Logic (2016)
5. Ante-Predicaments II: Said Of and In a Subject, Individual Substance, and the Ten Categories
Class of 2016-10-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/005-ante-predicaments-ii-said-of-and-in-a-subject-individual/

[0:00] chapter, you're going to have two what divisions, huh? And following the Greek, the first one is ton legomeno, which we translate sometimes English, you know, of things said, or just of the said. Okay. Then you have the division ton onton of beings huh? Tonanto. On is a Greek word for being, right? Okay. But the first division is ton legomeno. Okay. Yeah. Things said. Yeah. Of those said, you know the Greek is doesn't have the word thing in there, right?

[0:53] Of those said, right? Some are said with what? Sumplokeia intertwined, right, huh? Okay. Some without sumplokeis, without sumplokeis, without being intertwined. And he gives the fundamental sumplokeia that you have in a statement, right? Some are said what? According to sumplokeia, as man what? Runs. Anthropos trechei, or man wins, as we translate here, his victory. Anthropos nika. Now, what are these? Yeah, nika. The V is like a N.

[1:44] Yeah, yeah. just seeing myself here. Like this is the cause of deception. Okay. So these are really what statements, right? Okay. And it pertains to the what? Second act, right? I emphasize the statement because you want to separate the second act from the what? Yeah. Yeah. Because the things are in the categories, will they be statements? No, there will be things like virtue and vice, man, dog, cat, horse, right?

[2:20] These are said without any intertwining of things. But man runs. So the man and his running are not the same thing, are they? Right. So it's kind of a what? Yeah, mixture there, right? You can see how he's leading up to the categories, right? Because you're going to be putting things in there without sumploke, as the Greek word says, right? There's no intertwining of things there, right?

[2:48] But in a statement, there can be an intertwining of things. But even something like a white man can white man be put in some category?

[3:03] And you have I think two categories? Yeah, man would be in the category of substance. White would be quality. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And you could say by denomination, you're white. You're a white man. Yeah, yeah, yeah. yeah. You're white. This is where you're not supposed to use Negro, right? It means it would mean originally a black man, right? I guess they call us a whitey. That's...

[3:37] But can whitey or Negro be put in a category? No, there's a sumploke, a intertwining of two natures, right? Color and and and an animal, right? Yeah. See, see how Aristotle's doing, right? Yeah. So it's not only a statement that can't be put in a category, right? But you know, something like white man or short man or just man, right? Tall man, short man.

[4:16] See, because the one is his size, his quantity, how much of them there is. Yeah. When I first went up to Laval there, was uh the rector up there, he was a Monsignor, you know, the university, right? Was he a? Tough guy. He's kind of a short man, though, you know. You see, Napoleon was was short, right now, you know. But but he he uh breathed authority, right now.

[4:49] Well, this this guy did, you know. I remember first going to a social event there at Laval, and it was a kind of reception for students who are not of the province of Quebec itself, right? Kind of foreigners. And I'd never met the the the dean, right? I mean, not the dean, but the rector, rector of the university. He says, "You're a Berquist, he said. Must have heard the Berquist coming up there, you know.

[5:16] He recognizes some likeness in the face, but you know, yeah. I remember when when during the second Vatican Council, during some break in the second Vatican Council, uh, Cardinal Wright, I don't know if he's a cardinal at that time yet, but he came back, you know, and he he spoke, you know, at Assumption College there, right, and he gave a talk to the students, he gave a talk to the faculty, right.

[5:40] And I remember afterwards we were kind of shaking his hands as we were, you know, after his talk. He says to one of my colleagues, "So you're from Notre Dame, huh? How'd you know that?" Well just some some joke he made. He picked up the guy's reaction to it, you know, like that. He must be a Notre Dame guy. How do you know, I was from Notre Dame.

[6:01] you know, we never met him before. You know, or he didn't have any list of us. you know, He's got to he's got to be a sharp, you know. I told you the story he told now, you know. I guess during one of the breaks in the in the thing, Paul the Sixth went down to India, and he got off the airplane. It was just a tremendous crowd there, right?

[6:25] He burst into tears at the idea of evangelizing this huge crowd, you know. Newspapers reported, you know, they saw how much populations have increased due to his.

[6:37] He broke into tears. Oh, what have I done? You know. It shows you how the press, you know, I mean you see the political campaign, you know, but I mean, the way they twist things, right? You know, I mean, he just such a warm reception he got, you know. You know, just he's broken to tears. I mean, just you know, going to a foreign country like that, in a country like India, and being met with this enthusiastic crowd.

[7:00] That's what they said of John Paul when he went to Denver '93. All the bishops, American bishops, were dead set against. They thought it was going to be a total failure. Yeah. And when John Paul got there, and all the crowd was and all these young people, and they were so enthusiastic, they said John Paul was in tears. So joyful, joyful. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's just happened in in India there.

[7:22] I mean, to Paul the Sixth, you know, and see his talk about that. I remember talking about that. Your own habit there, right? Went to see him in Rome. Remember. And he he encouraged him, you know, right away, right away, yeah. And my wife knew him, you know, when he was bishop here of Worcester, you know,

[7:49] great man. Okay, so you see the significance of this thing here. The things we're going to put in the categories, categories themselves will be said without sumploke right? A sumploke huh That means kind of twisted together, right? Intertwined, you know. There's not a a bring together different things, right?

[8:20] Whether you say it together like white man, or whether you have a name whitey or something, you know, to name such a thing. Okay.

[8:31] Now, that's a distinction of two, right? But now we're going to get under ton legomenon. I mean, excuse me, ton onton of beings. You get a distinction of what four? Okay, but crisscrossing, yeah, yeah, because there's two distinctions of two, right?

[8:52] And what are the two distinctions of two that he has? present in a subject Yeah, you could say exist in another subject or does not exist in another subject, right? Okay, and then said of not in or not said of another distinction between universal and singular, right?

[9:23] Okay. So sometimes they talk about distinction into universal substance and singular substance, universal accident and singular accident, right? Okay. So geometry would be said of what knowledge is found in the minds of number of men, right? It's a number of women, too, I guess. And I think you can speak of the geometries in my head, right? And that would be my unique mess, right?

[9:59] The knowledge of geometry that's in my mind is something singular, right? I don't mean a pun on singular, but so all those who've been taught by Euclid, right? Huh? They have some individual knowledge of geometry, right? Not equal to Euclid, of course.

[10:26] And that's the way Aristotle proceeds, right? I see him do this in more than one division. He gives. He's using two things, right? Affirmed and denied, right? Huh? So what does he begin with? Something where one of them is affirmed and the other is denied. Okay.

[10:52] Because then you kind of what right away you see that they're not the same thing. Okay. Of beings, some are said of a subject, right? Okay. Now the Greek word is hypokeimenou in the genitive there. That's just like the word sub subject, right? Okay. So it means more placed under, I suppose, right? Okay. Subject means what's thrown under. you know that's. Those Latins are kind of sloppy.

[11:22] Okay. Of beings, some are said of a subject, right? Okay. Now I mentioned before you have two senses, main senses of whole and part. You have the universal whole, but the first meaning of whole is the composed whole, right? So the composed whole is. Put together from its parts, but it's not said of its parts, right? The universal whole is not put together from its parts, but it's said of them, right?

[11:53] Okay. So, animal is not put together from dog, cat, horse, and elephant, because then to say a dog is an animal would be to say a dog is a mixture of dog, cat, horse, elephant, and everything else, right? But animal is said of its parts, right? Dog, cat, and horse, and so on. Okay.

[12:18] But knife is that said of the blade? Is a knife and the handle is a knife? And the seat of the chair is a chair, and the legs are chairs. You know, how many chairs in this chair? Yeah, but it's put together from these, right? So, nice to contrast those two wholes. I'd say

[12:41] I use both things. I'd say the universal whole is said of its parts, but not put together from them. The composed whole is just the reverse. It's put together from its parts, but not said of them. So you see that? Okay. Well, here you're affirming one thing and denying something, right? Of beings, some. Oh, excuse me. Yeah, sometimes they call those parts that make up a that the universal whole is said of the subject parts, right?

[13:15] Because they are said of something which is imagined to be under what's being said of it, right? Okay. And why usually of parts you think of the composing parts, right? But you know this is a name. You could call them composing parts, huh? Parts put together. So some of beings, now, right? Now, some are said of a subject, but they don't exist in any what subject.

[13:54] As man, anthropos, is said as a subject of this man, right, or some man, right? But it exists in no what subject, right? Okay.

[14:18] Now that's what we would call what universal accident, right? This example, he's giving, right? Man is universal. I mean, using universal substance, universal substance, huh? Man is being said of what this man and that man, right? But doesn't exist in a subject, huh? Okay.

[14:44] Some are in a subject, right? Like my knowledge of geometry is in the subject, which is my mind. It's in my reason, my knowledge of the before and after, right? Yeah, yeah, it's in my. But the knowledge in my mind is not said of anything, is it? Okay. It's said of no subject, right?

[15:13] Now he says, "I call that in a subject, not what is in something as a what part belongs, right? But something belonging to something and impossible to be right, apart from that which it is. Okay. So, want some of my knowledge?

[15:47] Now can I take some of my knowledge out of my head and put it in your head? Not just somehow. You know the computer, but you can't do it.

[16:01] So you can't take my knowledge and put it over here, right, on the table, right? Or even in somebody else's head, can I? I can maybe generate a knowledge in your head, something like the knowledge in my head, but it won't be the knowledge in my head. Well,

[16:20] my teacher, Casirighi or De Koninck, you know, he was producing a knowledge like his own in my head, right, in his lectures, right? But I don't know if I understood the thing as well as he understood it. Based on, right? He had been teaching that since the 1930s, and always seeing more as he did it each time. I was just starting to read some of those things, right?

[16:53] So the knowledge in Deconic's head, right, is the example of the second thing, right? the knowledge in my head, right? Not said of something else, Nobody else has knowledge, right?

[17:08] Notice the difference between these first two things, right? The one is said to not be in a subject, right? And this is said to be in a subject. The one is said to be said of something, and the other is not said anything. So he takes the extremes, you might say, right? Okay.

[17:37] So you realize that to be said as something and to be in a subject. It means something different, right? If something, the first can be said to be of a subject, but not in a subject. They can't be the same thing, can they? And the second thing is in a subject but it's not said of a subject. Again, those two same things, right? Cannot be the same thing, right?

[18:02] But what is affirmed in one is denied in the other, and vice versa, right? Like if I said, you know, some human beings are are male and young, and some are female and old. Well, why'd you do that, Mister Berquist Was that sexist? But what am I doing, right? You know.

[18:38] You know what's going to be affirmed in one. is going to be denied in the other, right? Okay. So now, what's the third thing that he talks about?

[18:51] Well, he takes example the second thing there. As a certain what grammatica, a certain knowledge of grammar, is in a subject, to wit, in the soul, right? Huh?

[19:08] Okay. We mentioned that right there where he says what it means to be in a subject, right? What is in something not as a part, right? Which is the second sense of in, right? Huh? But it's impossible for it to be apart from that which it is. A part that maybe exists, right? You can pull the tooth out of my mouth.

[19:31] I do that sometimes. Okay. As a certain what knowledge of grammar is in a subject, namely the soul, right? Not being too precise there, but you know, it's in the mind, right? But in the soul. But it's not said of any subject, right? The knowledge which is in my head is not said of anything else, is it?

[19:57] And then he takes an example from what sensible example, right? And as some as something what that is white is in a subject, the body in which it is, right? Huh? For every color is in a what body, right? Huh? The white in my body is not said of anything else, right? Okay. kath' hypokeimenou oudenos none. It is said, right? Said of none of them. Okay.

[20:33] Now he takes up the two of the four that are what two affirmatives and one that's two what negatives, right? Okay. Some are said of a subject, right? Something universal. And they are in a what subject? has reasoned out knowledge, I translate. episteme, right? Science. Science is in a subject, to wit, in the soul, right? But it is said as a subject of grammar or logic or geometry or something, right?

[21:17] Did you see that? It's time for the universal knowledge now, right? Okay. Or if you take the word science, if you want to use the word science, science is in a subject, right? It's in the the soul, right? More precisely, in the the mind of the soul, right? But it's what said of this science and that science and so on, right? So, both being said of a subject and being in a subject is found in this third thing he's talking about, right?

[21:52] And that's universal what accident, right? Okay. So he first talked about universal substance, then he talked about individual what accident, right? Now he's talking about what.

[22:11] Universal accident. Yeah. Which is both said of something, right? And it exists in some subject. He gives example of each statement. Okay. He might say virtue, right? Huh? Virtue is in the soul, right? Huh? It's in something, right? And said of something, right? Huh? Courage and temperance and thing. Okay.

[22:42] And find the one that has both of these negated, right? Some are neither in a subject, like Dwayne Burquist or Father Michael, right? Patrick and so on. Um.

[22:59] Nor is it what said of something, right? Okay. So you don't exist in something that's in a subject to you. You might exist in something that's in a room, right? But not as knowledge exists in the mind or health in the body, right? Huh?

[23:17] And most examples he gives as this man or this what horse, right? For neither of these of these such things are neither in a what subject. Nor are they said of a subject, right? Okay.

[23:46] He says it's kind of summing up this distinction that's underlying these things. Haplos, right? Ta atoma. So you get the word atom, right? Atoma. The individuals, right? Huh. But atoma, an individual, etymologically the same thing, right? Individual means not what divided, huh? As universals divide into particular, right? So Socrates is not divided in the individuals, right? Okay. He is an individual, undivided, right? And the Greek word is atoma, right?

[24:23] Which comes from the negative prefixed a and tomos right? So we get the word anatomy, right? Anatomy means cut up, cut up. Ana is up and see up and see, but atom means what undivided, right? What they called atoms in. Democritus, I guess, first used the word, right? The atoms were what, indivisible, right? Huh? Okay, the ultimate building blocks, therefore,

[24:54] the parts of things that could not be divided, right? So what we called the atom was really a misuse of the name, right? But it was called an atom because by ordinary chemical means you couldn't divide it, right? So it's kind of, but now it stays there as a sign of our ignorance at that stage of our understanding, right?

[25:19] Now the proton turns out to be made out of something that is not proton or first, is it? That happens, right? Sign of ignorance, right?

[25:35] Okay. So he says, simp haplos, huh? Simply, huh? Speaking generally, they say it's not too bad. Ta'atuma, individuals, and what are one in number, right? Huh? It's another expression Aristotle uses, right, for individuals, one in number, are said of no what subject, right? But nothing prevents them from being in some subject, right? Of course, this grammatical knowledge, your particular knowledge of grammar, is among the things that are in a subject, right?

[26:20] But it's not said of anything, right? Okay. So he's distinguishing here now among four things, right? Universal substance, individual. substance, universal accident, individual accident, right? Okay. But he first took up universal substance and what? Individual accident. Yeah. Because what is affirmed and one is denied in the other, right? Then he took up the one where the two were affirmed, or the last, the two there, yeah, yeah.

[26:58] Okay. Now, there's a couple of reasons why Aristotle made these divisions, right? These divisions, to an atoma. One way is going to be preparing us for an understanding of the ten categories, because the first category will be about those things that don't exist in another as in a subject, right? Either universal substance or individual substance, and the rest of them will be what accidents, right? Things that exist in another, and whether they're universal or singular, right?

[27:40] Huh? My knowledge of geometry, or geometry in general, right? Okay. So it's going to prepare the way, in some ways, for the categories, right? And the distinction between the one genus of substance and the nine genera, right? That are accidents, right? Things existing in another.

[28:05] I mentioned how my teacher in logic there, an undergraduate, Father Dulac, he said he despaired of students seeing the distinction between accident here as opposed to substance, and accident as opposed to property there, right?

[28:26] Because accident here as opposed to substance could be a property of something, right? Okay. So accident doesn't mean the same thing here and there, okay? He says given up his spirit after his experience of teaching, right? But can you see the difference between the two? You gotta, you gotta think about that right now. Aristotle says in the book on sophistic refutations, right, that the most common mistaken thinking is because of the equivocation of the word, right?

[29:03] I mean, suppose someone says to you, "Do you know? Do you know that, or just think that so? " Okay, he's making a distinction between what. So the reason why just knowing that it's so Well, not necessarily that, huh? Because I could know that something is so, right?

[29:30] Wouldn't that be the same thing as thinking that something is so? See. I mean, suppose I said this. I know that no square is a circle.

[29:46] Who's going to win the election? I probably would not say I know so and so is going to win the election. I would probably say, I think that so and so is going to win. You know. Now, what's the distinction between knowing and thinking in in those words of mine? Why do I say I don't just think that a square is not a circle? I know the square is not a circle, but I don't really know who's going to win the election.

[30:18] But I think that so and so is going to win. What's the distinction between thinking and knowing? Yeah. See, I'm sure that a square is not a circle, right? I'm not sure that so and so is going to win the election. I think he or she is going to win, right? But I don't really know, right? Okay. Am I going to live to be ninety?

[30:54] I think so. My mother lived to be ninety. Got the same genes or something? Yeah, your father died at sixty-five. Well, that's dust in the wind now. Yeah, yeah. See, but I don't think I'd say I know I will live to be ninety. Unless God reveals it to you. Yeah, yeah. See.

[31:25] So knowing there involves being certain or sure, right? Thinking there in those examples, right, means not being sure or certain, right? Yeah, it's opinion, right? Huh?

[31:48] Now, if you ask me this, Mister Burquist, do you think that a square can be a circle, or do you think that a square cannot be circle? What do you think, Mister Burquist? What would I answer? I think that a square cannot be a circle. Well, then you're not sure, Mister Burquist, of what you're saying, right?

[32:19] I mean, don't I think that a square cannot be a circle? I think that. Equivocation, okay. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now, what kind of equivocation is this? Is it by chance or by reason? By reason, kind of like something like genus and species. Yeah, yeah,

[32:46] yeah. Remember how I gave a explanation of one kind of several kinds of names equivocal by reason, right? And sometimes a name becomes equivocal by reason when it's kept by one of the things what you just said, right?

[33:08] And then the one that adds something noteworthy gets a new name, right? This seems to be an example of that, right? So if you think something but you're not sure of it, right? That kind of thinking keeps the name thinking as its own name sometimes, and when you're sure of what you think, well, that's noteworthy to give a new name, you know? Yeah.

[33:41] So I remember my my daughter Maria saying, you know, I don't like this this food, whatever it was. I love it. So she's denying she likes the soup, but doesn't she like the soup? Hmm. Say.

[34:01] You say to the girl, "I like you." Is that all? Yeah, yeah. You better say to your wife, "I love her," right? Okay, but loving is a kind of liking too, right? So liking can be common, you know, to liking a lot and liking a little or something, right? But if you have a really intense liking, right, you might say, "I love you," right? What does the philosopher?

[34:43] No, no, it doesn't do justice to it, right? He's a lover of wisdom, right? You guys trying, you guys trying to like that or love that?

[34:58] I like that. He's a nice guy. No, but you can say that loving is a kind of liking, right? It's a strong liking, right? You know, if I say I I like, you know, my grandmother's cookies, you know, I do like them. She's kind of the standard which I judge all, you know, commercial cookies, you know, and so on, and cookies other people make, you know. You know, She was she was my grandmother's motto, maternal grandmother was, I aimed to please.

[35:33] that was her, her her her motto in life, So they please those cookies, you know. And so, first of all, to make the the Pepperidge Farm makes the best, you know, but but the measure, the criterion, I would say, judges them is my my grandmother's, obviously, but you know, approaches more closely to them than than most of the other kinds of cookies, you know. And

[36:05] okay, so can be easily deceived by by words, right? They're equivocal, and especially words are equivocal by reason, huh? Because they're closer, right? Who was

[36:25] it? Some artist that it was, rock band or something. I don't know. But one student at the college had the same name as the guy, right? Someone said so and so died or something, you know, and I thought you know that was the friend of theirs, right? You know, but

[36:46] I remember I'd heard that you know it was a test. Winston Churchill, you know, Churchill wrote a novel, right? You know, so you go to the library and there are novels by Winston Churchill, but it's not the same Winston Churchill. He does have one novel, you know. But anyway,

[37:07] so anyway, going back to Father Dulac's despair, right? huh? There's a difference in meaning between accident as as distinguished from substance, right? Universal accident and individual accident as distinguished from universal substance and individual substance. An accident is distinguished from property in the predicables, right?

[37:35] Say property. In the sense of the five predicables, right, is not an accident, right, in the sense of the five predicables, but is an accident. Couldn't be an accident in this sense here, right? Okay. But to say he he he said that he disbarred them. Let's turn this into their head.

[38:00] It shows you how easily we are what deceived by equivocation, right? So anyway, this distinction then is useful for a distinction of the what highest genera, because only one of them is the genus of what substance, right? And the other ones are what genera of accidents of things that exist in another. So your size exists. in you, right? But is your size you?

[38:45] Is it? If your size was you, you never grew up, right? You would have ceased to be yourself when you got what? Got tall, right? You know, you're marking on the wall, whatever they do. Sometimes, you know, I go into the sea. I go to the doctor. They they they check my size. I suppose I'm shrinking too much, though. I get concerned. Um.

[39:16] Yeah. Okay. So size, the quantity, right? Qualities, right? These exist in me in some way, right? Okay. Yeah. Okay, so that's one advantage what he's doing here, right? Huh? But I think there's another one that's more, more, even more so than this distinction, right? Because how are the ten highest genera going to be distinguished? You think?

[39:56] Well, as you may expect in logic, they're going to be distinguished by the way something is said of something, right? But is there something that among these four that everything else is said of?

[40:18] Hmm. Which one of those four do you think everything else is said of? The individual substance. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. You can say of me that I am a man, right? More generally, I'm an animal, and so on, up the scale to substance, right? You can also say of me that I'm, I don't know, five foot ten or something, five foot nine. What? You're White. Yeah, you can say I'm white.

[41:00] I'm just ever. Okay, I have a hard time stealing from people. Something, something draws me back all the time. Um, I'm a geometer, right, and so on. I'm a father. I'm a son. I'm a teacher. I'm a student. gardener, yeah. Ah, I'm in this room. I'm sitting. Clothed, and then you're right. in front of them Clothed.

[41:38] Um. on the table. So everything else is said of individual what? Yeah, some being said univocally of it, right? Others being said denominatively of it, right? Okay. So maybe Aristotle is going to distinguish the

[42:06] ten highest genera, right? By the way, something can be said of individual what? Yeah, yeah. Now the text we're looking at last next time from Thomas. Thomas will divide,

[42:25] will distinguish the highest genera by the different ways that something can be said of individual what? Substances, right? And his first distinction will be into what? Three, right? So let's take individual substance like Dwayne Berquist, right? Some things can be said of Dwayne Berquist for reason of what he is. He's a man. He's an animal. He's a living body. He's a substance, right? That's the first category.

[42:59] Other things can be said of Duane Berquist not by reason of what he is, but by reason of something in him, right? Other than what he is.

[43:17] And one is by how big he is or how small he is, right? His size, right? Others are these qualities of him. Is he healthy or is he sick, right? Is he just or is he unjust, right? Is he knowledgeable or ignorant, and so on, right? Or is ignorant of many things, knows some things, okay?

[43:46] And some things can be said of Berquist by reason of something outside of him, like I am in this room. I am clothed. Okay. The clothing is not in me. As any subject is it?

[44:08] Now the second and the third way, you know, will be subdivided by Thomas, right? We'll see how he does that, right? But just take those three, right? Huh? As examples of the three. Man is said of Berquist right? Berquist is said to be a geometer. And Berquist is said to be in this room or to be clothed, right? Is he a big distinction between those three? Man is said of Berquist by reason of what he is.

[44:44] And more generally, animal is said of man even for reason of what he is. Geometry is said of Duane Berquist not by reason of what he is, but something that is in my mind, or healthy is said of Duane Berquist by reason of something that is in my what body, right? Okay.

[45:07] But then some things are said of me by reason of something outside of me, right? This room is not what I am. My house is not what I am, right? I'm in my house sometimes. My car, I'm in my car sometimes.

[45:28] But I'm not my car. I'm not my house. I'm not this room. Okay. Another example of this third kind is I am clothed, right? Okay. Well, my clothing is not what I am. Clothes make the man. The habit doesn't make the monk. What

[45:50] is it? What do you call it? No, no, the hood, yeah, yeah. What is it? Yeah, I can't remember the exact Latin, but the one that the hood doesn't make the monk. Something called a cowl. or. Yeah, yeah, but the hood doesn't make the monk is what the the saying was, right? They put it in English. And so we all have things said of us in these three ways, right?

[46:13] But the second and third way will be distinguished in a number of things, right? Okay. But notice what is twin Burke is I am an individual substance, right? So I can take Father Michael. He's an individual substance, right? He doesn't exist in something else as in a subject. He's not said of anybody else. He's unique. Okay. And I can say he's a man, right? Okay. I can say he's

[46:46] in his room, but also he's, I guess, you're healthy, yeah. Thank God. Yeah, he's healthy, right? So some things are said of of Father Michael by reason of what he is, a man, right? Or more generally, an animal, or more generally, a living body, or more generally, a body. Okay. Other things are said of him by reason of what is in him, right? Is he tall or short or you know, big man?

[47:13] And but he's a son, right? Okay. The son is said of something in you related to the son of man, right? Okay. Who's your father? And then there are things said of him by reason of what he's clothed, right? Okay. Now his beard, I think that's part of him, right? I'm disheveled.

[47:43] Yeah. See, but but this is outside you right now, and these things are are not part of you right now. Even if you have contact lenses, it's not really part of you, right?

[48:01] So we distinguish the highest genera in general by the way something can be said of individual substances. So you have to distinguish among tonantol of beings, right? Individual substance from universal substance, and from individual accidents and from universal accidents, right? That's that's the reason why he's doing this, right?

[48:34] Makes sense. I don't. Know what? What time do we stop by the? way Four. Four thirty. Oh, four thirty. Okay. So, see what he's doing here then, right? Okay. I think that's even more more relevant to what he's going to do first, right? Um, but this is also relevant to the distinction, the fact that only one of the what highest genera is substance, right? And there are altogether nine genera of accidents, right?

[49:06] Okay. So, distinction between substance and accident here is is relevant, right? But no one here is going to understand the difference between accident as opposed to substance, accident as opposed to property, right? Because they'll escape all of you, right? Yeah. So you should even hope that you understand that distinction, right? No reason. to hope for it

[49:33] See if I like it. You know, he gets his exams, and then he he he got there and he burned the exams, you know. So people would be copying the other day's exams you know. See if I was about there towards the end of the day So

[49:54] the one the one they did the logician guy teaching the predicables up there in Laval, he's kind of a nasty guy, right? And he he he come down. He's a French guy, but he come down to you know he had a degree at Notre Dame and so on. But um, the uh, I was taking our exam one time, and and Nicole and little French girl there right before me, right?

[50:20] And I'm waiting to go in. The next guy to put me in. And Nicole comes out there, and she's mad as a, She almost knocked me down she's like that. But I found afterwards. What happened, right? You know, he asked her a question, and she just drew a blank, right? Which happens in an oral exam, right? Now, you do that, you either help the student, you know, if you're a professor, or go on to another question, right?

[50:46] Well, he just sat there, you know, and she couldn't answer the question, right? And after I know, you know, a few minutes, you know, of complete silence on her part, he said, "And do you have anything to add?" And so she stormed out of the place, you know.

[51:06] Well, it shows you how how logicians have no feeling, right? Nicole. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Nicole was a marvelous girl, you know, huh? And uh, and one American said he he came down to the factory, said, "See what you saw, Nicole doing." He said, "But I came down to the factory the other day, and I was really really depressed, you know. Ran to Nicole a couple minutes, so all my depression was gone.

[51:32] You know, so she was a very nice girl, but but uh, she didn't add, you know." Yeah, the guy who taught ethics and politics, you know, he would come and take the exam. You know, and be in there. What did he say? Let's go over the window. He says, "Get some cold air. You know, wake up. You know, so he gets you kind of going. You know, he was a nice, nice guy.

[51:56] You know, but so you get. There's all kinds of professors. Yeah. Okay. Now, what's the third chapter about? Right. The third chapter is about the order, right? Huh. Within a what genus, right? Or in the highest genus, right? Okay. Let's see what he says about this, huh?

[52:36] Whenever, one thing, right, of another, right, is kategoreitai, right, is said as of a what subject. Whatever is said of the what predicate, you might call it, right.

[53:02] All will be said of the what subject, right? So if habit is said of virtue as a genus, right, and virtue is said of courage as a genus, right, okay, then habit will also be said of what? Yeah, you see, he's saying about the order of these things, right? So if substance, if man is said of me, right, an animal is said of man, then animal is said of me, and if living body is said of animal, right, then living body will be said of man and of me, right, and if body is said of living body, it's all down the line, then body will be said of everything down the line, right?

[53:54] And finally, substance is said of body and spirit or whatever Aristotle doesn't give that distinction here because it's for wisdom. to know that there are bodies and spirits. But if substance is said of of body and body and living body and that of animal, animal of man and man of me, then substance will be said all the way down the line, right? You see that? So he's talking about the the order here of being said of, right?

[54:24] Makes sense, doesn't it? Right. So in the previous chapter, you got the distinction of individual substance from other things, right? And the categories will be distinguished by how something is said of individual substance, right? But now we're going to see something about the order within each thing, right? Does this make sense, right? It reminds you a little bit of of what you have when you get to the to the syllogism, right?

[55:00] Because in the syllogism, the principle of it is the set of all and the set of none, right? So if every B is an A, whatever is a B is an A, right? If no B is an A, whatever is a B is not an A, right?

[55:19] This is similar, right? But again, the syllogism. Now that's the order you might say of what genus and species, right? The species and the species under the genus, and the genus is the species, right? And so on all the way down the the thing, right?

[55:50] Okay, but now he talks about the third thing, right? Which is what differences, right? What do you have in predicament order, right? We have an order of what genus and species, right? And the genus, the genus, right? All up to the genus that is not a species, all the way there ordered, right? But in particular, the order being that the what is said of the higher genus would be said of the lower genus and lower species all the way down the line.

[56:21] Makes sense? Yes, that's clear enough. But now he talks about the differences, right? Because the species will be separated, right, by differences, and the differences will be what the species has in addition to the genus, as Porphyry says, right? But now he points out distinction here of heterogenon of different genera, right? And which are ordered, right, tetagmenon, right?

[56:53] And are not ordered under each other, right? Other in form or species are also the what differences, right? As for example, the differences of zoon, animal, and of what epistemes science, right? For of animal differences would be what footed, two-footed, right? Winged and aquatic and so on, right? Okay. These are among the differences of what animal, right? But they're not of any what species, right? They're two-footed.

[57:39] For one science, not different other science in being two-footed. Okay. Now. My first grade teacher there was Roman Casaubon. There, right? The wisest man at the College of Saint Thomas, right? The man who claimed his mind was the mind of Aristiles like the brain of an angleworm, right?

[58:02] But he said to me, you can tell a man's understanding of the matter by the examples he chooses, right? He used to say, you know, these bad philosophers choose an example that strikes imagination, right? But the purpose of example is to clarify something, right? Make it more clear. Well, no, the magnificent example Aristotle gave, right? What are the differences of animals? Well, he distinguished, you know, very much by two-footed and four-footed, right?

[58:31] And so on, right? And you find those as differences for another genus, right? It's not. And he takes episteme science. now, right? Is one science different from another because some are two-footed and some are four-footed? It's just so clear, right? You know, you know. That was a beautiful observance of Roman logic. I thought, you know. See? And of course, you get into modern philosophers like to take an obstruse example.

[58:59] You know, that's kind of weird. You know, it kind of puzzles you. So, and it's kind of contrary to the purpose. Okay. But he says when genera are under one another, right? Nothing prevents there being the same differences because the differences of the higher ones will come down, right? So, if good is a difference of virtue, then when you get down to the species of virtue, good can be said of them too, as well as virtue, right?

[59:32] So, justice is both a virtue and is something good, right? See. Okay. But is it odd or even? Those are differences of another genus, right? Which is not above or below what quality or virtue, right? Okay. So, still clear as always. You know how well ordered this is, huh?

[1:00:05] So that the differences of the what predicate, huh, the category, so many are those of the what? Yeah, yeah. And notice the word "category" here is not yet cut the sense of what we call the ten categories, right? Because the ten categories are what the highest genera, right, highest predicates, you might say, right? But it's kind of almost by what?

[1:00:33] Yeah, yeah. So you got to be careful, right? I think I mentioned how the word "category" comes from the law courts, right? See? Because then I inform accusation, right? So

[1:00:47] if I accuse you of some crime, I got to say you're a thief or you're a murderer or you're, you know, an adulterer or whatever it is, right? So I got to say something of you, right? And of course, you realize the necessity of of what you know manslaughter and murder, and so you have to distinguish these different things, right? You know, but you got to say something of you, right?

[1:01:08] So when I read the Gospels and they they accuse Christ of something, the word is "category," right? I mean, it's taken from the Greek word.

[1:01:17] Okay. Now, in the last chapter here of the anti- predicaments, right? Before he takes up them one by one, he now enumerates the ten, right? And that's what he says of those said according to no intertwining, symploke, right? Okay, not things like white man, but things that are thought in intertwining of different kinds of things. Each either signifies ousia, which is the Greek word for what we translate substance.

[1:02:00] We don't have the same etymology, right? Huh? Now the word hypostasis in Greek has got the same what Etymology. as substance, right? But the Greeks use the word hypostasis for a individual substance, right? And maybe even by custom for for person, right? But it's really, you know, could mean etymologically any what individual substance, right? Because that stands under everything else, right? So yeah, yeah, yeah. But the the word substance

[1:02:39] in Greek and Latin rather can also mean what what a thing is, right? The substance of a thing. Okay. And so they got into some troubles, you know. They say that there are three hypostases in the Trinity, right? Going from the Greeks, and then they translate three substances, right? Well, then then you seem like you're saying what heresy, right? You know. So you got to be careful, right?

[1:03:05] About these words, huh? Okay. Um. So of those things said according to no intertwining, each either signifies ousia right? Or posa right? Now posa, I don't know if we have one word in English because maybe it can can mean how much or how many. Well, it's a concrete word like how much or how many, right? Rather than the abstract word what quantity, right? And my teacher Roman Kasurik there used to point that out, right?

[1:03:43] Hypostasis is a concrete word, right? Or poion huh? Okay. And poion we might translate English by how rather than quality, right? How is more you know how are you today, right? You know, It's more uh, known to us, right? Than say what's your quality today? It sounds kind of abstract, right? You know, I'm depressed or I'm you know sick or whatever it is. Yeah. Or pros ti, right?

[1:04:12] Huh? Now in Albert they translate that ad aliquid right? It means toward something, right? Now you know if I read this English translation here, right? Each uncombined word or expression that's not said very well means one of the following things. Doesn't mean well, signifies okay. What or substance? How large? Okay, that's not too bad. That is quantity, he says. What sort of thing? That is quality. How?

[1:04:43] Related to what? A relation. So it's not he's lost the concreteness, right? And so I always say when I started to read, think about the beginning of John's Gospel. He says, "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was what? Yeah, Pros ton theon, toward God, right? And their God is standing for the Father, right? And the Word is toward, right? So the distinction between the members of the Trinity is by relations, right?

[1:05:13] By toward them, right? And so God the Son towards the Father is the Son, right? But is God the Son towards the Holy Spirit the Son? No, he's not the Son of Him, right? So the relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit is different from Father and Son, right? The Holy Spirit is not the Son of the Father of the Father and the Holy Spirit of the God the Son, right?

[1:05:49] But you say the Father and the Son breathe on the Holy Spirit, right? He's like their breath, right? So he's called a spirit. So it's a different relation.

[1:06:09] But the breath proceeds from the breather, right? Now, a lot of the textbooks, you know, they they would use terms quantity, quality, which you could use, but I mean just you know there's some nice thing. No Aristotle says it's concrete, okay? Or pou Where? right? Or pote right? Now, again, they make the mistake of calling it where. That is place. This guy says, right? When or time?

[1:06:49] Well, when you get to the category of quantity, they'll put place and time in the category of quantity. And now he's making it another what? Genius, right there? But it's where and when. It should be the name of those things. Pou and pote in Greek, right? Ubi in Latin and quando and and in Latin, right? Where and when, right? Okay.

[1:07:18] But time itself is put in quantity by Aristotle. Because time is a number of the before and after in motion. Number is a quantity, right? Yeah.

[1:07:39] I'm contained by these walls in this room, right? And they got length and width and depth, so they're kind of a quantity, place that contains me, right? The surface of the bottle or something, right? The container surface, surface, two-dimensional quantity. Okay, so that's a bad translation, you know, to to make it. He says when, that's good, but then he says in parentheses in this edition or time, you know, you say that's not time.

[1:08:10] Okay, it's the denominative when. Um. Or case keisthai right now. Now they use the term attitude. Now posture or position. He got in parentheses. That's a little bit better, right now. Case keisthai huh? But how you're what, you know? Your position. So to speak, is probably a good way of doing it, huh? Laid out, so to speak,

[1:08:44] or echein, right? That's the one which is to have here, what clothing, right? Huh? Habitus, they call it in Latin, right? They translate that sometimes. Okay. Or poiein or paschein huh? Now, I in English, I'd call that acting upon or what? Undergoing, right? Okay.

[1:09:09] So, if you take the word, say, warm, that would be in category of quality, right? but? If you say warming, that's acting upon, yeah. Being warmed, I'm sitting in front of the fire, being warmed, I'm undergoing, yeah, yeah. So you got to be careful, you know, to how you're saying those things, to know what category it's in, right? Okay.

[1:09:44] Um. Now, it's going to stop now, huh? Okay. They're gonna start exemplifying them, right? Huh? Okay. That's we're going to look at that text of Thomas if we have it next time, you know. Okay.