Logic (2016)
13. Quantity by Its Parts and Measures: Two Definitions of the Continuous, Logician versus Wise Man, and Music versus Painting
Class of 2016-12-01
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/2-logic-2016/013-quantity-by-its-parts-and-measures-two-definitions-of-the/

[0:00] What is text in the metaphysics here? This is for the bonitatem doctrinae, right? Now, two guys are going to be super, super wise, right? When you get down here. First, he lays down the ratio of quantity, saying that quantum is said—that's a concrete thing. What is divisible in those things which are in it, right? Which he says to the difference of mixed things, right? Because they found in a mixed body, right?

[0:29] Things are existing what the elements only in ability, right? Which are not in act in the mixed, but in virtue of what only. That's in modern science there, you know, when they get down to the

[0:48] elementary particles, and sometimes they bombard them, right? See what happens? Got a bit of do, and you get some particles as a result of that, right? Now, were they actually in there composing that thing before you broke it up, right?

[1:14] Well, you might say that when you got hydrogen and oxygen, right, from water, hydrogen and oxygen seem to be smaller than water, right? So maybe the water was composed of hydrogen and oxygen, right? What they found in these experiments was that sometimes the particles you got had more mass than original than original. So how can that original particle have been actually composed of ones that have what more mass?

[1:41] Yeah, they must have been there only in what? Yeah, yeah. I I chose that conversation now that my friend Warren Murray had with Heisenberg, right? And Warren could speak German now, so I thought Heisenberg could speak English too. He didn't actually English, but he went to Scotland. But Warren said, "Are you a Platonist or Aristotelian?" And he's trying to force Heisenberg to say he's more Platonist because Plato was more into the mathematical science of nature, right?

[2:14] And he had admitted that way he was more Platonist, right? But he had this great respect for Aristotle, his understanding of ability, right, potency, right. And so if you look at his Gifford lectures, right, they put out the title Physics and Philosophy. and it was the Gifford lectures that he gave in Scotland, right? And see how much he admires Aristotle there, you know.

[2:37] And now Warren would refer to some fragment in the Greek philosophers, and Heisenberg says, "Oh yeah," and he'd give it to him in Greek. So he's no dummy, Heisenberg, you know. He's an educated man, really.

[2:56] Okay. You see, you think that if you if you get some particles by what shooting something against this one, right? They must have been composing it, right? But if they actually turn out to have more mass than original ones. Then you kind of you kind of have to go to the idea of ability, right? Huh? And that says they're actually in there, right? Huh? But in quantity, right?

[3:28] In parts of the pie that we'll be eating later, we're actually in some way in the pie, right? Huh? Okay. And you've got to be careful with those West point guys, right? That you divide the pie evenly, right? Huh? You guys.

[3:46] Yeah, that'd be easy to do. Yeah, because then you just steal. No, in geometry, you know, they they what? You divide a straight line into equal parts, right? Huh? Or you divide an angle into two equal parts, right? Huh? You bisect a line, you bisect a thing, and they seem to have been in there already, right? Huh? But not separated fully and act.

[4:17] But in the mixed body, would it be like those things that I was talking about to Thesenberg there? It was not only a division of quantity, right? But necessary that there be some what alteration, right? Huh? To which the the mixed was resolved, right? Into elements. And then he adds again, right? That each one, or each one of them, is apt to be what?

[4:48] Something one. Yeah. On the Greek there, that's to the t, to the t. But in Latin, it's hoc aliquid right? huh Hoc est aliquid demonstratum, right?

[5:04] And Aristotle says many times in the famous article, what is the soul of man? It's a hoc aliquid, right? Because usually a hoc aliquid, in the full sense has got a complete substance, right? Huh? But because our soul can exist by itself apart from the body, right? Is something of the character of a hoc aliquid, huh? It would be hard to demonstrate it. huh? To point it out.

[5:32] And this he says to be moving the division into essential parts, which are what matter and form. Neither which is apt to be something one by itself. Huh? But even with the accidental form, right? You take the Pietas of Michelangelo there. It's in the Vatican. You seen that? Huh? Can you take? It's it's composed of what marble and and shape, right? Now can you put the marble over here and the shape over here?

[6:08] Is a division of the pietas into its matter, which is marble, and its shape, which. Gets all the credit. You divide into two, and that's the matter, and that's the shape. No, it's a different kind of division, right? Huh? Say, okay.

[6:37] Secondly, he lays down the species of quantity, among which, first, there are two: multitude or what? Multitude Sometimes they define a number as a multitude measured by one, right? Sometimes they define it as a multitude composed of ones, right?

[7:04] And both of them have the notion of quantity in so far as what? The one is able to be numbered, and the other is able to be what? Measured, right? Okay. For measurement, properly pertains to quantity, right? That's what I was saying about the question: how much or how many, right? How much, how many? It implies not only a multiplicity of parts, but what? Measurement, some way, right?

[7:40] You don't see the word quantity, do you? That there's a multiplication of parts. So as my teacher Casaruk writes and banging into my head, the fact that Aristotle uses these concrete things, huh? You know what he's doing, that guy Aristotle, right? Okay. I was talking to Warren Murray, who's very good in languages, you know, and I was saying, you know, we don't have one word for how much and how many, right?

[8:06] Like the Greek, there is one word, posas, right? And but apparently, some languages do, and Warren says combien, in French, I guess, can be used for for both, right? And there was one in Greek that we used for both, right? Give me some other examples, you know, this knowledge of languages, you know, he gets all this knowledge, but. And

[8:32] but I was thinking in English myself. The word size, right? It's not the which is not a noun now, but I mean, could use size for either discrete or continuous in some cases. My

[8:49] dad was coming with the whole family, and the size of his family. This is a magnitude. That's what the multiplicity. But you speak of, you know, when we have the march in life there in Rome. I mean, in Washington D. C., the size of the march, the size of the crowd, and something, you know, the size of. Trump's crowds, you know, he's going back. You heard about Indiana?

[9:18] He's going there. He's going on a triumphal tear to think all was all was voted for him. Yeah, he's going to Indiana because he stopped this one company from going to Mexico. Yeah, sorry. Oh, and there is. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And I had people, you know, who were very happy, though. Many working there, you know. I worked there for twenty-four years, you know, and it's about to lose his job, you know.

[9:40] So he's very happy, you know. Like I said, I I wasn't too excited about Trump. I'm going to shake his hand when he comes. You be feeling these working men, you know. It's going to

[9:59] lower the tax companies. Yeah, you know, expansion. So the stock market going up, you know, since. He settled down there. Okay. Was the stock market supposed to pretty much crash and lose all? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But the first day, some hesitation, you know, because of the excitement of it you know I didn't know what to expect you know. And then as he started. you know something he was going to do.

[10:25] um uh just start going up, you know, Up at the high guys, probably point. Okay. Okay. You can see the closeness here of quantity to what substance, right? Huh? That's div divisible, right? Quantitatively, to things that can be separated, what substances, right? Of course, you get some of the lower kinds of life. You can, you know, divide into worms, and both parts seem to move around, right?

[11:24] That they're alive, right? And some plants can be divided, right? Maybe divide you, me up, you know, we will make up a number of substances, right? That would be a lot of liquid, huh? Okay, but Aristotle does what in the chapter there, right? He divides them first by what? Continuous, right? As parts that meet a common boundary, and then parts that do not meet a common boundary, right?

[12:24] Now, sometimes you point out that in natural philosophy, there's another definition of the continuous. Can be divided forever. Yeah. Yeah. And then, is this true about discrete quantity? Can seven be divided forever? No, I can divide it two and five, or three and four, and divide three into two and one. But how can you divide one? No. Sometimes modern math gets you all mixed up on that, right?

[12:59] But the the one that composes a number, it's simpler than what a point, because a point is indivisible, like one, but it has what at least position. But the one in number, it's what indivisible, but it has no what. No position. No position. Yeah.

[13:24] Sometimes the Platonists would say a point is one position. Yeah, yeah. Is there such a thing as two and a half points? No. So a number, continuous quantity, is not divisible forever, right? But why are there these two definitions of the continuous: that whose parts meet at a common boundary, which is the definition of continuous quantity in the categories, and then the definition in natural philosophy, that which is divisible what forever.

[14:06] The natural philosophy definition seemed to deal with matter more. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That whole is to parts something like form is to what matter, right?

[14:21] What's the definition of matter as a cause? Well, it's that from which right something comes to be existing in it, right? So the wood is the matter of the table, it seems to me, right? The wood, the table comes from wood, and the wood it comes from is in it, right? Okay.

[14:51] And parts seem to be in a composed whole anyway. The composed whole comes to be from its parts, and they are what in it, yeah, yeah. So parts seem to be like matter, right? And the whole like what form, yeah. Makes sense, right? Yeah.

[15:17] Now, why is it more appropriate, which is being defined by whole? Well, in the logic, right, it's parts meet at a common boundary, and then they form the whole, right? So it's kind of defining more in terms of its holeness, right? Why in natural philosophy it's divisible what forever? You're going to parts of parts of parts of parts, right? So a straight line can be what bisected, and the two lines resulting that can be bisected, and this can go on forever, right?

[15:51] Okay. How do you know that straight line can be divided forever? Because you can't cut it so small there's nothing left. Well, notice, huh?

[16:12] So long as you get two lines when dividing a line, right? It can be divided again, right? Because a line can always be divided, huh? The only way that a division, right,

[16:30] could what come to a halt, is if you divided a line into two points. The point has no length, and you can't divide a point into something what smaller, right? Okay.

[16:49] So the only way the division of a line could come to a stop is if a line were composed of what two points, right? And then Aristotle argues that if you're making a line out of points, the points would have to touch.

[17:12] And if they touch, does a part of one touch part of the other? Well no, point has no parts, right? Does the edge of one touch the edge of the other? No, then the point would be a little circle or something, right, and not a point. So the only way the two points can touch is to coincide. In which case they have no more length. Two points touching, then what?

[17:40] One point. There's no length. Which is not a line. Which is not a line, yeah. So when you divide a line, mathematically anyway, you must always get two smaller what lines. And therefore, as long as you have a line, you can always divide it again.

[18:02] Case rests, right? Yeah. But natural philosophy differs from the other sciences because it brings in matter, right, in its definitions, huh? So it's more appropriate for natural philosophy to bring out that what definition.

[18:30] Natural philosophy, of course, talks about motion, right, and time, and they'll be also divisible forever, right? Aristotle is a nice way of showing that length and time are divisible forever. He shows it what both together, right? All you have to admit is that one body is faster than another body. So the faster body covers a certain distance, right, in a certain time, right, and in that same time, the slower body covers a what?

[19:06] Yeah, so now that you divide the distance, now the faster body would cover that lesser distance in less time than than you divide the time. Just alternate, right, huh? Say whatever time it took the slower body to go, the faster body would do it in less time. Whatever distance, what faster body went, the lesser body would do it in. We would do a lesser distance, right? So they wouldn't be both divisible, what forever, right?

[19:40] This is very appropriate for the natural philosopher to talk about, what the division of continuous, right, into its parts. So the kind of basic reason they give is is that it's like dividing it into its matter, right? And matter is what the natural philosopher has that the other sciences don't have, right? Huh?

[20:07] So Heisenberg is an actual scientist, right? Okay. By the logician is talking about what? Form, definition, right? Yeah. So it's more appropriate for him to define it in terms of its wholeness. All the parts come together, right? To form the whole, right? It's very subtle, Aristotle.

[20:41] Kind of amazing that the natural philosopher and the logician both have a definition of the continuous, right? It's not the same definition, right? It's amazing. Amazing. I suppose there's some connection between the two definitions, right? Because the parts always have a common bone. You can always divide at the boundary right? Yeah. But it's interesting. He does that. Very subtle.

[21:22] Okay. So that's in this texture. You can read it for yourself, but what we're saying about the difference in the two definitions, right? Okay.

[21:55] Okay. There's a little thing about part there, you know. When you read Euclid, huh? He'll say that two is a part of what six, right? But four is not a part of six. He's using part in what sense? Measure. Yeah, yeah, yeah. To measure six by three twos, right? But you can't measure six by four and see how many it is, right? That kind of Aristotle mentioned that use of the word part, right?

[22:30] In his time, even, you know. And you find that Euclid, huh? But that's not so much important for us right now. Okay. This is text in Latin. Then now, which is about the difference between those two.

[22:54] Notice what Thomas says there in page four there in the Latin text there, where we talked about the two definitions we've talked about here.

[23:04] At. The top of page four there, the second paragraph there. Et satis, convenienter hic definitio ponitur here. Aliam autem in what the categories in predicamentis. Quia consideratio naturalis versatur circa materiam right? Consideration, of the logician, is about the ratio of the species.

[23:34] We talked about species even in the Isagoge, right? Okay. This next text is a one that's very important. We see the difference between the logician and the what? Wise man, right?

[24:07] Remember that problem we had about substance, huh? Aristotle in the Categories here, he speaks of first substance and second substance. What would the wise men say about that?

[24:25] That's just in your mind, Aristotle. Does that really distinction of substances in the real world? No. It's animal, really a different substance. That's what a dog is—an animal, right? Yeah.

[24:53] But the logician is concerned with things as they are in our what? Our reason, yeah, in our mind, our knowledge, right? And we have not only Socrates, but even more so in reason, you have the universal. My teacher, Albert the Great, huh? Said the first thing to consider in logic is universal. Well, Aristotle will point out that it's not substance as much as what Socrates or Plato or you, but it signifies what Socrates is or what

[25:33] is and so on, dog and so on. So it's substance in some sense, right? But that's kind of way substances in our mind, right? Yeah.

[25:44] There's not only Socrates in your mind, but even more so in a sense, what Socrates, the species he belongs to, and the genus he belongs to, and so on, right? Okay. So very subtle distinctions here.

[26:30] Now, what does Thomas point out in this text here from the fifth book of metaphysics? Here, that we're going to talk about. Let's do here on page four.

[26:53] Beginning of it, huh? It should be known, huh? Sciendum that the philosopher in the predicaments, right, lays down that time is a quantity per se, right? When here he lays down that it's a quantity, what? per accidens. Because there he distinguishes the species of quantity according to diverse what?

[27:21] Measure diversity Measure, yeah. Another ratio of measure has time, which is an extrinsic measure, and magnitude, which is a what intrinsic measure. And therefore, they are laid down there as other species of quantity, right, huh? But here he considered species of quantity as regards the very being of what quantity, the wise man, right, huh? Okay.

[27:52] And therefore, those things do not have the being of quantity except from another. He does not lay down here a species of quantity, but quantities per per accidens, right? As motion and what? Time. For motion does not have a what?

[28:12] Then time and magnitude, and therefore neither here nor there is it what laid down to be a species of what quantity, huh? Place, however, is laid down there as a species of quantity, but not here, because it has a different ratio of measure, but not another one of what quantity? What the hell does that mean, huh? Well, what is place? We studied it in natural philosophy, you know.

[28:47] We hadn't done that, did we? But Aristotle defined it in terms of the what inner surface, right, of the containing body, right, huh? So if you have a bottle of wine, right, huh? The wine is contained in the inner surface of the what bottle, right, huh? Okay. And the inner surface of the of the what bottle is different from what the surface of the wine, right? Okay.

[29:19] But as to the kind of quantity it is, it's going to be really the same kind, huh? It's both what? They're both the surface, right? Okay, okay. But don't we, in a sense, make a separate measure of the two, huh? And I say, what do you say it means? Well, if you set up a house, you know, sometimes, and you've got a a wall there, right? And we say, well, we need a little more furniture in this house.

[29:53] Okay, well, let's go look at sofas. Okay. And what would you measure? I want the sofa to fit the the wall, right? So I measure the the length of the wall, right? And I go down and measure the sofa, right? Bring my little thing with me, huh? So it's different measurements, aren't they?

[30:20] So there's some difference in in the Measure isn't it? But they're really the same kind of quantity, right? The length of the wall and the length of the what? Yeah, yeah. But you kind of different measurements you make of each, right?

[30:40] Strange thing, huh? Strange thing. So the wise man is a little more picky about these things, right? He's interested in the being of the thing, right?

[31:00] When I buy a bottle of wine, sometimes I buy a one and a half liter, and sometimes a three quarter liter, right? You know, and one contains more wine than the other, so you expect to pay more for the one and a half liter, right? And then it's like a double of what the other one is, right? You got to know those things, right? But place is kind of like an extrinsic measurement of the thing.

[31:28] I don't go and measure the surface of the wine. Just external. Now those things are kind of subtle, you know, beyond what he's doing in the chapter on quantity. It's kind of for the goodness of the doctrine if we do this

[31:44] Okay. Now notice on page five there in the English. Now in this text, we should also note Thomas's statement that Aristotle in the Categories distinguishes the species of quantity according to diverse ratios of measure. Notions of measure. Hence, when Aristotle wants to show that logos or speech is a quantity, which is not as evidently so as number, he points out that it is measured by the long and the short syllable, right?

[32:18] And page five there. Okay. So it's not measured by the same thing, is it? That in the number, right? The number is measured by what? By one, right? And in Greek poetry and Latin, I guess it goes by the long and the short what? Syllable, right? So in in English, though poetry, it's the accented and the unaccented what? Syllable, right? Okay.

[32:59] Thomas's prayer there with communion there seems to be going like what? Visus tactus gustus in te fallitur. Visus, huh? Isn't the first syllable longer than the second one? Visus tactus gustus. Yeah. In te fallitur right? He tend to what? Not complete the last foot, right? In those one song, so you you you they use a turn in the clinic. They caught he cut off the last the last syllable, right?

[33:36] Because you want to end on an accent or something or on a longer one. But visus tactus gustus in te fallitur See, you measure by the long and the short syllable. That's not the way you measure a number, do you? See, so it's a different ratio of measure, right? But if you want to measure this room, would you measure it in inches? How many inches is this room?

[34:07] You measure it by what? Square inches, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. If you're talking about a container like the the wine bottle, like that, and you talk about or a cube, you know, that kind of thing, you talk about what?

[34:22] Cubic inches or cubic feet or something, right? Yeah. And come on these big, you know, water things, you know, how many? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[34:35] You can't. You don't measure a line in square inches. You see, it's not the same ratio of measure, right? It's interesting because I just bought some stuff to paint on the surface. It's interesting because they measure the container as a quart, then you say, "Well, how much can I paint?" But they measure it in square feet. Yeah. This this will cover about 150 square feet. Yeah, yeah,

[35:06] yeah. Now notice I say in the second paragraph. This is proper to logic because a measure is that by which the quantity or size of something is made known to reason, right? That's the definition of measure, right? That by which quantity is made known, the first sense of of measure, right? Then later on we apply it, you know. Virtuous man is a measure of all. And logic considers things in so far as they are what?

[35:39] In reason. Okay. Some Latin dictionaries give the word size as equivalent of measure. Hence, just as addition considers the species or the genus of a first substance to be substance, calling it second substance. But the wise man who considers things as being does not. So likewise, he considers what have a different measure to be different species of quantity, which the wise man does not when their being is not different.

[36:10] Well, notice how we said that the definition of the continuous in natural philosophy and the one in logic are not the same, right? And now we're talking about some things being quantities, right? In logic, but not in what? Wisdom, right? Or being substances, but not in what? For the wise man, right? There's no such thing as, you know. Man is separate from what? Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, only your mind, Aristotle.

[36:42] Okay. But because your mind, what, separates out what's common to those three, right? That each of them is a man, right? That's a substance in some way, right? So in logic, we'll call that a substance, but second substance, right? Wisdom, yeah. Not such thing unless you're a Platonist. You think that man himself exists in a world of forms or something, you know?

[37:15] You get through with Aristotle taking care of Plato there, you know, then you can take care of Hegel, right? Now, because Hegel tries to generate the whole universe from the notion of being, right? And one thing produces its opposite, you know, and then you get the synthesis, opposite, and so on. And so it's kind of trying to generate the whole universe from the most what vague notion of your mind.

[37:44] Not very, not very impressive, you know. But Hegel's better on isn't he? When he gets down into talking about what the fine arts and so on is kind of interesting there, right?

[38:00] He's targeting some of my colleagues there, you know. And Hegel put music before what painting is more, is a greater art. And so I have some colleagues, you know, who were trying to say the painting is better, right? Now, because painting's all there, you hear the music, isn't all there, right?

[38:27] But you know, Aristotle in the politics say there, and he talks about what music you should listen to, right, and what paintings you should look at, right. He's very brief as to paintings, right, but he's really very insistent upon what music, right.

[38:44] But which is more beautiful, music or the best music or the best paintings? Both beautiful, right? But which is more beautiful? I'll give you guys an argument for you guys.

[39:02] I get Thomas Thomas to show that Thomas thinks there'll be music in heaven, properly speaking. Think we're going with paintings? We'll have the vision. He said, "I did a painting. Vision.

[39:15] What? " Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. In terms, you know, in the bodies of the saints, they'll be beautiful, right? Huh? You know. You need a painting for? them. You got the Virgin walking around, or our Lord walking around, or the saints, right? Huh? You know. Can you imagine seeing Thomas up there? You know.

[39:41] The host of scribes following. This story get this story get me wrong, Wayne. I didn't mean that. In the magisterium, when it talks about the arts that serve the liturgy, I think it puts music in first place. Yeah, yeah. Music is the most important art. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Sight is the primary sense. It's interesting how it's the most important sense. You could say the most. Yeah. Useful for for men.

[40:18] Sing joyfully to the Lord all your lands. Serve the Lord with gladness. Come before him with joyful. Song. Know that the Lord is God. He made us as we are, his people the flock attends. That's the division of the Summa Contra Gentiles. right. But but it's put in the put the song right now. Um. The I guess the word uh, psalms has to have with music too, right?

[40:42] Very much so. the psalms. There's a musical instrument with it, right? In fact Even Shakespeare's sonnets, are taken for music, right, Sonnet Warren Murray and I we agree that Mozart's music is even more beautiful than Shakespeare's words.

[41:13] Is there a reason why, if vision is is our sense we rely on most of all, why what we sense through hearing would be the more important, more beautiful music? For example, Trump's

[41:37] stimuli. Trump's paintings. Yeah. Yeah. Is there a particular reason why it seems like there's a sort of a reverse of order almost? Yeah. Yes. Yeah. I mean, the eye seems more important in knowing, right? Huh. You know. But we

[42:02] can argue about that maybe, but but. I mean, what you see is the connection between music and the emotions, and therefore between music and what the virtues, right? Huh. It's more relevant that way, right? Book of the ethics. Does he talk about music? Well, he talks about music in education there in the city, right? In the eighth book of the politics, huh? The eighth book. Yeah. Politics.

[42:43] Politics. Yeah. Yeah. Not the ethics. No. He sees that. Plato speaks of the importance of music too, right? It strikes me that historically, he mentioned before about Boswell. Yeah. Go listen to Handel or whatever. They, it seems to me that you know we have the opportunity with all these electronic gadgets. Yeah. We can listen to a piece over and over. Yeah. Yeah. They can only go once in a while, so they must have much more powerful retention in their memory.

[43:20] Yeah. To appreciate something much. I say much sooner, they heard better. Yeah. than we hear it. We hear it many, many times. Yeah, yeah. We can't appreciate. Well, you know, some of the performances Mozart, you know, where the audience, you know, they had to have the second movement, you know, the twenty-second piano concerto repeated, you know, they wanted to hear it again, right? I mean, the concert itself.

[43:42] I mean, they would demand that, you know. I don't know how often that was done, but. play the same symphony for a week every night See what I guess Mozart would you know at the end of the concert he'd sit down in the piano there and he'd improvise you know the melodies right now and they like these more than concerts you know that's what's going to be next you know and now

[44:06] myself as as I was a little boy there I used to like to find marches on the thing you know and I still like marches you know and you know people would go down to West Point you know sometimes and it was a game down there you know and but they'd they'd go you know they'd watch them the march everybody coming out yeah yeah but

[44:32] you're representing in the march there what the virtue of what courage right now see and can in a painting can you represent courage as as well as the march does to get the essence of courage yeah I used to play marches for my my my son Marcus he's a little boy you know and and

[44:54] it's just for heroes right and one day said I want to be a hero too maybe being inspired by but by by these marches right you see in a way you know you can have a battle scene and a thing that's going to inspire courage in the way that the march does

[45:17] Maybe it's more important to us by by way of the emotions Yeah yeah Aristotle is talking about the music that's going to move the emotions in a way that's in harmony with reason right now I know when I was getting very interested in classical music there and Kasurik asked me you know do you find it helps you to to control your emotions more you know Because he wanted to see what the effect is on you.

[45:43] But uh this rock and roll stuff is really crazy you know when it's first coming out and and some place there down east there where they're picking up these you know these chairs that they're closing them up and

[46:05] guys right on those you know those, those chairs that fall flying through the air you know But it was the effect of this, of this crazy but music you know.

[46:18] You go to these mixers, they used to have a song, you know, that, uh, I remember the words of the song. Something about I'm going to make a monkey out of you, you know. You know what I mean? This is music doesn't make you, you know, make you kind of you know bestial, you know, it's the wrong kind of music, right? But the good kind of music, you know, elevates.

[46:35] huh? So one uh, enforces or inspires the virtue of temperance, the other one. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. If you read the words of my friend Washington Irving there, he's talking about the the organ there at the Westminster Abbey, you know, and really how it elevates you, you know.

[46:57] And uh, of course, you don't often you know play the best music in church, you know, but but it's really uh, get a good uh, Palestrina or something, you know, it really elevates the soul, right? In a way that a painting can't quite do, you know.

[47:17] Easy. I think I mentioned how Mozart's last symphonies there, you know, he's representing magnanimity, right? in? The thirty-sixth symphony and in the Jupiter symphony, right? They're both in C major, right? That's the key of magnanimity. But then in in the in the fortyth symphony and the thirty-eighth symphony, he's he's imitating what courage, right? But there's two acts of courage. One is to approach the the the difficult, the threatening thing, and the other is to is is that of patience, right?

[47:59] And the fortyth is more that, and the thirty-eighth is more. I tell people, you know, I mean, Beethoven is feeble compared to Mozart. Doesn't the thirty-eighth symphony, you know? I told you what Einstein said about Mozart and Beethoven, didn't I? He says he said Beethoven made his music right. Mozart found it. Mozart's music always seems to have been a part of the universe. Kind of a very good couplet, right?

[48:33] And I always compare it to my brother Mark, you know, saying, "Can you imagine fiction without Romeo and Juliet? This had to be a part of it, right? You couldn't have fiction without, you know. I mean, it just seemed like a natural part of the world of fiction, right?

[48:50] That's the way Einstein was saying, right? Mozart's music, huh? He described Einstein, you know, when he'd hear somebody playing a little bit of Mozart, you know, he'd drop whatever he's doing, run, I guess when he'd give a public lecture, you know, and you get these stupid questions afterwards, you know, Well how do you feel about all this? And you know, even already took out his violin. Heisenberg is a great pianist, you know, and so he got his wife.

[49:30] She admires his piano playing, you know. Don't think physics would have the same effect upon a woman. She admires equations as much Okay what time do you have to stop?

[49:50] Okay. Okay. Now, um, we always talk about order, don't we? Huh? About the middle of page five there, and the reason why Aristotle puts number in discrete quantity before continuous quantity is connected with this: that we distinguish these by the species of what, or the ratio of measure, right? For measure is found first, or more perfectly, in number, since the one is simpler. And absolute and indivisible, right?

[50:26] Well What do you use to measure length? You know, well, foot, ooh the king's foot, or the new king now? What are you doing? But I mean, it's not exact, right? You know, they say that the the the meter there, which was used, you know, for centuries, is really what a bar in Paris, right? That's this that's this that's a measure. Well, a a metal meter is what can contract to expand under heat and so on.

[51:00] Not for exact, what? Temperature control, so it's. Oh yeah, yeah, they got to do a lot of things to prop it up, right? We don't have to worry about the one in number, right? You know, contracting or you know. Yeah, That's very very accurate, right? I was going to say, even the king's foot, you know, when he got older, it got bigger. Yeah. Yeah.

[51:26] Okay. That's interesting that Aristotle has that order, right? He puts the discrete before the continuous, even though in the definition, you might say, in the definition, the continuous has got a definition that's affirmative, you might say, right? And the other one that is what? Negative. Yeah. Strange, isn't it? What does he care what Aristotle writes? You know, why does he do that? Well, I mean, it's because he's distinguishing these by the what ratio of measure, right?

[52:00] That's being used, and the measure is more accurate here than than there. Curious, huh? Curious. Okay, mention in parentheses there. We'll see that when we get to quality. This is also the reason why habit or disposition is given as the first species of quality. Well, habit or disposition seems to be less fundamental than natural ability, right? But, what's the reason they give here, right? For by habit one is well or ill disposed towards one's nature, that comes first.

[52:51] There's a special reason why it's given that first. A number can be measured by the indivisible one, but a line cannot be measured by the indivisible point. You

[53:04] got to get some screwy link there, right? To make that. And and what what I mean, what would be the the length to measure by is kind of arbitrary, isn't it? You know, by number, it's quite clear the one. Can I measure every number? No, prime numbers can measure other numbers too, but not all numbers can be measured by a prime number, right? But it can all be measured by one, and that's very exact.

[53:33] That's striking because the difference is, you know, why is why is continuous quantity defined affirmatively and the other negatively? Because affirmation comes before negation, right? You have to know what you're negating before you can understand the negation, right? And he puts, you know, because of this reason of measurement, maybe, maybe reverse order. But but why is the continuous more known and seen? You know.

[54:10] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Numbers are kind of a kind of an immaterial thing, right? I was talking to these students here about the soul there, and I was, I was, attacking MacIntyre as I mentioned earlier, because he was confusing the etymology with the meaning, right, of the word philosophy. So I was saying, what is the the origin of the word soul, right? I mean, the word psyche in Greek, right?

[54:37] Breath, yeah, yeah, idea of breath, wind, and why should the name breath? That's not the meaning of the word soul. But why was was the etymology, right? But why was what is the connection between breath and the soul? I suppose our experiences of living things breathe Yeah, that's part of it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you even call the angels the spirit, right? The same, you know, idea of breath or wind, right?

[55:08] Well, it's because air seems to be, it's a substance that's invisible. That's one reason they give, and the other is it's a substance doesn't seem to have much matter.

[55:22] Yeah, yeah. I make ice cubes out of water every day, or not every day, but quite often. But and we make things out of wood and so on, right? What do you make out of air? It doesn't seem to be really a material thing, almost, right? So it it seems to be it's invisible and seems to have less of matter than water does, and water less than than wood, you know, something like that, huh?

[55:59] So we we borrowed that word, right? Even though it's not a material substance, it's not really air, the soul. Kind of curious. So, but is continuous quantity more known in some way to us? Seems to me because. Affirmative before the negative, right? Now, there's some of the definition even in natural philosophy. You'd say that a discrete quantity is divisible forever.

[56:32] No, no. And Aristotle, in when he talks about thought, he says thoughts are like what numbers more, right? Because is a is a definition. You know, we defined reason with with with, following Shakespeare, we had to define what discourse is, right? And we had to, you know, define in sense what before and after is, or what the words meant and so on. But is every part of every definition in need of being defined?

[57:06] Because in that case, definitions would be divisible what forever, right? And likewise, you know, the conclusion of a syllogism we get it from two other statements, right? So you can kind of divide it into these statements that are relied on. But is every statement in need of proof by other statements?

[57:30] In that case, you wouldn't be able to know any statement, would you? So definitions and statements are divisible, not forever. So far, yeah. So Aristotle compares thoughts and more to numbers, right? He compares in the

[57:58] eighth book of wisdom. He compares forms to numbers, right? Not to continuous things, right? Suppose in evolution, someone compared to some continuous, right? That's what they're doing with this transgender nonsense. Yeah, yeah. Because you know these things are infinitely divisible, right? Like continuous quantity. You ready now? Yeah,

[58:23] yeah. But is is the natures of things more like numbers than like lines? What do you think? Numbers. More like numbers. Okay. Moreover, the property peculiar to quantity to be equal or unequal that we'll meet with when we get to the properties, supposes something that has been measured, right? And by quantities that have a common measure, hence a line and a surface cannot be what?

[59:31] Could you speak of a line and a surface being equal or unequal? And can can time and and length be equal or unequal? I used to say Quebec is eight hours away, and my hometown of Saint Paul is twenty-four hours away from where I am now.

[1:00:11] Twenty-four hours a lot more longer length, right? That's kind of playing around a little bit, huh? What's How long it take me to get there, right? We got to Saint Paul, we're going to do it in.