Logic (2016)
2. Logic's Three Acts of Reason, Univocal and Equivocal Names, and the Genus
Class of 2016-10-13
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/002-logics-three-acts-of-reason-univocal-and-equivocal-names/

[0:00] The Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Move us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son. I was laying in bed this morning and saying, "Wait, I have two versions of that prayer.

[0:31] You know, help us, God, to know and love you, and then move us to know and love you." Well then I remember what Augustine says, right? God, who created you without you, you didn't help us, I didn't cooperate at all with this, you know thing, will not save you without you. So you have to cooperate with God, right, with His grace, right? So when you say, "Help us, God, to know and love you," you're kind of implying that you're trying to know God, trying to love Him, but you need some help.

[1:01] Anything when you say move us, you're talking about Him being the principal agent, right? Huh? You know, let me move you in a way that's surprising to you. Okay. So

[1:19] we talked about the word logos, right? And how it is used to name one part of philosophy called logic, right? And sometimes the Latin guys call logic Philosophia rationalis, right? It's named from reason. We mentioned how the word logos first means what word in Greek, and then the thought which the word signifies, huh? And then finally, reason, which has thoughts, right? So it's a word that's equivocal, right?

[2:00] But equivocal by reason, huh? But there's something to be learned from that order, right? Because the word is first in the what our knowledge, right? Because the word is something sensible; it's a sound, in fact, right?

[2:20] That'll be important when we get into logic. Let me get a little bit into logic today. Okay. Um. Now, Thomas, son, there's one text there that we've got the proemium, you know, the major and the minor proemium That's something we can reproduce. But there, Thomas recalls what Aristotle says in the third book on the soul that there are two kinds of understanding, right, in reason. Understanding what something is, and then understanding the true or the false, which they often speak of as composition, division of the things understood in the first act, and then to this you can see there's a third act called reasoning, right?

[3:04] So Thomas divides logic into what three parts, right? Not two parts, right? But Albert the Great, as I mentioned, another one of my teachers, logic divides logic into two parts: the act, the art of coming to know the simple unknown, the art of defining, and the art of coming to know the complex unknown, which is what reasoning, the art of reasoning, right? And then he puts the art about statements about the second act with that part of reasoning, right?

[3:41] Because you're putting together statements, right? And that makes some sense, right? Because you want to emphasize the fact that logic is not for its own sake, but for the sake of coming to know what you don't know. What is it you don't know? Well, sometimes the simple unknown, sometimes it's the what complex unknown. So it makes a lot of sense its division, right? But Thomas divides it into three, right?

[4:05] According to these three acts of reason. And then, as you can see, especially in the major proemia of Thomas, he will divide the books of Aristotle according to those three acts. Aristotle has the title in history of being, among other things, the father of logic, right? So the book called the Categories is in the logic of the first act. the logic of the first. act. And then the book called the Peri Hermeneias, the Interpretation in Latin, is about the second act about statements.

[4:44] And then all the rest of which there are many books are about what reasoning. You won't go into the subdivision of that, but he has the two Analytics, right, which is about the syllogism in general and demonstration, the syllogism that he defines as making you know the cause and that which is the cause It cannot be otherwise. And then you have the book on dialectical syllogism, and then the book on the sophistical ones, and then you go all the way down to the weak arguments and rhetoric, and all the way down to the book on the poetic art because that's used to persuade people sometimes.

[5:25] You know, Uncle Tom's Cabin had a lot to do with getting people, you know, on the right side, I suppose you'd say, in the Civil War, right, or before the Civil War, right? Okay. Forgive me for asking this, Could you please tell me what the three divisions of St. Thomas are again? Okay, three acts of reason. The first act being understanding what something is,

[5:52] like you understand what a square is, you understand what a circle is, right? You understand what an odd number is, what an even number is. You understand not so well what a dog is, but you don't kind of know that's a dog. I know it's a dog around here. It's not a cat.

[6:11] Yeah. And so that's the first act, understanding what something is, right? The second act is understanding the true or the false, which results from putting together an affirmative or negative statement. These things understood in the first act. So if I say a square is a quadrilateral, or a square is not a circle, I'm understanding something what true. If I say the square is not a quadrilateral, or the square is a circle, I'm saying something what false.

[6:52] Yeah, yeah, something modern. Yeah. But more precisely, something false. Here, my brother Marcus got the, you know, kind of making fun of the moderns, you know, where Spinoza has philosophy, you know, geometrically demonstrated, right? Well, Marcus has the liberalism, you know, geometrically demonstrated, and a liberal's mind and reality, if they extend to infinity, whatever me. Like parallel lines, right?

[7:32] First theorem in geometry, right, is to construct a equilateral triangle, right? And Marcus says to construct a pyramid of absolute power on a flattened federal republic. That was his first theorem.

[7:54] So the second act you can call understanding the true or the false, right? Something a statement is true when it says what is is, and what is not is not. It's false when it says what is is not, and what is not is, right? So if I say you're sitting now, I'm true, right? If I say you're not standing, I'm true, because I'm saying what is is and what is not is not.

[8:21] You're standing is not now. But if I say you're standing now, I'm saying what is not is. And if I say you're not sitting, I'm saying what is is not, so then I'm false, right? Okay. So that's the second act, understanding the true or the false. But they often call Thomas composition and division because you're composing things in an affirmative statement or dividing them in a negative statement.

[8:48] But I often call it, you know, understanding the true or the false. And then the third act is what reasoning, right? Okay. So we put this on the board, didn't we last time?

[9:03] The first two acts are kind of understanding. Understanding something here. Understanding what a thing. Want to say that, right? Then understanding the true or the false, right?

[9:46] And then the third act is what reasoning. So again, it's a famous division into what three, right? And the Bible is divided into two or three. Two. But the New Testament is divided into two or three. Three. Three Thomas divides it down. Okay.

[10:15] The Gospel of Matthew is divided into three by Thomas. John two. Okay. Now, corresponding to each of these acts is a what speech, right? That is sometimes or very often necessary to perfect that, right? And so, definition

[10:46] is a speech making known what something is, right? Or a speech signifying what something is. Or speech bringing out what something is. I know there's those two definitions in there. I like to say speech bringing out what something is because nature of thing likes to hide, as Heraclitus says. So you're bringing out, you're thinking out what it is, right?

[11:20] Now we defined last time, if you remember, speech and what name, right? And the speech or name, both definitions have about five parts, right? And the first four parts of the definition are the same of each. Both are what sound, right? Vocal sound. Both are what vocal sound, right?

[11:49] Both are vocal sounds signifying something, but not by nature like a baby's cry, but by human agreement or by custom. Okay. But then the last part, the name has no parts that signify by themselves. About the definition.

[12:12] So my name is Duane, but the D U doesn't mean anything. The A M-E doesn't mean anything, but Duane means something, right? And even if your name happened to be put together from two names, like if your name was Johnson,

[12:34] that's not what the name means. Son of John. That's the etymology, right? You're confusing etymology with the meaning of the word, right? So don't be confused by the fact that some names are what in their origin are resulting from two names. Like I mentioned, my our name was originally Bergquist. and it meant mountain, Berg, and quist branch. I guess so. Mountain branch. That's not what it means.

[13:06] We're not a family of mountain branches, okay? So the definition is speech, right? But now it's made up of names, right? And so, when you study the definition, you've got to know and distinguish the kinds of names that you have in the definition, and distinguish them from the name of what is being defined, right?

[13:42] So when I say what is a square, right? You say well, it's equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. What kind of a name is quadrilateral? What kind of a name is equilateral and right-angled? What kind of a name is what square, right? Well, today, so go get Porphyry to find out the answer to that.

[14:08] Now, the statement that corresponds to the second act is statement. Some people like to use the word proposition, but proposition means pro, placed before. So a proposition more names the what premise of an argument. Premise means sent before, right? Preposition. So I prefer to call it a statement. And statement can be defined as speech signifying the true or the what false. So I used to ask my students, where do you find truth and falsity?

[14:52] In The ocean? In the air? Truth, or falsity? Or if you dig in the ground, you might find some truth. So where truth in the ground? Here or there? No. You find it in statements, right? Same thing. You find falsity. A contradiction is what the affirmative and negative statement, one of which is true, and then the other one is going to be what false, huh? Now reasoning.

[15:34] We sometimes they'll say syllogism. I can say in general they'll argument, huh? An argument is speech, right? Putting together statements and drawing a conclusion, right? But syllogism is the argument in which some statement's laid down, another statement follows necessarily, right? That's the Culmination of argument, but there are other arguments where the conclusion doesn't follow necessarily, which your mind is inclined to say. So you can say logic is directing these three acts of reason, but you can also say that logic is about definition and statement and argument, huh?

[16:31] They correspond to these ones, to these acts. Now you'll find a little difference between Aristotle and later guys when they take up definition. The only book of Aristotle that's come down to us for the logic of the first act is what? Categories. That's not really about definition. Aristotle takes up definition as the beginning of demonstration, right? And how you define? There's two ways of how you define, right?

[17:18] One is by dividing, right, the genus, and the other is by looking at many examples of the thing to be defined, separating out the common. But some of the later guys who put the logic of the first act after the categories, something on division and then something on definition, right? But many take it from Aristotle. Down here, okay.

[17:47] But these three distinction of these three corresponds to distinction of these three, and therefore one helps you to understand the other, right? So any question about this? Okay, we're stacking it there. It's got that in it together. What's called Peri Hermeneias which I guess you can in Latin they interpret, which I guess you can in Latin they interpret to mean de interpretation, right? I think it'd be simpler if it was called about statement, right?

[18:28] Yeah. Yeah. But the Greek word is a little difficult to translate. So the second book is about stating, right? We get the word. they they transliterate that in English they call it hermeneutics. Yeah, that's terrible.

[18:45] Should be like that for that. Some Germans come up with stuff like that. Yeah. Was there a handout from last week? No. No. No. I brought you know, I guess Faddisson. Tapes there, you know. Yeah. we'll print out some stuff for you Yeah Listen, first distinctions and definitions of logic, you know. Yeah. So, you can reproduce that, right?

[19:12] That's fine Okay. And all of these speeches are composed of what? Names. So we got to start from names, right, in logic. Okay. Now,

[19:45] my teacher, Albert DeMay, now, and some teachers, but the spoken words. Some teachers write written word only, right? And Albert's one I have to write written word only. But Albert says the first thing. To be considered in logic, he says, is the universal. Now, to

[20:16] go back to the definition of reason, by our friend Shakespeare, right? He said it's the ability for large discourse, remember? looking before and after. And the word "large" we found six meanings, right? But the first two meanings of large discourse is a discourse about the large, right?

[20:46] And what are those first two meanings, right? Well, about the large in the sense of covering a large area, right? To go back to our senses, a discourse about the universal, because universal is said of how many things. Well, how many things is man said, of, right? Every day people are being born, right? So there's no end to how many things it's said, of, right? Or number is set up how many things.

[21:23] Yeah, yeah. So, ooh, covers a large area. A discourse about the universal, right? A biographer, he's talking about one man, right? He may be a famous man, Napoleon or something, but

[21:41] very limited in one sentence. huh? To make fun of the historian, right? Aristotle says in the book of the Poetic Art, huh, that the tragedy and so on is more philosophical than history, right? Because it's more about universal.

[22:04] So you know, Paul VI just had a kind of a Hamlet, you'd say, right? Because in Hamlet you see a certain type of man, right? That's hesitant, to act, and he should act or something, right? Or sometimes they call somebody who's amorous or Romeo. He's a romeo. But you see something kind of universal, right? So they say that the poet presents universal, singularized, right? It's? Kind of a strange thing, right?

[22:33] It's universal This character, right? I thought he was a jealous man, right? He was a man whose buttons were getting pushed. Yeah. I was teaching California. There's some somebody's wife there who thought her husband was getting, you know. Kind of slack in his attention to her you know, so she started to flirt a little bit with other men, and some horrible things happened from this, right? you know, Because he thought, it was for real.

[23:04] You know, She was trying to arouse him a little. You know, it was a horrible story that happened in the newspapers. So, it makes sense with the great uh Albert the Great, huh? The Great, The Great. the Great He's known now as Albertus Magnus, yeah, Albert the Great. huh Uh the universal is the first thing you talk about in logic, right? First thing you talk about in the, you know, reason being about the a large discourse, right?

[23:41] But you can't entirely overlook huh, the natural road, huh? Even in logic, right? The natural road is the road from what? Senses. The Senses into reason, right? Now we call that the natural road because man is an animal that has reason, right? And every animal has senses, right? And what is generic in a thing like animal develops before what is specific huh, to a thing. So our knowledge begins with our senses, right?

[24:18] And goes into reason from our senses, huh? So the natural road in our knowledge, the road from the senses into what reason, huh? That's following the use of the word road, isn't it?

[24:38] Now this road, this natural road, is followed most of all in natural philosophy and natural science. So both Aristotle in ancient times and Albert Einstein in the twentieth century said that natural science begins and ends in the senses. You get your knowledge of the natural world from the senses, and when you form your universal ideas and your equations and so on, you test them by going back to the natural world and judge them by the senses.

[25:11] But even in logic, which is in some ways like logic, I mean, like the wisdom being about immaterial things, right? Even there, you can't avoid using the natural road. So I am more sensible when I say that the first thing to be considered in logic is name

[25:40] said of many things, yeah. Now the first two books, huh, that come down to us from the Greek, uh, philosophical and logical tradition are Aristotle's book called the Categories, right? And the Isagoge of what Porphyry, right? Which meant originally Isagoge, Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle, because Chrysaorius, some friend of his, said, "I can't understand the Categories. What do these words mean? Genus and difference and species and property or, you know, eidos and so on.

[26:30] What do these words mean?" So Isagoge, I mean, what's his name, Porphyry, wrote the Isagoge, Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle, to help out Chrysaorius right? But he has a magnificent proemium to his work, where he says it's necessary not only to understand the Categories, but to understand definition, and to understand division, and to understand demonstration. My God, this is very important, I suppose, you know? Now my colleagues are right now.

[27:06] Okay. But now Porphyry, I mean, uh, Albert the Great is a parafrasis, a paraphrase of the Isagoge, and in Latin it's called the Predicabilia, right? And then the Categories, you know, in Latin they call the Predicamenta right? And both Predicabilia and Predicamenta, they both are taken from the word for being said of in Latin. And the word Categories, I guess they say, comes from the Greek kategoria It means what accusation, right?

[27:48] So my friend Warren Murray says we could translate the, we could give the title of the Categories: The Ten Supreme Accusations. It's very striking, right, huh? But notice, when I accuse you. I have to accuse you of something. You're a murderer, or you're a thief, or embezzler, or whatever you are. You know, I got to say something of you. This is a very, very right word. when I read through the Gospels when they're attacking Christ, he had the word kategoria That's a great word, yeah.

[28:21] They accuse him of something, right? And this fits in now with what Thomas says, and I'm talking a little passage there in the in Metaphysics there, Thomas, where he says that natural philosophy proceeds by way of motion, per modum motus I think I had to take some of those things in there, but

[28:48] logic proceeds by way of predications. So in natural philosophy, everything is known through motion. Even nature is defined by motion. beginning and cause, motion, rest, and that which it is. as such and not by accident. But you know the nature of things by what they do, right? In logic, everything goes back to the way something is said of something, right?

[29:24] But being sensible again, right? The way a name is said of many things. And so they used to call the book of the Isagoge, the book of the five names. And the categories, the book of the what, ten names, yeah. But they kind of follow along the natural road there, right?

[29:52] Now, sometimes we distinguish names said of many things. Into two, and sometimes we do into three right away. But when we divide into two, we subdivide one of the two into two, so you get three in the case of number three. Because two is not enough. Three is the first number about which we say what.

[30:33] Now, a name said of many things can have just one meaning in mind when it's being said of these, right? It's saying exactly the same thing of all of them, right?

[30:55] Like the number is said of two, three, and four, right? It means a multitude composed of ones, a multitude measured by one. When animals are said of dog and cat, it's not bringing out the differences what they have in common, right? In quadrilateral, said of square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and trapezium, it's a figure containing four straight lines that's true of all of them, right?

[31:28] Now we use a Latin word here. It's being said what? Univocal name said of many things with the same meaning in mind when said of each of them, such a name is being said univocally right?

[31:58] Said univocally, right? Not very many words around that are univocal that have only one meaning. Or it's said of many things with what? Many meanings, yeah. Mind, huh? Not the same meaning when said of each. And then it's being said

[32:31] equivocal. Equivalently. Okay? So this is with one meaning, same meaning, right? The? Same meaning, or with one meaning said at each, right? Equivocally, it's said with what

[33:07] With many. Now, many here doesn't mean many as opposed to few. Many is opposed to one. So, if it has just two meanings, right? It's equivocal, right?

[33:30] An equivocal word is a word that has many meanings, right? But can a equivocal word be said univocally? Well, I under one of the meanings. Yeah, yeah. I could say an equivocal word if it has many meanings, a bunch of things having in mind just one meaning.

[34:07] So, equivocal word doesn't mean the same thing as said equivocally, does it? Yeah, because it has to do what you have in mind. Yeah, yeah. It's confusing. Yeah. Well, people have a hard time seeing it, but there's a distinction there.

[34:37] But now, the said equivocally can be divided into two: by chance and by reason. Okay. By chance, it just happened. You could say, right, that these things have the same name, right? So, I have a brother named Richard, my oldest brother. I have a student coming to my house. His name is Richard. When I worked part time in the package store, the manager was named Richard. Why did these three guys have the same name, Richard?

[35:29] Did someone see the three of them and say, "Well, they they've all got the same color or something," and we'll give them the same name to indicate that something? Just by chance. Now, was that the name

[35:47] Judas there, there, and one of the apostles? You know, is a good Yeah, yeah, yeah. Judas, not the Iscariot. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And then they call him Jude now, but you know, they don't want to call him Judas. He must be called Judas. The other guy is so famous, right? You know. So this is an example of a name equivocal by what? Chance. The

[36:15] name is equivocal by reason. There's some reason why the name is used for these these different ways. There's some connection, some order, as Shakespeare would say, right, before and after in those poems. And we have an example of that with the word logos, right? Where logos means first word. Then the thought that the word signifies has some connection to it too, right? And then reason that has thoughts, right?

[36:48] That produces thoughts, right? Brings forth thoughts, huh? We call sometimes the thought a concept, right? It's like the mind is conceiving, right? But yeah, that word is equivocal by what? Reason too, right?

[37:11] The concept of God is his son, right? I used to say to the people who support abortion, you know, that they can't be trusted to not be aborting the truth, because it's perfectly okay for them to abort the human being, so why wouldn't they not hesitate to abort the truth about what they're doing, right?

[37:37] Makes them in a difficult position, right? They support aborting the truth. I think they, they probably wouldn't care. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But they don't like to have you know that the woman see the baby, right? I was reading a review there of a book there, you know, of one of the people who worked for Planned Parenthood and left after he realized what they're doing, right? And someone had been coming in, they told these different stories, you know, of things, and someone coming in having a lot of abortions.

[38:11] Finally, she went to see the remains one time, you know. She, she went wild, you know, because, she realized what she had been doing, you know. I mean, there's arms, there's legs, the head there, you know. As I say, it's got the parts of human being. It's a human being, right? And this is terrible. Okay. Now, sometimes you'll find Thomas will divide a name said of many things into three, right?

[38:40] Okay. How do you do that, right? He said sometimes the meaning is entirely the same when said of these many, right? Some cases it's like entirely different, right? In some cases it's partly the same and partly different, and then the equivocal by reason is kind of in between the two, right? Okay. That makes a good sense too, doesn't it? Okay. I'm using divided into two and then subdivide this.

[39:18] So sometimes you'll see Thomas will use univocal for this here but here they'll use equivocal for this and then they use the word analogous for for this here, but here they'll use equivocal for this, and then they use the word analogous for for this, right?

[39:35] You got to be careful with that because the word analogous really has a sense of proportion, right? And proportion is only one way that a word becomes equivocal by reason. There are many other ways it becomes equivocal. People get kind of a a more narrow understanding of this than they need to have, right? Now, notice, then, you have an use of words where equivocal is used just for this here,

[40:20] and not for this. You have an example of a word equivocal by reason. The word equivocal becomes equivocal by reason. Now, what what way of being equivocal is that, right?

[40:38] Well, sometimes when a word is said univocally, right? Sometimes when a name is said univocally of two things, right? It is kept by one of them as its own name, and a new name is given to the other, right?

[41:09] What's an example of that? Em? Yeah, you say, what's a kitten? The kitten is a cat, and the puppy is a dog, right? You shouldn't call the kitten a puppy because the puppy's a dog. So, dog can be said a puppy and then the mature one, right? But sometimes he keeps the name dog as its own name, and you say it's only a puppy's not a dog yet because the fully grown dog has got the full what nature of a dog, right?

[41:46] Okay. We say a boy is a man and a girl is a woman, right? Okay. But then sometimes we distinguish the man against the boy, right? Okay. So there's all kinds of examples of that, huh? Okay. And and one way it takes place is that when one of the two has the common meaning of the two, perfectly, right? And the other has it imperfectly, right?

[42:14] Other cases, the one that keeps the name is the one that has nothing noteworthy. So sometimes we speak of we just we speak of wisdom and knowledge and we distinguish the two, right? But wisdom is a kind of knowledge too. So, but wisdom is an excellence in knowledge. It's a knowledge of of God, and therefore it gets a new name, right? And the rest of knowledge keeps the name, right?

[42:44] The ordinary name. So that's absolutely equivocal, right? The word's equivocal by what chance? All it is is what many meanings, right? And nothing, nothing in addition. But the word equivocal by reason, right? Has something extremely important, right? Namely, an order, a connection among the meanings, right? So it gets a new name sometimes, of analogous, right? And equivocal by chance keeps the name equivocal.

[43:24] But I like to be careful about that because I think the word analogous is like the Latin word proportional, right? What was the Greek word? And that's one way. But the word before, for example, right? There, the connection is one of what proportion, right? So if we go from the, like, say, the second meaning to the third meaning of before, this can be without that, but that cannot be without that.

[43:54] So this is before that in being, right? This can be known before that, but that can't be known without knowing this. It's a real proportion, right? This can be without that, but not vice versa. This can be known without that, but not vice versa. Okay. Well, there the word is being carried over by a what proportion? Proportion is very important in philosophy and in science, right?

[44:25] They say most scientific theories are what result from seeing proportion. It's very important in philosophy. One time the senior thesis, their senior philosophy course was making them forget, you know, take his. But Aristotle's use of proportion, right? You know, Aristotle says we have to know the first matter by what a proportion. The first matter is to man and dog, you and Habiba, right? Like clay is to sphere and cube.

[45:04] It's got to be known by proportion. Aristotle says in the first book, right? Because first matter is nothing actual, so you can't know it by itself, right? By itself, yeah, yeah. So proportion is very important, huh?

[45:25] Very important. So that's why you know, although analogous is kind of a word that even Thomases uses, right? I kind of hesitate sometimes and like to speak the name equivocal by what reason? Yeah. And it runs through philosophy, right? For example, they'll say,

[45:52] "Angel's mind is called an intellective summitum right? An understanding." Now our reason could be called an understanding too, but we don't understand very much and very well, very slow. We have to have a discourse in order to arrive a little bit of, you know, sheet understanding. So, you know, we have understanding of the whole sense, so we'll call the what, An angelic mind, understanding, intellectus. And we'll call us, who'll call us a reason, right?

[46:26] A darkened understanding that's what they call a reason, right? A darkened understanding. Most of what we understand, we have to reason out in some way or think out, right? Now, so we're really in really in a bad situation, right?

[46:55] My very first great teacher there, Kasurik said, you know, he was the wisest man at the College of Saint Thomas there, which is, and he said compared to Aristotle, he says I got the brain of an angleworm. Well, compared to an angel, right? Aristotle got the brain of an angle worm, right? compared to an angel my gosh. They're smart, you know. My guardian angels really smart, you know.

[47:21] Much more even talents, right? That's how I'm dead helping, that's why I prayed to Hamday help me, right? And understand more than I do, right?

[47:37] Now, anticipate a bit. The first two books in logic are the Book of the Five Names, right? Called the Isagoge by Porphyry. He actually gets the five names from Aristotle, the definitions of them, the explanation of Aristotle, but he brings it together, right? Okay. We sometimes bring things together; they're not, you know, laid alongside each other. You're not to help us.

[48:06] But there he's talking about five names. There are said of many things, but said univocally, right? When you get to the categories, right? Each category would be univocally of what is below it, but what's above the categories, right? Are said what equivocally by reason of the canon. Okay. So this is going to be necessary to understand as we get into those. schools a little bit Now let's go a little bit into the Isagoge, right?

[48:58] It's interesting now people now refer to Newton's great work. They call it the Principia. but that's not really the title of the book? It's Principia Mathematica Naturalis Philosophiae. Everybody's referring to it over and over again. In fact, the the great physicists of the 20th century they call the physics of the 20th century modern physics. The physics of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries they call it either classical physics or Newtonian physics.

[49:29] So he's the big shot, right? So rather than say Principia Mathematica Naturalis Philosophiae, they just call it the Principia. It is called. It's the first word, right?

[49:41] Well, the title of Porphy's book is the Isogogate of Categories, right? Because it responds to the question or the request, you might say, of Porphyry, right? Yeah, yeah. And but the Greek introduction is Isagoge right? Same etymology. as introduction. in Latin And uh in and leading in right, and so just just come down to us now with the name Isagoge.

[50:13] But these Greek, I mean these great philosophers, they're aware of Antonomasia, right? And Thomas says, well, you got to learn logic before the other parts of philosophy because it shows the way of using your reason in all the parts of philosophy. So the introduction to logic, which is the Isagoge, is the introduction, right? It's the introduction to the beginning of science, right? So it is by Antonomasia the Isagoge.

[50:41] What that's going to happen is after the the contracted to Conchidia and Isagoge. Now I mentioned how the the Greek philosophers called the Isagoge the book of the five names, right? And that's because he talks about five names, right? And these five names, to use kind of English words now for them, are genus, right, which is kind of Latin name, but in Greek it's also the same thing, genus, okay?

[51:23] V looks like a G, V. They're in genusa, difference, which again comes from Latin, right? But the Greek word is very similar, diaphora Okay, we use the word difference, huh? Then the word species, to use the Latin word, but the Greek word would be eidos, huh? Forget? The word ideas, but ideas doesn't quite get the same meaning. keeps quite the same meaning that eidos does.

[52:04] And then the word property, And then the word accident. Now the word accident will be used in the in the book called the Categories too, but doesn't have the same meaning. Not purely equivocal, not the same meaning. But Father De Lacy, there who taught the logic there at the college, he said he had despair if ever he used to recognize the difference between accident as one of the five, and they call them predicables in Latin right?

[52:53] It's an art of predicates. And accident, as opposed to substance, right? in the treatise on the predicaments or the categories. Okay I didn't wish to spare you before, before tonight, before you come down. Yeah. Okay. So what is the genus, right?

[53:36] Well, the first meaning of the word genus would be me, because from me there proceeds Paul and Maria and Marcus and so on, and then from Paul and Elizabeth, there proceeds about the ten, nine names. From Maria and Matt, there's ten that precede. You know, Christmas tree going out, right? In the Christmas party, they used to give you know what they call the tree of Porphyry, you know, to the magician, K.

[54:07] Talbot. But the Greeks talked about the Christmas tree like that, right? It descends. So the first meaning of genus, you know, the language might be one man from whom many have what descended. That's

[54:24] connected with the word generation, right? Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Genealogy. Yeah. Okay. When you go to genealogy, You start with one man, maybe, and you go down, and you know, tell some things.

[54:41] But then another meaning of the word genus is that multitude of people that descended from me. So we're my tribe. That's a different thing, isn't it? That's kind of interesting. Because you have one and many, both called a genus, right?

[55:09] And that's something like the universal, because it's something one, said of many. Not something one from whom many have what descended, right? Maybe maybe in Hegel a little bit. Right. We're not ready to expand just yet. Yeah. Hegel takes the most universal thought of our mind, the thought of being, right? He tries to deduce the whole universe from our most vague thought. When it actually came from, the one who said, "I am who am."

[55:45] right? It came from him. It didn't come from the general idea of being, right? But anyway. Okay. So genus is going to be a name, right? Said with one meaning, right? Of many things. It's going to be common to all of these, right? But now, what's specific to genus, right?

[56:19] It's a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, okay? In Latin they're called species, right? In Greek they're called eidos, right? Species is one of those weird words that has a same spelling as for the singular and the plural, right? But I, sometimes make this thing other in kind, right? It's not just different individuals, right? Okay. So the

[57:13] name said with one meaning of many things other in kind. Like the word quadrilateral, right? Said of the square and then the oblong, right? And then the rhombus, which is like a jerked square, right? And then the rhomboid, which is like a what? Jerked oblong, right? And they're all really parallelograms, you find out. Or a trapezium, which is irregular, you know, the four-sided where the the opposite sides and angles are not equal, right?

[57:43] Okay. They're other in kind, right? Okay. Or number is said of what? Odd number and what? Even number, right? One kind of number, right? Okay.

[57:59] But now a name has to signify something, right? Signifying what it is, okay? Now instead of each, right? Not to pretend the definition, but understanding. It's saying

[58:23] of each of these species, right? What it is. But now can it state completely what it is? If it has only one meaning. I'll

[58:40] take the example I was giving there. Quadrilateral is a genus said of square, oblong, rhombus, right? Rhomboid, right? You know, you know what these things are, right? This is more or less a square. This is an oblong. This is a what?

[59:05] Rhombus, and this is a what? A rhomboid, right? So it's like a jerk. And this is a, you know, what you call it? What?

[59:26] Yeah. These four later on you see are all parallelograms because the opposite sides and opposite angles are equal. Even here, so these two, these two examples. But this, you know, anything, you know. So in a way you can divide this into two, right? Parallelograms and trapezia right? Trapezium is a singular.

[59:53] So when you see the name quadrilateral, which of these, you say, what is this? In general, it's a quadrilateral. It's a plane figure contained by four straight lines. What is this? Why do you call this a quadrilateral? Because the plane figure contained by four straight lines is exactly the same, right? Why do you call this a quadrilateral? It's a plane figure contained by four straight lines, right? Okay.

[1:00:19] I know it doesn't answer the question completely. What is a square? Doesn't? It answers in in general. The genus in general are are connected there, right? You have the same two senses that you had in the Greek word genos right also one man from whom many descend? Or one man who commands many men, right? General Douglas MacArthur, right? He's not said of all his soldiers, right? But he's commanding them, right?

[1:00:55] He's in general cause, right? Okay. But the genus is something it is said of many, right? Okay. So soldier would be what? More like yeah. More like the genus. It's a name said with one meaning of many men, right? Not at one man who commands many, right? Okay. So name

[1:01:22] said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying what it is, but not in particular what it is, right? But in general. That's seen because it says one meaning, right? You can't bring out what the

[1:01:43] individual kinds, particular kinds are, right? Fully can't. Can only say general there. So genus is a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying what it is.

[1:02:00] Triangle is said of the what? Scamming triangle, isosceles triangle, equilateral triangle, right? In the same way, genus, right? It's said with one meaning, right? Of many figures other in kind, right? Signifying what it is. What is this? A triangle. You say that, right? Doesn't tell you fully what equilateral triangle is, right? Okay. Now sometimes, now, in that example there, we don't have a name for the species.

[1:02:40] What's the name of the equilateral triangle? I don't know the name. What do you? Square is the name. Equilateral and right angle quadrilateral is the name. Square. Okay. So sometimes you use a speech in place of the name, right? But it functions like the name, right? You don't have a name. Okay. Now take the genus number, right? Number is said of odd number and even number, right?

[1:03:13] Is it said of one meaning? Number, yeah, because number means a multitude composed of units or multitude measured by one, right? And that's true of an odd number and an even number. It doesn't tell you in particular what distinguishes the odd number from the even number, but it tells you in general what it is, right?

[1:03:44] But the odd number and even number differ in kind, right? Habit is said of what? For the ethics now, for example, we take mathematical examples because mathematics is what more proportionate to our mind, right? And Brother Marcus one time with the class, he had, he was supposed to teach them some geometry and some logic. So what's the thing he did first? Geometry, right? He used geometry to exemplify definition and other things he talked about and syllogisms and so on, right?

[1:04:26] Good idea, right? Okay. So that's why we begin with mathematics examples, right? Now you go to say the ethics, right? Virtue is a genus. I mean, habit is a genus said of what? Virtue and vices. Now there are other kinds. You don't know that. He shouldn't know that. Behold. So it's a

[1:04:55] name said of one meaning, right? Which is firm disposition, right? Habit is a strong disposition, right? Firm, stable disposition, right? And a virtue is that, and a vice is that, right? Vices are unstable, is the

[1:05:19] virtue, right? So yeah. So just as quadrilateral is a genus of these four kinds, right? Or of the parallelogram and the trapezium, right? So habit is the genus of what? Yeah. And again, you see how logic can be useful for ethics, right? And for geometry and for what? Mathematics, right? Okay. Government, right? Aristotle divides government into about what? Was it rule? Use the rule of two or three, right?

[1:06:01] Because there are three kinds of government. And then what multiplied with two kind government, is good and bad government, and is ruled by one man, by a few, or by what the many, right? Okay. So you have you know monarchy and tyranny, you got aristocracy and oligarchy, and you have republic and democracy. So majority working for our forefathers, right? It was really a beautiful thing of I bought this book just recently in the bookstore there, and it's got the Constitution in it at the end of the book, right?

[1:06:43] But it's got all the things they got to, right? All the main things, and he had one thing here from Benjamin Franklin there talking about you want to come to America, this is what to expect, right? And he's destroying the false images that they have of what America is going to be like, right? What's good about America and what you can do to get ahead and so on, right?

[1:07:06] Okay. Then there was the As we had thinking there, the was it 178 something like that, the Congress was giving out an open letter to the American people, right? Really beautiful thing, you know. They had to finish the war, you know, finish up, finish our and so on. Really beautiful, beautiful, beautiful argument. I say democracy is a majority of the word in some ways, you know. What does Alexander Hamilton?

[1:07:37] People serve as a feast. Okay. So government there is a genus, right? He said good and bad government, ruled by the one, the few, and the what the many, yeah. Okay. So it runs into all the sciences, right? Logic will meet syllogism as a genus of the what demonstration necessary, syllogism. I mean the one that we know with certitude, and then dialectical syllogism, right? Okay, two different species of syllogism.

[1:08:16] Okay. Our statement is said of what affirmation and negation, right? Okay. They're both a statement, right? Okay. So it runs through all the sciences, right? And you say, hey, that's going to be useful for all the sciences, right?

[1:08:41] Okay.