Logic (2016)
4. Ante-Predicaments I: Highest Genera, Being as a Name for Everything, and Equivocal, Univocal and Derived Names
Class of 2016-10-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/004-ante-predicaments-i-highest-genera-being-as-a-name-for-everything/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment. Help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen, praise. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:29] I was thinking of my guardian angel, in the chapel over there, and right away, and I left the church. I didn't even thought right. I think I'll. Eventually, communicate to you, but appropriate time, you know.

[0:43] About time to give you some help, you know. Found in my edition here, the old one here from the Dominicans. It's beautiful, but it's one of the Easter thing, you know. And this guy here is looking over the regular thing or casket we can call it and he seems like he's scratching his head. You know, where is he? Where is he? Yeah, I don't know how how historically authentic that is, but you know, because it was not really above ground, little artist freedom there, but.

[1:22] And he says, "why do you seek the living one among the dead?" That's what the angel says, I guess, huh? So now, you've been studying the categories,

[1:38] and is the categories divided into two or three? One or the other. Yeah, the the great guys that covered the great and so on, huh? Thomas and so on. They divided into three parts, right? And using the Latin word for categories, right, the predicaments, right? They call them the anti predicaments, and then the predicaments, we take each of them, and then the post predicaments, right? Now it's a little bit easier to see the reason for the anti-predicaments than the reason for the post predicaments.

[2:24] We'll talk about that when we get there. Okay. So in the predicaments, you're talking about the ten categories, and especially the most important ones: substance and how much, and how quality, and towards something gradation. But you have something to say about the last six too, huh? And

[2:49] these are preparing the way for that, right? The ante predicaments, huh? We'll see. Okay. Now, going back from what is a transition here from the the Isagoge right to the categories.

[3:08] We raised a question right, which led to a great discovery. Why does Porphyry and Aristotle, for that matter, define genus and difference by what they're said of, right?

[3:25] By what is below them in the way we represent these things. Why defines species or eidos forms with respect to what is above it, right? Towards the what genus above it, right? Why doesn't he define species by what is below it?

[3:49] Remember the solution to that. Because it's ambiguous. Because species can be a change. Yeah, below below species there might be only individuals. If it is what we call lowest species, huh? Like if man is a lowest species, right?

[4:10] Set of individual men or circle, even more clearly a lowest species, right? Set of individual circles. But if the species is not that low, it can have what species below it. So what is it to what is below it? Genus. In that case, right? So it's ambiguous to say, right? Okay. So Aristotle and Porphyry they define species by what what is above it. It's the name of a particular kind of thing placed under a genus, right?

[4:51] And of which the genus is said in answer to the question, what is it, huh? Okay. So if I divided habit into virtue and vice, they are species of habit, good and bad habits. But virtue itself is got what species below it, right? Courage and temperance and justice and so on, right?

[5:19] Now if you're a just man and I'm a just man and you're a just man and you're a just man, then maybe that's only individuals below it, right? Okay.

[5:33] But notice that leads us to now another thing to be seen, and that is that the same thing, like virtue in this example, right, or vice for that matter, um, the same thing can be both a genus and a what species. Now, does that mean that the distinction is not good?

[6:00] Well, then you have to say that father and son—that distinction doesn't make any sense, right? Because the same man can be a father and a son, can't he?

[6:11] You're looking at a father and a son here, but not towards the same what? So something can be a species with respect to genus above it, right? And be a genus with respect to what is below it. And there are the examples of that, right? You know, distinction that runs through our life is a distinction of whole and part.

[6:41] That a good distinction? You ate the whole pie. You're a pig. Okay. Um, I only want a part of your money, right? But it's not a whole and a part towards the same thing, right? So New England is a whole in comparison to Massachusetts. Massachusetts is only a part of New England, right?

[7:22] But New England is a part of the United States. When I was a little boy, I used to think, you know, I'm going to give my address, seventy-six-nine Stanford, right? Saint Paul, Ramsey County, Minnesota, Midwest, United States, North America, all the way to find the universe, right? Because of my astronomical things, right? Long story, right now. But these can be what part of and a whole with respect to something else, right?

[8:00] Even cause and effect, right? Can something be both a cause and effect, but not of the same thing, right? So what kind of question does all these examples give rise to, right?

[8:19] Was every cause an effect, and every effect a cause, right? Or as you look before and after, this is a good example. Looking before and after, right? Because the cause is before the effect. If you keep on looking before, right, with causes that are also effects of something before them, right, this go on forever. See, I'm rereading the the fourteen books of wisdom there, Thomas's exposition of them in Aristotle's Greek there, and I'm in the eleventh book now, right?

[8:51] And in the middle of the twelfth book, I'm going to find out what the first cause is. So I've been wondering what the first cause is. I'm really, you know, excited about this thing. You know, huh? Maybe another week or so, I'll be in there finding out what the first cause is. Kind of satisfy my desire to know causes, right? Okay. Makes sense. Okay.

[9:16] I mentioned how I used to talk to students. You know how the two main developments in the physics of the 20th century, relativity theories, right, and quantum theory. The one eventually led to a development of cosmology, right? And they're looking to see if there is a hole that is not a what part. If the universe went on forever, every hole would be a part of something greater, right?

[9:48] But if the universe, like Aristotle thought, was what finite, right? Then there's a hole that is not a what part, huh? Einstein came to the conclusion, right, in the general theory of relativity, and the cosmology came from that, right, that the universe is in fact finite. And Aristotle was right. That's a great question, right? But then at the other end, the students of elementary particles, right, the students of quantum theory, were studying elementary particles and going in the direction of the what?

[10:24] Part. And is every part have a sort of hole in respect to something else, right? See. Well, the Greeks thought that the elements were earth, air, fire, and water, right? But we discovered that water may be in some ways made up of hydrogen, oxygen, right? So hydrogen is a part of of water, hydrogen, right? It's named that way from its role, right? But is hydrogen a whole too?

[10:58] Something smaller? Yeah, like an electron and a proton, right? I guess hydrogen is pretty low as far as the number of hydrogen's, I mean, protons or electrons it has. But now does that go on forever? See, or Heisenberg says I don't. I never thought this could go on forever. See, that's a profound question, right? Huh?

[11:26] So in the two main developments of the physics of the 20th century, out of one of them they eventually went looking for a hole that is not a part, right? And the other they went looking for a part that is not a whole, right? Okay.

[11:44] So we could ask the same thing with father and son, right? I read somewhere that a guy named Adam was the first father, right? Who's not a son. This makes sense. Yeah. Called the son of God, but that's he's the word equivocal now, right? Huh? Okay.

[12:07] And I know sons who are not fathers, right? Okay. Sometimes they don't know whether they are or not, right? The Kasurik guy used to wander around the city there, looking at the little orphans you know, and see if anybody looked like him. He may have been one time a little bit guilty things would make him wonder there. He's got his little son there running around, being neglected there in the city, huh?

[12:37] So. But there are some sons who are not fathers, right? Okay. So more the question there is, is there a father who's not a son?

[12:51] Okay. So we could ask this question about genus and species, huh? There's clearly something that is both a genus and a species, but does every what? Species of a genus. And every And vice versa, yeah. Now it's kind of a question for the particular sciences to say whether we've come to a lowest species. And so I gave the example from geometry that a circle seems to be a figure that's what,

[13:25] yeah. To do different circles have a different shape. It seems not. It seems just they're individuals, right? They have the same exact shape, right? Maybe one circle could be bigger than another, right? That's more a difference in size than in the figure, right?

[13:47] Now maybe an equilateral triangle is like that, but maybe not isosceles. There's more shaped isosceles triangles, right? So that's a question for the geometry to answer. But there are lowest species like circle, right? Okay.

[14:06] Is dog a lowest species, or are there different kinds of dogs, right? You know, it kind of tough question. That's the question for the biologist, the zoologist in this case. The answer isn't it? Okay. But in the categories now, we're looking in the other direction, right? Does every genus have a genus above it? Is every genus a species with respect to something higher than it, right?

[14:37] Now, Aristotle thought out that no, not every genus has a what genus above it. Not every genus is a species with respect to it. But that there must be a highest genus or highest genera. Okay.

[15:04] Now, what would be a reason for thinking, like Aristotle thought, that there is either a highest genus of all things, or a number of highest genera of things? What would lead him to think that, and what would lead us to think it? Huh?

[15:33] Well, a genus is said of more than a what species, right? So if every genus had a genus above it, it'd always be a name said of more things than any given name.

[16:00] Does not follow necessarily. It always be a name said of more things than any given name. But there are names said of what of everything, right?

[16:28] Now they have a terrible name for these names in philosophy. You hear it the transcendentals. because they transcend the highest genera, right? But I call them the set of alls.

[16:45] I'm a nice concrete guy, right? The set of alls, right? There's about six of them. And Thomas, when he talks about truth, there in the *De Trinitate*, I mean, yeah, *De Trinitate*, not the *De Trinitate*. The very taught, yeah, yeah. These guys talking, explain something about them, right? Aristotle talks about goodness being in all the genera, right, in the categories and so on. But basically, the word "what being" right is a name said of all.

[17:32] If you ask this question, can there be something that is not a being? Being means what is, right? And can be said of anything that is in any way whatsoever. So, can there be something that is not a being? No.

[17:53] So here you come to a name that is said of all, right? A most universal name, right? So names don't keep on getting more and more universal forever, right?

[18:10] Now the fact that there is one name said of all, maybe more than one name, but there's at least one name said of all, is that enough to conclude that there's one genus of all things? There's one highest genus that covers everything and answers. Okay. If you go back to the definition of genus, right? Five parts to it, right? It's a name said of many things, other in kind, right?

[18:50] Signifying, right? What did he about? Signifying. What it is, right? What's a name said with one meaning of many things, other in kind, signifying what it is, what each is, right? Okay.

[19:16] Remember that definition, right? Okay. Being more explicit now than Porphyry, right? Huh? He said to Monsignor Dion one time, you know, Porphyry should have explained he was talking about five names said with one meaning of many things. He agreed that he should have done so. So,

[19:42] if being is said with one meaning, right, of many things, which it's only said of, right, other in kind, right, okay, signifying what it is, maybe to being something. Same thing would be the word something, right? But is it said with one meaning of all things, right? If it's not, then we would conclude that there must be a number of highest genus, right? There can't be just one, right?

[20:17] Okay. Okay. But we first conclude that there's either one highest genus or many highest genus, right? And we do so by the fact that there is a name said of all. That means that names don't get more universal at infinity to them, right? Because you can't be more universal than said of all.

[20:55] Aristotle shows, huh, a number of places in the fourteen books of wisdom, that the word being is not said with what one meaning of all things, huh?

[21:11] There's many ways to what see that, right, huh? How many are coming? Well, we're going to make dinner for people. How many are coming? You say, well, two are coming, right? Who are they? Who are these two that are coming?

[21:46] Well, Duane Berquist and the shape of Duane Berquist are coming for dinner. Now, is Duane Berquist and Father Michael one thing or two things? What'd you say? We tend to say two? Yeah. Right. He's something. I'm something. Right. Oh, you're something. I'm something else. You are something else. yeah. Okay. But now, is Duane Berquist and the shape of Duane Berquist one thing or two things?

[22:26] Or is Duane Berquist and the health of Duane Berquist the same thing? Doesn't seem to be No. But is Duane Berquist and the health of Duane Berquist two things, like Berquist and Father Michael?

[22:49] So you know, you might say Berquist is really one thing. Well, but in some sense, there's two things there, right? Berquist and his health, right? Or Berquist and his knowledge, right? Or Berquist and his size, right? I get these 19 grandchildren, right? And their size is always. Their height and so on, right? Huh? You know, some of them are getting taller than their mother, who's not particularly tall.

[23:19] You know. But it's still Sophia or still Cecilia or wherever it might be, right? Um. So you can see that the word "being" is not said with what one meaning, huh? Okay. If you leave this room today, you will cease to be.

[23:44] Okay. Now, if they bring me into court for threatening people, right? I'd say all I meant was, Your Honor, that he would cease to be in the room. No one would understand that, Mr. Berquist, and he said he would cease to be. So understanding the word "cease to be" there to mean not just substantial life, right? Yeah.

[24:09] So to walk out of this room is not to cease to be, is it? Except in some particular sense, right? Okay. Now, another way that Aristotle shows that being can't be a genus, huh? Is the genus in the definition of the difference?

[24:39] No, then you'd be putting the genus in twice in the definition, wouldn't you? Okay. But can there be a difference that that isn't? No, being has to be part of the understanding of everything, right? But a genus can't be part of the definition of the difference, can it? No. So being can't be a genus said of all things, huh? And therefore, Aristotle rightly concluded that there must be many highest genera, right?

[25:21] Now, Aristotle later on in his *antepredicamenta* will enumerate the highest genera, right? Exemplify them, right? But in a text that we'll look at next time, right? Or a couple of texts of Thomas. Thomas, following the rule of two or three, right, distinguishes these highest genera. Okay. But we'll see that we get to to that point, right? Okay. At this point, it's clear that those names like, uh, being or a name like something, right, are not said univocally with one meaning of all things, huh?

[26:02] Okay. I'm something in a way that my shape is not, right? Or my health? Or my being seated, right? It's a very strange kind of something, isn't it? Being seated is something, is that? We have a chair, don't we? You're seated, you know. Is that something like like I am? No, I'm doing the sitting, right? The sitting isn't sitting down, is it? Huh? I don't think so.

[26:32] But I'm sitting down, right? I'm the fundamental something, right? And that sitting down is just kind of a, you know, kind of a minor thing, something compared to me, right? See? Not said of me and my sitting down the same way, is it? We're both something in the same way. No, no. Now another way of seeing that there must be highest genus, right, huh? If every genus had a genus above it, right?

[27:05] How many genera would you have to know to know anything? There'd be no end to them, right? So could you know what anything is?

[27:23] No. You couldn't begin to know what anything is, right? Because there's always something you have to know before that, before you can know that.

[27:34] You'd know nothing, right, to start with, right? Before you could know this. Yeah, yeah. It's like we were saying before about statements, right? Suppose someone says that every statement must be known through other statements, huh? Every statement, you got to reason out. I want a reason for every statement you make.

[28:01] Well, every statement is known through other statements. Would any statement be known? No. Having known statement A to at least statement B, right? And statement B through statement C, and statement C through D. If I didn't know D, I wouldn't know C or B or A. But I couldn't know D until I knew E first. I couldn't, you know. I have to know infinity of statements before I know any statement, right?

[28:30] I couldn't begin to know any statements, right? Because any statement I tried to use to prove something, say, prove that before you use it. And then whatever I tried to use to prove that, prove those before you use them, and so on, right? It would go on forever. So if every statement was known only through other statements, even that statement that you just made, every statement is known through other statements, wouldn't even be known.

[28:55] So you can't possibly know that every statement is known through other statements. Well, it's impossible for any statement to be known if that were so, right?

[29:08] It's the same with definition, right? So if every part of every definition was in need of definition, you can never define anything. But a definition is by genus and differences, right? So if every genus had a genus, there'd always be a definition before you could use it to define anything. Couldn't begin to define anything, could you?

[29:36] So do we know what some things are by definition? Yeah. So it must not be true then that every what genus has a genus, right? Okay.

[29:55] Just like it's true, there must be some statements known through themselves, right, and not through other. Statements. So there must therefore be a highest genus or a number, many highest genera.

[30:14] Aristotle thought that out, and I just got to think out what the highest genera are, right? But the reason why there can't be one highest genus is because those names said of all are not said with one meaning of all.

[30:45] Okay. So look at Aristotle's beginning here now, the categories, huh? In the Greek, he says, "Homonuma," right? Things named what? Equivocally, right? It's one word in Greek. Homonyma are said of which the name only is what common, right?

[31:16] The logos, the meaning, right? According to the name, right? Of the of what it is is heteros, other, other, right? And he gives an example of that as the name zoon, animal. So you get the word zoology, you know. Zoon is said of a man and of the what painting of the man or the statue of the man, right? Painting of the man, I guess, in the here it's written.

[31:47] Okay, grammar. So when our friend, who was the Frenchman that was served as a general in our army, huh? In fact, that college named after him here, Lafayette. Lafayette. Yeah. And Lafayette and Washington became very good friends, huh? We have some of the letters between them and so on, right? Well, Lafayette eventually went back to France and got a little trouble with the French Revolution, so on.

[32:20] But eventually he came back to America, right after Washington had died, right? And he'd see these statues of what Washington here and there, right? And that that that's not really Washington, you know, because he was, you know, yeah. Then he got to the statue of Washington, which I guess is down now in Virginia State Assembly, something, some right down there. There it is. That's Washington. Okay. When he's pointing to the statue, that's Washington, right?

[32:51] Is that Washington in the same sense in which the man he knew was Washington? Is that flesh and blood and bones and? Yeah. So that's an example of a name that is what equivocal, right? Okay.

[33:09] Now, why is Aristotle talking about a name that's equivocal? Isn't that purely equivocal, is it? See, it's got a reason for it, right? But the names that will be said of all the highest genera, like the word "being," right, will be a name of the sort that's equivocal, right? But equivocal by what reason? Huh?

[33:36] Now, I said I stopped off at the chapel there, and I said little prayer to my guardian angel. So when I get out, he put a thought in my mind, right? He said, "Look, Dwayne," he said, "um, if a name is equivocal by chance, how many things do you think it'd be said of?

[34:01] Everything? No. I kid this guy who comes to my house on Tuesday night, you know, from seven to nine. His name is Richard, right? I say, well, Richard, gee, that was the name of my oldest brother, right? And was the name of my maternal grandfather, I guess, was Richard. And I worked in the package store part time once, and the manager's name was Richard. Why are you guys all called Richard?

[34:34] Somebody line you up and say, hey, these guys all got a same shaped nose, so we'll call them Richard or something like that. No, just by chance, right? That this student and my brother Richard have the same name, right? But would the name Richard be extended to everybody in the universe? See, if a name is equivocal by chance, it just happens, but it happens all the time.

[35:00] Everybody gets that name. Everything gets that name. No, no. But if a name is said of all, my guardian angel said, right? Must be a reason. There must be some connection among the meanings, right? It must be a name equivocal by what reason? Yeah, yeah. Aristotle is talking a bit about the kind of name, right, that's going to be said even of the highest genera. It's going to be equivocal, right?

[35:33] Maybe equivocal by reason rather than by by chance, right? Okay. Very orderly this guy Aristotle, you know. Okay. Then what does he talk about next? Huh?

[35:48] Well, finish the the thing there. If one is to give what each of these is to be an animal, right? He would give what?

[36:05] The one would be property of each one, right? Okay. Okay. Now the second thing he says, sunonuma, right? In the Greek, right? I know she had to translate that things are univocally named, right? But synonyma is one word in Greek, so we'll forgive him that, and it's okay. Which the name is common, and the what? Yeah, the sias, huh? According to the name, the logos. The Greek actually says the what?

[36:38] The according to the name, kata tounoma the name, the logos, right? the thought of something, tes ousias, meaning of what it is, right? Is the same, right? Huh? And he gives example as zoon, which means animal, said of man and what? Boos, which means ox, I guess, right? Okay. For animals, said of dog and cat, right?

[37:12] For man and the ox are called by common name zoon, animal, right? Okay. Interesting. I guess the Greek word for animal zoon comes from the Greek word for life, huh? Because although there's life in the plants, it's kind of hidden, but the animal, you know, jumps around and it's obviously sensing things, right? Huh? Okay.

[37:41] So he said, but why the Latin word for animal comes from what? Anima. Yeah. It's interesting to see. So those two words mean the same, but the etymology is what? Yeah. The one is named from soul, the other from life, right? Well, soul names the source of life in a living body, right? Huh? So the similarity in the etymology, but two different, right? But both soul and living are used now to name the animal, right?

[38:16] Because life is manifest there in him, and it's hidden in the in the. Yeah. That's Eve's name in Greek, subtritus Zoe. Yeah. Well, I know my my teacher in graduate school there, my second grand teacher, right, the the Charles DeConick, his wife is named Zoe. Yeah. Because his name that's translating from the Hebrew, it was Hayyavah.

[38:42] That's her name. Was that's where you get the Latin Ava, so that's spelled A. Yeah. Hey, twelve children, so that's good. He was on the thing, you know, my birth there in the Second Vatican Council, so a fairytale. It's a joke, you know. He's

[39:08] so they're called by a common name, right? Huh? But also the logos of, ho logos tes ousias is. actually, used that phrase a lot now. The thought of what it is, right, is autos, huh? The same, huh? Okay. So we get the word automobile, right? From autos, self-moving, right? You know, you see the farmers on the first self-car. You know, they looked at the hood, looking for the horse, right?

[39:35] And there, or the animal is pulling the damn thing. Where is it? What's going to happen? Is that right? But automobile means what? Self, self-moving. Yeah. See, yeah. If you're being pulled by a horse, the carriage is not an automobile. It was being moved by the horse, right? Petromobile. Yeah, yeah.

[40:08] For if one was to give the logos for each of them, well, what it is for each of them to be a a what animal, one would give the same logos, right? The same meaning, right? Okay. Now, this is the way the highest genera will be said of what are below them, right? Aristotle's proceeding in beautiful order, right? Names that are said of the highest genera will be said what equivocally.

[40:36] More precise, you can say equivocally by reason, right? But the genera themselves, the highest genera, will be because they're genera, they're said with one meaning. They're said univocally of their what species, huh? And this will be too down the road, I mean down down the the file. Okay. Now, what does he give the third thing here for though? Okay. The Greek word is what paronyma, right? Huh?

[41:06] Okay. Now, how should one translate that? They direct this guy translates derivatively. Paronuma, yeah, yeah. In Latin, they'll use the term denomination, huh? Denomination, right? Okay. Yeah. Yeah. But it's a name that is taken from the name, right? Huh? Okay. Now, why is he introducing this? He doesn't define it too precisely here, but he says paronuma, right? And I think the best thing is to take Latin word denomination, right?

[41:47] They don't like the word derivatively, but it is derived from another thing. But from something, but differing in what ending, right? A tose, right? Huh? Okay.

[42:04] The common name, huh? Common name, the other naming, as grammatic grammatical from what grammar we'd say, right? Huh? And from what? now they say hero and heroes, but I think the Greek word is courage, right? and courageous, right? See. So now you're thinking of the fact that not only are the words said equivocally, right, of everything, equivocally by reason of everything, and therefore said of the ten highest genera turn out to be what of the many highest genera, right?

[42:46] But then within each what genus, the name is said univocally of what's below, right? Well, how about taking something from the later genera and saying it of the first one, which is the substance. See.

[43:06] Now, if you take me, what am I? I am a man, right? I am an animal, a living body, a body, substance, right? And then you take something like my health or my knowledge of geometry, right? Now, would you say that Brookwest is health? Do you say health or Brookwest? You say Brookwest is geometry? No. But you could say something that because health is in my body, I guess it is more or less.

[43:45] And geometry is in my mind, right? You can say something of me with a name derived from this, right? You might say Brookwest is something of a geometer, right? Or Brookwest is what healthy, right?

[44:04] You see that? Notice how thorough Aristotle is, right? What is said of the highest genus, right? Then the way the highest genera are said of what's immediately under them, right? And then how something in one genus can even be said denominatively, right? Of something another genus, right?

[44:30] So I'm more in the genus of substance, and my health or my knowledge may be over in the genus of quality or how, right?

[44:44] Well, the name of a species of quality like geometry or courage, right? Or temperance or something, right? These cannot be said of me, Duane Brookwest, except denominatively, right? So I'm said to be temperate if I am, right? Or courageous if I am, right?

[45:12] So it's said of the genus by something under. It's said of something something in a different highest genus, right? It's said of the fundamental highest genus, substance, denominatively, right? It's not said as the species would be geometry, right? Species of virtue might be courage, right? It might be what justice, right? But you wouldn't say I am justice. You might say I am just, though, right? If I am, right?

[45:48] To say I'm justice is to say I have justice, right? I have the virtue of justice, not that I am the virtue justice, right? It'd be kind of figurative speech if I said Euclid is geometry. Aristotle is philosophy. Mozart is music, right? No, Mozart is a musician, right? He's not music, is he?

[46:17] Is Mary holiness, Or you call her holy? Right, you know, named right from that. It's kind of kind of interesting why she says I am the immaculate conception, right? Why does he say that, right? I say there's a reason why she's saying that. Special reason why she's saying that, right?

[46:45] But notice these denominative words. You could also translate as I have this, right? I am not the knowledge of triangles and squares and circles. Am I? Is that what I am? I am the knowledge. You said we are this complement. Yeah. Yeah. You could say I have

[47:16] because there is knowledge of triangles and squares in me, right? And it can't be taken out of me and put over here, next to me, right? It exists only in me. But I can't be said to be that because I am I'm a man. I'm not knowledge. But I have the knowledge, right? Huh? And therefore, you might give me a name derived from this, huh? Am I logic, huh?

[47:42] The students might say that you know. They wouldn't say that. Yeah, he's logic. Yeah, yeah, but no, you'd say something denominated from logic, right? Huh? But I mean a different ending, right? You'd say Berquist is a logician, right? Which means that he has some of this knowledge called logic in himself, right? Berquist is not. Even I'm very healthy, right?

[48:11] As soon as the doctor said I'm very healthy, and at least for my age, so I say, okay, he didn't say I'm healthy himself, but he wanted to be kind of figurative, you know.

[48:24] Hillary is deception. She's a lie. But properly, you should say she's a liar, right? Okay. Okay. Possesses many. Okay. So you see what he's doing in the first chapter there, right? Most all he's going through words, right? Because he's following the natural road, right? Even in logic, right? Oh, logic is a very abstract science. In many ways, it has the greatest difficulty. Thomas says, right, because of that.

[49:05] But even there, you bring out the fact that hey. We're going to be talking about the categories, the highest genera, right? And there are names set of all of them, right? But there are said of them, what equivocally or more precisely equivocally, or more precisely, equivocally by reason, right? But the example kind of shows that, right? Okay.

[49:28] Okay. Just like in the senses of before, there, you know, you get to the third sense, and Aristotle seems to be saying that the third sense is order. Well, no, he got the examples he gives there, right? Because he's talking about the order in the discourse of reason, the order in our knowledge, right? Okay. So, talk about the names that are set of all. Then each highest genus is said of what is below it, univocally.

[49:57] That's the second thing he talks about. Now, how about something in one? Being said about something in another. At first, it might seem you know, well, how can you do that? You know, because Berquist is not geometry. See, Berquist is not justice, right? But maybe he what has some justice, right? Maybe he has some knowledge, right? So we'll call him a what denominatively, right? Not geometry, but a geometer, right?

[50:26] We'll call him healthy and not health itself, right? If I was health itself, I could never be sick. No one else would be healthy. Yeah, yeah. But now she used the word have there, right? Huh? If you wanted to make it, you know, a speech, right? I have health, right? I have knowledge, right? huh?

[50:58] Call the one Grandchild, Her name is Grace. I call her the graceful one. But graceful means what? It's denominative from grace, right? Yeah. Holy from holiness, right? Yeah. Now the word have will be one of the post predicaments huh.

[51:22] It's kind of interesting how much the word have appears in logic, right? We might say that a thing has a name sometimes. Sometimes the thing doesn't have a name, right? Let me give it a name, right?

[51:42] You give me a book, I have a book. You give a thing a name, it has a name, right? Okay. Sometimes the thing has a definition, right? Okay.

[51:57] Does a genus have species? Yeah. Does a species have a genus? Well, when you say a genus has a species, when you say a species has a genus, does have mean the same thing? I don't think so No. Now, in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle says that have seems to have as many meanings as the word in.

[52:30] So we go back to those eight senses of in, right? You could distinguish senses of have corresponding to them, right? And that would just be the beginning, right? You know.

[52:45] Um. The substance have accidents. Things that are not substance itself, but exist in substance in some way. See. I have you in my power. So you see how the connection there between have and in—they're very, very important words.

[53:21] So you see, a genus has species, and a species has a genus, right? That corresponds to two different senses of in, right? The what was the third sense of in? Is it genus and species? Yeah. Now what's the fourth sense of in?

[53:49] Whole and part No I don't know No The First sense of in is in a room in a place, right? Second one is part in a whole, right? My teeth are in my mouth, right? Okay, it's a bit like being in a place, right? Except my teeth are really, you know, they don't come out at night. So then they're in my then yeah, so really a part of my mouth, right?

[54:13] Okay. Um, I guess my grandma had false teeth finally, in all so in those days. that's the second sense of in, right? Third sense of in is a genus in the what species? And the fourth sense is reversed: the species in the genus, and then form in matter, and so on, right? Okay. So there's many senses of have, right? So corresponding to a genus in the species is what the species has a genus.

[54:53] Corresponding to species and genus would be that the what? The genus has species. Right. That's amazing. You see these words, right? Um, if I say the wood has a shape, and the the the marble has a shape, right? That corresponds to the fifth sense of in, form in matter, right?

[55:28] Sixth sense of whole and part is what the whole is in its what parts, right? Like that. Then you get into the other kind of ability, active ability. I have you in my power right now. Notice that, right? You are in my power. I have you now.

[55:51] Please catch up with you, right? We have you now. It's over. But I also have what a car. I have a house. I have books and so on. I have some money. Does that same sense of have, when they say that I have some knowledge, I have some health.

[56:24] So this word "have" runs all around logic and every other science of that matter, right? But it occurs up in the post predicaments, right? You know, just like the word "before," right?

[56:39] Genus comes before the species, right? But substance, in another sense, comes before accident, right? Okay. Maybe the thought comes before the word, signifies it, right? In definition, the genus comes before the difference. See, so here you got some understanding of what I am saying.

[57:05] Okay, it's kind of marvelous the brevity of Aristotle, right? But how perfectly ordered it is, right? Starting above, and then the genera, and then sideways, right? Denomination.

[57:26] Now you see, there is some distinction between the haver and the had said to have something, there is some distinction, right? The genus has species. There is some distinction between the genus and the species. The species has the genus. There is some distinction between them. If I have a house, there is some distinction between the house. Even if I have health, there is some distinction between me and what health, yeah.

[57:56] Some composition in me, right? Now, sometimes God is said to have something, right? Say God has mercy on us, right? God has mercy as a virtue, mercy. But is the haver and the had there are two different things? So in this one sense, every name they say is what my way of expressing is inadequate to God, right? Okay.

[58:32] If someone says to me, "Does God have knowledge of me?" I would say yes, right? Who would want to deny that? But then, is there a real distinction between God and His what? Yeah, that's only in our way of speaking, because we have the way of speaking that's appropriate to creatures, right? So sometimes we say about God that God is whatever He has. That's not me. I am not my house.

[59:05] I'm not my car. I'm not even my health. I'm not even my knowledge of logic. Am I? You know, Christ says, you know, I am the way. That's his man, right? And then is God the truth and the life, right?

[59:26] There's no difference between God and His what? Life, right? And God and truth, huh? You know, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and in both Summas, in fact, when he takes up God being good, right? The first thing he shows that God is good, right? And the second thing is that God is goodness itself, right? Okay.

[59:54] You see, for us, goodness signifies not what is good, but that by which it Is good. Yeah, we want to say both about God that He's good,

[1:00:08] but He is goodness itself. He's also that by which He is what good, huh? Why, and that's not the same thing, right? If I'm good, it's I've got some virtue, or I've got grace or something, right? You know. So my goodness is something I have, not what I am. God is goodness itself, right?

[1:00:32] So nothing can be good unless it's like God in some way, right? Because He's goodness itself, unless it partakes, right? Some way of God's goodness.

[1:00:44] But you realize, kind of, you know, our mind is kind of. Some of the church fathers said stuttering. You know, the mind stutters and it speaks of God, right? Huh? So Thomas says a chapter that shows that God is good, then a chapter that shows that He's goodness itself because of His simplicity, right?

[1:01:06] And then from that he concludes there can be nothing bad in God. My friend Warren Murray says Burke was. He says people put up with you because of your mind because there are other things they wouldn't put up with. I'm not goodness itself, right? There's something good and something bad in there, yes. I think he's hitting there.

[1:01:32] If you're a perfect adult you're all mixed up and sad Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if God is goodness itself, there can't be anything bad in Him, right? So that's the third chapter Thomas has, huh? God is good. God is goodness itself because of His simplicity. Therefore, the third chapter: there can't be anything bad in God. And then he has this beautiful thing that he took from Augustine: that God is the good of every good.

[1:01:58] And then that He's the summum bonum, right? You have only four of those in the Summa Theologiae, right? But all five in the Summa Contra Gentiles. No, I left out that thing. God is the good of every good, but we may say another place in some other ways, but it's kind of beautiful. My favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentiles. The

[1:02:24] big print, you know. That's why I brought the this one because it's got bigger print, you know, the Oxford. Got that at home too, but it's kind of small print. This one here's got the English if you get lost or something better. Okay. Now we come to what they call the second chapter here, huh? Okay. It's not a bad division here. Second chapter, the predicaments, right? So the first chapter is about three ways about names, right?

[1:03:03] Some names are said equivocally of many things, right? Some are said univocally, right? And some things are named denominatively, right? And how's this got to do with the categories, right? Well, as I said, overarching them, right, is something said equivocally, but equivocally by reason. Then within each genus, each highest genus, and going straight down, it's univocally, but from one genus to another, it's said what? Denominatively, right?

[1:03:38] Okay. So virtue and vice are species of habit, which is a species of quality, right? But if you're going to say this of a man, we'd say he's virtuous or he's vicious, right? Okay. We'd be saying something denominatively, right? It's a very complete thing he's doing there, right? Okay. He's distinguishing three ways that things are named, but in a way that's very relevant now, perfectly ordered now.

[1:04:11] Okay. Now in the second