Logic (2016)
10. First and Second Substance, and How Words Take On Related Meanings (Analogy vs. Equivocation by Reason)
Class of 2016-11-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/010-first-and-second-substance-and-how-words-take-on-related/

[0:00] Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, help us, God, to know and love you. Guardian angel, strengthen the lights of our minds, order our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:29] So, where would you put your guardian angel? By the way. Wherever. Which. Which category? Yeah. Yeah, it's good. Okay. Interesting how we say where would you put where where you know because you're putting it in some what genus right in the first meaning of in as Aristotle teaches us in the fourth book of Natural Hearing is place right so when Thomas orders the eight senses of in right he does so following Aristotle right starting off with in place and then what's most like that and closest to it part and whole and then genus in what species and then moving to universal whole species and the genus right

[1:28] it's interesting how that later on in the post predicaments you have the the equivocal word by reason have right huh and Aristotle in the fifth book of wisdom he says talking about equivocal words by by reason that the meanings of the word have are correspond to the meanings of the word in okay

[1:54] so this room has what some furniture in it right there it has in right huh yeah and the parts are in the whole right but the whole has parts right you get the odd thing about the genus and the species because you can say both are in the other right but in a different way right and therefore you can say that a species has a genus and genus has species right because there's both a sense of in where the species is in the genus and one where the genus is in the species but genus and species is given first right because that's actual right it's actually in there but the species in the genus in inability then you get the sense of form in in

[2:48] matter right huh but you can say the wood has a shape here right has a form right. And so, or else I can say, you know, put them together in sense. Next sense, there. I have you in my power. I have you in my power.

[3:11] Sounds fishy. Yeah. And even at the sense then of the the the whole is in the parts, right? You know, I always tell that I always tell that joke, you know, about you showing the guy the university, right? And you show him this building, this building, this building. Now he wants the university? Well I show it to you. What do you mean? Well, it's in all these buildings, right?

[3:33] You know. So in some sense, the whole is in the parts, like form is in matter, right? Because the whole is to parts like form to matter. Matter is defined as that from which something comes to be and is in it. Well, the whole is from the parts and they're in it, so it's similar, right?

[3:57] So, but we'll leave it to have it. Have it. Do we get to the post predicaments? So, in the anti predicaments, though, we had the distinction of those four. Remember.

[4:17] Now, this distinction that was involved in that distinction between singular substance and universal substance. You had universal and singular accident too, right? In that division, right? But now, what does he speak of here? What distinction he makes of two substances here? Primary, secondary. Yeah, but that's a Latin word. Primary, you know. Speak English. First or second? First and second. Yeah.

[5:04] First substance and second substance. Now, is this distinction and this distinction named a little bit differently, right? Are they? Do they correspond together? To each other? I think so. Yeah. Isn't singular substance the same as first substance? And universal substance, he says, is the species or genus in which these are. So, species and genus are said of the first substance. So they correspond, right? But now do you see an order, right?

[5:55] That this distinction here came first in the antepredicaments, and this distinction came second in the what? Chapter on substance, right? Do you see something significant there?

[6:16] General to particular. Well, they correspond, don't they? But I was going back. See if we can figure this out. It's currently kind of interesting. We know the singular substance first, but we know the singular substance first. Well, I'm giving them evidence of order, right? But the singular and universal say anything about order among the two. That's how we come to know. Yeah. Yeah. We know the singular before we know the universal.

[7:02] Yeah. And you can actually, you mentioned the slash, right? You gave the reason for that, right? Yeah. Remember how there's what two things affirmed and denied, right? And he gives those ones where one is affirmed and one is denied, and another one where another thing is denied and another affirmed, right? And then the ones we have both are affirmed, right? And then last of all, both are negated, right?

[7:36] Okay. So universal substance is said of another. That's not the sort of thing that exists in another, right? By individual, the individual substance is what neither existing in another nor said of another, right? Okay. But notice he distinguishes between these two things, right? And here you're making kind of the same distinction, right? But what do the words first and second? Why not? Some different order. Yeah. He even goes so far as to say that that among second substances, the species is more substance than the genus because it's closer to the first substance.

[8:21] So I say you're a man, I'm closer to you than if I say you're an animal, right? So man is more substance than animal if you are most of all substance, right? Okay. So the first one. Yeah, yeah. But notice this here, huh? Here you have what what we learned from Shakespeare, from Thomas, right? You know, reason looks before and after, but always you have to see before you can see before and after.

[8:54] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So here you see a distinction between these two, right? Just as you do here. But here you see the order, right? It's kind of interesting, right? It's interesting that he should give this in the antepredicaments, right? And this in the what? Predicaments. I mentioned how the book of the categories should divide in three parts, huh? And using the Latin word anti-predicaments, huh? Before the categories, before the predicaments.

[9:24] there's a number of distinctions there, so right? About the order of things and so. And then you go to pick out the categories one by one, right? But mainly the first four, right, which are the big ones. And then you're going to have the post postpredicaments, right? It's kind of struck me that the fact that this is, in a sense, distinguishing between the same two things, right?

[9:45] But here you have an advance and distinction to what? Or the order, right? That's what I was thinking. Is would it be to say that that's going from the general to the particular, or is that from the? Oh no seeing seeing a distinction between the two, Confused? to distinct Yeah, yeah. Here you see distinction again, but now you see something that comes afterwards, seeing the order. You have to see a distinction before you can see an order, right?

[10:09] That's kind of strange. I'm not saying that that's the whole reason for it, but but it's kind of interesting. He gives this first, right? He makes you very much aware of this distinction of these two, right? Before he tries to introduce you the fact that there's an order, right? And this is first substance. And then I had a text there from Thomas where he says that in wisdom only this is called substance, right?

[10:38] Because that, that just you know, there's no such things around unless you're thinking this, right? You think that there is man himself out there, right? And dog himself, and cat himself, right? And the so-called forms or ideas, as they say from the Greek word for form, eidos, right? Okay.

[11:00] So this is very much more substance than this, right? So much so that in real philosophy, as opposed to what's in the body, right now. Okay.

[11:13] But notice, huh? Is it purely equivocal that you call both of these substance? See, if you admit that I, William Burke, is kind of substance, or that your grand angels are substance, right? Okay. Well, if man instead of me is the grasp what I am, that's that's pretty close to being a substance, isn't it?

[11:41] I am substance. What am I? I'm something substance instead of me in regard to what I am. We can call it substance, but in a secondary sense, wouldn't you say, right? This first substance or singular substance underlies everything else, right? It stands under, right?

[12:06] Of course, there are many things called substance, right? That's kind of interesting. But now, did we look last time at that other text from Thomas there where pointed out how the word substance seems to be used in about four ways, right? In the treatise on the categories, are those four senses of substance?

[12:41] Understand. What's the importance of understanding names equivocal by reason? Well, maybe you know you don't have the Greek there, you know, maybe you know translators are. Traitors, right? You see, there's some kind of way of saying that in Italian, I guess, where it's very close to words, right? The word for translator and traitor, you know, huh? You know, but I usually paraphrase, you know, Plato saying, you know, until philosophers are kings, or kings are philosophers, you'll have bad new government.

[13:14] I say until philosophers are translators, or translators are philosophers, right? You will have what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But in the beginning of Aristotle was talking about how a name, right, can be said of many things, right, with the same logos, the same thought or definition, logos, tes ousias, which is the genitive, the logos of the substance, right? The logos or definition of what it is is sometimes the same, right, and sometimes it's what?

[13:54] Not the same, right? And then you have an equivocal word, right? Okay. So what does substance mean there? You say the logos, right? Tes ousias right? Ousia is, the Greek word for substance, right? The way we translate it doesn't have that etymology, substance, right? Hypostasis says that, right? But

[14:24] that's one meaning of the word substance in the treatise, right? What a thing is, right? Okay. And then these are two other what meanings are these two, right? Okay. Now what's the fourth sense of substance

[14:42] in the categories? Or even in the definition of person. I'm going back to wait, this is definition of of person, right? A person is a is a very distinguished singular substance, right? I'm a person, right? I told you about this. We had Sister Jane Persons there in the parish, and she had some liberal ideas, you know, like wanting to be priests and so. But no, this, you know, in John Paul II, but no, this guy did.

[15:20] Well, this one old guy, he he said that. Persons? Oh, I didn't know you were a person. He said. That's kind of funny, you know. Your last name was person, right? I didn't know you were a person. I know some persons. Yeah, yeah, I was kind of, yeah, so thought that they were, but your last name was person. Didn't know you were a person. But the definition that he gives, individua substantia.

[16:00] rationalis is kind of the same thing, or a singular substance, right? When you say individual substance, does "substantia" mean singular substance? Well, then you'd be saying individual singular substance. That would be kind of strange, right? So, when you say individual substance, you're kind of taking substance here as common to both of these, right? And this here is contracting it to to that, right? Okay. So, if you take substance, can be said of both of these, right?

[16:50] That's my meaning. One meaning of substance is the only meaning of substance for the wise man, right? Individual substance. Another meaning is second substance. Let the logician get away with that because he likes to talk about where things are in the mind, right? And something in my mind is said of me as regards what I am, right? But it's also said of you guys too, right? Man, an animal, even of us, and our friend out here.

[17:20] Okay, he's very friendly. Okay. So that's the four senses he gives, right? Okay. And I mentioned there I was reading, the Prima Pars that you continue to reread it every day of your life or every

[17:42] month or year of your life, over and over again, right? You know, he said, "Hey, I missed that." You know, I always understand it better. But Thomas, the first question of the prima pars is about the nature of theology, right? And then the second question, the question that divides you into articles, is what the existence of God, right? Okay. Then it's a series of articles, right? Question three, I think it is, is about the simplicity of God, right?

[18:18] God is not composed, huh? And then four and five and so on, right? Are about what perfection of God, right? You got to bring that in next because, as Thomas says, in the material world, the simplest things are very imperfect, right? So the stone is simpler than the tree, but the tree is more perfect. The tree is simpler than than our dog out here, right? And we're more complicated than and more perfect, right?

[18:48] So you got to bring out that God is, I know he's completely simple, he's not like you know simple things in the material world, but he's altogether perfect, right? Okay. And therefore, he is what good, right? Okay. And then he goes on to show that he's what infinite, right? Okay. And then finally that he's what Unchanging, Unchanging, right? And then in question eleven that he's what one, right?

[19:20] Okay. Then he has kind of an interlude in a way. He's talking about how God is known by us, right, and how He's named by us in his twelve and thirteen, right. But then he's going to go into the what operations of God, right? His understanding and His willings, so on, right? And starting in article fourteen, question fourteen, right? Okay. There's no preambles, you know, right? He says, having considered the substance of God, now we're going to consider the what operations of God.

[19:56] What does the word substance mean there? Maybe, you know, Something a little different than us. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It could mean, you know, in some sense, what it is, right? But I'm kind of careful about that, right? now. So, it might be another meaning of the word substance, right? Okay. But Thomas, had been given that text, he's talking about in the categories, here, right?

[20:23] And another place that's very famous for substance is what the definition of faith, right? In the Epistle to the Hebrews, right? And Thomas takes that definition: the substance of things hoped for, right? The conviction of what is not seen. Okay.

[20:45] Not the sight of what is not seen. they say sometimes. Evidence. The vision of what is not seen. The evidence, I say. Evid- evidence, yeah. evidence. Yeah. But there is not even in there is further removed, right? Because it's not in the genus of substance. Okay. But is God in the genus of substance? When we said, "Well, the very angels have substance, " and we

[21:12] put him in there, right? And you know, getting put in a genus is a little bit like getting put in jail, right? You can't get out, right? You know, it's I teach in the catechists like the English word "predicament." Huh? Are you in a situation that you could call predicament? Are you in predicament? It's hard to get out, right? There is no way out, right? He says it's kind of funny because it seems to be taken from the the Latin word for categories, right?

[21:49] And uh he can't get out of predicament right For Tyro you can't get out of predicament, right? a fortiori you can't get out of a category for anyone right? Well, is God confined in one of these?

[22:01] Thomas says, you know that one can be to some extent confined in the category of quantity of your number, right? Not that it's a number, but because it's a beginning just of number, right? But God's beginning of everything, so; you can't even in that way put him in a thing. In the Summa contra Gentiles, huh?

[22:26] Thomas explains that thing more fully there. He says, "What is substance? What is this genus of substance, huh? " He says it's a res cui convenit esse non in alio, right? No. Okay, it's a thing to which it belongs to be, not in another.

[23:05] But notice if you say a res cui convenit esse, it's as if the res and its esse are not what the same thing, right? The res is what it is, right? And the esse is the act of existence, right? And only in God are those two the same, right?

[23:29] And as Thomas says, in a genus, you've got to have what it is is common to these things, but the esse is always different for the individuals. So to be in a genus, you have to have you have to be a res that is not the same as its esse. So when you say God is a God is a substance, we talk about the substance of God, right?

[23:51] You've got to be careful there, right? Okay, because he's a res who is its own esse, right? I am who am, right? huh? He says, huh?

[24:07] So this is another meaning of the word substance, right? I think when you start, it's somewhat related to to what that sense of substance, what a thing is, right? But because we know God starting from creatures, right? In creatures, what a thing is and what it does are not the same thing, right? Its substance, what it is, and its operations are not the same thing, right? So what I am is not my thinking, right?

[24:44] Not my willing, right? But in God they're what on the same, right? But that's why knowing God from creatures, right? Okay, there's something like substance in God and there's something like operation in God, but they're not really different if they're in creatures, right? Okay. And you have to approach God both from what substance means in the creature, right? And what operation means, even though they're the same thing in God, right?

[25:18] Because the essence of God is what is found in a simple, like a simple thing, right? And in creatures it's what? Divided. We're conflicted.

[25:38] Now, I was, I was reading a few of the parts there. Thomas is talking there at one point about the good, right, and the beautiful, and he says that

[25:52] not really the same thing, right? The good and the beautiful, right? But they're connected, right? Because they're both based upon the perfection of form, he says, and so on, right? But he quotes a common definition of the beautiful, The beautiful is that which pleases when seen, right? Okay, when you talk about good and true, right? Good is clearly the object of the will, right?

[26:19] And true is clearly the object of the reason, right? But what is beauty? Or the beautiful, you know? And when I first thinking about this, you know, years ago, in college, and so on, and, uh, I was kind of being led by the fact that we have a kind of synonym for beautiful. We say something is lovely, right? So the lovely must be more the object of love, right?

[26:47] And that's why he's falling in love with some beautiful girl. I said, it must be that the beauty is the object of love, right? You love a beautiful girl.

[27:00] I said, here it comes the synonym, right? And if you define the beautiful as that which pleases when seen, then it's the object of what? Of some kind of knowledge, right? Okay. And so the higher senses, like the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, right? You see a beautiful sunset, you know. In our in our house there,

[27:25] we had a place there in the living room there, where at one time you could look out the window where there were trees there at the time or something, you could see the sunset, right? And if It was a beautiful sunset. I'd say to the children every night, Say, come look at the sunset. that your heavenly father sent you you know, y'all want to see it, right?

[27:42] " And really, it was some beautiful sunset, right? Huh? Just incredible. And they don't come that often. Once or twice a month, or something like that, the really beautiful sunset. Heavenly father sent you, right? You see? And then you know, I hear the music of Mozart and I see how beautiful it is, right? Had to play a CD over twice yesterday. Oh my goodness. I didn't hear it for a while, you know, just beautiful.

[28:06] right? And uh, so I was wondering, you know, in heaven, you know, when you see God as He is, you see Him face to face. He's what? It's most pleasing to see God face to face, but you're seeing Him with your what? Reason, not with your your will, but you're loving God because of His goodness that you see, right? Goodness.

[28:35] I was trying to remember I haven't read for a long time the Confessions of Augustine, right? But I thought Augustine says here somewhere in the early part of the Confessions, he's kind of you know regretting his slow conversion, so to say, his delayed conversion. He says, I thought he said, too late have I come to know Thee, Thou Ancient Beauty. Have you read the Confessions? Remember him saying that?

[29:01] Yeah. Do you remember me correctly? Did he say that? I read it in time where I wasn't fully conscious, but I don't remember that. So I'm not the exact quote. I I think he said, late have I loved thee. Yeah, That's in Book 10, it's a famous. passage, I'll find out. but. Yeah, But this one here. I mean, if he said, "I'm going to go back and check it," maybe.

[29:24] Too late, I come to know thee. Oh, ancient beauty, right? There kind of indicates that you're seeing the beauty of God as the object of what knowledge, huh? Instead of saying "Too late, I come to love thee," right, huh? He says "Too late, I come to know thee, of ancient beauty." But I just, you know, I don't trust my memory, you know? But you can remember, that, huh?

[29:48] Well, if you run across it, you know, this might be interesting. thing. In some sense, beauty is not clearly, you know, one or the other, right? It's actually both. But but maybe it's more the object of of knowledge. right

[30:04] When I say the sunset is beautiful. It means that it pleases me when I see it. Doesn't mean I primarily that I love sunset, but I can say I love beautiful sunset, right? But

[30:20] what the first, must be is that it pleases me when I see it. right? My wife and I were down in Virginia, you know. I think the southern sunsets are more beautiful than the northern sunsets, and we're having a kind of dinner outdoors, and you know, in the sky—you see—it waves like oh, it's got a tail. Since the the weekend, oh, the fresher, you know. But it pleases me to see this thing, right?

[30:46] You know, see it, you know. So if you're on the cross, but it's closer to the sense of what the thing is. I just speak of the ideas, right?

[30:58] Because of the substance of God, doesn't when he first takes it up. I don't think it divides. Simple, right? Perfect, unlimited, right? That he's what unchanging, right? Right. So now we turn into its operation, right? But the senses definition of faith, right? Well, but it's not even in the genus of substance, is it? It's in the genus of words that are equivocal by what reason?

[31:33] Now, one thing that I think got mixed up with, and I think I was someone mixed up with, you know, but Thomas was talking about naming God, right, in the 13th question, right? And when a name can be said properly both of God and of us, it's said univocally, right? Or equivocally, or in some other way, right? And Thomas shows in that article that it's not said univocally, right?

[32:02] But it's also not said purely equivocally, right? And therefore, he says it's being said what by analogy, right? And he gives in Latin. Then analogy comes from the Greek word, I guess, okay. And he uses as a kind of synonym for analogy proportion. Okay.

[32:27] Now, proportion, I think, is used by Thomas as a word somewhat equivocal by reason, right? But my teacher in geometry, arithmetic, Euclid, right? Huh? Um, he would speak of two to three as not a what proportion, but a what ratio, right? And then a proportion. Means a likeness of ratios, huh? But Thomas seems to use the word proportion like the modern physicist or chemist does, right? For ratio, right, huh?

[33:09] Although maybe sometimes for a likeness of what? Ratios, huh? Aristotle says the most beautiful what metaphors are by what? Yeah, Even when we speak of God, you know, as you know, the Lord is my shepherd, right now. Is he really my shepherd? See, are we his flock?

[33:37] Yeah, it's a likeness of ratios here, right now. That the the the leader, the king, so to speak, is leading his people a little bit like the shepherd is leading the what? Flock. And just as we follow our king, Christ, so the flock follows the what? Shepherd, right now. So it's beautiful, beautiful things, huh? You know, the similes that Shakespeare has, like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore, so do our minutes hasten to their end.

[34:10] Each changing place of that which goes before, in sequent toil, all forwards do contend, right? These most beautiful proportions, huh? I thought her chaste as unsunned snow. Beautiful things, huh? Okay. But I think there's sometimes a, and I I'm responsible for this too. I think I sometimes would kind of identify analogous word with a word equivocal by reason as opposed to one equivocal by what? Chance. And I wonder if a word equivocal by reason

[34:58] isn't more general than a name that's analogous, huh? Because when Thomas explains analogous there, he's doing in terms of the ratio, right, huh? And the one has a ratio to the other, right? Okay.

[35:20] And I don't think that all names that are equivocal by reason are result of the ratio of one thing to another, or even the likeness of what? Ratios, huh? You take a word like,

[35:40] we always take the example that Aristotle gives, huh? Of what? Healthy, right now. And the first thing about being healthy is a healthy body, right? But then you speak of a healthy diet. Well, that's not the same meaning. That's not really equivocal, right? Because there's connection between a healthy diet and a healthy body, right? Or he's always taking samples of urine to see it, you know. But healthy there means what?

[36:09] A sign, right? A sign of, yeah, yeah. I was at the doctor the other day Tuesday, And uh there's a nurse takes your blood pressure and so on, you know. And then, and the doctor usually does again, right? You know, so mine was nice and good. at 120 or seventy something like that. It's healthy. That's healthy, you know. But that's that's a sign of health, right? Huh?

[36:39] It's not what. It's not the health of the body, that is. So, but say if the word like like before, I don't think the first meaning of it has other meanings because of the ratio of the first meaning. But there is a likeness of what ratios, right? I think especially when you go like from the the second to the third, right? Huh. Just as this can be without that, but that can't be without this, so this can be known without that being known, but that can't be known without knowing this.

[37:21] You see the proportion. The second meaning of before, right, is what? If this can be without that, right, but that can't be without this, then it's before in being, right? If this is more known than that, and can be known without that, but that can't be known without this, yeah, that's yeah, yeah, that's not purely equivocal, is it? That's a likeness of ratios, huh? But is that the only way that a word becomes equivocal by reason?

[37:56] Huh? See, I'm pretty bright there, and I figured out how the word political in the term political philosophy is equivocal by what reason, right? It's equivocal in the way Aristotle said being was equivocal, right? Because political refers above all to what? What's the first meaning of political? The city, the polis, right? I was born at St. Mary's Hospital in Minneapolis, Minnesota. My parents had already bought a house in St.

[38:31] Paul. But Minneapolis means what? The polis of what? Lakes of waters. Mini, I guess, is Indian for waters or lakes, right? We have a nice stream there, a nice place there in Minneapolis called Minnehaha, And it means the laughing waters, right?

[38:54] But Minneapolis means the the city of waters, the city of lakes, right? I guess they claim to have altogether twenty lakes in Minneapolis. That's impressive. I used to go with my friend Roy Monroe over there. We go swimming over there, go on the lakes, right? Okay, just drive across. It. wasn't very far to drive. And but Polis is a name for the city, right? Huh? Especially the city in the sense of, you know, sovereign, sovereign city.

[39:23] And so, what do you talk about in political philosophy? Well, first of all, about the Polis, right? But why do you talk about government? That's not a Polis.

[39:40] Yeah, there's a ratio to that, right? Rules, right? You talk about law, right? Yeah, yeah. Okay. Then you talk about what things that are further removed than government. How about revolution? See, So Aristotle has books on revolution and a book on How governments are what preserved and instituted and so on, right? See, but they all by their ratio to what city, right? Some more close, or not.

[40:11] That's where establishes a being, right? Huh? You know, Being is primarily substance, right? That's why we've got to study substance. It's book seven and eight, the wisdom we're all about substance, right? Well, material substance, right? It's not until then on book twelve you get the immaterial substances, right? Eventually, God. Okay. But that's what Thomas is explaining. You know, the word that's analogous, right? But there are words that are equivocal by reason.

[40:44] They're not by a ratio or by likeness of ratios, huh? Because sometimes we use the word analogous kind to mean the same as equivocal by reason. But I always thought it's kind of a little bit misleading because you know you say is that the only way that you can become equivocal by reason is by reason of a ratio or a. It's interesting. The word ratio can also mean reason, right?

[41:13] You know, in Greek, you might have logos, right? Shows you the connection between reason and logos ratio, right? That kind of stands out, right? Then. But I was saying that I had made this distinction of names equivocal by reason, and there's at least two other ways that they take place.

[41:37] And they're not really by ratios or likeness of ratios. What are the other two ways? I think I explained them before, haven't I? One is where a name is said of two or more things, right, with more or less the same meaning, right. But then it's kept by one of them, right? That's its own name, right? Or a new name is given to the other.

[42:09] Now, is there a good reason why this is done in some cases? Well, sometimes it's because one of these two has nothing worth noting, right? Nothing noteworthy beyond what's the common meaning of both, right?

[42:33] But sometimes one of the two has something really significant and noteworthy, right? So we give it a what? New name, right? Okay. I take the word disposition, right? Disposition can be said of a very stable disposition and of a easily Change right. So in English, you know, we speak of somebody's mood, right? Huh. And sometimes you meet your friend, you realize he's in a certain mood, and sometimes you can get your friend out of this, right?

[43:14] Huh. You see these signs up, you know, for cocktails, you know, after work, you know, and so on, and and it has an attitude readjustment.

[43:34] So it can be quickly changed the mood, right? Huh. And there was this one now, some Quebec does one girl really was nice to talk to, you know, huh? And I was very, very fun, very, very interesting. And this one of the other Americans, you know, said, "You know, I never saw you saw in Nicole. " he says, "But I came down to the faculty the other day, and I was feeling really down and dumps, and ran to Nicole, and a few minutes, my whole attitude was changed.

[44:01] " You know, something about her. Well, that that's it's an easily, you know, changed disposition, right? But then there's another one called the habit, which is kind of a firm disposition, you know, and you, and it's really got a hold of you, for good or for bad, right? Depending upon things, and so it's got something noteworthy, right? That firmness, that stability in disposition. So sometimes we let the the weak disposition or the easily lost disposition, the temporary one, right?

[44:35] At least let it keep the name disposition. I'll give a new name to the one and call it habit. So sometimes Aristotle will distinguish, like we see in the chapter on quality, right? He'll distinguish habit against disposition, right? Other times he'll say habit is a disposition, a firm disposition. So how can he say that is a disposition and divide it against disposition? The word has now become what?

[45:04] Equivocal. Was it becoming equivocal by chance? No, there's a very good reason why one kept the name and the other was given a what new name? Now in logic, if you ever get to the book on places, right? Huh. Aristotle will speak of speech that is convertible with something. You know what that means? A and B are convertible if every A is a B and every B is an A, right?

[45:37] Okay. So Aristotle calls speech that is convertible with something as a what idia, huh? Or a property, we'd say in in the Latin word, right? Property, right? Okay. But now when you examine these speeches that are convertible with something. Some of them has something remarkable. Not only are they convertible with the thing, but they bring out what it is. Boy, that's very important, right? So let's give a new name to that property, and we'll call it what?

[46:20] Definition, right? And then the property that is convertible, but doesn't bring out what the thing is, right? Keeps the name property, right? So Aristotle will say that definition is a property. Definition will be divided against property. It's same thing, right? It's become equivocal by reason now. The word what? Property, right? Okay.

[46:47] Now there's another way that a name is kept, right? And that is when one of the two things of which it is said is what?

[47:00] Yes. Yeah, yeah. So your guardian angel has got understanding, huh? This faculty of understanding things, and I've got a faculty of understanding things, right?

[47:14] Was it Duane's definition? Reason is the ability to understand and so on. But man's not very good at understanding things, right? And the Latin said he had the Latin word for understanding was intellectus, and Thomas always quotes this one guy who says we have an intellectus obumbratus, an overshadowed, darkened reason, right? Overshadowed with what? Images and so on, right? Huh? And we need to reason out things and think them out, and then we get a little bit of understanding, you know.

[47:57] Well, let's keep the word understanding what the angels have, right? You know, because their mind is full of forms and they're created, right? Huh? You know, they're able to use all these forms and understand things right away. They don't have to reason things out or think them out, right? I told you how my son Marcus, little boy, can we be born knowing what we have to know?

[48:18] You know? I said you want to be born an angel, I said, and not a human being. That's true. What he's doing, right? Oh, what if I would be, you know? To be. I go to school.

[48:31] Yeah. So angel, what? I mean, the angel keeps the name understanding because he has perfection of this thing, right? Huh? And we'll give man now a new name. We'll call it say man is reason. So sometimes Thomas will say reason is understanding, right? Huh? To be able to understand. Other times he'll divide reason against understanding. So the word understanding has now become what? Equivocal by reason. So it's two ways that the name is kept, right?

[49:05] Sometimes it's kept by the thing that only has the common meaning of the that's common to the two, and the one that has something noteworthy that strikes us, you know, is very important, right? Gets a new name, right?

[49:20] And but sometimes, right, it's kept by the one that has fully the common meaning, right? And the other one gets, those are both good reasons, right?

[49:43] I have another example there. We've got to kind of multiply these examples a bit. Someone asked me about the election. Do you know who's going to win? I would say probably no. I don't know who's going to win But I think so and so is going to win. Okay. Well, I was thinking mean there. Yeah, something uncertain, right? Huh? Okay. It's a guess, right?

[50:17] Thomas says opinion and suspicion are two forms of guess. Opinion is stronger, right? So dialectic, dialectic argument can produce opinion, right? But the rhetorician produces what suspicion. I'm suspicious of this person.

[50:41] I think he did it, and I sus—suspect him. I suspect him. When the wife gets killed, the first thing they suspect is a husband.

[51:01] So, but if you ask me now, what about two is half of four? Say, I know that two is half of four, right? Now, couldn't I say, if you ask me now, do you think that two is half of four, Dwayne? I might say some unguarded, yes. I think that two is half of four, right?

[51:28] But I let the guess keep the name, think, right? I give a new name to my thinking that two is half of four. It's knowing. I know it, right?

[51:43] Makes sense, doesn't it? Okay. So those names seem to be those two ways of naming things, right? Is different from by like this the ratios the ratios, right? But still, it seems the word is equivocal. By reason, there's a reason why this is done, right? And this is done very often in daily life. We don't stop and realize it, huh? Okay.

[52:20] Now, there's one other way that I I see very common. What's that way? Do you remember that way? We had an example there when we were doing the. Isagoge, right? Huh?

[52:48] Remember how genus and difference and species signifies something essential to the thing, right? What it is, or how it is, what it is, right? But accident and property, right, signifies something outside of what it is, right? But what is the difference between an accident and a property there in the Isagoge Property helps you know it makes you know something about what it is Yeah it's connected with the nature of the thing, right?

[53:25] But the accident doesn't do that, right? So half of four could be a property of two, right? Follows upon being two that you're half of four, and a third of six, and so on, right? But that a triangle is green, right? Doesn't seem to have any connection, right? But the triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles right angles. Ah, that falls upon what a what a triangle is.

[53:54] You know if you know a little geometry, okay? There's some things. Okay, it's fine, right? Okay. Now Porphyry defines a property as what belongs to one species, to every member that species, and always, right? So half of four belongs only to two. The other number? Not any other number. There's a million of them. It's even more than a million. Infinity of numbers. But you're never going to find any other number that is half of four.

[54:33] So it belongs only to two, right? And he says it belongs to every two, right? And what else? Now, what about two being less than ten? Is that a property or an accident? What would you say?

[55:03] Just happened to? Two happen to be? This two happen to be less than ten? Like this triangle happen to be green? No. In fact, every two is less than ten, right?

[55:20] Always. And always a two is less than ten, right? But it's not only two that is less than ten, right? Now, if I call it the property of two, is the same sense as half of four is a property? No. But you dropped out part of the meaning of property, right? It belongs only to one species, right?

[55:45] Okay. Now, it's a property of man to be a logician. You'll admit to that? It's quite independent. Well, is every man a logician? Sorry, just looking at the votes huh Well your experience in teaching school, you know. Yeah. And is man always a logician Eventually, he retires Not even, not even the what man who is a logician, right? He's not always a logician, right? But is any other animal that's a logician.

[56:37] Okay, so there is some connection with the nature of man, isn't there? Right. Now I've dropped out two parts right now. So this is another way that a name becomes equivocal by reason, by dropping out part of its meaning and kind of generalizing it, right? Okay.

[57:00] So Aristotle in the great three books on the soul, right? He talks about how we know the powers by their objects, right? And either the power acts upon the object, like my digestive powers and my teeth act upon the food, tearing it apart and grinding it up, and so.

[57:25] Or the object acts upon the what? Power. Yeah, like sound acts upon the ear, right? Now, okay. And so he speaks of hearing as an undergoing a sound, right? Now, but the first meaning of undergoing seems to have the idea of something what bad, right? And there might be some kinds of music that's bad to hear for many reasons, but it's not bad to hear the music of Mozart.

[58:00] It's perfection of your ear, right? Your ear is most perfect when it's hearing Mozart. So if you are concerned about the perfection of your ear, you will listen to Mozart and listen very carefully, right? Yeah. And I got to reading Austen's essay there, right? I put the record on of Mozart and I'd go out there and play there by the machine, make sure I hear it. But you keep on hearing things.

[58:29] I say, gee, it wasn't. Sometimes I'm driving in the car and you turn on the classical music station. There's one in Boston, and they have a piece of Mozart on. You know, haven't heard for a while. Doesn't occupy my mind much driving the car. So I say, "Hey, this is really good." I didn't realize how good this was, you know. So my ear is reaching its apotheosis, right?

[58:51] I told you then about about reading some of the lives of Mozart there, and and they were producing an opera, right? Write this beautiful aria, you know, for one of the sopranos, one of the singers, and no one realized how beautiful a woman's voice could be in a Mozart wrote these arias, and the singer she's beside herself, you know, she's going to be singing this this this aria Mozart, you know, on the stage, and everybody's going to be oh, looking up at area Mozart, woman like that, you know, to kind of show off a little bit, you know, so and just like a bride, you know, she's really adorned, you know, and everybody's going to be ooh, ooh.

[59:29] And I was an altar boy you know, I used to serve weddings sometimes, and the little girls from the neighborhood, you know, were not part of the bridal party or part of the even invited thing, they would just come in to sit and watch the the bride and so on, so on, and dream about what they do, but never never even the boys, no girls, you know, kind of, so she's she's beside herself because you're going to be singing this aria, he he creates something so beautiful, you know, you know, and she didn't realize. how beautiful her voice could be, you know.

[1:00:06] We have a singer there with the singing. She's in high school, right? She's a senior in high school now, but she's beautiful voice, beautiful voice. We have a lot of female talent in the parish, you know, and so. And I think she's an adopted girl too. Is it not my thought? But we having to run into her after mass, you know, the other day. And so Rosey asked her, you know, where she was, and she was a senior in high school.

[1:00:36] She said, you know, she might be going to to Northeast College, and just went up the stairs and to another place, but but Rosey said, we're thinking of majoring, and oh, she wants to do mechanical engineering. I was so surprised, so surprised. Which had a beautiful, beautiful voice, you know.

[1:00:58] Yeah, yeah, I know. I I admit, you know, that there, you know, one time we we had to be up at the in the front of church where she sings, you know, and and when they sing the Our Father, you know, because she was hard to handle for this stuff, and when she come down, she, you know, she took my hand, held my hand, you know, and so I know she comes down, comes down, and if I feel, you know, having to be there, you know, and so you expect you to be going, you know, as you say.

[1:01:27] I mean, I don't know how she learned how beautiful. I was going to ask her, you know, how she got trained the voice, beautiful like that.

[1:01:35] Okay, but the first meaning of of undergoing or the Latin word is passio, right? It's like you're having in the passion of our Lord, right? Where you are being acted upon in a way that's painful and harmful to you, right? You know, so I'm sticking my pin in you or my knife in you, jabbing you, you know. But then I'm acting upon you, right? You're under, you're undergoing.

[1:01:59] We are. Yeah, yeah. And but then when you apply it to the ear being acted upon, right? Keep the idea of what receiving something, but you drop out the idea that it's actually harming the ear, right? Perfecting the ear, right? And when you see some beautiful sight, it's perfecting the eye, right? Seeing such a beautiful object, huh? And then, but there's still a what? A body being acted upon there, right?

[1:02:30] Which is in the first meaning of acting upon and undergoing is the body being acted upon, right? It's kind of a spiritual thing, the sensing compared to my jabbing, my pinning you,

[1:02:42] and so on, right? And so you're dropping out the idea of something harmful to you, but you're keeping the idea that the body is being acted upon, right? And then Aristotle applies it to the act of reason, right? That the reason, what? Yeah, it receives its object, right? Okay.

[1:03:04] Aristotle speaks of the undergoing reason and the acting upon reason, right? That separates universal from the what images, right? Okay, and that's what really acts upon the what or what it receives. As the Boethius is often quoted as saying, "The thing is singular when sensed, but universal when understood," right? Okay. Now, Plato thought you know there were the forms out there that existing independently of the singulars.

[1:03:33] Aristotle concluded this was not so, and therefore he had to recognize the existence of this acting upon understanding. So, you're dropping out part of the meaning of it, as it goes from

[1:03:47] punishing you to sensing and then to what understanding, right? So that doesn't seem to be by a ratio so much, but more by generalizing the meaning by dropping out part of it. So,

[1:04:07] I think you got to be kind of careful there, right? Calling, trying to use analogues for, you know, synonymously as equal, equivocal by reason, huh? You know, Thomas, the textbook Thomas says that you know, but he does talk about those other ways of naming things, right? They seem to me to be giving you equivocation, but by reason again. Okay.

[1:04:42] So, be careful these words.