Logic (2016)
11. The Properties of Substance, the Hypostasis of Christ, and Thomas's Texts on Substance
Class of 2016-11-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/011-the-properties-of-substance-the-hypostasis-of-christ-and/

[0:00] Now, you don't have the same number, I guess, as me. Okay, but Thomas has a texture that we had from the De Potentia, I guess, was it? Where, yeah, yeah, page one or two substance, yeah. We talked about the difference between this and and wisdom and in what logic, right? Huh? Logic is concerned with what the way things are in in the mind, huh? And so that the universal in the mind might be called still substance, right?

[0:34] Huh? Okay. Now, after that, we had a text from Thomas there where he's talking about the the. Well, I guess before we talked about distinction between first and second substance. It's not distinction of two what genera, right? But a distinction, really, kind of a what?

[1:02] Yeah, but also distinction. Therefore, the equivocation by reason of this, huh? And first and second implies this by reason, right? Because first and second is what. Order and reason looks before and after, right?

[1:26] But the the the wise men say that's a lot of nonsense, right? That's not that's not substance, right? It's only individual substances in the real world, right? Outside the mind, there's no universals running around, are there?

[1:42] Yeah. When I taught college there, you know, you had to get a list from the office in the first day of class, right? And you had to read these names and show up there. And you know, and Judy and Jane and Bob and Philip and so on, but never a man or woman on that. A man or woman never showed up for my class. Humanity. Yeah. There's no man or woman out there.

[2:15] It's just Judy and Philip and Tom and David and so on, right? A wise man would say, you know, who's the real substance in the real world, right? Okay. But the logician talks about the way things are in the mind, right? And therefore, you know, man can become something universal in the mind, right? And because it's said of first substance as regards what it is, is both the species and the genus, right?

[2:45] So both man and animal are said of me, for example. I'm a real walking substance, right? But man and animal are said of me in reason of as regards what I am, right? Well, why not call them substance, right? But in a kind of what second way, right? Okay.

[3:13] That's clear enough, though. Okay. We saw the distinction of the four meanings of substance, right? In the metaph in the what categories, right? I added two outside there, right? The substance of God, right? And

[3:37] the faith being called substance, which is even further removed, right? That's really an accident, right? Categorical sense. Now, which is more substance, though, species or what? Genus. Yeah. Now, does it give more than one reason for that, or not? Two.

[4:04] Yeah. One is that it's closer to first substance, right? So when you ask what is Duane Berquist, you could say he's an animal, or you could say he's a man. But you're closer, I hope, to me when you say I'm a man. Animal is further away, so that's one reason why species is more substance, right, than animal, because it's closer, right?

[4:35] Now maybe another reason would be by likeness of what? Ratios, yeah. That just as what Species in general are said of first substance, right? So what genus is said of what species? So species seems to underlie, right?

[5:03] You wouldn't say man is Duane Berquist, would you? Hope not. You say, "I mean, Berquist is a man, right? Yeah, and you say, 'Man is an animal, aren't you? ' More than animal is a man. Might say some animal, careful what you're saying, right? You wouldn't say simply that animal is a man. You say what is Duane Berquist? He's a man. What is a man? He's an animal, right?

[5:38] What is an animal? It's a man. So man is to animal something like Duane Berquist is to what man, right? Is that the kind of reason he gives? Okay.

[5:58] So Aristotle is just distinguishing in the antepredicaments, right? But now he's what looking before and after, right? He's advancing in his thinking, right? Sees a distinction first, and then he sees what the order, yeah, even the master, right?

[6:30] Okay. Now, what are the properties of substance? Well, I could say one more thing there, of course, That only what the genera and species, the species and genus in which the first substances are, are called substances in a secondary sense. The accidents are not, right? Even though they're said of you, right? Okay. But they don't say what the thing is, right? There's something happens. Okay. You had that part there.

[7:12] It's on page five of this, maybe a different page in yours. In the first group, in the second part of the chapter, he says like that. Aristotle gives properties of substance.

[7:24] In the second part of the chapter Yeah. They fall into two groups of three. The first group pertains to substance alone, right? While the last three can belong to something else, right? Okay. So it's going to help to kind of separate substance from other things, right?

[7:45] In the first group, Aristotle gives a property of substance common to first and second substance, and then a property of second substance, and then a property of what first substance? Huh? The property common to both is that they are not in a what subject? Huh? And that was in the antipredicaments too, right? Huh?

[8:09] So even universal substance, it's said of something, but it's not existing in another, right? Okay. Now the property of first substance is to be a what?

[8:29] Excuse me. The property of second substance is to be said only what? Yeah. In the narrow sense of the first chapter, right? What does that mean? I think it means univocally in the sense of what a thing is, right? Okay. And that being said, what denominatively, right? Okay.

[8:54] Thomas was beautiful in his talking. If I make a little digression here, right? It's kind of related to this thing about denominative things. Um, you know, he's talking about whether you can name God anything, and some people say you can't name him because you can use the concrete word or the abstract word.

[9:19] He says, "Well, if you use the concrete word, then you're saying that God is composed. Never not simple. And if you use the abstract word, then that signifies that by which you are something, and God is not really there for this. Okay.

[9:40] And that's a problem, right, about these things. And Thomas says, "Well, man's mind is tied up with the material world, right? And material world, what do you have? Things are composed of of matter and form, right?

[10:04] And the form exists in the matter, right? then affecting the matter. Now, why do we have these two words? Let's take an example of this. Why do we have the two words, health and healthy? One is

[10:31] one of them is that by which you are healthy, which is health. Yeah. The other is yeah, yeah. And the composite can be said to be healthy, right? Now, the body can be said to be healthy, right? Are we just said the health is healthy? No. Health seems to signify that by which you are healthy, right? So health is really naming the form you have, right?

[11:06] And then healthy, what you have by that form, right? But it's not that form. I got a problem, right? God, right? Is God good or goodness?

[11:25] Well, if you say He's good, you seem to be saying that God has goodness, right? And that implies some kind of distinction between the haver and what it has. Now God ends up being what? Yeah.

[11:44] What do you spend question three on? Eight articles, right? To show that God is entirely what? Simple. Very thorough what he does there on question article question three.

[12:03] Okay. So what are you going to say about God? He's going to say that he's he's good or he's goodness itself, right? Well, if you say God is goodness, you don't seem to be admitting He's good. Because healthy, not healthy. Yeah. If you say God is good, then you seem to be saying God has goodness, and then you've got the distinction between the haver and the had, and I get composition.

[12:42] So one of the objections says, "Well, then, can't have any names instead of God. " Just bail out. It's sad, right? Then you become a Muslim. Yeah. I won't be able to talk about God, right? Because there's no names we can use to talk about God.

[13:05] Like Saint Augustine says, if you say that God is ineffable, you've said something about God. Now, when Thomas takes up God being good, there in the Summa Contra Gentiles maybe Summa Theologiae too, he first shows that God is good, right, and then that He's goodness itself, right.

[13:31] Well, Thomas says we don't have any other words because what? Our mind is designed to know what what it is as something sensed or imagined, and that's a composition of matter and form. So we only have these two ways of naming it, right?

[13:51] So we say that God is good because He really is good. He's not something that, but something is good. But we say He's goodness itself because He's altogether what. Simple, simple, yeah. And so, no name is what complete, right? Yeah, perfect, right?

[14:14] The way of speaking, right, fits material things, right? And so we have to kind of adapt it, right, so far as we can for God, right? And one way brings out what that He is good, and the other that He's in a simple way, right? Now sometimes we say, you know, that God is whatever He has,

[14:38] which is not true, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But no, it's the original meaning of the word "have," right? You know, if the body has health, the body is not health.

[14:53] I guess my body is healthy, and it's healthy enough for an eighty-year-old man. But my body is not its health, is it? But in God, we have to say, you know, that the haver. And the had are what the same, right? And we can't have a perfect way of speaking about God, huh? Because our mind's adapted to knowing things that are composed of matter and form. For Aristotle, in the eighth book of wisdom, and he talks about a material substance starting from natural philosophy.

[15:34] He talks about in terms of matter and form, right? So it's not until the twelfth book he talks about something that's not a substance that is not composed of matter and form, right? But that is just what form, right? Okay. But shows the problem we have, right? Okay.

[15:59] So healthy seems to be a denomination from health, right? Okay. And that was one of the three ways he spoke of speaking there in the first Antepredicaments, right? But then univocal was taken just when something is said as something, what signifying what it is, right? So it's kind of more narrow sense of univocal right than broad sense. You could say that healthy is said univocally of my body and the dog's body and so on, right?

[16:31] Okay. Okay. So the property of second substance is to be said only univocally, right, and not what denominatively. In the property of first substance is said to be a this what something. The hoc aliquid of Latin, so you see that. Famous controversy: Thomas speaks of the human soul as being a hoc aliquid in some way. Some people get very excited about this.

[17:09] But I mean, the immortality of the human soul is a sign that is to some extent a hoc aliquid. This something. This something is something by itself, right? Distinct from all the things and complete in its nature, which the human soul is not, right? Okay.

[17:29] Therefore, for our ultimate happiness, we need what? Yeah, our body to be rejoined to our soul again, right? It'll be even more blessed when we get our body back. Because I like to say a new set of wheels.

[17:48] Yeah. Okay. So those are the properties that are what pertains to substance alone, right? But one to both first and second substance, right? One to second substance alone, and one to first substance alone. So he's kind of making you get these things distinct in your mind, right? By these properties, huh?

[18:17] The second group of properties revolves around contraries. The first property is not to have a contrary. This is a property shared by quantity. Hey, how can something be shared by quantity. Well, it's a property in a broader sense, right? Huh? You can tell me genera. And this is a property shared by quantity, which perhaps points to its closeness to substance, huh? Now, what are contraries? Contraries are said to be species furthest apart in the same genus, right?

[18:52] So, in the genus of color, what are furthest apart? Black and white, right? And green and white are not as far apart, right? Yellow and white are even less far apart, right? So on. There's a kind of a continuum, you know, from what white all the way to black, right? So blue is closer to black, right? Okay. Yellow is closer to to white. Green is maybe in between yellow and what?

[19:25] Blue, right? Huh? So on. So it's a property of first substance. I mean, excuse me. The first property is not to have a contrary, right? Okay. And this is a property shared by quantity, which perhaps points to its closeness to what substance? Let's put the next category.

[19:48] The second property is not to be said more or less. This seems to to follow upon not having a contrary, because contraries can be what mixed, you know? Can be a continuum between white and black, right? So I put white bread in the toaster, and I keep on pushing it down, and it gets golden, and then it gets what? Black, and finally just dissolves

[20:17] in the toaster, right? Yeah. Okay. You take another pair of contraries, hot and cold, right? You know, I put the cold water on in the morning, and it gets hotter and hotter, and then starts to whistle at me, you know, then I come and pour it on the tea leaves, right?

[20:39] The second property is not to be said more or less, and seems to follow upon not having contrary. This property is also shared by quantity. What numbers are furthest apart in the genus of number?

[20:56] And Aristotle has a famous thing there in the ninth, uh uh in the eighth book, I mean, of wisdom, right? Where he compares the natures of things to numbers, huh? You remember how Shakespeare said, "What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed, a beast no more?"

[21:25] And my mother objected to my calling man an animal. I said, "He's not just an animal, Mama. He's what an animal that has reason."

[21:39] What does just mean? See, just kind of precise, huh? It means equal in a sense, right? Okay. So if you called a stone one, you could call a plant two, right? Stone is just a body, right? But the plant is a body with something added, right? Yeah, so that's two. And then the animal is something—it's a body that's what senses. Senses, So that's three. And then man, he's got something in addition—to reason—and so man's what four, right?

[22:15] So the natures of things are like numbers, right? We know what Shakespeare says, huh? A beast no more. If man had no greater good than the beast has, then he's no more than a beast. It seems, right? Notice the word more there, right? More or less is tied up with what number, right? Number, yeah.

[22:42] So when Aristotle takes up tragedy and comedy, he takes them as being kind of contraries, right? So we've lost part of the book on the poetic art on comedy, right—the more detailed thing. So when I got studying these things under the influence of Austin Farrer and so on, because he got talking about the poetics too, you know, but using the things he talked about music. Well, then I said, "What?

[23:10] How would you define comedy, right now?" I was trying to argue from comedy being the contrary of what tragedy. So tragedy, as Aristotle and Shakespeare teaches us, moves us to pity and fear, right? Well, comedy should move us to the contrary of pity—some kind of joy—and to the contrary of what? Okay. And so I was saying some kind of joy, namely mirth, merriment, and some kind of opposite of fear, which is boldness, right now.

[23:50] Okay. And that was a good dialectical argument by Berquist, right? But then when I got into it more deeply, I got really Thomas Aquinas about the emotions, right?

[24:06] Then I found out that the principal emotions are what: joy and sadness, and fear, and not boldness, hope. Hope. Yeah. Okay. So well, maybe, maybe the two contrary forms should move us to a form of sadness, which is pity, right? Very noble sadness, right, or the misery of another, right, undeserved misery of another, and fear, right?

[24:40] And then comedy should move us to the other principal passions. So then I started to read more deeply, comedy and so on. I was reading a book on the Latin comedies, right? And the guy was quoting me on the famous words of what Saint Paul: "There Remain these three things: faith, hope, and charity, and the greatest of these is charity." Right. But he said, in comedy, the greatest is hope.

[25:15] And immediately goes to the plays. It does arouse this kind of a hope, right? And I was talking about right then. You know, it's kind of confirmation, right? That comedy is about the chief passions, right? And the chief forms are tragedy and comedy. But then I begin to see that there are plays of Shakespeare that are in between these, right? So it can be a transition, right?

[25:41] You get the love and and friendship romances, which are closer to comedy, and you get the mercy and forgiveness romances, which are closer to pity and so on, right? And so it's kind of a continuum there, right? So the fact that you can go from one contrary to the other contrary, right, is tied up with this second property, right? It's not more or less, right? So, so is one man more a man than another man?

[26:13] Well, if by man you mean courage, yeah, one man more courage, more. But that's a quality, right? But in case of the substance itself, is one man more a man than another man? Or is one dog more? Some dog are really dogs. I think I told you last. Was it the last time I told you that you know I was teaching a course one time, an Assumption Night course, and you had adults in it, right?

[26:36] rather than the than the students and kind of talking about you know the statement all men are created equal. You know, I said, well, some are created strong, some weak, some healthy, some sick, you know, some prone to anger, some, you know, and are all men, you know, equal in terms of knowledge. But the only way you can say all men are equal is that one man is not more a man than another man, right?

[27:03] You know, seemed like the the substance. Well, this is the the property there, right? You're kind of getting to see this, right? Of course, even quantity we we speak of more or less, don't we? Okay.

[27:19] Although one circle is not more a circle than another, right? Either circular, you know, if you take it in strict sense, right? You can't be more or less a circle, right?

[27:32] Is an equilateral triangle more a triangle than a scalene or isosceles triangle? But we do use more or less sometimes and time about numbers, right? But is one three more a three than another three?

[27:51] Now even substance, you could say man is more than a beast, right? But one beast is not more a beast than another beast, right? Or one man more a man than another man. That's what this second property is, right?

[28:12] The third property is to be susceptible of contraries, right? While remaining one in number. So I, Duane Burquist, I'm a substance, and sometimes I'm hot and sometimes I'm cold, right? Sometimes I'm sick and sometimes I'm healthy, right? Sometimes I'm good and often I'm bad, right? Okay. And this seems to be a property of what? Of first substance, right? So Aristotle is doing. He's trying to make these things distinct in your mind, only by as we're defining them, but by giving these kind of what sort of properties, right?

[28:54] Okay. Now we had a discussion there in the appendix there about what. Yeah. How can one meaning of the word substance be what a thing is? Isn't that found in all genera? You know, that's a difficult thing, right?

[29:16] But when you first distinguish the categories, you do by what the way something can be said of the same thing. And then you need something of which everything else is said, and that's first substances, right? Okay. And only something in the genus is substance, right? Species or genus of substance, right? Is said of individual substances as regards what it is, right? But then I think we've spoken here before about the the difficulty of of saying how can there be a definition which tells you what a thing is?

[29:54] How can there be a definition of what accidents, right? Because definition means what? Well, yeah, you've got limits there. I mean, it comes from finis, limit, huh? Okay. Greek, they'll have horos, limit, the, horizon, right? Well, nothing should be in the definition except the thing is being defined. It seems by what a definition is. But if I define health as something a good condition, let's say of the body, something like that, right?

[30:37] I'm defining something by something outside of it, right? That's not a definition, or not in the same sense a definition, right? So it's the way in which what it is is found primarily in substance, right? And especially if you distinguish them by how something can be said, individual substance is found only there, right? But in another sense, you can speak of habit saying what a virtue is, right?

[31:03] Number saying what an odd number is and even number is, and so. Okay, so that's just kind of a difficulty there. We don't get into the immaterial substances there so much. That's kind of a difficulty thing.

[31:20] Another subtle distinction that is made there, the later pages there, where we say that in natural philosophy, when you talk about the genus, you go down to what it's based on, right? The genus is based more upon matter and the difference on form. So if you have a different matter, like they thought the heavenly bodies had different matter than the ones down here, then there'd be a natural way of saying they belong to different genera, right?

[31:49] Not the same matter, but don't get too concerned about that. Okay. There's all kinds of subtle things here. I don't know if you want to dwell upon all of them, but I think it's time to stop, isn't it? No, we couldn't have another twenty minutes. Thirty minutes. Oh, you do? Okay, okay. No, no, no. I just, I would just. um

[32:23] try to see if in your your faces. if you're like the students of this guy's like students, you know, looking at the kids in this class. I know he's teaching at some public university there in the West, and the students looking up, you know, why are you doing this to me? That's what the expression on their face. Why are you doing this to me?

[32:45] Well, we're monks. we know, We know why you're doing it. to us We came to the monastery just to do this. Okay. Some very subtle things here about Christ, this body.

[33:10] Notice this one here. It's on page eight of this thing here, but From the scriptum, commentary on the sentences. Is the hypostasis of the Word, right?

[33:25] Is that in the genus of substance, or do you have to qualify that? See, we say, we say the second person. We say, you know, person, and the Greeks say hypostasis, right? He's talking about hypostasis here. Although it is not in the genus of substance, simpliciter, insofar as it's the what? Hypostasis of the Word. Yeah. Nevertheless, it is the hypostasis also of human nature in Christ.

[34:03] In so far as it's the hypostasis of human nature, it is in the genus of substance, just as it is in the species of man. Okay. I find just to ask people. Let's just finish the passage here first.

[34:21] For hypostasis is not ordered to a genus or a species except through the nature which it it has right now. Okay. So, as a hypostasis, in some way, in the genus of substance, the hypostasis of Christ, the second person. In some way. Yeah, but in what way is it? What way is it not? Right. The reason of human nature. Yeah, but not in so far as it's the hypostasis of the divine nature.

[34:50] And the hypostasis of the second person is the same as God, right? Okay. It has less the meaning of hypostasis as far as etymology of the word is concerned, right?

[35:08] When Thomas takes up you know the Perfection of God in theology. Where does the word "perfect" come from? Material things. Yeah, and that's because when they're made, they are what perfected, right? So you can't go identify the etymology of the word "perfect" with the meaning of the word, right?

[35:35] So when you say God is perfect, you mean He's well made. So that would be to confuse, right? The etymology with the meaning of it, right? But because when when a material thing is what perfected, it's it's receives its form and so on, right? It's made actual, right?

[35:57] Well, then God, who is pure act, is going to be what perfect, right? Well, we kind of borrow that word, right? The etymology is probably

[36:11] if you use the word hypostasis, you know, for the the persons of the Trinity. Hypostasis etymologically it means what stand under, right? Well, does the hypostasis of the person stand under the divine nature?

[36:33] You have a composition there, right? Okay. When you compare the hypostasis of each person with the divine nature, is any real distinction between them?

[36:49] It's very hard for us to understand, right? But are the three persons three gods? The three persons are one God, right? And this one God is three persons. That's the way to speak, right?

[37:17] Why do you use the word hypostasis, right? If it doesn't stand under it, right? If it's the same thing, right? I mean, when you say you know that the church is the pillar of truth, right? Say it stands under truth, right? Well, the church and truth are not the same thing exactly, are they, right? But the church, you know, has teaching and so on, has tradition and so on, supports the what truth, right?

[37:44] Now you can see you can see what is a certain connection between the etymology of substance, right, and standing under and saying the church is a pillar. Right, it's kind of metaphor to say it's a pillar of truth, right? They can be kind of led by that, huh? Well, how do you do that with the Trinity, huh?

[38:12] You you move a long way, I mean, from standing under. Because if you stand under something, you're not the same as if you're standing under, are you?

[38:28] And they compare, you know, faith to the foundation of the house, and then hope to the what walls, and then the roof is charity, which covers a multitude of sins and so on. But you can see a little connection between the etymology right now, and saying that it's the substance things hoped for right now, kind of this kind of foundation of it. But but how can you speak of

[39:00] three hypostases right now? As Thomas points out in here, in one of the texts we have in here, substance substance can be what a thing is, right? And therefore, there's certain danger of saying that there are three substances, right? And when they took substance as a translation of hypostasis, as by the what? Yeah, and they said Jerome was warning them about this poison, you know. But if you say there's three hypostases, which you can say in Greek, right?

[39:29] And then you translate this into Latin, you say there are three substances. Well, now you seem getting a little bit unorthodox, to say the least, right? You know, you see the danger there, right? You know.

[39:46] What justifies using the word hypostasis there? You know, if one is not really under something, right? Well, if you go to if you go to Aquinas's definition of person there in Latin, which they used there, right? Yeah, yeah. That there's a real distinction between the Father and the Son, and a real distinction between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, right? But how are they distinguished, right?

[40:16] Well, they're distinguished by relations of procession, right? Okay. So we see in the creed, you know, God from God, Light from true God, Light from Light, true God, and so on. And so one is Father and one is Son, right? So it's a real distinction, right? So he has something of the notion of the hypostases that it's something what? Yeah. And persons, yeah. Individual substances distinct from from one from another individual substance, right?

[41:05] A lot of texts would be speak of one as being not only undivided but divided from others, and so the Father is really distinct from the Son.

[41:18] God the Father is not God the Son, is he? No. He hasn't had two sons. is he? No. But God the Father is God, and God the Son is that same God.

[41:33] And so, in comparison to the divine nature, there is no distinction between God the Father and the divine nature, or God the Son and the divine nature. But compared to each other, there's a real distinction, right?

[41:51] Not just a distinction of reason. It was a heresy, right? They call him God because he created us, and call Father, and call him Son because he became man, or something like that. The same guy, right?

[42:14] So then we had in this great division of the chapter right the let's go over. it Okay Then we had some text there. at the end.

[42:33] The first text there we had from the Sentences is is that distinction of the four ways substances said right. Okay, you got you got to that place, and it's called substance short text, you know. Okay, the first text is the one that we've been talking about here right now. Okay.

[42:54] There's that text. You might know what that fourth sense was. In the fourth way, substance is commonly, insofar as it abstracts from, first and second substance, and through individuum in the definition of person, as it were, through a difference is drawn to standing for first substance, right? Yeah. So you're not saying, you know, individua first substance, right? That'd be redundant. Okay.

[43:24] That's text we've seen already. Now, another little thing here in the Summa Theologiae although universal and particular are found in all genera, because we had universal and particular, what? Accident, right? Nevertheless, in a special way, individual is found in the genus of substance, right? For substance is individuated by itself, but accidents individuated by their subject, which is substance.

[44:02] For it is said to be this whiteness, in so far as it's in this subject, right? Well, just take a typical example. Let's take two rubber balls that are exactly the same size. Just make it simple, right?

[44:16] This rubber is not that rubber, right? That's more more in the genus of substance, right? But this sphere is not this sphere because what? This sphere is in this rubber, and that sphere is in that rubber, which is a different what? Substance, right? So the individuals in the genus of substance are distinct one from another. Per se, you might say, right? By accidents or what? Yeah. If you and I know the same theorem in geometry and no complete, you know, so on.

[44:50] Why is your knowledge of that theorem and my knowledge distinct individual knowledges of that theorem? Well, it's because it's in my mind, right? And so it's in your mind. Why is your mind different than my mind? Well, because in you the substance, right? In my mind is in my substance, right?

[45:15] So individual is, you know, more per se or originally in substance than in what any other genus, right? And that's why we have these special names like hypostases and first substances, right?

[45:35] Those are kind of subtle things, um. Now, this text from the De Potentia, right? Again, it's a text which is pointing out that it's not a division of a genus into species, the distinction of first and second substance, right? But it's more what a division of an analogy than of a genus, right? Okay. Now there it seems like it's proportion, isn't it? In the sense of ratio, right?

[46:15] Because Aristotle speaks of the second substance as a species or genus of first substance, right? So it's looking back to first substance, right? But it's ratio to that. It's the species or the genus of a first substance.

[46:34] So first substance is primarily substance, most of all substance, substance, anything else, right? Why are you calling the species a genus? Well, because it's sort of that, right? It's species of this or it's the genus of this, right? And more the species than the genus, right? For the reasons we gave, right? Now,

[47:09] the next text from De Potentia is one that De Potentia gets into the question of the Trinity, too. You know, that's the most powerful disputed question of Thomas Aquinas.

[47:21] Remember when I was teaching out in California? You know, the some some philosophy department there at one of the University of California wanted us to come over and put on one of these medieval debates. You know, so they could get us. We turned them down. We're going to. That De Potentia would have lost them, I'm sure. Yeah.

[47:51] This is subtle things, here, right, huh? I wanted to say that the human nature in Christ is an hypostasis, but not a person. Again, all those very subtle things.

[48:05] That's where he explains that substance is not placed in the definition of person, for hypostasis, but for that which is common to first substance and what second substance. This is just making use of the distinction of substances, of the meanings of substance, right?

[48:28] Okay, we've seen that already in other texts. Okay, the next text addresses the distinction between substance and the way the wise man talks about it, where he rejects Plato's ideas of the what? What the heck is Socrates doing, right? He's defining something that is what universal. See, Socrates is the first guy to really try to define things, you know, among the philosophers.

[49:00] And what was he defining? Well, he wasn't defining a singular, was he? He wasn't defining Xanthippe his wife or his teacher or whoever it was, right? Okay, or Solon or anybody else, right? He was defining what man, and defining something universal. This is what is going on, right? Where is this universals being defined? Yeah, and this is kind of key to to real vigorous knowledge to be able to define things, right?

[49:40] To begin to see that definition was the key to this, huh? But what are you defining? Must be a universal there in separation from singulars out in the what world, yeah? Makes sense, doesn't it? A little bit. Some. Yeah. Aristotle gets suspicious of this, right?

[50:11] But if the universal existed outside of our mind in separation from singulars, it would be what something very substantial, wouldn't it? And then individual men, kind of in some way or other, partake of this, right? Plato couldn't quite explain how this was so, but anyway.

[50:34] So from the point of view of wisdom, the universal is not a what substance, right, in the real world, huh? We get the logician who likes to talk about the way something is said of something. He sees that the species and the genus is said of individual substance as well, kind of secondary way their substance, right?

[50:58] And species more than genus, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? So he says in the third paragraph there. It should be said that according to a logical consideration, the philosopher speaks in the praedicamentis of the categories, huh? For the logician considers things according as they are in what reason, right? And therefore he considers substances in so far as by the taking of reason they are under the intention of universality, right?

[51:39] And therefore, as regards predication, or to speak English, being said of, right, huh? Which is an act of reason is said to be what predicated of the subject, that is of a substance subsisting outside the soul. But the first philosopher he considers things according as they are beings, right, huh? And therefore, for him, to even be said of a subject is to not be a substance, right?

[52:07] Okay. Not only to what be in a subject like an accident, huh? Okay, that's a very subtle text. Don't worry too much about it. Okay.

[52:48] I guess that's enough to torture you on substance, huh? You've been tortured enough, right? You you confess to your crimes and so on. Torture you longer. So the text of the on the quantity, we can start next time, right?