Logic (2016)
7. Deriving the Ten Categories: Substance, Inherent Accidents, and Extrinsic Denomination by Cause and Measure
Class of 2016-11-03
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/007-deriving-the-ten-categories-substance-inherent-accidents/

[0:00] So expanding the words of Thomas then, in three ways all predication comes about, huh? All predication of what? Something, thing said of individual substance, right?

[0:17] In one way, when of some subject, meaning individual substance, is said that which pertains to its essence or nature, right? As when I say Socrates is a man, right? Or more generally, that man is a what? Animal, right? Or champion is a horse. Horse is an animal. Or Tabitha is a cat. We had a review of a book about cats there in the National Review, just the last issue there, and and they said that there's a hundred million domestic cats now.

[1:01] Yeah, this country has that many? Yeah. Hundred million. I don't. It can't be that high. That doesn't seem strange to me. Some people have thirty-five in their small apartment. Yeah. Then a cat is, you know, you know, more prominent than the horse that Aristotle uses as example, right?

[1:35] My wife and I always joke about when when we was a little girl there and Tabitha was giving birth to her kittens, right? And the tears were coming down her eyes, and so and now she's got ten children, right? A good, a good, you know, woman. Interest in those things, obviously.

[1:57] Okay. And according to this, has taken the predicament, the set of substance, right? Okay. In another way, something is said of something. When it is said of something, not that which is of its essence, right? Its nature, what it is, but nevertheless, what? Belongs to it. Yeah. Inherits in it, right? Exists in it, right? Okay. But now this one is going to subdivide, right? And not just have one.

[2:33] Which either is on the side of the matter of the subject, huh? And according to this, is the predicament of what? Quantity, right? There Thomas using the abstract word quantity, right? Okay. For quantity properly follows upon what? Matter, right? Okay. Whence also Plato laid down magnum, right, on the part of matter, right. Great. Or it follows upon form, and thus it is the predicamentum of what? Quality, right.

[3:15] Whence also qualities, some of them are founded upon what quantity, right? As color is in the surface of the body, and figures and lines and in surfaces, okay? Or it has itself with respect to another, and thus it is the predicament of what relation? Look at Thomas using these abstract words, huh? Falling, you know, departing from the concreteness of Aristotle, right? And he he was that got him in in in his exposition of Aquinas there in the in the Gospel of Saint John, right?

[3:57] Yes, somebody should have Mm hmm So he had some of the Greek should have said, Thomas, if you are going to be a philosopher, you've got to learn some Greek, because he knows he knows some of the Greek, but I don't know.

[4:13] For when I say that man is a father, there is not said of man something absolute, but a respect which is in him towards another, right? Huh? Okay.

[4:26] Quality is not. If I took away quality, would I be taking away something essential from you? It wouldn't Well it would be by very nature, you see. You know. It doesn't. your quantity doesn't belong to your very nature. Well, it follows upon my nature, right? Just like my my so my qualities follow upon my nature, but it's not it's not by very nature itself. So you can have man without Quantity?

[4:55] No, but can you have two without half or four? We're here for the I said, go get me, what? Oh well, that explains it. see.

[5:17] Can you have two without half or four? You see, half of four is not really two; it's something that follows upon two, right? The nature of two, and every two, right, and always, right. But it's something that follows upon it towards another, right? So half of four or a third of six, right, follows upon that, right? So

[5:45] a property is not the nature of a thing, but it's something that follows upon the nature, as opposed to yeah. So your your quantity is a property. Yeah, yeah. So it's essential. essential Yeah, the distinction in the Isagoge between property and accident, right? I told how Father Dulac, the teacher of logic I had in college. He'd gone to Laval too. Father Du Lac said, you know, after teaching logic for a number of years, he had despaired, right, of the students ever getting to see the difference between accident as one of the five predicables and accident as opposed to substance, right?

[6:27] That it shows you how much trouble, you know, a word that's equivocal, right, even equivocal by reason, gives people, right? I mean, the poor man had despaired. I mean, he's good-natured about it, you know, but he was kind of almost a joke with him, you know, but it was experience, you know.

[6:52] What is the famous joke about Samuel Johnson? You know, where this guy had made not too good a marriage or something. I don't know if the wife died or what, but then he got married again, right? And he says it was a triumph of experience. I mean, I mean, of hope over experience. Basel is so attached to Johnson and trying to save his words, right?

[7:27] That's what the man's experience, right? They led him to despair. and you've ever seen the difference, but the difference between property and accident is, as

[7:38] the isagoge, right? An accident, as you have it in the categories, an accident in the sense of the categories, could be a property, right, in sense of the isagoge, because they're both property and accident are outside the nature of the thing, something added to the nature, but one follows upon the nature in some way, right? And the accident in the isagoge is something like like green, sort of triangle, right?

[8:07] Doesn't follow upon it. Okay. So a property is essential in a certain sense. of essential Yeah, Porphyry says a property is what belongs to a to only one species, to every member of that species, and always, right? And he's kind of defining property in a very strict sense, right? So half of four belongs only to two, to every two whatsoever, and always, right? But now to be a logician could be said to be a property of man, because it belongs only to man, right?

[8:50] No dog or cat or horse is a logician, at least to my knowledge. And but not every man is a logician, right? So it's not as strict a property, but it still has a connection with the nature, right? That's why only man, you know, can be a logician or a geometer or something of that sort. But say less than ten, right? Could be a property of two, but not in the strictest sense, because there are other things besides two that are less than ten.

[9:20] Okay. This is another way that name becomes equivocal by reason, right? By dropping out part of its meaning, right? So if you drop out part of the meaning of of uh Porphyry's definition there, of, property, you have a equivocal use of the word property, but not a purely equivocal. There's a connection still to nature, right? Okay.

[9:49] So he'll state this a little bit differently in the metaphysics, but it's the same thing basically. So you have three, the the second, the third, and the fourth highest genus, right? Are here in the second part of this threefold division, right? Okay.

[10:11] Well, that's again the division. Sometimes you divide them into three, but sometimes you divide the first two, right? It's absolute, right? And then it gets relative, because how much really is double, right? I was giving examples to him, says, "I'm going to give you half of the money in my half of my money. How much money do you have? It doesn't mean much, you know, half money.

[10:36] I might have just, you know, two pennies in my in in my pocket, you know, that's all I got in my pocket. You're getting half of it, you know. I mean, but how much is it, you know? It's not something absolute, right? And is two one, or is it three, or is it five? It can be anything, right? You know, it's not something absolute, right? It can only be half towards something, right?

[11:02] Okay, three is half of six, right? But it's a third of nine, you know. Okay, how can it be half and a third? To be half and a third is not the same thing, is it? But how can three be half and a third? Well, if it's something absolute, then you'd have a problem, right? But it can be a half and a third, right? But towards other things, right?

[11:28] Am I a father or a son? Yes. I'm both, but not towards the same man, right? I couldn't be a father and a son towards the same man, could I? See, am I taller or shorter?

[11:50] Well, some basketball player probably is taller than me, right? You know, but I can be taller and shorter, but towards different men, right? Okay.

[12:06] Now it comes to the third way of being said of, right? And the third way of being said of is when something extrinsic, right, something outside of you, right, Is said of you by way of some what denomination, right? Aristotle talked about that way of naming, right, in the first chapter there of the Antepredicaments. Thus, also, what accidents, extrinsic denominations are said of the substance. Now he goes back and shows that we often speak denominatively of things that exist in the man, right?

[12:49] For we do not say that man is whiteness, but that man is what white. Okay, that's why the important to use that concrete way of speaking, right? Okay. I've learned some geometry, so am I geometry? You wouldn't say that man is geometry, would you? Except figuratively, you'd say that Euclid is geometry, you know. Mozart is music, you know. Well, that's kind of a figure of speech, right?

[13:20] Strictly speaking, Mozart is a musician, right? He's named denominatively for music, right? And the great Euclid is derived named denominatively, right, from what geometry? Okay.

[13:40] Now, to be denominated from something outside of you, right, extrinsic, is found in one way commonly in all things, at least in the material world, and in one way, especially in those things which pertain to man alone, right? Okay. And this category of what to have, right, habitus, seems to be man's category, right? So my teacher did kind of give a lecture on that, right, a public lecture, right?

[14:10] Okay. But notice how how we change our clothing, right? Huh? So you know we're getting married. You're going to dress in one way, right? Huh? We're going to play a game, right? To get dressed another way, right? Going to go swimming, another way, right? Okay. And for serious occasions, you know, and so on, and merry occasions, and so on, you might dress differently, right? All these things, right?

[14:35] Okay. If you're a soldier, you might dress differently, right? But even my son there, you know, he's a ten-year-old now, but he wears one kind of clothing one time, and he's going to go to he's going to speak, you know, he's gonna put on this fancy stuff, you know.

[14:59] They want him to speak at the at the trivium banquet, you know, and you know about his experience at trivium school, right? So they asked him to do that. So he comes all dressed up. One guy said, "I thought I was the best dressed man," he said, until his son came up and said

[15:17] fancy stuff, you know. Okay. Now, Thomas is a very smart guy, huh? Commonly, he says, right, in a way, it's not just private to man, right? Something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic, either according to the ratio of a cause, huh? Or according to the ratio of a measure. For something is said to be caused and measured by something what outside, huh? Okay.

[16:07] Now Thomas is going to go into the four kinds of causes. The right to see what causes are directly tied up with them, and it's tied up with an extrinsic cause, of course, but with the mover, right?

[16:20] So I can kick you, right? I'm kicking you, and you are being kicked, right? That's something being said of you, but isn't something outside of you, right? I'm kicking somebody other than myself, right?

[16:39] Or if I kick myself, it's one part of me kicking another part of myself. I kick myself. You don't say that, okay? And you're being kicked by something outside you, right? Okay.

[16:52] And this is a thing he's got to explain by acting upon and undergoing. It's something to do with motion, right? Huh? In this context. Okay.

[17:10] Now, how, by reason of a cause? Well, now he goes on. Because recalls Aristotle's distinction of the what four kinds of causes, yeah. Aristotle's the only guy who distinguished these four kinds of causes, as far as I'm aware. Those who followed Aristotle, right?

[17:36] But what do you mean by a cause in general? What do you mean by a cause? Something that how do you say without saying cause, Causes either the being or the becoming of something. the source, the source of the being or becoming of something. Okay. To say that which something depends upon, right, for being or for coming to be, right? Okay. Now, when I try to explain cause or distinction of causes, I try to force people, right?

[18:14] Necessity, right? See. And so. Yeah, it's here, right? Okay. I ask my students. You see that word on the board there? Yeah, yeah. What does that depend upon for being, existing there? What is the most undeniable thing that depends upon? The three letters. Yeah. He says now, if you say it doesn't depend upon C and A and T, let's take away C, it doesn't depend upon that, and take away A, it doesn't depend upon that, and take away that.

[19:03] Okay. Convinced? Yeah. Now we call that kind of dependence, huh? That kind of cause, the letters C, A, and T, we call that matter for want of a better name, right? Okay.

[19:29] And matter has a definition this kind of cause. Matter is that from which something comes to be and is in it, huh? Okay. Part of the definition. So the word cat comes from the letters C, A, and T, and is what they are in it, right? Okay.

[19:55] You take all the wood out of this table, right? No table. Yeah, same thing, right? Huh? The wooden table comes to be from wood, and wood is in the table, right? Now you might say the wood table comes from the carpenter, but He's to the best of my knowledge not in the table, okay? So he's not a cause. If he's a cause, it's in some other way.

[20:20] Not as matter, right? Okay. They say matter, in Latin, the word here, materia, that comes from what mother, right? Okay. I always tell the story. This is a true story. One time, my lieutenant colonel's son was a very little boy. He's trying to get things, you know, straightened out in his mind and understand things. And all of a sudden, he comes to me and says, "Did I come from mama?"

[20:55] I said, "Yes, you did come from mama." And then he said, "Did Maria, that's his sister, did Maria come from mama?" And I said, "Yes, Maria came from mama." And then he says, "Marcus, that's his younger brother. Did Marcus come from mama?" And I said, "Yes, Marcus came from mother." And then he said to me, "Did you come from mama?" (Laughter)

[21:18] And I said, "I said no." He says, "Well, then you already belong, he said, but you can stay, he said." (You know. Well, it shows that this kind of cause is most known, right? You see, matter, okay?

[21:38] Mother Earth, right? It's like the poets and even the philosophers, right? Okay, philosophers take you know water, air, fire, but the poets come first, huh? Infima doctrina right? They? Come first, and they said Mother Earth, right, is the source of all things, huh? Okay. Now I force you to admit that kind of cause of matter, okay?

[22:07] But now, same word, exactly the same letters, right? Got a table here, right? Made out of wood. This is made out of wood. So this is a table too. Both made out of the same, could have been the same kind of wood, maybe, huh?

[22:34] Now you're being forced by the truth itself to say that the word cat depends upon something in addition to those three letters. Because these letters are the same three. I'm talking to a graduate of Thomas Aquinas College, you know. They said oh yeah I'm a graduate of

[23:01] TAC, TCA, Thomas, Aquinas TAC? Thomas Aquinas College, right? Okay. They refer to TAC. right? I hear them say it all the time. Okay. So this is enough here, right? And you say, what does it depend upon? Whether the C is before or after the A, right? Depends upon the order of letters. This is the second kind of cause, huh? Which we call what form, right? What completes the nature of what it is, huh?

[23:36] So you're forced to admit those two kinds of causes, right? But now, how do the letters get in this order, or this order? huh Do they automatically arrange themselves in that order?

[23:52] No. Somebody has to write them in that order. Yeah. I put them in that order, right? Okay. So now you've got the third kind of cause, the mover or maker, huh? Okay.

[24:13] And so first there is beginning of motion, right? Now is that enough to explain everything? Well, why did the mover or maker, namely Berquist, right? In this case, huh? You see me? I'm responsible for it.

[24:37] Why did I put the letters in this order? If I did. Well, I'm one of those hundred million cat owners, or I wasn't. You know, had cats when I was a little boy. My daughter has a cat. I always talk about these cats. Okay. I want to talk about my favorite animal, right? The cat. Some reason I'm more attached to cats than dogs. What's wrong with you?

[25:05] Because I saw a dog, I had a dog, and then you saw a cat. I'm much more friendly. I got a couple of pieces of dog's friendship for me, don't you? It's kind of, you know, that kind of unusual thing, right? Um. So I put them in this order because I wanted to talk about, right? My favorite animal, right? Now why did I put it in this order?

[25:31] Well, I'm a philosopher. I like to talk about act and ability, right? Because I want to teach the ninth book of wisdom, my favorite book in the 12 books, right? So

[25:43] that's my purpose, right? I want to teach metaphysics, or I want to talk about my favorite animal. So my end or purpose is another cause, now, right?

[25:55] So now I force you to admit there's four kinds of causes, right? Which doesn't mean that everybody, that every place, you should look for all four kinds of causes, right? Aristotle explains that, right? So in mathematics, right, we don't we talk about the mover or the end, right? Or even matter in the ordinary sense, right? Just

[26:19] My friend Warren Murray was at University of Minnesota for a while, and the professor was saying Aristotle has 4 causes and look, the four causes everywhere.

[26:29] I thought through it all, and I'm quite clear about that. So Thomas is recalling this distinction of the four causes, but these two causes are interior, right? These two causes are exterior, right? And how do you denominate something from something exterior, right? Okay, he's going to say three is third cause, right? Okay. That's cool. There, okay.

[27:07] So he says since there are four genera of causes. Thomas learned this from his master Aristotle, right? Who he calls by antonomasia the what? Philosopher.

[27:33] Two of these are on the side of the what essence or nature of the thing. Now that's terrible word essence. Okay, kind of used to make fun of that. I guess in French essence is for gasoline, right? So that was part of his joke about the the word. Okay, two of these are on the part of the nature of the thing, right? Essence, what it is, to it, matter and what form.

[27:58] Whence the predication which comes about according to these two pertain to the predicament of what substance? If, for example, we say that man is rational and man is what bodily, right? So the genus is taken from what is like matter, and the difference from what form. Okay. So those aren't going to come under this third division, right? Where you're being denominated from something outside of you, right?

[28:32] Okay, this is pertain to your very nature, right? But the final cause does not cause anything apart from the what agent, because agent is acting for an end that the is got a cause. For to that extent, the end has the notion of a cause in so far as it moves the agent. It remains, therefore, only the agent cause, which is the name of the third kind of cause, the mover, from which something can be denominated as from something what outside of it, right?

[29:10] If, therefore, according as something is denominated from an agent cause, there is the predicament of passion or undergoing, as I call it in English, which is nothing other than to receive something from the agent or the mover or the maker. But according as a converso, the agent cause denominated from his effect, there is the predicamentum of what acting upon or action. For the action is the act from the agent to another, as has been said above.

[29:49] So if I go over and give you guys a good kick, right? Um, I got to have something outside of me that I'm kicking, right? You. Okay. And so this is something from me in towards you, right? Okay. And you are being on the other side. You are being kicked by something outside of you, right? Okay. So you're being denominated from something. Outside of you, right, and that is either the cause of you or the effect of this.

[30:24] How would that be related? How would actio be related, or passio? How would that be related to motion? Well, motion is from the mover into the moved, right? So, insofar as motion is from the mover, right?

[30:44] Yeah, I am being moved by another, right? So, something is being said to me by reason of something outside of me, right? I am said to be moved by the mover, right, and receiving it from. And vice versa, the the agent is what communicating or bestowing or giving motion to what something outside of it, right? So, if I push this thing here right now, this thing is what being moved by something outside of it.

[31:15] My hand is not part of the glass. See, so it's being moved by my hand, and my hand is moving something what outside of right? So you can say that the glass is being moved, and I am what moving it, right? So you have to bring in something outside of me, right, to say that I am acted upon something, or that I am being acted upon, or I am undergoing something from another.

[31:45] Could the actio be in different categories? In other words, could actio belong to the category of quantity or quality? Well, this is something to come up later on, huh? Because Aristotle will say that motion, right, is in the categories of quantity, like growth, right, is a kind of change in quantity, and alteration, right, is in the category of quality, and locomotion or change of places is in the category of where, right?

[32:25] But acting upon and undergoing are said by reason of something outside of you, right? Okay. So acting upon would differ from the motion itself by the fact that it's from me to you, right? Or undergoing it's in me from you, right? Okay. Now it's the difference here between.

[33:00] I put water on in the morning there, and it comes out of the faucet. They're cold, right? Okay, and they're going to heat up the water and make tea.

[33:11] So warm is a or hot is a quality of what water, right? Not a natural thing, maybe. It's induced, right? And so, where would you put becoming warm or becoming hot? In what category would you put that?

[33:38] It's a change of quality. Yeah, yeah. It's something imperfect in the category of quality, right? So it's reduced, right, to the genus of quality, not because it's a quality fully, right, but it's because it's the what imperfect, you know, becoming of that quality, right? Okay. So the becoming hot would be put in quality, right? Becoming five foot ten wherever I am, right, would be put in the category of quantity, right?

[34:14] Growing, right? Growing is acquiring a certain quantity, and therefore we'd put it in quantity, but it's something imperfect, right? But now, what about? I might say that the stove, that the stove is heating my water.

[34:34] That would be an act, right? Yeah, the acting upon, yeah. And if I say that the water is being heated by the stove, right? That would be it's undergoing something from the stove, right?

[34:49] But just becoming hot, right? If you just if you abstract from the fact there's something outside me, right, that's responsible for my becoming hot, right? And you just say, what is becoming hot? What's you know imperfectly acquiring this what quality, right? So it's put in quality as something imperfect or incomplete or incomplete things. Yeah. Just like you might say, you know, learning, right? Are you learning logic now?

[35:19] Yeah. But you're acquiring, right, a quality which you put in the first species of quality, their habit or disposition, right? It's going to leave your mind disposed a certain way, right? We hold better disposed. Yeah, it's going to be a virtue of your mind, of your reason. But isn't any passio a passio in quantity or quality or like? Yeah, well, that's a distinction he makes, right? If you're considering merely the fact that the water is becoming hot, right?

[36:03] Then this is something in the water, right? Becoming hot is in the what? The water itself, right? But you're not taking anything outside the water, right? When you just speak of becoming hot, say. But if you say that you are being heated,

[36:26] see, there's a difference there, right? See, in the same way, if you say that the stove is hot, that's a quality in the stove, right? But if you say the stove is heating the water, right? Then you have to bring in something outside it, right? And therefore, it's being, uh, because there's something outside of it that's being heated by it, right? That you could say that the stove is heating my water for my tea.

[36:59] You can't make a cup of tea without logic, right? No, you can't understand making a cup of tea. without a cup Very good. See, see, how see, how how his mind is sharpening up now. And I can testify that Dr. Douglas makes very good tea. Personal experience. It's kind of a subtle distinction. No, I know it is. It is, but it's it's it's a real distinction, right?

[37:33] Your mind is going from confusion to distinction now. Your mind is confused, and now it's more distinct. So distinction, division, definition—distinction. There's something difference between becoming hot and being heated. There's something difference between becoming hot. Yeah, you say becoming hot. This is something going on in the water that's being prepared for my tea, right?

[38:04] Being set up water by itself. But when you say it's being heated, when you say it's being heated, you're bringing something outside of it, right? That is being, is acting upon it, right?

[38:22] You say that the fire is hot. That's a quality of the fire, right? Now, when I say that the fire is is is burning the the paper or something, right? Now, I used to see the same logician there. who said he despaired of the that thing. He'd be out there at the exam after, ex, you know, thing, and he'd be burning, burning the exams.

[38:47] So I'd see him doing that. Oh, it's joy. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So this is the two ways in which you can be denominated from something outside you that is a cause or an effect, right?

[39:12] I can't be kicking without you. Can't be beating you without you. Got to have you there to beat you, right? To whip you. Can't spank the kid without.

[39:33] My father come back from work, you know, and I haven't been good, you know. Sit there and tell me to sit there, and he didn't. hit me, He never hit me. I just, I would just. Yeah. I used to hit the kids. I'd take the belt off, you know. I'd whack the table, you know. That was enough. I had to whack them. Just whack the table before they sober up.

[39:53] The sound of it, Daddy's going to take his belt off. Wham Had to act upon the poor table, though. But the table don't really get felt too much about it. Too excited about it. Now, the other way you can be denominated from something, you know,

[40:22] commonly is measure, right now. Okay. And so, you know, sometimes I make rice. Okay. Well, then it says I don't know a cup of rice and how many cups of water? Two cups of water, I guess. I always say, Rosie, what is that?

[40:46] So, but you know, I take this cup measurement, and so now I've got a what cup of rice, right? All the things the logic taught me to do. I was going to

[41:08] use an exterior measure, right now. And sometimes you know you used to, you know take the kids' height, you know, against the wall there, you know, and you see, oh yeah, this is this is it, this is it, and so on, right now. And every time I go to the doctor for the checkup, you know, they put me on a damn machine and saw my height is I've shrunk or something.

[41:34] You must have shrunk when you get old, I guess. And, uh, and they weigh me and so on, right now. So you're measured by something outside of you, right now.

[41:46] And you know when they they get the March for Life there, you know the the guards there they try to what you might measure how many people you know occupy such an area and they try to estimate the the size of the crowd, right now. Because he's been trying to count everybody, right? You know, they say, okay, they they they they covered the whole such and such a thing, you know, and we know what it's about.

[42:11] So many people, right? Now, um... Of course, Thomas has studied Aristotle, and in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, he takes up place and what time, right now. So you get the idea of place and time being tied up with what measure things, right?

[42:43] So what did that guy get stranded on an island there? What's his name? Robinson Crusoe, Robinson Crusoe, is that his name? Yeah, he wanted to keep track of time, so he's marking the sunrises,

[42:59] and that's the way we, you know, the sun comes around. So you're being measured by something outside of you, right now. How many years have I been on this island? How many days? Can I keep track of it, How long I've been marooned here, right? Okay.

[43:23] So, place is something outside of you, right? So, if you take place itself, you know we go by bottle size, right? And sometimes you get one bottle size of the wine, you know, and you get a, you know, one and a half liter or something, and you get a three quarters of a liter, whatever it is. Yeah.

[43:51] So, if you take the inner surface of the bottle, right, which contains the wine, it's contained within the inner surface of the wine. That's a quantity, right? That's we put in the category of of quantity, right? Now, but the wine is what being contained by the surface of something outside of it, right?

[44:16] And that's good. Okay. It's it's a measure how much wine it is, right? Okay. So otherwise, in this bottle, I know it's that much of wine. It's got this bottle, it's got twice as much, you know. It's like having a bottle to Thanksgiving dinner at my brother-in-law's. Oh, I've got to have this bottle, this bottle, Don't bother with the, don't bother with the little bottles, right? Okay.

[44:46] So Thomas points out that, okay, the extrinsic measure is one thing, and the intrinsic measure is another thing, right? The intrinsic measure is the proper length of something, and its length and width and depth and so on. And from these, one is denominated by something intrinsic, right, Inhering, right. So that's a large mountain, right, or a small hill or something. Once it pertains to the predicamentum, the category of what quantity.

[45:22] But the exterior measures are time and what place. And according to something is denominated from time, it's the predicament of when, quando. According to something is denominated from place, it's the predicament of ubi, right? But then he adds and situs, right, which adds above in addition to ubi in order of one's parts in place. Okay. So if you say I'm in this room, right,

[45:59] that's ubi where? Where am I in this room? But I could be sitting in this room as I guess I am now, or I could be standing as I was a few minutes ago. I probably wouldn't lay down in this room. But if the weather gets a little bad, I'm gonna have to lay down. In this room, right? And so there's an arrangement of parts in what place?

[46:25] Okay. Now, you might want to distinguish between being positioned, is what maybe you call this category, and shape or the something intrinsic, right? So, an example: I used to always give with students. I'd say,

[46:46] "notice, the way my parts are arranged, one is above or below the other, kind of in a straight line." Okay. Now, if I jumped out of an airplane, my body could be in that same, you know, respect to each other. But would I be standing as I came down the sky, right? No, no. In order for me to be standing, I have to have something outside of me to stand on. And there's nothing to stand on when I jump out of the airplane, right?

[47:16] Do you see the idea? See? So that's the difference between just looking at the order of the parts of my things, the same, right? But it would not be called standing, you see. And if someone knocks me and I go like this, I'm like a man sitting or laying down, right? But I'm not really laying down. You got to have a bed or something, or a sofa or something, right, to lay on, right?

[47:40] Or or lay on the floor. You got to have something outside of you, right? Okay. And in order for me to sit, right, I need something outside that I can share that I can do this, right? The example we used to get in class was I said, you know, suppose someone comes up to your house and you say, "Sit down." He did like this, you know. Is this sitting down?

[48:01] Am I sitting down? No. See, I'm in the same position as a man sitting down, right? You see? But if you're talking about the intrinsic, I'm not sitting down because I've got to have something, I'm crouching, really, you'd say, right? See, I need, you know, something like a chair, right? I can, right? Yeah. And then, you know, that's why I'm being denominated from something outside of me that I'm sitting on.

[48:31] Even standing, I depend upon the floor or something below me, right? It's holding me up. Thomas explains that you don't have something that is to quando like situs is to ubi, like being position Because situs means the what the order of parts in place, right? Okay. Which is not in the notion of where, right? You say where am I? I'm in this room, right? He doesn't say what my position is, does it?

[49:07] But time has in the very definition the idea of position or order, right? Because time is the what the number of the before and after in motion. In fact, you gentlemen know from the post predicaments that the first meaning of before and after is in time, yeah. So you're not going to have have another category there for that, right? That's very subtle, right? This he says is not necessary to add in the part of time because the order of the parts in time is implied in the very notion of time, right?

[49:44] It's a very sense of what order means, what before and after, right? Okay. And that's the very notion of time. It's the number of the before and after in time. For time, he quotes a definition of time. For time is the number of motion according to the before and after.

[50:10] What does poor Richard II say in Shakespeare's play? Now it's time made meter numbering clock. He's crying, you know, for for guy. Okay. Thus, therefore, something is said to be when and where through denomination from time or place. And then he takes up man's special category, right? Okay.

[50:40] There is something, however, special in man. That's what we call this man's category, right? Okay. Now, because Thomas talks about this last, some people arrange the categories putting this last, but Aristotle doesn't do that, does he? What does he give as the last categories?

[51:06] Enumerating them. Because he just didn't but he didn't knit with you know. he didn't knit with philosophy, or enumerate them. You wouldn't expect to see any order. But Aristotle put last what?

[51:21] Acting upon and undergoing, right? And he put where and when and position, right? And then this man's category in that order that just gave them before acting upon undergoing. Was there a reason why he gives them before acting upon undergoing?

[51:50] Hmm. Well, that's another thing that's said later on, but where and when are kind of tied up with what quantity in some way, right? Although they have the exterior denomination from place and time and so on, right? By acting upon and undergoing, are more tied up with what quality, aren't they? So just as quantity is before quality, right? So the categories that pertain to extrinsic measure, right, are put before those that pertain to acting upon undergoing, just as quantity was before what quality.

[52:33] So Thomas is goofing it up here, right, a little bit, huh? Okay. Nobody's kind of saying just not kind of. He wants to those things that are common to all of us, right? Okay. And then man's kind of special thing, right? So in some of the old things like an ostrich logic book that we used in college, I think they would put habitus last and all that.

[52:59] Influenced by Thomas's explanation of these things, right? But makes some kind of sense to you know to explain the ones that have something in common before the one that has something kind of private to man's oddball thing there, right? Okay. If you think of a you know of a soldier or a fireman you know or a policeman right you know or a bride and so on right huh you know something special about these occupations or the occasion right huh requires a special kind of what dress the bride's going to wear all by herself or with her father you know is going to give her away you know and I didn't want her to take her dress off you know her wedding dress you know keep

[53:48] all the ornaments beautiful you so on and so I mean there's something peculiar really about that huh you know to to man right woman especially you know okay

[54:05] so the other things huh other animals they have by nature huh their fur grows thicker in the winter time and they shed fur don't they in the summer or something you know we take up put away the big overcoat now or take it off take it out you know when the winter comes right okay and the same way these things we need to protect ourselves right

[54:29] so I need a knife a fork and a spoon I need a hammer and a saw and a screwdriver and all these sorts of things you know okay

[54:44] so when the other animals are said to be armed or clothed or shod huh in a way they are not denominated from something extrinsic but from some of their what parts huh okay

[54:57] now as the cat there to go into the bed there and the dog try to you know the cat yeah and what a cowboy has a little boy there we'd we'd be out raking the leaves you know in the winter I mean in the fall and the leaves are all accumulating you know and the cat would jump inside the pile of leaves the dog comes to ground the cat yes they're kind of clever Washington Irving describes you know being at Sir Walter Scott's house and he had dogs and cats now but the cat would sit there and put a paw on each animal going by and showing that they're the king you know what

[55:43] Christ is called the lion of the tribe of Judah right he wants to call my dog you know so the the lion you know you have the king English king right you know Richard the Lionhearted right not the doghearted it says the dogs are outside the city yeah yeah the dogs yeah

[56:09] That's it. Yeah, so but then the great poem, you know, Francis Thompson, "The Hound of Heaven." Oh. Well, we had a guy on on EWTN the other night there, where these people who've converted or this guy he grew up in the Catholic, in grade school and everything, but he became some kind of psychologist, right? And heard all these stupid arguments that the moderns give against God, right?

[56:36] Huh? And he became kind of an atheist, right? And I guess in his forties he had to pick up the Summa Theologica, and all of a sudden these answers, these arguments that seemed good to him, they seemed to be no longer good, right? And and Thomas was you know straightening him out, you know, so he came back to the faith, you know. And then he wrote a book about the Dominican saints, right?

[56:59] Huh? Of course, you know, Saint Dominic or his mother had the great dream of a dog, you know, you know, because because they protect the church from the heretics, right? Huh? And. So it's a hound, I think the name of his book is the hounds of something, you know. talking about the Dominican saints, right? Dominican Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, remember what his name was, remember what? his name was What?

[57:27] Remember what his name was? Saint Thomas's name? No, no, the psychologist. Oh, I can't remember the name yet. We have to see it on the watch sometimes. So, we'll get him there. Yeah, interestingly, people are.

[57:48] I guess I'm overrunning your gift a little bit. Yeah. Okay. Okay, but we we have to look at the other other one though for the metaphysics, right? Okay. So when man is these other animals, it's like you say that like a man is a hand or an arm or a leg, it's denominated from, from part of your what body, right? Now, but when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, right, he's denominated from something extrinsic, right?

[58:19] Which neither has the notion of a cause nor of a measure, right? Now, once it's a special predicament and it's called habitus, right? That's what they get in some of the Latin logic books. Their English ones they use the word habit, you know how. But gotta be careful because the word habit is got another sense, right?

[58:40] And the other animals, this thing is not attributed in their own life, but when they come the use of man, you know. So you put something on the horse, right? You would have a parade or something, right? And

[58:53] little girls try to dress the cat and so on, you know, sort of nonsense. But anyway, I see Bob walk around with a dog and with a little little bit of a little jacket for the dog, you know. They said, yeah, yeah,

[59:07] not written in English here, but tried to do that. So maybe next time we'll look at the one from metaphysics. Yeah, fifth book in metaphysics. See, see if if we see any difference between that and the the other one in the physics, right?