Logic (2016)
9. Crossing Two Divisions, How Words Become Equivocal by Reason, and the Start of the Chapter on Substance
Class of 2016-11-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/009-crossing-two-divisions-how-words-become-equivocal-by-reason/

[0:00] Interesting too, you know the the way we divide sometimes by crisscrossing two divisions of two, right? That gives you four things, right? But sometimes that's a way of getting three, right? Because one of them is not real. So I take two examples there. One from from Aristotle's book on the poetic art, where he's distinguishing the parts of a what plot, and he praises Homer for teaching other Greeks to say that a plot, a plot's unity is not being about one man what happened to him, but it's about a course of action that has a beginning, a middle, and end.

[0:40] That's what the great Homer saw. He taught all the Greeks. That's what's got to be. Well, how you define those, right? Where Aristotle takes what he takes two divisions into two. He says a part of the of the

[1:10] it's either before another part Or it's not before another part. And it's either after another part Or it's not after another part. Now isn't it clear to you, right? Because of you know spent on time, right? Any part of the plot is either before another part or not before another part. It's got to be one or the other. And it's either after another part or not after another part.

[2:12] No alternatives, right? Okay. Now we're going to crisscross them, right? Okay. Now what's before another part and after another part? That's the middle. Now what's before another part

[2:36] but not after another part? The beginning. That's the beginning. Now what is after another part but not before another part? Yeah. Now the fourth one is what is neither before another part nor after another part. Is that a real

[3:06] part? No. No. It's impossible. So that's that's right. Aristotle divides the plot into beginning, middle, and end, right? But you might say he's crisscrossing these things, right? And getting these three, and then realizing this is not one, right? Now another example here, right? Now, this is the beginning, and this way you read maybe Philomythos before you're a philosopher, right? So this is example from the Philomythos is going to be questioned, right?

[3:42] Okay, now we go to the highest thing, theology, right? And you say the members of the of the Blessed Trinity, right? How are they distinguished then? By relations of proceeding, right? Okay. How many kinds of proceeding? You say

[4:09] you proceed from another, or you do not proceed from another. You can't be one the other, right? So a divine person either proceeds from another or he does not proceed from another. He must be one of those.

[4:36] And another proceeds from another Who proceeds from it? yeah Okay Another proceeds from it? Or another does not proceed from another, or another does not proceed from a verb. Oh, I didn't do it right here. I should have.

[5:41] Okay. I get my four boxes, right? Okay. Now who proceeds from another, or another proceeds from him? That is the Son yeah. Now who proceeds from? what From another Who does not proceed from another, or another does not proceed from him? The Father. That is the Father, right?

[6:18] Now who proceeds from another, but another does not proceed from him? What? Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit, yeah. Now, who neither proceeds from another, nor does another proceed from him?

[6:42] Well, if the divine persons are what distinguished, right, by relation of what proceeding from or another proceeding from him, relations of proceeding, this is there's no possibility, right? So it can only be three persons, right? Well, it's the same way as with the with the plot, right? So sometimes by crisscrossing a division of affirming and negative, right? Huh? You get four slots, but only three of them are what real, right?

[7:21] Okay. Now, in Aristotle, in the *Antepredicaments*, what kind of a division did he have, though? Well, this is the way we we can speak of one of the *Antepredicaments There said of another, and not said of another. Okay.

[8:12] And then exist in another is in a subject, and not exist in another, right? So I'm just saying exists in itself, right? That's what it's saying. Okay. Now you draw the shot here, and what is said of another and exists in another?

[8:46] Universal accident. Yeah, universal accident. What exists in another but is not said of another? Singular accident. Yeah, singular or individual accident. What is said of another, but does not exist in another? Universal substance. Yeah.

[9:17] And what does not exist in another has not said of another, but you or me. Singular substance, right? As you can see from those two that I did before, right? You don't want to leave out what, and just assume that they're all real, right? huh? See? Well, is there such a thing as a singular substance? Yeah, you get to know yourself, you know, know thyself, right? What am I?

[9:48] Oh, I'm see, yeah, I'm one of these things, yeah, yeah, yeah, okay. As such a thing as universal, is such a thing as universal substance? Well, let's be careful. now I mean. If you're a pig in this you might think there's a world of forms right now, but we're in logic now right now, and logic, you know, talks about things as they are in our mind, right? So do you have universal substances?

[10:14] We talk about the cat and the dog, right? But that's universal, right? That's substance, right? But universal, right? Instead of another one. So dog instead of our friend down here who's trying to get in the lecture, right? Okay. So that's that's real, right? In the mind, right? Okay. In wisdom, you'd say a little different, you know. It's outside the mind, right? Remember that distinction again, right? Being in the mind, right?

[10:41] Okay. So universal substances, substance in the mind, maybe not out in the real world there, like Plato's, you know, man himself, dog himself, and cat himself, and so on, right? Okay. So we have that in our mind, don't we? Man, generally animal, etc. Okay. Now, singular accident, huh? Well, there's some knowledge in my head, right? And that's my knowledge of geometry, right? That singular accident, right? Yeah, my knowledge.

[11:19] Okay. Doctor says I'm pretty healthy. He doesn't agree that I turned to be an old man at eighty. We can tell you I'm an old man at sixty, he says. What do you mean? I mean, I've been an old man for twenty years. I didn't know it.

[11:37] He says, "Yeah, you're here, ready? You're here. You're pretty impressive by health at my age." So, um, so my knowledge, right? But then, can't you think of knowledge in general, right? Okay. So knowledge, geometry or something, right? Okay. This distinction, my knowledge of geometry. Okay. So they're all real, at least in the mind, right? They're all beings in the mind, huh? So, see, that's a good piece four, right?

[12:14] Now, what order Aristotle enumerates them, right? Universal substance first. Yeah. He didn't take the one where both of these were, but affirmative, right? First, huh?

[12:39] Which did he take? One where? What was that? Set up. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That being a substance, right? Okay. Is that a substance? Yeah. He takes one where one of these is affirmed, one negated, right? And he does those two first, right? And then he takes the one where both are negated or both are affirmed, right? Why does why does the master do that?

[13:16] Well, because he doesn't want you to confuse said of another and exist another. method that's kind of the same thing, right? They're kind of similar, aren't they, right? Said of another, exist another, right? You know, I'd say yeah. It's both of them, you know, like your kind of synonyms, right? See, but this is said of another, but doesn't exist another, and this exists another, but not said of another.

[13:35] Then to exist another and said of another are quite two different things, right? And maybe Aristotle would say, you know, look, Porphyry you dummy, why don't you start talking about the middle first, right? Because that's before something and after something, right? Why don't you take something that's before something and not after anything, and something that's after something but not before anything, and then find the one that's both?

[14:00] See, then you'd be doing like I was doing there in the antipredicaments, right? You dummy, Porphyry, you know. I'd say, well, my teachers told me that compared to Aristotle, I got the brain of an inguorm, right? So. Those are your expectations, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But I've been enlightened by you. What more can I ask for, Aristotle? Yeah. But the other examples I gave you, you know, when you crisscross two divisions, affirmative, negative, you get only three real, so we say, possibilities, right?

[14:43] But still, it's kind of rigging the mind there, right? See those four combinations you get, right? And then examine the four and see, hey, they're all real, you know? Is it really a part of the of the drama that's not before anything or after anything? Wouldn't be part of me. He's stupid, right? Is it really a

[15:05] member of the blessed Trinity that is neither proceeding from anyone nor is anyone proceeding from him? He's kind of a a loner. So I'm left out. Yeah, he's kind of over by himself there, you know.

[15:24] the god of solipsis. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So would you agree that Thomas has followed the rule of two or three, right? coming those ten, but, Aristotle just gives you the ten there, right? But maybe in the Insecta Placide he made it done that. But I mentioned that place, you know, you know the beautiful uh equivocal word by reason, the word in or to be in, and Aristotle, in the texts that we have, he just gives the eight senses.

[16:05] And he doesn't what order them right? Well, as we see in the categories, and you get to the chapter on before that I gave you before with the with the Shakespeare's excitation, right? What does it mean to look before and after, right? Aristotle not only distinguishes the main senses, but he gives the order, right? now on the text we have in the fourth book of the Physics, Aristotle doesn't order the eight senses, right?

[16:34] Although he indicates it to be in places the first one, right? And Thomas then what orders them perfectly, right? Now what kind of word equivocal by reason is before, right? How does this word become equivocal by reason?

[16:53] And I've spoken about that, you know, the different ways in which a word becomes equivocal by reason. Aristotle says, you know, in the Politics, I guess, other places that the man who sees how something, you know, comes to be, you know, will get a clear view of it, right? Well, how does a word become equivocal by reason?

[17:27] Well, I can think of at least three different ways that a word becomes equivocal by reason. Sometimes a word that is said of two or more things with more or less the same meaning, right? Is kept by one of them as its own name, and the other one has to get its new name.

[17:59] Now the word has two meanings, right? You see, that's a kind of strange thing to do, isn't it? Well, there's a couple ways in which this takes place, right? Sometimes one of the two things that it's said of, right, has nothing noteworthy in addition to that what common name. Why the other one has something very much noteworthy, right? Okay. So sometimes we say animal of man and dog and cat without insulting man, right?

[18:41] Other times we distinguish man against the animals, don't we? My mother was shocked when I called man an animal. The nurse, as I replied to my mother, well, he's not just an animal. See, so the animal that is just an animal, meaning he has nothing noteworthy in addition to being a living body with senses and so on. He keeps the name animal as his own now, right?

[19:09] You give me a new name, man. Why? Because I've got something really noteworthy, huh? In addition to what the animal has, I've got universal reason and will, right? Wow. So give me a new name and call me man, right? Okay.

[19:28] You'll see Aristotle when he talks about habit and disposition in the category of quality, right? Suddenly he'll distinguish between habit and disposition, right? But he'll call sometimes habit a what? Firm disposition, right? Where disposition is easily lost, keeps the name disposition as its own name, right? And habit has something noteworthy, right? Huh? You know, you really got a good or a bad habit. Probably a bad habit. You're kind of stuck with this habit, right?

[20:05] So, okay. But now the other way that sometimes one of the two things keeps the common name because it fully or perfectly has the common meaning, and the other has imperfectly, right? So if someone says to me, you know,

[20:35] if a little kid calls a kitten a puppy, said, "No, no, that's not a puppy. A puppy is a dog, and a kitten is a cat." Okay. But sometimes we distinguish between a kitten and a cat, and a puppy and a dog, right? Okay.

[20:59] Because a cat is a fully developed cat, right? And a kitten is an immature and not fully fully developed, right? You can fool a little kitten more easily than a cat. A cat is no more sh— Okay. In. The same way you might say that a boy is a man and a girl is a woman, and another time you might distinguish a boy as a man, right?

[21:23] He's only a boy, you know. Still a girl, you know. I found a woman who liked to be called girls, you know. Men, men don't like to be called boys, you know. No, but my mother used to have, you know, she was, you know, the parish station would read scripture or something, you knew some some kind of spiritual reading or thing, you know. And I said The girls come in today, and they'd like to be called the girls, right?

[21:50] I know that, you know. See why my students say when you know my men student coming to the house, I wouldn't say you know the boys here tonight. Say gentlemen, you know, gentlemen, huh? I call him gentlemen.

[22:05] But uh uh so it those are two ways, huh? Okay. Aristotle calls wisdom theology. Do you know that? Okay. Now we usually distinguish between what philosophy and theology, right? And between what Aristotle also calls at first philosophy, right? See, well, now does theology become equivocal? In one case, the philosophy is not theology, you know. And you know, when I was teaching college, we had a philosophy department and a theology department.

[22:45] See, and but Aristotle calls philosophy theology, right? So philosophy theology is a knowledge of God. Well, Aristotle's a knowledge of God here, you know. But. revealed theology is a much more perfect knowledge of God, right? Much fuller, right?

[23:10] It's not just the goal of theology; it's the very subject of theology, right? What the subject of first philosophy is being, he's dividing, right? And so,

[23:25] revealed theology keeps the name theology, right? And then we distinguish the other and call it first philosophy, or maybe wisdom, something. Even wisdom is more said as theology, right? Revealed theology than first. But Thomas gives, you know, wisdom as a synonym for philosophy, right? Okay, okay. But I take the word theology there, right? Okay.

[23:52] So it has more fully what is meant by theology, right? Knowledge of God, right? Those are the two ways, huh? Aristotle, when he talks about property and definition, right, where property is speech that is convertible with the thing, right. So definition is a property, huh? In that sense, right.

[24:22] But speech that is convertible with the thing sometimes, although being convertible with the thing, it doesn't bring out what it is fully, right? Speech that's convertible with the thing and brings out what it is has an excellence the other one doesn't have. so we'll give that a new name and call it definition, and then we'll call the other thing a what? Yeah.

[24:50] Do you see the idea? Yeah. So Aristotle suggests something there, right? In the book on the places, huh? You know. So those two ways come under one way, right? That when a name is said with the same meaning of two things, right, or more, sometimes it's kept by one of them, right, as its own name, and then the other gets a new name, right. But it takes place in these two ways, right?

[25:19] So now the word becomes what equivocal. You know, they sometimes say Thomas. I have an article, I think. in the Summa even doesn't he, where he says that man's understanding is his reason. Understanding the name of his power, right? The power to understand, right? But then sometimes they say, yeah, but man doesn't understand very well. And he has to go through a lot of reasoning and thinking about a thing, and I think it's a little bit of understanding, you know.

[25:48] So let's keep the name Intellectus, right? Understanding, for what an angel has, right? What kind of angel has, right? Or what God has, right? You know. No, the mind is full of forms as Dionysius says, right? You know, you know, this, you know, my son Marcus Ari. Now, why do we have to learn all these things? Why can't we just be born knowing everything we need to know?

[26:15] I said, you want to be an angel rather than a human being, you know? It's disgusting. Yeah. So what do they get called? So they call sometimes they say man has got an intellectus umbratus which means a what, cloudy, cloudy, overclouded, darkened understanding. You know, I thought was like sounds pretty close in, but so we're going to give we're going to let the angels keep the name understanding for what they have, and we'll give man I don't need to reason.

[26:45] You've got to try to reason out things and get a little bit of understanding. You know, you see me. So I mean, this runs through all of our things, and people get you know confused because they don't realize that this is one way the name becomes equivocal. Okay. Now, another way, right, the name becomes equivocal is by what? Dropping out part of its meaning.

[27:15] So, when Aristotle talks about the sensing, right? He takes the Greek word, you know, for understanding, right, for passio, right. Okay. And the first meaning is something bad, right? It's being acted upon in a way that's harmful to you, right? Okay. Now, why is that the first meaning of of of undergoing, right? Well, when I take a pin and I'm sticking you with this pin, you know, torturing you, you know, you know, it's it's extremely clear to you that you're being acted upon, right?

[27:53] You know, okay. When I walk around the room and I bump into something, oh, oh, oh, oh, I'm very much sure that I'm undergoing something, right? I've been acted upon, right? If I got a broken arm or a leg or something, you know, as a result of this collision, you know, I'm very much sure that I've been acted upon, right? Okay. But

[28:17] when I what hear something, isn't the sound of Mozart's music acting upon my ear? Well, it's a beautiful sound, right? It's perfecting my ear, you know, a noble object like this, huh? The incorporeal motet as John Paul II said, about Mozart's Ave Verum corpus, right? You know.

[28:42] So I'm dropping out the idea of what you're receiving something, right? But not in a way that's contrary to your nature. It seems very much in accordance with the nature of my ear, right? As they often say, no one knew how beautiful one's voice could be until Mozart got a, what? aria for it, right? And we have some of these, you know, singers. You know, besides the wits, with the beauty of the aria that Mozart has given them to sing, and they're going to, and everybody's going to be, oh, you know, yeah, you're going to be going crazy about these things, you know, huh?

[29:15] You know, you know, we see we have a lot of talent in our era series, you know, the women singers, right? And singers from the masses, you know, and even, you know, some of the girls here in high school, right? And I have to go up there and say, You know, where'd you get this? You know, but but but you sing Mozart, I mean, you know how beautiful his voice is.

[29:36] So this is the way that you you drop out part of the meaning of it and kind of generalize it, right? You see. So Aristotle takes the word undergoing in a bad sense, right? And drops out the see, and then says that sensing is undergoing, but it's still undergoing in the body, right? And finally carries it over and even drops the body and the mind undergoes. Something that it understands, right?

[30:01] It's acted upon, right? By the agent intellect, right? Okay. That's a beautiful way, right? Now, another example. This is the word road, right? So I says to my son Paul, when he was a little boy there, he was going to find him with the first toy car I bought him, and he didn't know what to do with it, you know. So I get down on the floor there and said,

[30:28] boom, boom, boom, and oh boy, boom, boom. So I says to him one day, Paul, what do you think of the basic road in human knowledge? He says, there are cars and trucks on it. He says. So he's stuck on the first meaning of road, right? Huh? But when I carry the word road over and speak of the first road in our knowledge and the private road of each science and the road of reason and so on, I drop out the the stone or cement or tar, whatever it is that the road is made out of, but I keep the idea of a before and after, you know.

[31:04] See? So what is a road in our knowledge, right? It's a before and after in our knowledge, huh? So I've what dropped out part of the meaning of road, right? The concrete. Take a pun on that, right?

[31:24] Okay. But I keep something of the idea of road, huh? You know. What's the physicist there, Eddington? You know, new pathways in science, you know, and so on. Okay.

[31:39] So that's a second way, right? The word becomes equivocal by reason, huh? Now, a third way is by a ratio or ratios, right? So sometimes a a name, right, that is said of one thing is carried over to another, right, by reason of the ratio of the second thing, right, that it has to the first thing, right.

[32:20] So philosophy is an knowledge that a lover of wisdom would pursue, right? Was logic a knowledge that a lover of wisdom would pursue? No. It's out of necessity, right? See? So logic is really the the tool of philosophy, right? Huh? Bah! it's got connection there with philosophy, right? It's not philosophy, but the tool of philosophy. What couldn't we call the tool of philosophy? Philosophers' movements. It's a little different sense, right?

[32:55] Okay. So the name is carried over from the first thing to the second thing by reason of the ratio that the second thing has to the first.

[33:14] But now the most interesting name to equivocal by reason is where there is a likeness of ratios, right? And that seems to be what's going on there with the word before, right?

[33:30] And you know, especially if you look at the way you go from the the second sense of before and after, which is in being, right? If this can be without that, but that can't be without this, then this is said to be before that in being, right? Now, if this can be known without knowing that, but you can't know that without knowing this,

[33:56] then this more known is before the less known, right? You see, it's like that, right? It's proportional, right? So now it's not as easy a proportion like four is to six as two is to three, right? But you can say, you know, what can be without another is to what cannot be without it. Something like what can be known without another can that can't be known without it.

[34:22] You see that, right? Yeah. So it's carried over, right? Now, and those eight senses of in, right? Sticking the poor, the poor, the poor, poor brother Jerome there, the Benedictine, right? The eight senses of in there. So I came in the class with the name. The eight senses stole the board there, you know, because nobody erases that. Put it right up on the board.

[34:54] But there it seems to me something like that. You're being carried over, right? I'm in this room. My teeth are in my mouth. Not their room, so to speak. It's kind of similar, right? You see, there's a little difference there because my teeth are attached to the inside of my mouth, right? I'm not really attached to this room, you know. I can move quickly out of the room if I have to.

[35:30] But the someone loosens one of my teeth for me. A nice blow in the jaw or something. Then it would be in there just in a place, right? There's this kind of a likeness of ratios, huh?

[35:46] So this is a another way, right? Either by what the ratio of one to another, or by a likeness of ratios, huh? Which we call a what proportion, right?

[36:03] So we talk about a substantial form, right? The word "form" is what And it's in proportion, right? act and ability there, right? So act is known by by proportion, huh?

[36:35] I'm not walking now, but I'm able to be walking now, right? When I go from the ability to walk to actually walking, right? Or the wood is able to be a what chair, but it's not actually a chair until it gets its what form. Well, form is like walking in that sense, in proportion, isn't it?

[37:01] I'm able to walk, but I'm not walking until I actually start walking, right? The wood is able to be a chair, but it's not a chair until it actually has the what form, yeah. Oh, yeah, okay. We can call the form then the act of the wood, right? And the my knowing something is the act of my ability to know, right? But it's a little different sense, isn't it?

[37:24] Right? There's something proportional about that, right? Aristotle says that act cannot be defined, but it's the first thing known. The first things known they're known without definition, right? But you come to know or understand act by seeing this likeness of of ratios, huh? Is it the same for for what they call prime matter?

[37:48] Yeah, yeah. It's known by Aristotle says in the first book of the Natural Hearing that the first matter is known by seeing a proportion, right? And you

[38:00] say the first matter is the man and dog, as the clay is the sphere and cube. Let's say, right? Well, this cube is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not at the same time. And when it's actually a sphere, it's able to be a cube, right? But if it became a cube, it would cease to be a sphere, right? Well, the matter is able to be a man or a dog, right?

[38:25] But when the dog eats the man, and then the man becomes a dog, right? You know, so it can't be both a man and dog at the same time, right? So it's a likeness of what proportion, right? But since man and dog are these fundamental things called substances, right? Why sphere and cube are something in the category of quality? You can say that the first matter then is pure what ability, right?

[38:57] So it's interesting that both at least one sense of matter. or ability to have one sense of matter Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And so you you know these things by a likeness or ratios, right? That's kind of amazing thing to see.

[39:22] And Aristotle says, you know, that in in talking about metaphor, you know, the best metaphor is based on a you know likeness or ratios, and just like the similes, you know, like is the ways make towards the pebbled shore, so do our minutes hasten to the end, right? I mean, the the the likenesses are the things that are further apart, right? You know, so you got to be careful with them, right, in the poet.

[39:53] That's what uh my mother did a cross-stitch thing, and she had something like as swift as the sun. re resolve revolves today so that we hasten to the dead Mm hmm Mm hmm Something like that Mm hmm

[40:12] This word, you know, substance, or the word to understand, right? Do you even see it? It was just kind of the category, right? Isn't Isn't there a passage? Is it in Saint Paul? You know where the church is called the pillar of truth? Does it call that?

[40:33] Yeah, it is quoted in Vatican II, but anyway, that's kind of you know, pillar, right? It's something that's understand, yeah, yeah. Or Saint Paul defines faith as the substance of things hoped for, right? Stands under. But it's a connection between carrying the word undergoing up to the mind, right, and understanding, right?

[41:13] Okay. Now we can go and look at the. Now, if you know the ten categories a little bit, right? Now we can go and Aristotle takes them up one by one, right? But mainly just the great ones, right? Substance and how much or quantity or how or quality and towards something, right? Just very briefly with the last six, right? Huh? Okay.

[41:43] So you have the the thing on substance now in particular. We don't have too much time. Get a little bit into it. So the the fifth chapter has two parts. The first part is about the distinction and order. It's an order, isn't it? There. You have to see a distinction before you can see the order, right? The distinction and order of first and what second substance, right?

[42:18] Notice he's going to call them first and second substance here, and not individual substance or particular substance and universal substance, like he did in the antepredicaments, right? Okay.

[42:31] But you see a connection there between order and first and second. Yeah, why he chooses that way of speaking, right here, right? Okay. And the second part is about the properties of substance. Let's see what these properties are. Okay. Now later on in here, there's there's a outline there of the yeah page five I guess here. in your R R Yeah.

[43:14] I think. I think even later on, later on it's even more like a division there. On page nine. Okay. Does it he's got a different page numbering than we do so it's page five in our text Yeah, the one where it's kind of laid out like this though, in a kind of very explicit way like this. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay.

[43:43] Distinction of first and second substance or what is contained in the genus of what substance. And there's the distinction between the first and second substance, right? What each is, and then the order first and second substances, right?

[44:03] Okay. Kind of funny Greek there, tho omega, and antitho, okay. And then among second substances, the species is more substance than genus, right? Okay. And then you have the properties down there. You'll see how they're broken up, right? Okay. To bear that in mind. Okay.

[44:33] Now, one thing you'll notice when you compare this chapter on substance with the chapters on quantity and quality, he does divide quantity, the genus, into its what species, right? Discrete and continuous quantity, and then he subdivides, you know, the discrete quantity into its species, right? And continuous quantity, and he does something like that with quality, right? He divides into different species and so on. He doesn't do that here with the the substance, right?

[45:06] Huh? He divides it into first and second substance, which is not a division into what species, right? Well, you might ask the question, why does he divide substance into species, like he divides quantity, let's say, into species? Because he's not adding a difference from outside. You can still do a little Porphyrian tree of substance if you want. We see in wisdom or first philosophy he will divide substance into material and immaterial substance, right?

[45:39] Huh? But it's very hard to know that there are immaterial substances by reason alone, right? Huh? Is it division? Are you are you predicating substance of those two things univocally? As far as logic is concerned, you are, yeah, because they're both a thing that exists, not as another isn't a subject, right? Okay, but if you go back to the foundation of genus and difference in things, we tend to say that the genus is taken from matter, right?

[46:14] Huh? And the difference from form. Well, there is no matter in the immaterial substance, so if they don't have the same matter, you know, they're not the same what genus it seems, right? And of course, Aristotle also thought that the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon, the stars, right, were some different kind of matter than things down here, right?

[46:39] It is kind of amazing the sun doesn't burn out, you know. The moon is burning out slowly, but as far as we can see, it's always the same, right?

[46:50] And so they put the sun and the moon, the stars, in psalms praising God with the angels, right? Huh? Because of their long living, you know, but they're not maybe like Aristotle thought that they don't change at all, right? Thomas in the book on the universe says, you know, that maybe it takes longer than the lives of many men, right, to see any change in the stars, right?

[47:14] So Aristotle's argument that they are unchanging is not, except for change of place, right? It's not necessary argument, right? Huh? But it's kind of unusual, right, that the sun can go on so much, right? They say that Heisenberg's pupil, Weizsäcker, had a lot to say about why the sun can go on so long, right? But you know, Herr von Weizsäcker said the sun is a hot stone, right?

[47:43] A stone on fire. Well, if it was a hot stone or a stone on fire, it wouldn't last as long as it's, you know, you know. But in other words, to to distinguish between material and immaterial substance is something that only the wise man can really do, right? Huh? And seems inappropriate in in logic to get into such a subtle thing, right? Yeah, he could just leave that aside and just go substance is living and non-living.

[48:08] Yeah, he could go that, but then that would be more, you know, what natural philosophy does, right? You know, but with quantity, he's going to give it right away into discrete and continuous, right? And we'll see how he does that. Okay.

[48:26] So I talk about that difference there, right, in the way he proceeds, huh? Okay, this would not be clear to a beginner, right? The same guy wrote the letter. He asked me, you know, you know, why did why does Aristotle say, you know, the first philosopher has identified substance with body, right? Huh? You know, I said, well, reason doesn't. Reason has difficulty separating things that are never separated in its experience.

[49:02] And so, you can see that even in the natural road of our knowledge, where reason doesn't separate the universal from the singular until it has an experience of many what singulars that are alike in what they are. It seems right. But if you saw only one dog, you wouldn't maybe separate dog from this dog, right? But if you see many dogs, you know they do find the dog is found without this individual dog and is found without this individual dog.

[49:38] You can more easily separate what they have in common, right? Well, it's not until you No er reason to say that they're immaterial substances, right? That you would tend to separate substance from body, right? huh We kind of confuse the two, right? You see So our mind's kind of stuck there. right Sad sad mind See

[50:07] That's true though, right? When Miranda sees the young man, right? She thinks so. They're all like this. O brave the world! they take the word "o brave the world, such creatures in it. And

[50:26] Prospero says, "It's new to you," he says. So, what kind of distinction is this between first and second substance that he gives there? And the little explanation here from Thomas. Thomas explains that the division or distinction of substance into first and second is not a division of a genus into its species, but a division of a genus by diverse ways of what being in that, right?

[51:09] So this is what Thomas says. When substance is divided into first and second, this is not a division of a genus into species, since nothing is contained under second substance that is not in first. But it's a division of a genus according to diverse ways of what being. So it's kind of like a division of what meanings of the word substance, right?

[51:36] For second substance signifies the nature of a genus by itself absolutely, but first substance signifies it as individually subsisting. Hence, it is magis divisio analogi divisio analogi, right? Of a that's the word they use sometimes for equivocal by reason, right? I know that's another example of equivocal by reason, though, right? Because sometimes Aristotle will use the word equivocal to mean equivocal by chance, and then and then they'll give a new name to equivocal by reason because that's something noteworthy, right?

[52:17] And what equivocal means is you have many meanings, right? If that's all you have, many meanings with no connection among the meanings, right? That's all you have, right? So we'll call that equivocal. But if there's an order among the meanings, oh my goodness, this is noteworthy, right? And so we give a new name. Yeah. Okay. I'm a little bit weary, I mean leery of the word analogous, because that means proportional, right?

[52:45] It's like taking one of the kinds, one of the ways that a name becomes equivocal by reason, right? And giving it for all that. So,

[52:56] so the word equivocal now becomes what? Equivocal, yeah, yes, yeah. Okay. Now it gets into a subtle thing here later on, but Aristotle is going to be, Thomas is going to rather be dividing the senses of substance that you have in the categories, right? And first substance and second substance will be two meanings of substance, right?

[53:44] But then in the beginning of the book, Aristotle uses the word substance for what a thing is. You didn't see that maybe in your text there, but the Greek when he's talking about

[53:59] um, equivocal and uh, univocal and so on, right? He says homonyma legetai, right? Equivocals are said onoma monon koinon. The name alone is common, right? The ho de kata touto onoma logos tes ousias huh The logos tes ousias is what?

[54:28] Yeah, the thought or definition of what it is is not the same, right? Okay. Well, there usia means what? What a thing is, right? That's one of the meanings of usia, right? Okay. And that sense of of substance, what a thing is, could be what found in any genus, right?

[54:50] What is courage? Well, it's a habit. It's a good habit. It's a virtue, right? So you can start to define this, right, and say what it is, right?

[55:11] When we speak of understanding, what's the first act of understanding? Simple grasp. Yeah, but Thomas in the Proemium to logic there he speaks of it like Aristotle in the third book on the soul, understanding what something is.

[55:32] Then the second act is composing or dividing, whereby you understand the true or the false, right? But the first act is understanding what something is. And I think I kind of know what a square is. I suppose you know it's not pride that you think you understand what a square is, but a circle is, right? What a quadrilateral is. And

[55:57] but notice, huh? If one meaning of what a thing is is substance, right? You see the connection etymologically between substance and understanding, right? They have a similar, right? So it's appropriate that understanding, that's, yeah, that There's a connection with the two words of what a thing is, yeah. This is the first meaning Aristotle gives in the first, antepraedicamentum. He says these words are the thing is being said equivocally when there's one word, but the logos, right, the thought or the definition, is tes ousias That's in the genitive, right?

[56:41] The definition of what it is, right, is not the same, right? Then, okay, but he says tes ousias huh Tes is the article, but ousias right? The genitive, of ousia or substance, right? So it's got it's a different sense, right? It's terrible this this, rash of words equivocal by reason, right? But you know that's what I'm going to propose as a as a dialectical question. Is it necessary to understand words equivocal by reason?

[57:18] We can't really understand fully even the axioms, right? You can't even get through the category of substance without running into all these meanings, right?

[57:33] I remember the the College of Saint Thomas there, you know the the big shot in the politics department, political science department, I should say, you know. Well, Thomas has so many meanings for the words he uses, he can't know what he means, He'd given up, right? You know. But the point is, you know, the words we use every day, like "whole and "part, have many meanings, right?

[57:55] And not by chance, right? There's an order among these meanings. And I told you my example. I used to try to show kids in metaphysics that they have to understand, you know, the different senses, right, and the order. And and I I deceived them with that argument I gave them to you many times. I think.

[58:20] I'd say, my mother didn't like when I called man an animal. I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal; he's an animal that has reason. Well, that's a better doing, she said. She never went to college, mother, but it didn't seem nice to say man an animal, you know. And I said, so therefore, an animal is only part of what man is. Everybody agreed, right? But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant.

[58:49] So sometimes it's only a part includes more than the whole. Yeah, yeah, So they're all deceived. This is kind of the most famous example, the most common example of a axiom, the statement known to itself by all. The whole was more than one of the parts, right? One of the axioms that the Euclid gives, right? And now it seems that

[59:15] we should have put a name Yeah. So that's not the most difficult name, right? But there's two kinds of whole, at least, which Aristotle distinguishes in the fifth book of Wisdom, and that is the composed whole, or they call it integral whole. I think composed whole is better. The whole that is put together from its parts, right? Every whole has parts, right? And the universal whole, which is set of its parts, right?

[59:48] And uh, notice how we use the word particular for one of the things it's set of, particular from part, right? So the universal whole is set of its parts. But not put together from them. The composed whole is put together from its parts, but not said of them, right? Okay. So the legs of the chair, are not four chairs down there, but it's a part of it, right?

[1:00:17] Composed whole. So a definition, right, of man as an animal that has reason, that's a definition. And what kind of a whole is that? Well, it's composed of the genus and difference, right? So

[1:00:34] a composed whole is always more than one of the parts composing it. And a universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts, right? So there's a difference there, right? But there is a what? A likeness of ratios, right?

[1:00:55] So the composed whole is just parts a little bit like universal whole is to its subject parts. They call them right, the parts it's said of, right? So if you can't distinguish those, you can be deceived by Berquist the sophist or someone else who's not going to lead you out of it, right? And so

[1:01:22] I said to Warren Murray, you know, I mentioned that on the phone there. I can't think of a modern philosopher I read who says this word is equivocal by reason, and this is the distinction of the senses, and this is the order of them. You know, they just go along and publish more books, publish more books without telling anyone. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But that was a good point this author was making, you know, about the distinction of senses of opposites, right?

[1:01:51] Contradiction and contraries, and having and lack, and relatives, and so on. Marx doesn't do that, right? This is the key to his whole his whole thinking, right? Dialectical materialism. Everything develops by the opposites. You think the man would stop and think and distinguish and see the distinction order of the senses of it.

[1:02:22] It's one thing's extreme going into me, you know, force it. But Aristotle, in the post-paragraphs here, give those distinguish the senses of opposites, right? Yeah.

[1:02:38] Now some people wanted, you know, you know, see if they could avoid words having more than one meaning, right? do we need words equivocal by reason? If you can do it by one only right Yeah Yeah Yeah Yeah.

[1:03:03] Whenever you came up with a new one, you gave it a different name, but you lose the connection, don't you? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you did give it a different name, of equivocation then you wouldn't have the problem of being deceived by equivocation as well Yeah, yeah, yeah, But. Our mind kind of have other problems. Yeah. Our mind kind of, you know, naturally, you know, extends words like this, right?

[1:03:34] And part of the thing is you can see that that let's say with words equivocal by likeness of ratios, that one sense is more known to us, right? And by seeing in orderly way, making a discourse, right, through the eight meanings of it, you come to know what you didn't know or didn't know so well from things that were more known, right? And you need the mind, you know, to see the likeness of the later senses to the first sense, huh?

[1:04:05] And what does Hank Sager say? Things seen are a glimpse of what is not seen. It's a likeness, right, to it, huh? I say God is pure act. I have in mind, right, act and ability that I first saw in creatures, right, huh? Like he made glimpse of what God is, right?

[1:04:35] God is act with no but ability to be actualized or that has been actualized. Interesting. I won't say creature because you're not a creature.

[1:04:56] So we'll be going through this thing on substance here next time, right? It's going to break into it, huh?