?

[52:47] One power, of which both of which is impossible. For the first of these posits that the human nature in Christ was imperfect, right? Didn't have its own operation, and to the second there would be a what confusion of the natures, going in the direction of monophysites, and therefore reasonably Thomas says, huh?

[53:18] In the sixth synod. This opinion was condemned. In whose what determination is said? Two natural operations. Yeah. Not convertible, right? Unconfused, separably, in the same Lord Jesus Christ, our true God, we glorify. That is the divine operation of the human.

[53:51] We owe quite a debt to these early councils, don't we? Huh? If I can find that text, you know where they say one of the popes said that he venerated the first what four councils as much as the four Gospels. Huh? Kind of strong, beautiful statement.

[54:15] That's a beautiful example in Second Vatican Council, you know, where it says that the tradition and Sacred Scripture and the Magisterium cannot what stand one of them without the others, right? I was in the military academy. They used to have the little hooks like that, and you put one end very far on the other one, and then you get a third one, and you get the three.

[54:39] But you couldn't do just two days forward. You needed three, you know. So it's something like that. There are these three things. I keep on thinking that for some reason. I think of the text and the Vatican too.

[54:53] Now, what about the language here of Dionysius?